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# A Synthetic Analysis of the Polish Solidarity Movement

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**A SYNTHETIC ANALYSIS OF THE POLISH SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT**

**A thesis submitted to  
the Graduate College of  
Marshall University**

**In partial fulfillment of  
the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts  
Sociology**

**by  
Stephen W. Mays**

**Approved by  
Dr. Richard Garnett, Committee Chairman  
Dr. Marty Laubach  
Dr. Brian Hoey**

**Marshall University  
Huntington, West Virginia  
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## Table Of Contents

	Page
<b>Acknowledgements</b> .....	<b>iii</b>
<b>Abstract</b> .....	<b>v</b>
<b>Chapter</b>	
<b>I. Introduction</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>II. Methodology</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>III. Historical Background</b> .....	<b>11</b>
<b>IV. Theoretical Background</b> .....	<b>52</b>
<b>V. Literature Review</b> .....	<b>78</b>
<b>VI. Elaboration On The Proposed Factors</b> .....	<b>87</b>
<b>VII. Conclusion</b> .....	<b>210</b>
<b>Sources</b> .....	<b>215</b>
<b>Appendix</b>	
<b>21 Demands Document</b> .....	<b>223</b>
<b>Consent Form (English)</b> .....	<b>225</b>
<b>Consent Form (Polish)</b> .....	<b>229</b>
<b>Questionnaire (English)</b> .....	<b>233</b>
<b>Questionnaire (Polish)</b> .....	<b>238</b>
<b>Photos: Ethnographic Fieldwork in Gdansk</b> .....	<b>242</b>

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Finally, I want to acknowledge and thank the people of Gdansk and members (current and former) of Solidarnosc who shared with me their life stories. As Marx said, "Men (and I'll add women too) make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please...but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past." Few people realize more vividly and more concretely the gravity of this saying than Poland's post WWII generation. As Marx "turned Hegel on his head," the Solidarity generation, "turned history on its head." This thesis tells a very small part of their story.

## Abstract

The aim of this study is to arrive at a holistic understanding of how and why the Polish Solidarity Movement succeeded, against great odds, within a regime hostile to its existence. From this movement emerged *Solidarnosc*, the first independent labor union in the Communist Bloc. *Solidarnosc* evolved into a political party that succeeded in replacing the Communist Party in Poland. Seven factors are elaborated on, each contended to have facilitated *Solidarnosc*'s success. Some factors occurred naturally (such as the structural conduciveness of Poland's industrially-based economy), some occurred fortunately (such as the political opportunity afforded by Mikhail Gorbachev's liberalizing policies), and some were deliberately constructed (such as use of samizdat communications in mobilizing the movement). This study is a synthesis of these various facilitating factors. Ethnographic description is also part of the explanation, as is inclusion of eclectic factors that do not "pigeon-hole" well into conventional social movement theory compartments.

## **Chapter One**

### **Introduction**

This study is a synthetic analysis of the Polish Revolution during the 1980s. The central problems to be addressed are explaining how the labor union, *Solidarnosc*, was able to initially emerge, survive illegally for seven years within a regime hostile to its existence, and eventually succeed in displacing the regime.

*Solidarnosc* was much more than a labor union. Some analysts, such as Kubik (1994: 2), taking a very holistic approach, consider it part of broader sociological construct known as, "the Solidarity culture." For the purposes of this paper, it will be considered in terms of how it functioned as a social movement organization and acted as a central hub for a broader, overall social movement. This movement's ultimate goals were the restructuring of the social and economic order of Poland through democratization and restoration of human rights. This goal was eventually achieved; a domino-like effect then began with Poland as its source, and within two years of its realization most of Eastern Europe was democratized and the Soviet Union ceased to exist. These rapid and monumental changes altered the course of world history by displacing the authoritarian control of the Soviet Union and a system of closed socialist economies with (generally) democratic governments and capitalist economies. This restructuring directly affected perhaps one-third of the world's population and contributed to the emergence of the current global capitalist system. Although many other factors and forces converged to create the conditions necessary for this gigantic socioeconomic shift, it can be argued that the persistent collective actions of *Solidarnosc* and the Polish Solidarity Movement were indispensable elements in the process.

Three major theoretical perspectives are generally used in explaining the workings of social movements: resource mobilization theory, political opportunity theory, and issue framing theory. A synthetic analysis combines elements of these three perspectives in an effort to explain the complexities of social movements in light of material/economic realities, political/historic factors, and ideological/cultural presentation and manipulation of issues.

However, this study, while considering the above mentioned perspectives, will also make reference to the older "collective behavior" perspective with emphasis on structural conduciveness and shared worldview. It will also consider the charismatic leadership of Lech Walesa as a facilitating factor, as well as the political opportunity afforded by the liberalizing effects of Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost. In researching the Solidarity Movement, it was concluded that limiting analysis of it to the three general bodies of social movement theory left out some very critical factors that facilitated its success. In reality, the theoretical perspectives overlap as do the explanations of them and the real-world historical events that they attempt to explain. In some cases the attempt may result more in description instead of explanation. However, the aim of this study is to arrive at a holistic understanding of how and why the Polish Solidarity Movement held together against great odds. Description, then, is part of the explanation, as is inclusion of eclectic factors that do not "pigeon-hole" well into conventional social movement theory compartments.

Within affluent liberal democracies, such as the U.S. or Western Europe, resource mobilization is often considered the prime factor in the success of social movements. Obviously, without the material resources of money, labor, and infrastructure and the means of communication and networking to organize and utilize these resources, social movements will fail; more likely, they will simply fail to emerge under such adverse conditions. However, the



Polish Solidarity Movement emerged within the unlikely conditions of an authoritarian political regime within a closed, faltering economy. Material resources were limited in the former Peoples' Republic of Poland, but more importantly, all means of communication - TV, radio, newspapers, all forms of journalism, mass mailings, and even public signs - were controlled by the Communist Party. All open dissent against the Party and its ideology was immediately suppressed, and the networking, organizing, and communications necessary for mobilization of labor and material resources was extremely hindered. Additionally, in the 1980s current personal technological conveniences such as cell phone networks, email through the World Wide Web, and computer printing, were not available. The lack of these technologies, and even a shortage of conventional pre-computer era printing and copying devices and basic telephone service, was an additional hindrance to networking and mobilizing.

Therefore, it is the contention of this paper that in the case of the Polish Solidarity Movement the use of conventional forms of resource mobilization as the prime social movement facilitator is not applicable; structural conditions were too adverse for the conventional movement strategies. Based on readings of historic accounts, news reports, and academic articles, and through data obtained by in-depth personal interviews with current and former members of Solidarnosc, this paper identifies seven factors by which the movement was facilitated in its emergence, maintained through its adversities, and brought to its success. In general, these factors enabled the activists of the Polish Solidarity Movement to overcome the extreme difficulties of organizing and mobilizing a social movement within an authoritarian regime by creation of a collective identity and sense of common purpose strong enough to overcome the hindrance of a highly constricted ability to network and to mobilize resources. Additionally, unconventional methods of resource mobilization were used in lieu of standard

procedures. As mentioned above, some of the factors do not fall neatly within the three basic categories of social movement theory, thus, the proposed explanations are not only synthetic but eclectic. However, based on the data obtained in this study, the author believes that these are the most substantial and salient factors best accounting for the success of the movement.

Most of these factors are not entirely original contributions to the study of the Polish Solidarity Movement, in that within the plethora of information and analysis available on this topic nearly every conceivable contributing factor has, in one form or another, been explored. Certain factors, such as the "*Gorbachev Effect*," for example, are so well documented that they have taken on 'patented' names. This study is a synthesis of existing data with the addition of new data obtained by several interviews and direct communications with individuals having first-hand knowledge concerning the Solidarity Movement. The synthesis is intended to elaborate on and clarify the seven chosen factors.

Some of these factors, such as the role of structural conduciveness as a facilitator to social solidarity, are not, as related to the Solidarity Movement in particular, directly documented (no specific discussion of this topic was found in the academic literature). This study uses secondary data and comparative analysis in attempt to validate this claim. Additionally, the notion of intentional construction of "*fraternal proletarian solidarity*," (an idea mentioned frequently in the memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, for example) and the ability of this idea to facilitate Solidarnosc is undocumented in this specific terminology. The Soviet Union intentionally cultivated social solidarity within its borders and within the Eastern Bloc nations (as theorized by Lynd [1945] and as described and elaborated on through personal interviews obtained for this paper). This paper contends that Solidarnosc became an alternative object of fraternal loyalty.

An attempt is made to validate the idea mainly through a synthesis of secondary data with personal accounts of individuals who lived in Poland prior to 1989.

As a comparative factor, in terms of the contentions made concerning social cohesion in industrial settings, several interviews were conducted with former U.S. industrial workers. The findings are compared in "factor 1" of chapter six.

As these findings (and all interview data in this paper) were very personal accounts obtained through informal, open-ended interviews, the structure of this paper often deliberately shifts from third-person form to first-person form when interview dialogue is presented. Occasionally, the first-person form is also used to emphasize important direct observations made during the course of this research project. This is intended for clarity (bypassing awkward circumlocution) as well as to humanize certain points.

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Below are listed the seven factors which will be elaborated on in chapter six of this paper:

***1) The emergence of the Polish labor union, Solidarnosc, was facilitated by the structural conduciveness of a society based on a heavy industrial economy.***

***2) Social solidarity within the movement was facilitated by the existing sociocultural construct of "fraternal proletarian solidarity," as cultivated by the USSR. Solidarnosc became an alternative object of fraternal loyalty.***

3) *The Solidarity Movement was facilitated and maintained (particularly during its outlawed period when Poland was under martial law) by persistent and intentional use of "samizdat" or "bibula" (illegal, self-published communications) as well as by other nonconventional means of communication.*

4) *Solidarity was able to overcome severe limitations to resource mobilization by use of "super-effective" ideological framing.*

5) *Solidarity's success was due in part to the charismatic leadership of Lech Walesa.*

6) *A three-way coalition between the industrial working class, the " Poslska inteligencja" (or prominent Polish public intellectuals, such as lawyers and academics), and the Polish Catholic Church further contributed to social solidarity within the movement and each group contributed elements lacking by the others.*

7) *Solidarity's success was due in part to the "Gorbachev Effect."*

## **Chapter Two**

### **Methodology**

The primary data used in this study was obtained through 16 interview sessions and through direct personal communication and discussion with several other individuals. Six interview sessions were conducted in Gdansk, Poland from March 7th through 13th, and seven interview sessions were conducted in Gdansk from December 12th through 22nd. Additionally, as a comparative feature in this study (in regard to the contention that Solidarity was facilitated by the structural conduciveness of a society based on a heavy industrial economy) three interview sessions were conducted in Ironton, Ohio with former employees of the Allied Chemical Semet Solvay plant and the Dayton Malleable Iron Foundry. These were conducted in January and February, 2010. One interview was conducted in Ithaca, New York and one was conducted in Malmo, Sweden (both with former activists from Poland). Altogether, 29 individuals were interviewed (the interview sessions ranged from 1 to 5 participants).

Background information and literature concerning the Black Madonna of Czestochowa was also obtained through direct personal communications at Cestohowa, Texas, during the summer of 2010. Two Americans with ties to Poland also provided background information for this study by means of personal communications. One individual has family members living in Opole, Poland and makes yearly trips to that city. Likewise, the other individual has a parent from Poland. This informant speaks both Polish and Russian and was working in Poland prior to martial law and in Russia during martial law. This informant also provided short Polish and Russians translations to English for clarification of certain terminology used in some secondary sources.

Six individuals assisted in Polish to English translations: In March, I was assisted by Andrzej Falkowski and Marta Rutkowska, local business operators in the Gdansk area. In December, Marta Skibinska and Aleksandra Kristiansen, under the direction of Dr. Paula Gorszczyńska of Uniwersytet Gdański, were my translators. Additional Polish and Russian language assistance came from Zofia Rudnicka, of Walbrzych, Poland.

Some of the respondents came to be "key informants" due to the depth of their interview responses, complexity of their answers, and due to their first-hand experiences concerning certain interview topics. These individuals will be referred to as "Informant B," Informant J," "Informant PZ," etc. throughout this paper simply for expediting the writing process and as a means of clarification between the various informants. In less exacting circumstances, statements such as, "A Polish informant told me...." or "An informant from Ironton said...." will be used. Additionally, as a means to further protect the identity of the informants, the pronoun "he" will be used throughout the paper in reference to all informants regardless of gender; this is not to be taken as a form of sexism but simply as an alternative to the awkward use of terms such as he/she or s/he. All of the interviews were very informal and were guided by a set of open-ended questions included in an appendix to this paper. I encouraged the informants to relate to me their stories, memories, and anecdotes of their experiences in Solidarnosc or of their life experiences as they pertained to the topics of the interview questions.

During the first trip to Poland, I was able to spend an entire day with a retired employee of Stocznia Gdanska (the former Lenin Shipyard where the labor union, Solidarnosc, originated) and tour the interior of the yard with him. The informant was able to get me directly into the working area of the yard, into now abandoned areas of the yard that held considerable historic significance to the Solidarity Movement, and into the office of the current shipyard director. This

informant, who was 67 years old and had started work at the shipyard in 1963, had been highly involved in the Solidarity Movement since its very first days. His interview (and others) constitutes a direct oral history that will supplement the secondary sources for the historical background section of this thesis. A considerable amount of first-hand recollections of life in Poland prior to democratization is included in the historical section.

During the second trip to Poland, I was able to meet and interview the current director of the Gdansk local of Solidarnosc, who had also worked in Stocznia Gdanska for nearly thirty years. This interview provided me with not only an historic perspective, but with an update on the current state of the union, and with an informed opinion concerning its future.

Finally, during both trips to Gdansk, I spent several hours each day in the nearby working-class neighborhoods adjacent to the shipyards, and at other industrial sites near the shipyards. I was invited to the homes of several of the interviewees living in these neighborhoods. One visit was with a relatively high-ranking official in Solidarnosc, and another was to the home of a couple who were former publishers of underground literature (samizdat publishers). I was also invited to a conference and to a ceremony commemorating the 40th anniversary of the December, 1970 shootings in Gdynia, and to the premier of a locally-filmed movie concerning the 1970 shootings. I observed and photographed all these events, the industrial sites, and the homes, apartments, businesses, neighborhoods, and gardens near the yards. I attempted to follow the daily patterns of local residents, such as the patterns of daily commuting - mostly pedestrian or by tram - and I observed the daily patterns of residents as they attended schools or churches, and visited shopping areas. I studied maps of the Gdansk area and also spent a day with a tour guide visiting historic buildings, churches, and monuments.

The aim of all this was to arrive at a more holistic perspective of Gdansk in general, and of the events that had occurred there. I felt this was necessary in order to better understand the significance of my informants' descriptions of their experiences in Gdansk. It is nearly impossible in a qualitative study to maintain complete objectivity, but, I believe, the concentrated observations and direct experience in the neighborhoods - albeit for only 17 days altogether - contributed significantly to my ability to accurately interpret the meaning of the data I was obtaining from local residents. I consider all these activities as further sources of primary data in this study.



## **Chapter Three**

### **Historical Background**

This chapter will focus on three primary reasons for the Polish revolution of the 1980s: 1) economic exploitation of Poland by the USSR; 2) eventual economic failure; 3) demand for independent labor unions as alternatives to existing State-controlled unions. These conditions set the historical stage for the emergence of the Solidarity Movement and motivated participants to take the actions necessary for change. Rather than reiterate details from the many complete histories of Poland and Eastern Europe during the 1980s (such as Kenney 2002, and Stokes 1993) and rather than document in journalistic style the many events that comprise the totality of the Solidarity Movement, (such as done by Ash 2002) this section is a thematic account generally limited to the three above mentioned conditions. It will mainly utilize data obtained through personal interviews as a means of describing the conditions as they pertain to the contentions of this thesis. A final concluding section will briefly recount the main historical events from the August 1980 signing of the Gdansk Agreement to the December 1990 election of Lech Walesa as the first president of The Republic of Poland.

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#### **General Background:**

Ash's (2002) account of the Polish Revolution (deemed on the back cover as "the definitive account" by the New York Times Book Review) begins with a rather emotionalized discussion of the 'betrayal' of Poland at the Yalta Conference ("...their country was delivered up by their western allies, Britain and America, into the famously tender care of 'Uncle Joe' Stalin") (3), and continues this 'messianic theme', citing Adam Mickiewicz's notion of Poland as "the Christ

among nations" sacrificed for Europe's redemption (5). Ash cites the figure of some six million Polish casualties in WWII, or "one in every five citizens..."(3).

As a permanent monument to the destruction as described by Ash, the city of Gdansk has left Granary Island (Wyspa Spichrzow) on the Martwa Wisla (a branch in the delta of the Vistula) in its utterly ruined state. Smaller structures were reduced to crumbling piles of brick while the massive masonry walls of industrial buildings still lie some 30 degrees askew, literally jolted off their foundations by Nazi bombing. Enlarged panoramic photos within the *Zlota Brama* (the "Golden Gate" into Gdansk's Old Town area) of the rebuilt city testify to similar conditions of war time devastation across Poland (personal observations, Gdansk 2010). The ruined state of Poland in 1945, not only in terms of its infrastructure but also in regard to near complete political disarray and economic collapse, left the country vulnerable to the will of its Soviet "liberators."

However, with no intentions of downplaying the suffering of Poland during WWII or during the long period of Soviet domination (from 1945 to 1989), it seems also necessary to consider the war time losses and post war intentions of the Soviet Union in order to understand the urgency of the Soviet agenda for Eastern Europe. It is from the Soviet perspective that the society and economy of post-war Poland were built, and from the result, the Solidarity Movement, out of necessity, emerged. Thus, a very brief historical and ideological background will clarify this theme.

Taubman (2003: 179) describes the unimaginable economic setback and human losses that the Soviet Union encountered as a result of WWII. He cites war casualties as an estimated 27 million lives, 1700 towns destroyed, 70,000 villages destroyed, 32,000 factories destroyed,

52,000 miles of railroad destroyed, and 100,000 collective farms laid waste. Taubman says these figures translate into roughly a 30% to 40% loss of national wealth for the nation. In contrast, the United States' economic infrastructure emerged from WWII virtually unharmed and, in fact, 'geared up,' due to massive war-time industrial investments. Thus, the Soviet economy was then forced to play 'catch-up' with Western capitalism which was enjoying tremendous growth in the post-WWII years. This was accomplished not only by rapid and urgent rebuilding of industrial and economic infrastructure within the Soviet Union proper but also by developing and expropriating industrial and agricultural production in the Soviet 'sphere of influence.' The nations of Eastern Europe became, in effect, exploited peripheries of a core state (to use Emmanuel Wallenstein's terminology). It was under the above mentioned historic and economic scenario that the post-WWII Polish Peoples' Republic came to be, and the eventual dysfunction of the system was a primary reason for the civil unrest that led to the emergence of the Solidarity Movement.

In legal terms, the Yalta Accords agreement of February, 1945 had called for "...the rights of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live", as per the Atlantic Charter (Stokes 1991: 15). Poland's provisional wartime government, established in 1942 (Ash 2002:7), calls it a "puppet communist party" that replaced Polish officials ordered killed by Stalin) was then fully co-opted by Stalin's NKVD through rigged elections in January 1947. The NKVD translates to, "The Peoples Ministry For Internal Affairs," and was actually a secret police group and forerunner of the KGB, that brutally enforced Stalin's orders with little mercy for "enemies of the people." Full "sovietization" of Poland began in earnest shortly thereafter (Ash 2002: 7 - 8).

Informant "PN" explained it this way:

"There was a Communist party here (in Poland) *before* the Russians came (referring to the early post-WWII years). Polish communists did not like the Russians - this goes way back to many problems between our countries - between how we believe socialism to be. The Russians killed a lot of Polish Communist Party members. They were afraid they would not be loyal to Russia and to Lenin! Poles in school read Lenin - not Marx. Even Lenin was afraid of workers reading Marx! (laughter) The people in the Soviet Union read what was give them - not true Marxism, I don't think - no, it was Lenin's version. It was that the workers need the Party to represent them and that the Party is always right - so whatever the Party decides is what happens. They control everything - economy, where you live, where you work, what you learn in school, what you see on TV! The Party will make a world for you! Don't ask questions! So they took over this way."

This Sovietization entailed both political/economic control of Poland (and all of Eastern Europe) as well as an attempt at a cultural shift toward the USSR. Informant "B" described Sovietization this way:

"They were aiming everything toward the Soviet Union - not only political ideology but literature in school, language - we began learning Russian language in 2nd grade. They wanted to make all Eastern Europe as one country - yes, was like colonial times! They were colonizing us! Supposedly they were Polish (referring to Communist Party officials in Poland at the end of WWII) - but many - in the beginning, right after the war - were not. The government was then pretty much run by Russian military."

Informant "AF" added this comment:

"There was a minister of education responsible for sovietizing of Polish education and culture. Everything had to fit the Communist ideology - if history did not fit they just changed it! Yes, they were trying to change our way of thinking - either by fear or by propaganda in schools and on TV. And you could not see a movie or hear music or radio or TV from Western Europe - they kept it blocked. You see that big hill where the cross is on? (he points to a hill overlooking Gdansk, called *Gradowa Wzgorze*) There was tower up there that blocked all radio and TV - all you get is what that tower sends - nothing else!"

Sovietization was based on Bolshevik notions of singularity and "...absolute denial of any possibility of pluralism - an intransigence rooted in a worldview based on class and class struggle, whereby only the interests of one class, the proletariat, could become universal"

(Kotkin 1995: 151). Lynd (1945: 184) condenses this worldview and the goals of Soviet society as follows:

"It is a society with (a) announced collective goals; (b) the utmost speed of movement toward these goals...;(c) a single, authoritarian leadership apparatus and geographical segment in the pursuit of these goals; and (d) a positive policy of encouraging total social organization for the achievement of these goals and changing, or when necessary, destroying all tendencies to opposition and cleavage at every level in society, including the leadership apparatus itself...Here is a society that sets bold objectives for itself, or, more accurately, has them set for it by the Communist party; that conceives of these objectives as necessarily the objectives of *everyone in society*; that encourages everyone to identify his personal goals with the stated goals; and that allows no organized opposition."

The ultimate *positive* aim of this system (at least from the idealized Marxist tradition and ignoring the negative means used to reach the goal) was creation of a worldwide egalitarian workers' society in which each individual had the economic means to reach his/her greatest human potential. The great inequalities of condition, exploitation of human life, and chaotic market swings inherent in a capitalist society, as driven by the profit motive, would be abolished. The Soviet Union invested very heavily in promotion of this ideology. Labin (1960) estimated the Soviet budget for direct propaganda to Eastern Europe alone at equivalent of \$500 million per year (during the 1950s and calculated in that era's currency value) with 140,000 full-time government workers employed in this specialized area. Kovaly (1997: 54 - 55) describes the proliferation of "pamphlets printed on cheap paper" in early post-WWII era Eastern Europe, which all eventually arrived at the conclusion "...that all injustice, discrimination, misery, and war...stem from...the exploitation of the working class... As soon as the working people - the creators of all value - understand what must be done, they will overthrow the exploiters...and the Kingdom of Heaven will come to earth." No doubt, many adherents of this system truly

believed that they were elevating the material conditions of humankind and that their system could provide the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Thus, the second world-war was directly preceded by the ideological and economic struggle of the Cold War. As stated by Kotkin (1995: 151 - 152) socialism and capitalism soon became defined by their opposition to each other:

"Socialism, which began as a way of looking at the world based on a critique of capitalism, became a concrete form of social organization based on the suppression and ultimate elimination of capitalism...Those ideas [referring to the Soviet Union's official ideology] centered on the proposition, "socialism is the antidote to capitalism." Capitalism had bourgeois parliaments; socialism would have soviets of workers... Capitalism had selfish individualism; socialism would have collectivism. Capitalism had the chaos of markets; socialism would have planning. Capitalism had private property; socialism would have societal property, and so on...To put it another way, one achieved socialism by eradicating capitalism."

Thus, in light of the above ideology, and in regard to operationalizing this ideology by a nation devastated by war, in a world dominated by a capitalist superpower which had survived the war with no damage to its infrastructure (with the exception of Pearl Harbor), one can readily see the urgent agenda of the USSR as it began consolidating its assets in 1945. Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Albania, Romania, and Bulgaria, as 'military allies' within the Warsaw Pact and as 'economic partners' in COMECON (Communist East European Economic Community) became industrial workhorses for the Soviet Union in a form of 'peripheral exploitation' (again, as per Wallenstein's core-peripheral theory). The economic exploitation and resulting decline in living standards in these peripheries brought on strikes, riots, and protests against Soviet domination many years before the beginning of the Polish Solidarity Movement. The most well known of these were the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the revolt of Prague

in 1968, but Wejnert (2002: 65 - 90) provides a statistical analysis on dozens of smaller episodes of collective protest in all nations of Eastern Europe from the late 1940s to the 1980s.

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### **Interview Data:**

I interviewed a former employee of a Gdansk port facility, a former member of a Student Union during the time of the Solidarity Movement, two former employees of the Gdansk Shipyard in which the labor union, Solidarnosc, originated, and a former resident of Gdansk now living in Malmo, Sweden. Their stories provide original oral histories concerning the themes of Soviet exploitation, economic failure in Poland, and the demand for independent labor unions - three primary reasons for the Polish Revolution of the 1980s. Secondary data will also be used in this section.

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### **Economic Exploitation Of Poland By The USSR:**

The Gdansk Shipyard (in Polish, Stocznia Gdanska; from 1952 to 1989 it was called the Lenin Shipyard), four other related shipyards, and several port-loading facilities are located in the province of Pomorskie (Pomerania) on the Baltic Sea. Here the Wisla (Vistula River) forms a delta of three branches: the Leiwka Wisla, Smiala Wisla, and the Martwa Wisla. The city of Gdansk is over 1000 years old and lies along the coastal estuary formed by the Wisla as it empties into Zatoka Gdanska (Bay of Gdansk). The city is surrounded to the south by wooded hills, the highest being Gradowa Wzgorze, on which is erected the Millennium Cross, a

monument to 1000 years of Christianity in Gdansk. Shipyards and sea-ports have been located on this protected coastal plain since the 1400s, first established by rich merchants of the Hanseatic League. A German company owned by Ferdinand Schichau built the first modern-era shipyards at the Gdansk site in 1890, called the Schichau Seebeckwerft. In 1921 the Danziger Werft yards (referring to the German name for city, Danzig) were opened as additions to the Schichau yards. The shipyard complex and various port facilities expanded and prospered until WWII. During the war the shipyards and most of the city of Gdansk sustained heavy damage. After the war the Gdansk yards were restored and modernized through loans from the Soviet Union and became part of the state owned enterprise of The Polish Peoples' Republic. In this way the USSR established a very profitable means of production in Gdansk (personal observations and personal communications with informant "AF", Gdansk, 2010).

However, the wealth generated by the shipyards was not realized by the residents of Gdansk; it was extracted by the USSR. According to my informants, the Gdansk Shipyard produced 30 - 40 large ocean-going ships per year during its prime (1960s and 1970s). Most of the ships were coal and ore carrying ships, oil and chemical tankers, and cargo ships. Most of the ships were produced for the Soviet Union, which sold them around the world as a source of income for the State. The shipyard workers felt that they were producing these ships "for free," as informant "PZ" told me, for the benefit of the USSR:

"We built all kinds of ships here - military ships, commercial ships, fishing ships. But we were building them for free for the Soviet Union...we built them in Gdansk, the Russians put their name on them, and sold them to Albania, to Brazil - all over the world. They made good money on our ships...and we couldn't even afford to buy basic food on a regular basis..."



"PZ" was 67 years old at the time of this interview and had started working in the Lenin Shipyard at age 20 in 1963 (he is now retired). He was married in 1970, at which time, he told me, he had worked in the shipyard for seven years but still could not afford to buy a suit for the wedding. "I worked hard every day and was still poor," he commented. Once he asked the shipyard manager why wages were so low in the yard:

"I asked him where the money is going - you know how many ships we build - why can we not have a pay raise? He said the money is all going to Warsaw, to the government to pay for our benefits. But we didn't have any benefits! If we got sick, yes, we had our own hospital right here in the shipyard. But that's the only benefit I know of. Everything else we pay for from our pockets!"

Informant "AF" had worked in a port facility near the Lenin Shipyard. Coal, ore, grain, and chemicals were shipped from the interior of Poland up the Vistula by barge and loaded onto ocean-going ships here. He commented on the low wages in proportion to living expenses and on the constant promises of "better days ahead."

"You could work here - we had policy of full employment - but you can not buy what you need. Sometimes all the stores had was vinegar and tea! You had ration cards to buy everything with, like in war-time. Meat was hard to get - if you were a worker you could buy something like two kilos - if worked in an office, half that amount. Now I see all kinds of meat in stores! Back then...no. It was a miserable time - no hope, no food, no future. I didn't even think there was a possibility for a different kind of life. They kept telling us things will get better - just keep working and life will be a paradise someday! They had all kinds of slogans. In the '70s it was, "We will build a second Poland." But all they built was more industrial things - it didn't seem to help us - "*more industrial production*", they said, but less to buy in stores. Why is this? Because that is the way of Communist Party."

The last lines of "AF"s observations, above, parallel the general thesis of Kotkin's 1995 *Stalinism as a Civilization*: industrialization was synonymous with civilization in the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence. With all means of production planned and controlled by the

State, and private investment forbidden, production of consumer goods was greatly neglected in favor of heavy industrial production. A "forced austerity" was demanded of all citizens in the Soviet Bloc, (with the exception of the Party elite) foregoing the "luxuries" (necessities?) of the present for a promised utopia of the future. Heavy industrial output would generate the wealth needed for rebuilding the system in the aftermath of WWII, for providing social welfare programs for citizens, for military competition with the capitalist world, and for operation of the enormous government bureaucracy necessary in a planned economy. Consumer needs would be deferred until these priorities were met.

According to Mansfield (1974:405) this plan actually worked and was one reason for the fantastic growth in the Soviet economy from the 1930s through the 1960s. During this period, per capita consumption remained practically flat while industrial output soared. Mansfield reports that the Soviet Central Planning Commission re-invested about 30% of all gross national product during this time, as compared to about half that amount in the U.S. Obviously, in human terms, this meant that the quality of life in the USSR, in terms of living standards, was about the same in 1960 as it had been in 1930.

In Poland, industrial output increase through the 1950s, '60s and '70s but living conditions continued to deteriorate. According to my informants, in December, 1970 the government of The Polish Peoples' Republic, headed by Wladyslaw Gomulka, announced tremendous price hikes on food (cited by Ash 2002:13 to be as high as 36% on all staple food items.) The increase was justified by the State as a needed 'correction' in the planned economy. This 'correction,' as unreasonable as it was and coming two weeks before Christmas, resulted in widespread strikes and riots across Poland. My informants speculated that the price hike was simply a method to generate more revenue for the State, even though newspaper reports had suggested that the

increase was an attempt to lower the Christmas season demand as a result of actual food shortages. The Lenin Shipyard, with some 20,000 workers, went on strike to protest the price increases. About a week before Christmas, Gomulka responded by sending in a police and military contingent to break the strike at the shipyard and restore order. The crackdown resulted in a conflict at the gates of the shipyard in which an unspecified number of workers were killed by police gunfire. Ash (2002: 13) reported "dozens" of workers killed in the event and an online source (Gdansk- Life.com 2009) reports 80 killed. Dziwanowski (1976: 307) reports 45 killed and 1,165 wounded. One of my informants in Gdansk told me that the exact number is not known because the Polish government contacted the families of the slain workers and threatened them with more violence if they told anyone how their family members died. Thus, funerals were held for the victims but the cause of death was not attributed to police intervention. A large monument now stands outside the gates of the Gdansk Shipyard to mark this event. The strikes and rioting lasted five days and spread beyond Gdansk to Gdynia and Szczecin (Dziwanowski 1976: 307.) Lech Walesa, the future leader of Solidarnosc, was a witness to the shootings in December, 1970.

Ironically, in Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs, published in 1974, (Khrushchev died in 1971) he very aptly summarizes the cause of the Polish wage and price riots of 1970 - the direct predecessor of Solidarnosc's 1980 actions - and the potential outcomes of the Soviet system if reforms were not enacted. Khrushchev's statements proved to be a very accurate ideological summary and historical prediction:

"I believe that we can compete successfully with capitalism only if we alter the priorities and organizational structure of our economy so as supply our citizens with the food and consumer goods they want. A man labors and lives in order to satisfy his material and spiritual needs. If capitalism satisfies those requirements better than socialism, it will

become increasingly difficult for us to propagate our point of view and consolidate our way of life. Eventually, we will run the danger of losing everything - of going bankrupt. The danger is political as well as economic. Just look what happened in Danzig... [He is referring to Gdansk as Danzig, and to the 1970 riots there]. What happened in Poland represents a lesson for us. The events on the Baltic coast were a direct result of a food shortage and a consumer revolt against rising prices...The teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin cannot be hammered into people's heads only in the classroom and newspapers and at political rallies...Our people must be able to use their wages to buy high-quality products manufactured under socialism if they are to accept our system and reject capitalism" (Khrushchev 1974: 146 - 147.)

### **Economic Dysfunction in Poland - Examples From Gdansk:**

Mansfield (1974: 397 - 407) explains the attempted "balancing act" beginning in the 1960s "Khrushchev Thaw" and extending through the '70s that became necessary in the planned economies of the Soviet system. According to Mansfield, production of much demanded consumer goods cut into production of export commodities. Less state revenue from lower exports of industrial products meant less money available for reinvestment in future growth. In theory, all goods and service in communist economies would be produced at cost and wages would be set so that every citizen has a decent standard of living. But in a closed system, as was the Soviet Bloc, the increased burden of producing consumer goods had to be offset by some exploitative differential. Thus, economic planners attempted to make up the difference by limiting the newly available consumer goods by raising prices on them and by imposing a heavy 'turn-over tax' on items deemed luxuries. This tax was simply an additional cost beyond the production cost, tacked on to certain items.

For example, informant "AF" told me of working and saving for five years in order to buy a used "Fiat Bambino." Yet, when he actually tried to buy one he realized that he was still short of

cash as a 25% turn-over tax was to be added. Car loans were nearly impossible to get, reported the informant. He also said that refrigerators, TVs, washing machines, and even upholstered furniture were considered luxuries in Poland in the 1970s and were heavily taxed.

Discontent in Poland reached intolerable levels several times during the 1970s. Despite the shooting incident at the gates of the Gdansk Shipyard, other factories and shipyards in the Gdansk-Sopot- Gdynia tri-city area went on strike soon after to protest low wages, high taxes, and shortages of every kind (Ash 2002: 14 - 15). Informant "B" said, "The reason for the strikes was that the people were starving in the cities. There was nothing on the shelves but tea and macaroni! That's all - was all empty shelves! No goods on the shelves of any kind. I mean like shoes, clothes too - besides food. Nothing for us!"

Soon after the December 1970 shooting incident at the Gdansk Shipyard, Wladyslaw Gomulka was replaced by a new Communist Party leader, Edward Gierek, in an attempt by Politburo strategists to appease the discontent. A group of some thirty factories in Szczecin province had banded together forming an inter-factory strike committee, a first attempt at the large-scale organized protest Solidarity would master a decade later. On January 24, 1971, Gierek met with the strikers for over nine hours and by way of emotional appeal and by successfully identifying with the workers, convinced them to end the strike (Ash 2002: 15 - 16).

According to Laba (1991: 80 - 81) Gierek emphasized his own background as a coal miner, shed tears as he persuaded the strikers to cooperate with him in proposed solutions to food shortages and high taxes, and finally pleaded with them, "Will you help me?" The strikers agreed to go back to work, to cooperate with Gierek, and to work with his new administration to jointly solve the economic problems of Poland. Gierek froze food prices, granted some wage

increases, and proposed 'new and improved' Socialist Five-Year Plans. However, he and his economic planning committee could do little about the overall dysfunction of the Soviet dominated system and still remain in ideologically accepted territory. Privatization of any means of production was forbidden. The significance of this scenario is that it came to represent the standard practice for dealing with workers' demands throughout the 1970s; promises were made that could not be fulfilled and resulted in appeasements that simply delayed real solutions.

In addition to food shortages, there was a serious housing shortage in Poland during the Communist years. There were no private building contractors and nearly all residential construction and all commercial construction was controlled by the State. The only exception was in rural areas where some private ownership of land still existed. Informant "B" told me that full collectivization of Poland's farms never occurred, probably because the State saved money by excluding farmers from social welfare programs. "B" said that private farmers had no health insurance, no form of old-age retirement or pension, and no support from the government in case of crop failure. One advantage rural families did have was the freedom to construct their own houses, that is, if building supplies could be obtained. A conversation with informant "AF" details the Polish housing shortage and the rural alternatives:

*"Before '89, how long did it take to get an apartment in Gdansk?"*

"Before transformation, for an apartment, people were waiting 25 years! We would pay a membership price to be member of cooperative - to start to get an apartment. Every month, we pay into this. But you might pay - wait - 25 years. Now developers are making apartments in every city. But right now not everyone can borrow money from bank."

"For me - after I was married, we stayed with my wife's family for 20 years! That was typical - two generations - even grandchildren - three generations, all in same apartment. Today is less common, but that was for everyone in my generation. We had no choice."

*"So, did everyone live in apartments? I mean, did anyone have a private home? I mean, like a house - not an apartment."*

"Private people could construct own house or apartment but borrowing rate at banks was very high. Was impossible to pay back the bank at such high rates. And State controlled building - I don't think there were private building companies. But in the country the people built houses for themselves. In city, only State Cooperatives could build."

"In rural areas some people had some land. When I wanted - let's say we wanted to build a house - OK - we help each other! When I'm finished with mine I help you - we help neighbor build his. We didn't pay - didn't charge - it was labor for labor. And if I knew a trade like electricity, pipes - the guys who know that helped with that kind of work. The guys who know bricks trade their work - you see, we traded what we knew - we helped each other!"

"Like with everything else, you wait in line to buy things to build with. Maybe you can buy two bags of cement today - wait a month, buy two more bags. Lay some bricks - wait for cement - it was slow! And for roof - the tiles for roof - hard to get!"

There were no real economic solutions for nations such as Poland who were dependent on the USSR for approval of economic plans as the USSR intended on maintaining a 'favorable balance of trade' with Eastern Europe. Khrushchev even admits that "trading concessions favorable to the Russians" were established by Stalin to exploit satellite nations' resources (Khrushchev 1974: 209) but he insists that these were terminated upon Stalin's death. In reality, the USSR maintained nearly total control of Poland's economy by requiring 'permission' for Poland to make adjustments in its economy as part of Comecon. Under these conditions the quality of life and quality of goods produced in Poland continued to decline through the 1970s. Ash (2002: 18) sums it up well in reference to the Polish economy of the 1970s: "...ham and beef are wanted by all, but Polish machine tools and cars will not be bought by anyone who is quite sane."

But by 1976 even Polish ham and beef production - and all agricultural production, for that matter - was in decline, and food shortages led to yet another round of strikes and demonstrations. In June of '76 food prices were again increased in an effort to reduce demand. Sucharczuk (1974: 31) reports cheese and butter prices up 60%, meat prices up 69%, and sugar prices up 100%. Police and military were readied for the inevitable backlash and violent conflicts did occur in several locations. Eventually the prices lowered, but between 1976 and 1980 Poland's economic planners were behaving, in Ash's words, "... like the pilots of an airliner which has gone into a nosedive. Starting with the so-called 'economic maneuver' of late 1976, they tried every trick they knew , but the machine would not respond to the controls...the debt dial whizzed up into red, from \$10 billion mark in 1976 to around \$17 billion in 1979..." (Ash 2002: 19).

### **An Alternative To Dysfunction:**

A final example from observations and interviews at Gdansk will demonstrate the severity of food shortages in that city prior to democratization; remnants of an alternative means of production are still evident:

Up the wooded hillsides surrounding the outskirts of Gdansk I noticed what seemed to resemble the squatters' towns outside the city of Juarez, Mexico where live the *maquiladoras*, or in-migrating factory workers. The slopes were divided into small plots, each with a little lean-to shed or shack made of scrap wood, sheet metal, and assorted odds and ends. I saw this again in a city park; a little 'settlement' seemed to have once occupied the park's extremities, but I could see it was now abandoned. Later I noticed similar 'shanty towns' built on the property of a coal-fired power plant. The old plant, according to an informant, was said to be "a gift from Uncle Joe



Stalin," and apparently still used pollution control technology from Stalin's era; that is, it had none. I noticed fly ash in the air near the plant and the acrid smell of burning low-grade, high sulfur coal, reminiscent of childhood memories of coal and coke processing plants in Appalachia of the 1960s.

A local resident told me that these "shanty towns" were actually tool storage sheds for little, private gardens. Some had large south-facing windows or clear sheet-plastic covers and had been used to start tender plants in early spring. These gardens were not at all 'picturesque European flower gardens,' but were ramshackled hillside conglomerations of recycled industrial materials, home-made, and protected by woven brush fences and sagging barbed wire. In some places the steep hillsides had even been terraced using everything from aluminum siding scraps to splintered utility poles, to hold back the soil and form small flat strips that contoured with the terrain. Some plots had long-neglected fruit trees and grape arbors. These private plots had fed the people of Gdansk during the worst years of Poland's economic crisis. All of my informants (those old enough to remember) have described to me the hardships of those years, especially 1981 - 1983, during the time of martial law.

In order to survive, people bought and sold garden produce, fruits, and berries grown on these little plots for the 'black market.' As everything produced in The Peoples' Republic of Poland during the Communist era was subject to a state tax, the operators of these little market gardens were, technically, committing tax evasion. However, my informants told me, the State generally ignored this 'crime.' The tradition continues and I saw several 'old-timers' selling jam, honey, and home-canned fruit on the sidewalks of Gdansk (perhaps it is again necessary due to globalization of capital and deindustrialization.) Most of the gardens are abandoned today but I was told that in

the worst economic times the 'garden shacks' were also used as hen houses, rabbit hutches, and occasionally as a shed for a milk goat or two.

It is not unusual to see backyard gardens or community gardens within any city. Many residents do this as a hobby, for fun, or as a throwback to more traditional times. However, it is the economic and historic context of the Gdansk gardens that make them so striking and so telling. They extended up the hillsides and into city parks of a town that was the site of one of the largest industrial works ever built. The Gdansk Shipyards are immense and once produced great wealth for the State. The current director of the Gdansk local of Solidarnosc told me that at one time some 70,000 workers were employed in shipbuilding alone in the Gdansk-Sopot-Gdynia region. Yet, this city was dependent on little hillside gardens and chicken houses as a supplemental food source.

The significance of this observation of a material cultural tradition (or perhaps the hillside gardens may be called folk culture relics) as an antidote or correction to the economic dysfunction of an ideological/political system cannot be understated. It is analogous to imagining New York City residents forced to take up gardening in Central Park to avert starvation, or Washington, D.C. residents grazing goats on the National Mall in order to earn extra money to buy shoes; this, however, *not* by the unemployed - because full employment was guaranteed in Poland - but by people working 40 - 60 hour weeks in highly capitalized, heavy industrial facilities. It reflects not only a long-term dysfunction of the economic system, but a realization by Gdansk residents that the system was beyond repair and that reform or relief was not coming. As one informant told me, "You can't make soup out of ideas." Resolved to materially fend for themselves by gardening and 'black market trading,' while their 'official' labor - the output of

their industrial jobs - went to support, in effect, a colonizer, the people of Gdansk who formed Solidarity understood the long-term nature of the struggle they were in.

Even more outrageous than the necessity to become self-sufficient food producers while fully employed in heavy industry was the attitude of lower-level government economic planners who placated the Politburo in Moscow when strikes and riots over food shortages occurred in Poland. A quote from an official sent to Poland to investigate the situation reveals the denial of the shortages and greater concern that the government was being shortchanged in tax revenue:

"...the Poles have plenty; there is grain, meat products, vegetables, and so on. But they give nothing to the State and are adopting a wait-and-see attitude. In the private markets, a rather active trade is being conducted at very elevated prices. They buy what they need...the people are not going hungry" (Paczkowski 2007: 447).

### **Demand For independent Labor Unions:**

The out-of-control Polish economy under Edward Geirek during the late 1970s and the accumulating social unrest the situation generated would come to a "boiling point," so to speak, by August 1980. Each crisis, each conflict, and each temporary "fix" resulted in three things: 1) With each event the Poles lost more and more confidence in the ability of their government to remedy the economic problems through 'socialist-approved' methods - that is, through adjustments to market forces; 2) With each event the leaders of the workers, such as Lech Walesa, gained valuable experience in organizing protests and in negotiating demands; 3) With each event there must have begun to emerge the 'assurance' (or at least the hope) that dissent in Poland - although it had resulted in some deaths - would *apparently not* result in massive Soviet military intervention as had occurred in Hungary in 1953 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. This factor must have led the future Solidarity Movement leaders to the belief that a 'political opportunity' through apparent Soviet liberalization was emerging. The *perception* of possibility

of favorable outcome as a facilitating factor is a noted concept in general social movement theory.

In the summer of 1980 waves of strikes, protests, and demonstrations swept across Poland as they had in prior years in response to the failing economy. However, this series of strikes was the most organized and coordinated to date. Ash (2002: 36) states that government officials were confounded by "...the speed with which the information about the strikes spread around the country, despite the complete silence of all the government-controlled mass media." Additionally, this time workers did not simply demand wage/price corrections. Even before Solidarity's late August agreements (which resulted in government recognition of a series of legally constructed rights for workers) the workers at Lublin truck factory near Warsaw, for instance, had drawn up a list of 35 points they wanted addressed including creation of free labor unions. Also, the various striking factories and shipyards were not 'going it alone' this time. In a matter of weeks, in late summer of 1980, an "Inter-enterprise Strike Committee" (known in Poland as the MKS, *Miedzyszakladowa Komisja Robotnicza*) was formed which represented the demands of workers from several dozen of the huge industrial works on and near the Baltic Coast. The MKS was a direct predecessor to Solidarnosc (Walesa 1987: 115 - 130).

Although various strikes had been occurring across Poland through the summer of 1980, the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk did not go out on strike until August 14th. The immediate cause of the strike was the firing of Anna Walentynowicz, a crane operator who had worked nearly 30 years in the shipyard. Walesa (1987: 116) states that she was fired just five months before her scheduled retirement, at age 53, thus making her ineligible for receiving retirement benefits. Ash (2002: 42) adds the reason given for her dismissal was claimed to be petty theft; gathering the butts of candles used in a ceremony to honor the 1970 shootings of striking workers at the

gates of the shipyard. This outraged her fellow workers at the shipyard who obviously realized the dismissal had nothing to do with candle butts. The intention of the Lenin Shipyard management was to 'teach a lesson' to workers by threatening them with losing their job and retirement benefits (even with 30 years service) for participating in memorials to worker solidarity. Lech Walesa had been fired some months earlier from the Lenin Shipyard for attempting to organize construction of a monument to the slain workers just outside the shipyard gates and for passing out samizdat publications at the yard. He said that he used his 'time off' from work to continue passing out more samizdat at many other plants and shipyards in the tri-cities area (Gdansk, Sopot, and Gdynia) during the summer of 1980 while looking for work (Walesa 1987: 100 - 101.) No doubt his actions contributed to inter-factory support and cooperation in August.

By evening of the first day of the strike (August 14th 1980) the shipyard manager, Klemens Gniech, had appeased the workers by promise of negotiations if they went back to work. Lech Walesa, though at that time considered a former employee (due to his earlier dismissal), is said to have "jumped the fence" into the shipyard as Gniech was addressing the workers and proposed the formation of an occupation strike within the yard until some basic demands were met. The workers enthusiastically followed Walesa's lead and thus his position as leader of the growing movement began (however, at that moment, obviously, his role was still unofficial and it was not imagined the degree to which his participation would affect events to come.) A negotiation committee was formed with immediate demands being stated as the re-hiring of both Anna Walentynowicz and Lech Welesa (as per their former plant seniority positions so that Walentynowicz could work her last five months and receive retirement), a specified pay raise, family allowances similar to that of police and government workers, assurance of no further

reprisals for striking workers, and permission to build a monument to the memory of the workers killed during the 1970 strike (Ash 2002: 44 - 47).

Informants "JB" was "PZ" were both employees of the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk during the initial days of the formation of Solidarnosc. They were eyewitnesses of the above described events. I asked them to describe those times:

(JB) "It was August 1980. Thousands of people were coming to the gate of the shipyard to see what was going on. We had went on strike because we had enough - the shortages - and everything was forbidden - we had to apply for apartment, and wait for years, even to buy furniture, we wait for years - food bought on points card - *Come on!* Like war-time but no war! The people learned, in those days, that they have a voice. They can criticize the State and were not afraid anymore. They just said, "This is enough!"

"JB" emphasized to me the resolution of the strikers at Gdansk to unite all workers in the process of peaceful change; he used the phrase, "evolution not revolution," several times. He continued:

"We knew after 1970 (referring to the shootings at the shipyard gate) that we had to act with good against bad - this was policy of Walesa too. Like the Pope used to say, if you have something bad against you then present yourself as good, and fight like that. You see, people respect this - respect words of Pope. This was the peaceful way. The plan was not to pull down the Communist Party but to build our own organization. Before, they burnt some buildings of the Party - like in Poznan in '68 - and here in Gdansk - right down the street they burnt the Communist Party building! We stopped that - it would not work. We changed our policies.

"PZ" was a witness at the moment Lech Walesa became the "unofficial" leader of Solidarnosc. He described the moment and insisted that I take several pictures of the exact location as a new shopping center is planned to be built on the existing site. "PZ" was very proud of his involvement in the Solidarity Movement and had worked very hard in supporting the

union. He had been jailed for six months for passing out samizdat literature and had worked directly with Lech Walesa in organizing city-wide strikes in Gdansk in the early days of the movement. He was still amazed at the rapid spread of the Solidarity Movement in 1980; "The movement organized itself," he said. "From here - *right here*, where we are standing, Solidarnosc spread across Poland. Ten million people joined the union!" PZ continued:

"Here is where you hear of how 'Lech jumped the fence!' See, there are houses here - apartments, up against the fence. The shipyard manager was talking to the workers here - trying to calm them down - a guy named Gniech. Walesa jumped up on an excavator beside him. He said, "Remember me? You fired me a while back. Now I'm back!" The crowd yelled, shouted, laughed! And they drowned out Gniech. In this way they just started following Walesa - he just took the lead!"

What followed was a two week strike centered at the gates of *Stocznia Gdanska*, (the Gdansk Shipyards - at that time still called, Lenin Shipyard) and in the old red-brick administrative buildings located nearby. Eventually, a document with twenty-one demands was drawn up by the strike committee. PZ took me to the old building where this document, the Gdansk Agreement, was formally signed on August 31, 1980 by Lech Walesa and the Deputy Prime Minister of The Polish Peoples' Republic, Mieczyslaw Jagielski. PZ shook his head in disbelief and remorse that this historic site - where for the first time in an Eastern Bloc nation, the Communist Party recognized *any* formal, representative body other than itself - was now in the process of being converted to general office space for local Gdansk companies. He explained:

"People have forgotten already what this was all about - what happened here. We had mass here every day during the strike...we made a wooden cross and put it here - before the big monument you now see outside the gates was built. The *whole country* was on strike with us...yes, it all spread from this spot! We had mass because we were afraid this might be our last days! The military might come in and wipe us all out - who knows? Back then things like that happened."

Ash describes the last two weeks of August, 1980 in Poland as "something like a nationwide general strike," and states that, "it was officially estimated that c. 750,000 workers in some 750 enterprises took part in the August strikes. This is certainly an underestimate" (2002: 63).

Informant "B" also remembered the August 1980 strikes, and confirmed the reality of informant PK's fears of violent reprisal during the strike. I asked "B" if the Gdansk Shipyard strikes had been an occupation strike or a walkout:

"Initially they stayed in the buildings because prior years when they walked out into the streets they were killed. But they said, "OK - we are stopping work." And they stopped! Everyone - totally! The workers in the plants, the students in the schools - they said, "OK - we are not coming to class." They stopped. The faculty said, "OK - we are not teaching." They stopped. That's it - *that's* solidarity! Everybody stopped...students said, "We don't care if you expel all the students." Faculty said, "We don't care if you fire us." Workers said, "We don't care if you kill us." You can do it - but there is nobody to take our place...

We were afraid the Polish military might try to end the strikes - or maybe the Soviet army would come in...yes, it was a very scary time! I remember tanks did come to shipyard - Polish tanks - Polish soldiers. Women took flowers and put them on the tanks and said, "Sons, we don't want you to fight your fathers" - and they didn't! The guys knew, of course, they risk desertion, or disobey of orders...but the military knew also, that they cannot get rid of whole army - cannot tell Polish army to attack Poland! One person, yes - but whole army, no! Whole factory no! See, that is how solidarity worked!"

The number one goal of the Gdansk strikes was to gain official government recognition of *independent* labor unions; this was the first demand of the Gdansk Agreement. Ash (2002: 61) quotes a strike committee negotiator, Florian Wisniewski, as saying, "...on the question of free trade unions we shall not be moved." The wording of the Gdansk Agreement on this subject is as follows:

"The activity of the trade unions of People's Poland has not lived up to the hopes and aspirations of the workers. We thus consider that it will be beneficial to create new union organisations, which will run themselves, and which will be authentic expressions of the working class. Workers will have the right to join the old trade unions and we are looking



at the possibilities of the two union structures co-operating" (from, *The Gdansk Agreement*, in, *The Polish August: Documents from the beginning of the Polish Workers' Rebellion - Gdansk - August, 1980*. MacDonald. 1981: 102.)

Kotkin (1995: 206) describes the traditional labor unions of the Soviet Union as tools through which the government advanced its own interests by pushing worker productivity, not as defenders of workers' interests. Dziwanowski (1976: 23) describes even the earliest versions of Communist parties in Poland as considered by many to be, "...heretics to the creed of Marx and Engels, whose doctrine they pretend to worship but whose opinions concerning Poland and her right to free and independent existence they ignored" (referring to the early Polish Socialist Party advocating Partition by Russia and Germany.) Thus, through Soviet intervention after WWII, the Party and the Union in Poland became virtually the same organization. The writers of the Gdansk Agreement saw the absolute necessity of establishing independent unions as the first step in true social change for Poland. Ash (2002:71) quotes Lech Walesa's statement at the signing of the Gdansk Agreement as evidence for this:

"We got all we could in the present situation. And we will achieve the rest, because we now have the most important thing: *in-de-pen-dent* self governing trade unions. That is our guarantee for the future...I declare the strike ended."

Informants PZ, JB, and AF, like nearly all Poles (and for that matter, like nearly all workers in the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence at the time), were members of State sponsored labor unions before Solidarnosc was formed. Informant B helped organize an independent student's union as an alternative to a State sponsored union at a university. I asked all four informants what the State sponsored unions were like before the alternative of Solidarnosc:

PZ: "They were a bunch of assholes! Their job was just to make you work harder. They say, "We will get you a raise." Then, a week later, prices on everything go up - so there goes the raise!"

JB: "We had a union at the shipyard - yes...but it was just one big trade union of the Communist Party - membership was compulsory. We had no right to strike - so what good was it? How can we make change? They were for the interests of the Party - not us."

AF: "Well, they took care of families - got time off for mothers to have babies - got us medical care. But our pay was so low...didn't we deserve at least to have a doctor, a hospital visit? You just took what they offered...and hoped things would not get worse."

B: "It was believed that you didn't need a union - independent union, like in U.S. - because in Poland the State cares for people - provides for people. But they didn't do anything - didn't represent us. They might have end of year party or coffee time - little present for kids at Christmas - or organize trip around the factory - nothing! (laughs) You know, mushrooms? - yes, wild mushrooms in the forest. Well, they organize a trip to gather mushrooms - hahahah! Nothing to do with issues or grievances that workers had! They maintained the system that the State wanted - that was their main job."

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The above viewpoints aptly demonstrate the dysfunction of Poland's State sponsored unions and the memberships' dissatisfaction with their agenda. The previous section of this chapter provided evidence of major, systemic economic failure in Poland and the first section provided evidence of economic exploitation of Poland by the USSR. In light of the interview data obtained and in conjunction with other historical accounts of the era, I believe these three issues were the primary factors that brought the Polish people to the brink of revolution by August, 1980.

Out of this turmoil the labor union, Solidarnosc, was created and along with it a long-term, international social movement - the Solidarity Movement - first emerged. These two events are very significant, historically and sociologically. First, in that the recognition of Solidarnosc by

the USSR as an independent representative body of citizens in a Communist State constituted the first act of political plurality within a system ideologically founded on Leninist principles of non-plurality. Secondly, the Solidarity Movement did eventually bring about the freeing of Eastern Europe from Soviet political and economic domination in a peaceful transition.

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The following sections briefly summarize the history of the Solidarity Movement from the signing of the Gdansk Agreement in 1980 to the election of Lech Walesa as the first president of The Republic Of Poland in 1990. It is drawn entirely from secondary sources.

### **Signing Of The Gdansk Agreements:**

Without recounting all the details of the long and tedious 18 days of negotiations, we can arrive at Sunday, August 31, 1980, at which time the final meeting took place between the Solidarity negotiating committee and the representatives of the Polish government. Most of the items in the list of demands had been accepted (some in altered form) by the government negotiating team and a promise in good faith had been made to continue to pursue items of conflict. Walesa addressed the workers at the Lenin Shipyard calling the negotiations a success and calling an end to the strike. Work was to resume the next day, Monday, September 1st. A signing ceremony was carried out in which General Wojciech Jagielski, representing the government of The Polish Peoples' Republic, accepted the agreed upon terms of the negotiations and also officially recognized the right of the Polish people to organize free and independent trade unions. Walesa and Jagielski shook hands and Walesa thanked him and those he represented for the peaceful settlement of the strike and for the advancements made. He claimed

no victory, but said that they had settled "As Pole talks to Pole." Jagielski is reported to have picked up on this and said to the effect, (paraphrasing) "Yes, Pole to Pole, for the sake of our People in the Socialist Fatherland" (Ash 2002: 71).

On September 17th, in a meeting of the representatives from some thirty-five newly formed unions (directly formed in the days immediately following the official legalization of trade unions in Poland) the name, *Solidarnosc*, (Solidarity) was chosen as the simplified name for the "Founding Committee of Independent Self-Governing Trade Unions" (NSZZ; Niezalezny Samorzadny Zwiazek Zawodowy.) Within a week 3500 factories across Poland, representing an estimated three million individuals, had joined the union. A year later Solidarity had ten million members. MacDonald (1981: 13) describes the original organization of *Solidarnosc* as being "a federation of 17 autonomous regional bodies with a coordinating commission on the national level based in Gdansk." Mac Donald adds that about 500 individuals representing the newly formed unions from all across Poland were in attendance.

The most important of the original 21 demands had been met. Ash (2002: 74 - 75) describes the conditions of the final agreement as follows: All Poles would have the option to join the newly formed independent trade unions which would coexist with the old State operated unions; The right to strike was granted; The new unions agreed to continue to honor the role of the Party as "the leading force in the building of socialism"; The new unions were allowed their own independent publications; The government agreed to make public economic information concerning the nation; The demands concerning pay increases and cost of living/family allowances were to be achieved over time with gradual increases beginning immediately; Retirement age was lowered; The issues concerning food supplies, maternity leave, and housing programs were said to be "vagner," but were supposed to be remedied over time. All of these

items were major victories for Solidarity; this kind of social contract was unheard of in the Communist world - practically 'too good to be true'- which turned out to be the case!

Within days of this agreement it became apparent that major obstacles stood in the way of its realization. In fact, it may have been physically impossible, that is, economically impossible, to fulfill much of the agreement; Poland's economy simply could not sustain the demands.

It soon became apparent that it was also politically impossible for two centers of power to coexist in the Soviet system; as stated earlier in this chapter, Lenin's version of Marxism was absolutely "non-plural." This reality was stated aptly by Adam Michnik, as quoted in Walesa's book, *A Way Of Hope* (1987: 150.)

"The truth is that without agreement between the government and the people, this country cannot be governed. That truth is also that, in spite of official pronouncements at national functions, this country is not a sovereign country. This is the truth: Poles should admit the fact that their sovereignty is limited by the national and ideological interests of the USSR. In the last analysis, the truth is that the only Polish government acceptable to the leaders of the USSR is one controlled by communists; there is no reason to think this state of affairs is going to change overnight, if ever."

Five days after the Gdansk Agreement was signed the Party's Central Committee replaced Edward Gierek with Stanislaw Kania as First Secretary Of The Party. Just as Wladyslaw Gomulka had been replaced by Geierek in 1970 (after the riots and shootings of workers in Gdansk) so Kania's appointment was meant as a break in a failed leadership (failed in the assessment of the Party.) MacDonald (1981: 12 - 13) states that Kania's acceptance speech as Party leader openly indicated his goal of breaking Solidarity. MacDonald says that Kania immediately began a "petty crackdown" on all Solidarity activities, "...requiring the workers to struggle every inch of the way to build their new organization..."(12). This crackdown included "...arrests, harassment, denial of offices and access to the media, vicious slanders of individual

leaders in the media, house searches and confiscation of materials. Desperate attempts were made to preserve the old official unions and to intimidate workers seeking to join the new unions” (12).

On October 3rd, thirty-three days after the signing of the Gdansk Agreements, Solidarity called a "one hour warning strike," to call attention to the lack of wage increases (supposed to be incremental but immediate as per the agreement), the failure of the government to allow the union full access to mass media, and the worker harassment that Kania had instigated.

A series of confrontations between Solidarity activists and the Kania administration continued throughout the remainder of the year. The continued delay by the government to abide by the Gdansk Agreement and the intensification of harassment eventually led to longer and more wide spread strikes. Unable to break the Union by intimidation, slander, and the offering of separate, competitive settlements, legal action was undertaken. {Kania had attempted to bargain with certain "less militant" branches of Solidarity advising them to take concessions on the original agreement and excluding from further negotiation those branches that demanded full adherence to the original agreement. This was meant to divide the Union. The administration also spread rumors of an imminent Soviet invasion if Solidarity continued to press its demands; this rumor may have had some truth behind it.}

This legal action set the precedent for arrest of Solidarity activists on the grounds of "anti-Socialist activities." It was based on the wording of a clause in the final, elaborate version of the Gdansk Agreement as accepted by the government negotiating committee and MKS. The clause reads as follows:

"These new unions are intended to defend the social and material interests of the workers, and not to play the role of a political party. They will be established on the basis

of the socialization of the means of production and of the socialist system which exists in Poland today. They will recognize the leading role of the PUWP [Polish United Workers Party; *Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza*, or more clearly, the Communist Party] in the state, and will not oppose the existing system of international alliances" (The Gdansk Agreement, taken from MacDonald 1981: 102).

In effect, this clause entirely negated the notion of independent trade unions in Poland. By recognizing the leading role of the Party in the State and not opposing the "existing alliances," which referred to Poland's necessity to answer to the USSR on all economic matters, the "independent trade unions" would simply enter a "parental-like" relationship with State as "mother" and Party as "father"; if the unruly "children" misbehaved they would be punished. Thus, the Kania administration enforced this interpretation of the Gdansk Agreement (approved by the Supreme Court in Warsaw) and began arresting the more militant and outspoken Solidarity activists, charging them with anti-socialist activities as per the interpretation, and sentencing them to prison terms up to five years (MacDonald 1981: 13 - 16.)

Lech Walesa recalled the months directly after the signing of the Gdansk Agreement, initially jubilant, then with a sickening realization that the old system would not be broken:

"We spent the autumn haggling with the government. It was a difficult dialogue between two camps who spoke different languages. ..For every term defining the growing trade union and its activities, the government insisted on resorting to the standard lexicon patented in the Eastern Bloc. Everything departing, however slightly, from the wooden forms was suspect, treated as "counter-revolutionary" and "anti-socialist." The result was an exhausting struggle over each word, each definition...they remained enslaved to "petrified" forms, incapable, with rare exceptions, of taking part in the new dialogue...They always trotted out the old Party theses, afraid to let go of the ideological lifeline that had supported them for so long.." (Walesa 1987: 158.)

## **Poland under General Wojciech Jaruzelski:**

Kania's tactics were not working. His attempts to break Solidarity only resulted in more strikes which worsened the economic situation, which in turn added to the rising frustration level of the Polish people, which increased their propensity to strike and protest even more. Kania was simply creating a 'vicious circle' of ever-rising mass discontent.

In February 1981, after six months of ineffective leadership, Kania was replaced by General Wojciech Jaruzelski. His appointment was met with mixed feelings by most Poles who knew his background. Jaruzelski had close ties to Moscow, having held several trusted, high-ranking positions. He had been Poland's Minister of Defense during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, in which he oversaw the Polish Army's participation in this event. This fact, and other links to the Soviet military "...suggested a communist soldier completely loyal to Moscow..." [however] "...he was widely reputed to have opposed the use of force against the workers both in December 1970 and August 1980"(Ash 2002: 151.) This background information led the Solidarity leadership to see Jaruzelski's attempt at governing Poland as possibly "...the last card before the use of force" (Ash 2002: 152.) In his inaugural address on February 12, 1981 he attempted a display of good faith toward the Polish workers and Solidarity calling for a voluntary 90-day freeze on all strikes and work stoppages in exchange for renewed commitment to dialogue. He made his appeal on the basis of mounting economic problems which were only exacerbated by work stoppages. He proposed the creation of "wide ranging economic reforms" though these were yet unspecified and were to be forthcoming.

As they had done with both Geirek and Kania, the Solidarity leadership agreed to work with Jaruzelski, to attempt renewed dialogue and to attempt to improve the workings of the Polish



economy. Work stoppages as a form of protest were set aside for the duration that Jaruzelski had requested and some factories and mines even agreed to Saturday work as a gesture of good will.

In the mean time, university students and faculty had joined in with the workers of the Solidarity movement in attempting to gain needed reforms in their sphere. Student sit-in strikes had occurred in recent weeks on several campuses and, like the workers of the Solidarity movement, the students had drawn up a list of grievances and demands. Among these were opposition to compulsory Russian language classes and compulsory Marxism-Leninism classes. Probably thinking that "giving in" to these demands would seem a good bargaining gesture for his incoming administration, Jaruzelski granted the students their request. Only a few days later, in late March 1981, Jaruzelski was summoned to the Kremlin for a 'talk' with First Secretary of The Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, and several other of the highest ranking officials in the Party. Among these was "Supreme Guardian Of Ideological Orthodoxy," Nikolai Tikhonov, who was enraged that Jaruzelski had allowed the Polish university students the option to disregard Marx, Lenin and Russian language studies. The Soviet leadership, already barely tolerating the Solidarity movement saw this ideological 'blasphemy' as the last straw. Ash (2002: 155) notes that Jaruzelski's orders from the Politburo concerning the dissent in Poland were, "to reverse the course of events."

The Jaruzelski administration prolonged negotiations with Solidarity eight months from that point. No real progress was made and the economic situation continued to worsen. Seeing no progress, Solidarity called a nationwide strike in April, reported to be the largest in the history of the Soviet Bloc. By midsummer shortages of nearly all basic consumer goods were common. By autumn of 1981, "...shops were virtually empty; the lines grew longer and longer. Never before had there been such a scarcity of the most basic consumer goods (Walesa 1987: 204.) The

Jaruzelski administration spread rumors that Solidarity was to blame for the shortages (due to strikes.) This was yet another attempt to break the union, however, by this time, after literally years of broken promises and disinformation from their various government administrations, few Poles believed the simplified allegations (they probably realized by this time that a plethora of economic problems were to blame.) Ash (2002: 248) reports that by November a near "collapse of the system" was underway. Factories were shutting down as supply chains were disrupted. Harvesting and processing of the fall harvests were disrupted in the same manner. It was estimated that some 30% of agricultural production went to waste in 1981 due to processing plant disruptions and to lack of repair parts for farm machinery. Heavy industrial plants were also idled due to lack of basic repair parts.

Rumors also spread about the possibility of a Soviet invasion to "restore order" as had occurred in 1956 in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Poland, however, was spared foreign invasion. On December 13, 1981 General Jaruzelski declared Poland under Martial Law.

### **Poland Under Martial Law:**

By both the account of Ash and Walesa, martial law in Poland went into effect at midnight December 13, 1981. Jaruzelski addressed the nation at 6:00 AM that morning but tanks, police and soldiers had began patrolling streets in major cities overnight. Roads were blocked, phone lines were cut, and "...thousands of Solidarity activists, advisors, intellectuals, and even critical Party members were carried off to 'interment' camps (Ash 2002: 273.) Jaruzelski announced that as Poland was 'at the brink of an abyss' and as Solidarity's leadership was set on 'overthrowing socialism', he had no choice but to bring order to the State by military intervention.

In his book, Walesa reprints the account of beginnings of martial law as described by Jan Mur, a samizdat publisher:

"...the announcers read the communiqué from the Council Of State, the declaration of martial law, and all its attendant provisions, including curfew, suspension of the right to travel, shutdown of all telephone and telex communications, suppression of freedom of expression, suspended publication of all newspapers and magazines, reduction in radio and television programming, suspension of classes in schools and universities, forced contribution of funds to the army, militarization of numerous businesses, service in the civil defense, suspension of all student organization activities, freezing of bank accounts. This went on all day. People began to understand what had happened. They realized they'd been reduced to nothing in their own country, and that those that had declared war on the nation could do whatever they pleased with them (Walesa 1987: 210 - 211.)

Ash (2002: 274 - 275) adds that,

"All gatherings, processions, and demonstrations ...were banned. All trades unions and student organizations were suspended, as was the right to strike. All mail and telephone communications would be censored. A Curfew from 10 p.m. to 6 a. m. was imposed. Everyone over the age of thirteen had to carry an identity card...Anyone who was thought to threaten the interests of state could be immediately interned for an indefinite period. In a long list of 'militarized' enterprises the workers came directly under military discipline. Absenteeism or disobedience would be punishable by court martial sentences from two years' imprisonment to death...The first popular reaction to the self-invasion" [referring to Polish troops imposing martial law on fellow citizens] "was shock and incredulity."

Even under threats such as these, a series of uncoordinated strikes erupted at major industrial sites. The Huta Katowice steel works and Gdansk Oil Refinery were surrounded by the army as workers staged occupation strikes. Tanks crashed through the gates of the Lenin Shipyard, occupying workers were driven out, and the yard was shut down. Academics who had supported solidarity were rounded up at universities and taken to jail. Riots broke out in cities all over Poland. Ash (2002: 277) says that due to the crackdown on mass communications and the general chaos during the initial period of martial law, no exact figures are available pertaining to deaths and injuries in civilian/military conflicts. "Unofficial" estimates indicate near 1000

injuries and perhaps ten deaths. By early January 1982 an estimated 5000 Solidarity activists were serving long prison sentences; some up to seven years; distribution of illegal publications (samizdat) was punishable with three years in prison. Thousands more striking workers and protesters had been jailed in the first week of martial law, but had been released. Among the leaders serving long sentences was Lech Walesa. He was held in a former government mansion near Warsaw in "...relatively decent physical conditions. The same could not be said about the unknown worker activists freezing behind barbed wire on the Hel peninsula near Gdansk..."(Ash 2002: 282).

### **Solidarity Underground:**

"By imprisoning its leaders and outlawing its publications, the party intended for Solidarity to slip into silenced obscurity" (Penn 2005: 101.)

In the introduction to this thesis I list as one of the factors that facilitated the Solidarity Movement the following: *The Solidarity Movement was maintained by persistent and intentional use of "samizdat."* Without samizdat Solidarity would have 'slipped into silenced obscurity.' A very dedicated group of activists, mainly women as the male leaders of Solidarity were, for the most part, in jail, kept the movement alive. As mentioned earlier in the description of life in Poland under martial law, all forms of communication were entirely under the control and the watchful eye of the State. Obviously, in the early 1980s, the current World Wide Web and cell phone networks were nonexistent; home computers and printers were just emerging in the U.S. market (and were very expensive) and were probably nonexistent in the Soviet Bloc countries. Thus, the samizdat publishers made use of antiquated printing presses - many of them

simple, hand operated presses - the remnants of raids, shut-downs, and confiscation under martial law. A lengthy section will address this important subject in the next chapter of this thesis.

### **Re-Emergence of Solidarity:**

Solidarity, as a legally recognized union, re-emerged in January, 1989. Amnesty had been granted to those imprisoned for participation in the movement in September 1986. However, many of the freed activists as well as several thousand individuals in university teaching positions, the news media, journalism, and publishing fields were unable to find work in their former professions. Stokes (1993: 103) reports that the Jaruzelski administration conducted a "verification process" in which employees were "...interviewed concerning his or her attitude toward the regime and toward Solidarity." If one "passed the test" (presumably those fired from their jobs did not or would not conceal their support of Solidarity) then a written statement was required promising to break all ties with Solidarity. This practice was intended to silence and isolate media and academic supporters of Solidarity in an ideological sense; that is, the Polish government already fully controlled (by censorship or outright ownership) TV, newspapers, magazines, etc. and the content of such, but firing academics and media personnel was meant to silence *the source of* intellectual dissent.

Yet many of those who lost 'official jobs' found their way into the underground Solidarity movement (this was being funded, in part, by contributions from Western labor unions, from funds "stashed away" during legalized Solidarity, and from continued dues payments from workers supporting the underground movement.) In this way their ideological contributions

remained, quite literally, 'in circulation,' through samizdat. Helena Luczywo, a publisher and frequent contributor to underground publications during the years in which Solidarity was banned, described the goal of her group in preparation for possible reemergence of the union:

"Once the military blocked all the strike efforts that followed the declaration of martial law, people stopped protesting. They lost confidence in Solidarity. They believed that they could no longer win more than they had already gained during the movement's legal period. They were afraid. We worried that no one would care about Solidarity anymore. Consequently, the goal of the underground was not to fight the regime but to restore Solidarity's legitimacy and credibility among its members" (Penn 2005: 168.)

They were remarkably successful, not only in simply restoring faith in the continuation of the movement after martial law, but in maintaining interest in activism which materialized very shortly after the 'more liberalized' climate and release of political prisoners in the mid '80s. The major factor in bringing about the political liberalization in Poland occurred in the Soviet Union; it is summed up as "*The Gorbachev Effect.*"

Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of The Communist Party of The Soviet Union on March 11, 1985. In April, at the Plenum of the Communist Party, he announced his plans for perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness.) Zdravomyslova ( 1996: 122 - 137) explains that "restructuring " was impossible as the USSR, ideologically built on Leninism, was a static system stagnating within an outdated worldview. She quotes a slogan from the Democratic Union (a radical democratic organization that emerged in the USSR in 1988) which aptly condenses this idea: "Perestroika actually means the rejection of perestroika , which goal is impossible to achieve without a radical restructuring in ideology" (Zdravomyslova 1996: 128.) The leaders and intellectuals in Solidarity had realized this fact years earlier and perhaps the Communist leaders of Poland had also realized it. Perhaps many others had realized it too but, just as Nikita Khrushchev had risked his life and career by denouncing Stalinism, so Mikhail

Gorbachev took great risk in proposing *dimocratizatsia* (free elections and open competition between political candidates and parties - pluralism in contrast to one-party, authoritarianism.) The tradition of Stalinism, a throwback to Czarism, still plagued the modern Soviet Union, and the proposition of "enlightened" ideas continued to be very risky. However, as 'desperate times often call for desperate measures', Gorbachev may have been as much a 'victim' of political and economic dysfunction than an 'enlightened reformer.' Regardless, the favorable political climate created by Gorbachev was a very critical factor in Solidarity's reemergence and re-legalization. "*The Gorbachev Effect*" will be fully discussed in a later chapter as one of the eight critical factors in this synthetic analysis.

Ash (2002: 369 - 371) summarizes the political essence of Gorbachev's reforms in relation to Eastern Europe by humorously referring to them as the "Sinatra Doctrine"; do it your way. This is a reference to the content of a 1987 speech by Gorbachev, "...which legitimized the independence of all Communist parties and called for reform throughout the bloc (Wejnert 2002: 67.) Without this political liberalization the Solidarity Movement would have had a very different historic trajectory and perhaps would have never been re-legalized. By releasing the various Soviet States proper and the states of the Eastern Bloc to pursue their own political interests, Gorbachev's "Sinatra Doctrine" unleashed a chain of events that led not only to Solidarity's re-legalization, but within four years, the complete political reconfiguration of the Soviet world.

However, Gorbachev's role must be viewed as a "facilitating factor" (one among many) in Solidarity's success and, as Ash (2002: 367 - 378) points out, the workers of the reemerging movement still had to resort to their old tactics of strikes, protests, and negotiations right up to

the 1989 re-legalization. "The Gorbachev Effect" created political opportunity but it was up to the reemerging Solidarity participants to take advantage of it.

The details of the final months before re-legalization are complex and constitute another lengthy history in itself. For the purposes of this thesis the events may be condensed, below, as per the final chapters of Ash 2002, and Kreis 2004:

The liberalized political climate in the Soviet Bloc (beginning in 1985 with Gorbachev's perestroika, as discussed above) and the granting of amnesty to imprisoned Solidarity activists in September 1986 led to reconstitution of Solidarity as a (still illegal) social movement under the coordination of the (still illegal) federation of cooperative labor unions, under the general name, *Solidarnosc*. In 1987 Lech Walesa headed a movement to form a new National Executive Commission which began reorganizing the union and rebuilding support and communication networks among the old Solidarity leadership. A new generation of members also entered at this time, as many had been children in the 1980 - '81 period of legalization and were now entering the workforce.

In the spring of 1988 a wave of coordinated strikes again swept the nation culminating in August 31, the eighth anniversary of the Gdansk Agreement and Solidarity's initial recognition as a legal and independent labor union. On this date official negotiations between Solidarity and the Polish government were reopened, beginning the first of the "Round Table Discussions" that would lead to re-legalization of the union in January 1989. In the June elections of that year, (1989) Solidarity backed candidates won 99 of 100 seats in the Polish Senate (upper house) and all of the contested seats (161 out of 460 total) in the Sejm (lower house.) In August a new coalition government was formed between the remnants of the Communist government (United



Workers' Party) and the new Solidarity party. In December the name, "Republic of Poland", was restored to the nation, and Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a Solidarity advisor from the KOR group, was temporarily appointed as Prime Minister. In December 1990 Lech Walesa was elected as the first president.

## **Chapter Four**

### **Theoretical Background**

This chapter will first briefly describe three general bodies of social movement theories, resource mobilization, political opportunity, and issue framing. It will then describe several theoretical constructs that will be combined under the heading "collective behavior theories." In chapter six each of the contentions proposed in the introduction as facilitating factors to Solidarity's success will be introduced with a very short reference as to how they relate to the theoretical background below.

#### **Resource Mobilization Theories**

This perspective takes into consideration the rational choice of individuals to actively mobilize dissent into collective action by use of material resources and organizational tactics. Rather than a 'spontaneous emergence' of collective action, (as some early theorists proposed, such as George Herbert Mead as described in Ritzer 2009: 411 - 433) in resource mobilization theory, activists, union committees, party leadership – some core group – consciously begins to organize funding, media coverage, public support, staff or volunteers, all aimed at furthering the growth of the movement.

According to Della Porta and Diani (2006) this has been the dominant American perspective on social movement organization since the 1970s and is still a widely used body of theory. They cite such well known theorists as Charles Tilly, Mayer Zald, John D. McCarthy, and Anthony Oberschall as early contributors (14.) Della Porta and Diani describe the resource mobilization model as collective action resulting from, "...a calculation of the costs and benefits influenced by

the presence of resources - in particular by organization and by the strategic interactions necessary for the development of a social movement...The capacity for mobilization depends on the material resources (work, money, concrete benefits, services) and/or nonmaterial resources (authority, moral engagement, faith, friendship) available to the group" (2006: 14 - 15).

Zald and McCarthy's 1987 "entrepreneurial model" of resource mobilization is generally not too concerned with the resources themselves or even how resources are used but with how they are acquired and organized. In contrast, McCarthy, nearly ten years later (1996), added another concept to the resource mobilization perspective when he elaborated on the importance of *mobilizing structures*, which he defines as, "...those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action (McAdam et al. 1996: 3). Whereas McCarthy and Zald's entrepreneurial model emphasizes (in the form of eleven stated propositions; Zald and McCarthy 1987: 25 - 39) the quantity of resources available to SMOs as a defining factor in their structure, operation, and success, McCarthy's 1996 comments emphasize how *mobilizing structures* affect SMOs outcomes through the various *mobilization strategies* and protest tactics available to specific mobilizing structures.

In simplest terms, McCarthy's idea is this: the mobilization structure of a movement will affect its outcome *because different mobilizing structures have different mobilizing strategies* available to them, or, (for whatever reasons) different mobilizing structures utilize different strategies. For example, McCarthy cites the fact that the U.S. civil rights movement, the women's movement, the environmental movement, and the peace movement all had *similar* mobilization structures; with one important exception: the peace movement lacked a "litigious formal structure." That is, the peace movement failed to evolve a SMO that was able to link its agenda to the U.S. legal system; the civil rights, womens', and environmental movements all

were able to establish legal precedents and see the passing of laws defending their goals. Thus, the lack of the “litigious formal structure” in the peace movement greatly hindered its ability to legalize any of its goals (this probably being that there was no political opportunity broad enough to allow for a citizen’s group to attempt to intact legislation that would affect U.S. military withdrawal in Viet Nam). A slight difference in structure made a great difference in outcome (McAdam et al.1996: 146).

A wide variety of mobilization structures exists and John D. McCarthy explains that, “...the choices that activists make about how to...pursue change have consequences for their ability to raise material resources and mobilize dissident efforts...which can directly affect the chances that their common efforts will succeed” (McCarthy in McAdam et al. 1996: 141).

The two broadest general categories of mobilization structures are simply the informal and the formal structures. Informal mobilization structures include family and friendship networks, neighborhood connections, work networks, activist networks, affinity groups, and “memory communities” (defined by McCarthy as networks of de-mobilized protestors or activists who still maintain connections but are not active). Formal groups include churches, unions, professional organizations, social movement organizations (including social movement unionism groups), protest committees, and formal movement schools (McCarthy in McAdam et al.1996:142 – 145). Some scholars apparently may spend much time and effort in creating taxonomies for the plethora of possible mobilization structures but the more meaningful analysis seems to be in linking the given mobilization structure to available *mobilization strategies and protest tactics*.

Mobilization strategies, like the mobilization structures from which they evolve, will vary greatly per situation. A key point here is simply the legality, or lack thereof, of the movement. Legal strategies of mobilizing support and legal protest tactics may lend more legitimacy to a

movement *if* such are possible. Grassroots movements for change in totalitarian regimes are seldom tolerated as dissent and opposition are illegal in these societies. Attempts at such are often squelched by brutal retaliatory force as was the case, for example, in the summer of 2009 concerning the disputed election results in Iran. Thus, well organized social movement organizations with legal rights and the privilege of litigation of grievances do not evolve in totalitarian societies (in Poland, for example, the outlawed Solidarity movement operated underground for a decade before its legitimacy was acknowledged). Lacking legal recourse such situations call for creative tactics in both mobilization and in protest repertoire. McCarthy notes that in the U.S. the civil rights movement, the women's movement, and the environmental movement all made use of formal litigation in reaching their aims and *formal* social movement organizations connected to professional groups, churches, and lobbying committees evolved in the process. This was not the case in Poland as Solidarity had no rights as it had no legal recognition from the State. Thus, mobilizing and protesting without legal rights calls for more creative measures and more risk taking than in situations where none exist.

Concerning protest tactics, Harvard University professor Gene Sharp has identified 198 different tactics or methods of nonviolent action available to participants of social movements or collective action in general. In part two of his 1973 book, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, he explains each tactic and gives concrete historical examples of the use of each. Obviously, violent actions may be used also, but as history often shows, violence is often met again with violence. Violent tactics were for the most part abandoned in the 1970s in Poland, as it became evident that military and police force would be used to maintain order.

Sharp's detailed and exhaustive analysis seems to indicate that study of the methods or repertoires of protest possibly constitutes a separate branch altogether in the study of social

movements. Many of the eclectic tactics he describes, such as various forms of walkouts and strikes, symbolic public acts, processions, honoring the dead, declarations by prominent individuals, and the use of newspapers, leaflets, and pamphlets to spread ideology, were all used by Solidarnosc. These and many other innovative means of resource mobilization were used in Poland as conventional, overt, legal methods were not possible in the authoritarian society of Communist Poland.

### **Political Opportunity or Political Process Perspective**

This perspective emphasizes structural weaknesses, divisions, breakdowns, or otherwise weakening of existing political power structures as a facilitative condition for social movements. Some scholars (such as Skocpol 1979) place more emphasis on the weakening of political regimes in precipitating major societal changes than on the actions of social movement groups; McAdam comments, “Most contemporary theories of revolution...argue that revolutions owe less to the efforts of insurgents than to the work of systematic crises which render the existing regime weak and vulnerable to change from virtually any quarter” (McAdam et al 1996).

Barbara Wejnert (2002) studied the correlation between frequencies of protest activities in Eastern Europe and changes within the makeup of top political office holders. She found that protest activities increased as ‘regime adjustments’ occurred; that is, as perceptions of a regime’s vulnerability increases (due to changes in leadership) so does the frequency of protest against the regime. Additionally, she notes a “variability in the degree of liberalization” within the former Communist governments of Eastern Europe and in those deemed less hard-lined (Poland and Hungary less so, she reports, than Czechoslovakia and East Germany). “It is believed that the variability...was partly due to internal conflicts and divisions that plagued the authoritarian

power of Communist parties” (Wejnert 2002: 68). Party disunity or changes in Party leadership then may create a political opportunity for dissidents as the perception of weakness or liberalization (even relative liberalization in comparison to other regimes) raises the perception of the chance for success of a protest or movement.

Additionally, Wejnert proposes that a reciprocal dynamic exists between the opposition and established regimes. As vulnerability is perceived as an opportunity, groups may take action and in doing so further ‘soften’ the regime. A counter hegemony may evolve out of grassroots mobilization that poses a real threat to a regime by offering alternatives to it. This cycle may have greater and greater impact upon the regime. Wejnert refers to this as “perestroika from below” (2002:69).

In addition to domestic political opportunities some social movements may benefit from international political opportunities. The Polish Solidarity Movement is a prime example of this. “The Gorbachev Factor” is a phrase commonly found in much of the literature on international political opportunities of the Solidarity Movement. This refers to the general liberalizing policies of perestroika and glasnost (restructuring and openness) advocated by Mikhail Gorbachev. One might argue that a “Reagan Factor” as well created political opportunity for Solidarity.

Doug McAdam warns that analysts of social movements must carefully differentiate political opportunities from other facilitating factors, such as cultural or ideological components, that may be closely related to political opportunity. Otherwise, he states, the political opportunity paradigm risks losing its effectiveness as it becomes so broad as to encompass factors not necessarily within its boundaries (McAdam et al. 1996:25).

## Issue Framing

The contention that a strong collective identity and a unified sense of purpose were major facilitating factors in Solidarity's success will be backed up in chapter six by use of examples from interview data and from secondary sources. This section will elaborate on the theoretical/conceptual framework that is intended to support these contentions. The framework draws from several separate grounded fields of sociological theory. It unites these several fields to create a theoretical perspective that fits and explains the workings of Solidarity in relation to use of issue framing and ideology in creating a strong collective identity. This strategy is based on social historian Arthur L. Stinchcombe's notion that, "One does not apply theory to history; rather one uses history to develop theory" (Stinchcombe 1978: 1).

Issue framing or frame theory as an analytical tool for explaining certain elements of social movements has its roots in Erving Goffman's, *Frame Analysis*, (1974) and Goffman's notion of "schemata of interpretation." Frames are a form of this "schemata" and they constitute a "...primary framework {that} allows its user to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms" (Goffman 1974: 21). Primary frameworks occur naturally or are simply expressions of benign events.

"Natural frameworks identify occurrences seen as undirected, unoriented, unanimated, unguided, "purely physical" ... Elegant examples of versions of these natural frameworks are found, of course, in the physical and biological sciences. An ordinary example would be the state of the weather as given in a report" (Goffman 1974: 22).

Social frameworks, however, are not 'naturally occurring.' They are 'social constructions of reality,' to use Berger and Luckmann's term (1966). Goffman states:



"Social frameworks, on the other hand, provide background understanding for events that incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effort of an intelligence, a live agency, the chief one being the human being. Such an agency is anything but implacable; it can be coaxed, flattered, affronted, and threatened. What it does can be described as "guided doings." ...Guided doings...allow for two kinds of understanding. One...pertains to the patent manipulation of the natural world in accordance with the special constraints that natural occurrences impose; the other understanding pertains to the special worlds in which the actor can become involved..." Goffmann 1974: 22 – 23).

It is this element of "live agency" - of will and intent - that elevates social frameworks from benign mental schemata to potential animation of the schemata. The schemata becomes a condensation of much complex meaning and in the process of grasping this profound and complex meaning it can engender in the individual (and in the collective aligned with the schemata) the famous question posed by V.I. Lenin, "What is to be done?"

Benford and Snow paint a very clear picture of this process. They state that framing,

"...denotes an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction. It is active in the sense that something is being done, and processual in the sense of a dynamic, evolving process. It entails agency in the sense that what is evolving is the work of social movement organizations or movement activists. And it is contentious in the sense that it involves the generation of interpretative frames that not only differ from existing ones but may also challenge them. The resultant products of this framing activity are referred to as "collective action frames" (Benford and Snow 2000: 614).

This paper contends that the activists of the Solidarity Movement used various forms of framing and manipulation of frames in such a way that in the process thereof they created a very high degree of collective identity and common purpose, so high in fact, that Solidarnosc was able to overcome the great structural constraints to its mobilization through its very real social solidarity.

I now state four specific ways in which Solidarity manipulated frames or was manipulated by frames:

- 1) *Solidarity aligned its frames with other existing frames.*
- 2) *Solidarity linked its frames with existing cultural constructs.*

By the same token, members of Solidarity and the general population of Poland were, as individuals and as a collective, shaped, manipulated, and indoctrinated, over time, by frameworks established, maintained, and empowered by the Soviet Union. I contend that one “master frame” of the Soviet Union in particular, “fraternal proletarian solidarity,” was truly internalized by the Polish working class in general, and that Solidarity capitalized on this frame construct. Fraternal proletarian solidarity was achieved but its loyalty was *not* to the Soviet Union. Thus:

- 4) *Solidarity was strengthened by the existing frame of fraternal proletarian solidarity.*

Additionally, Solidarity did not develop its entire ideological framework from scratch. Although the totalitarian government of The Polish People’s Republic controlled access to information and greatly limited communication, cross-national diffusion of ideologies did occur. Thus:

- 5) *Solidarity was ideologically informed by diffusion of ‘frames of dissent’ from the Soviet Union and by ‘frames of resistance’ from Poland’s past (resistance to German, Austrian, and Russian control in various historical eras.)*

I will now elaborate on the theoretical/conceptual framework to be used in conjunction with the four statements listed above.

First, I wish to look at frame analysis as associated with social movements in light of two different versions of collective identity theory as described by Taylor (1975) and elaborated on by

Abizadeh (2005.) The *particularist* version (as opposed to *cosmopolitanism* version) has roots in Hegel's notion of the self developing from recognition of the *other* – another self, another human being – but Taylor (1975) extends Hegel's thesis *beyond individual self to include the collective* (this is known as the “Hegel-Taylor” argument; Abizadeh 2005: 48). The Hegel-Taylor argument is strictly a particularist version of creation of collective identity. The cosmopolitanist version of collective identity supposes that *global* solidarity is possible as individuals taking part in a collective will identify *within* that collective – thus, there is no need of an external other in the creation of collective identity, and in turn, creation of social solidarity. The particularist version supposes that collective identity and social solidarity are possible *only in relation to an external other*, and most often in terms of that other being an adversary. There are different shades of this theory, different degrees of intensity, so to speak, but Abizadeh states, in describing the “stronger version” of the particularist thesis:

“The second, stronger version of the particularist thesis goes further and specifies the nature of the relation to the other that the constitution of a collectivity supposedly requires: a relation of either antagonism or hostility. On this interpretation, a collectivity inherently requires *adversarial* exclusion: the existence of some external other *against which* it can define itself” (Abizadeh 2005: 45).

The concept of collective identity as a component of social solidarity is a common theme. It ranges from macro-level versions such as George Orwell's, *1984*, which pits the fictional Oceania against Eurasia, to Samuel P. Huntington's, *Clash of Civilizations and The Remaking of World Order* (1996) , which divides the world into eight archetypical cultures based on commonalities of language and religion. On a mid-range level, Fantasia's 1988 compilation of three case studies of workplace strikes and attempts at unionization (*Cultures Of Solidarity*) is

based, in a large part, on realization of collective identity as a prerequisite to emergence of class consciousness and ultimately, social solidarity. A micro-level example that extends to the global level is illustrated in a traditional Middle-Eastern folk saying: “Me against my brother. My brother and me against our uncle. Me, my brother and our uncle against the village. The village against the state. The state against the world” (Sethi 2009, personal communication).

The point is, identity, be it individual as in Hegel’s thesis, or collective as in Taylor’s is constructed in relation to the other. In constructed oppositions, as Orwell made the ideologies of Oceania and Eurasia, identification *within* the collective emerges easily (in opposition to the ‘*extreme otherness*’ of the other) as does identification by the collective as a whole in relation to the collective of the *other*; that is, *externally*. Collective identity and social solidarity are then easily maintained and strengthened through exposure to ideology (ideology that contrasts the two opposing collectives) and through exposure to ideology’s irrational extreme, that is, propaganda.

Additionally, slightly differing ideologies may be accommodated within the collective consolidating solidarity into wider and wider spheres; this is the meaning of the folk-saying, “Me against my brother,” all the way to the implication of, “My brother and all similar to us against the external world.” The “otherness” of some individuals or collectives becomes less and less, to the point of inclusion, in relation to the perceived threat of an “extreme other.” This reflects Abizadeh’s conception of the “strong particularist” view.

I suggest that in order to better explain the success of the Solidarity Movement in terms of ideological framework it is not sufficient to merely identify the frames. It is necessary to describe how Solidarity used frames to build social solidarity through creation of collective identity and common purpose. I suggest that we consider Solidarity’s frames as dialogisms (from Mikhail Bakhtin’s , *The Dialogic Imagination*, 1982) – as “language conceived as ideologically

saturated” – that so profoundly resonated with the people of Poland that a collective identity and common purpose was formed that was strong enough to overcome the difficulties of mobilization.

By the same token, in dialogical form, an existing ideology (Rude {1980} refers to these as “inherent ideologies”), specifically the Soviet ideology of “fraternal proletarian solidarity,” was manipulated, used, and/or co-opted by Solidarity to maximize social solidarity and to amplify unity of purpose.

Thus, to return to Goffman’s original notion of frames as “schemata of interpretation” that are “guided doings” of “human agency,” I add that such frames were used with intent to engender collective identity as a means to facilitate social solidarity in the trade union, Solidarnosc. To put it another way, the particularist version of collective identity theory can be enhanced by attaching to it the power of using ideological framework as a tool for collective identity building, the result of which is a strong social solidarity within a collective and against the ‘other’ collective.

To more clearly understand the workings Solidarity’s ideological framework as a dialogism, it is necessary to apply Bakhtin’s concept of the dialogic process to the construction of frames.

Bakhtin’s dialogism can be described, in very simplified terms, as the construction of identity through the process of dialogue, or perhaps, as the social construction of collective identity through dialogic interaction. Where as Hegel’s dialectic amounted to synthesis out of two opposing views, Bakhtin’s dialogic does not suppose that one or the other views will be abandoned for a synthesis; both views remain intact but in the process of expressing the views identities are constructed, clarified, strengthened. (Bakhtin, 1982; Sulashiva, 2007).

This notion is similar to the particularist version of collective identity formation. Bakhtin supposes that conflicts over discourses or ideologies between the self and the ‘other’ will not be resolved by synthesis or compromise, and in the process of the dialogue collective identities are formed. The point here or the implication is that frames can function as dialogisms; *frames can be the medium through which collective identity is intentionally built and collective identity is a prime component of social solidarity. Social solidarity is critical to any social movement especially to one like Solidarnosc in which resource mobilization was actively hindered by State power and authority.*

Thus, by combining Goffman’s original notion of frame analysis (which served as an interpretative tool) as elaborated on by Bedford and Snow in respect to social movement theory, with Bakhtin’s notion of dialogism (as a creator of collective identity) we now have a concept or a perspective with which we may analyze some of the actual historic events of the Solidarity Movement. As stated in the beginning of this section, this method follows Stinchcombe’s strategy of developing a theory that explains historical events rather than attempting to “bend” history to fit an existing theory.

Another way in which Solidarity used ideological frameworks to its advantage is by linking them to national and cultural traditions. This is similar to Snow’s (Snow et al.1986) ‘frame alignment and frame bridging.’ “Frame-compatible sentiment pools” are identified, these being, “...aggregates of individuals who share common grievances and attributional orientations, but who lack the organizational base for expressing their discontents and for acting in pursuit of their interests” (Snow et al. 1986: 467). As a mobilization tactic, these pools can be linked by many forms of communication depending on the availability of the communications systems; only in the recent past, for example, were internet communications available for networking in attempt

to locate and link supporters of a social movement. Solidarity used a variety of methods to network, bridge existing frames, and thus link to other similar interest groups, labor unions, individual supporters, etc. (these will be identified and described in the body of the thesis.) Solidarity used this exact, conventional method of frame bridging as described by Snow.

However, I contend that Solidarity's 'frame bridging' also went much further, in some cases, than simply physically linking supporters; again, I believe that Bakhtin's notion of dialogism more aptly describes Solidarity's linkage of its frames to Polish national and cultural traditions. This kind of linkage went beyond associated 'interest groups' to link the entire nation of Poland internally as well as to generate international support for Solidarity's struggle.

Perhaps the best way to describe the ideological bridge that Solidarity constructed between itself and existing traditions is to quote a passage from a more familiar historical time and place. Dorothy Hale used the following passage to open a paper entitled, "Bakhtin In African American Literature" (1994):

"The strident, moral voice of the former slave recounting, exposing, appealing, apostrophizing and above all *remembering* his ordeal in bondage is the single most impressive feature of a slave narrative. This voice is striking because of what it relates, but even more so because the slave's acquisition of that voice is quite possibly his only permanent achievement once he escapes and casts himself upon a new and larger landscape" (Stepto in Hale 1994).

Hale uses Bakhtinian ideas in relation to African American experiences to demonstrate "...social identity as materialized through language" (Hale 1994:447). The words of Pope John Paul II and of Solidarity's leader, Lech Walesa, for example, when linking Solidarity's goals and ideologies to the traditions of Polish Catholicism, to the sacred icon of Our Lady of Czestochowa (and to the associated litany, being a long, emotionalized prayer in behalf of the deceived,

betrayed, and oppressed) or to The Pope's personal mission – a mission he felt was his own through the supernatural message of Our Lady of Fatima – “the consecration of Russia to my Immaculate Heart” – these ideas hold condensed, deeply emotional meaning for Poles, similar to “the strident moral voice of the slave remembering” in African American culture as described by Hale. Ideas such as these surpass any sterile, academic understanding or application of “frame theory.” They create identity through what Hale, drawing from the work of W.E.B. DuBois, calls the “socially constructed consciousness” {similar to Bakhtin’s “ideological consciousness”} (Hale 1994: 446 – 450 and Bakhtin 1981: 30). If we look at Solidarity’s linking of its ideologies to cultural traditions in terms of Bakhtin’s notion of dialogism we get a more accurate understanding of the social implications than simply creating a taxonomy of frame varieties (as in Benford and Snow 2000).

In, *The Dialogic Imagination*, (1981) Bakhtin describes how tradition and memory constitute a power greater than the “absolute past” – a past that is “...walled off absolutely from all subsequent times...” and in such terms, “...memory, and not knowledge {that} serve{s} as the source of power for the creative impulse” (Bakhtin 1981: 15). In other words, the idealized, emotionalized, remembered past can take on an existence of its own – it may not even be entirely historically accurate – that is not the point. The point is the power of this sort of narrative to unite those who take part in it. “The epic past, walled off from all subsequent times by an impenetrable boundary, is preserved and revealed only in the form of national tradition...The important thing is not the factual sources of the epic...the important thing is...its reliance on impersonal and sacrosanct tradition, on a commonly held evaluation and point of view...{it} displays a profound piety toward the subject described and the language used to describe it, the language of tradition” (Bakhtin 1981: 16 – 17).



*Tradition held in reverence unites people* - I believe that is what Bakhtin is saying. A recent American example of this concept would be the image of the Reverend Jesse Jackson fighting back tears during Barack Obama's inauguration address when Obama said, "And because we have tasted the bitter swill of civil war and segregation and emerged from this dark chapter stronger and more united, we cannot help but believe that the old hatreds shall someday pass" (Obama 2009). All Americans, black and white, understood the condensed meaning of this statement and regardless of its accuracy (did we really emerge more united or more divided?) it is a potent statement that unifies us as Americans, at least at the time and in the context when it was spoken. I contend that many statements such as this - that is, statements that appeal to national memory, that unite through reverence of tradition - were incorporated into Solidarity's ideological framework. Thus, combining Bakhtin's notion of dialogism with conventional social movement frame analysis gives us the analytical tool needed to explain, in part, the power of Solidarity's appeal to the Polish people

### **"Collective Behavior Theories"**

In explaining the first factor proposed in this paper, I draw on several ideas found within certain bodies of grounded theories which may be generally referred to as "collective behavior theories." I place this term in quotations to indicate that it is not a wholesale reference to the outdated "emergent behaviors" notions of George Herbert Mead or a complete application of Neil Smelser's full-blown "value-added model." Just as complex historical realities cannot all be reduced into neat, linear stories without ignoring or omitting ramifications or exceptions that do not "fit" a simplified framework, neither can one body of sociological theory be expected to fully explain a phenomena as complex as the Polish Solidarity Movement. Therefore, in addition

to the three general bodies of social movement theories previously discussed, I add a fourth category and give it the generalized name, "Collective Behavior Theories."

For the purposes of this thesis (specifically for explaining factors 1 and 2 as proposed in the introduction) I draw loosely on Smelser's (1962) "structural conduciveness" model, on George Rude's (1995) notion of "popular ideology" (as opposed to formal ideology) and on a group of concepts which may be called "the elements of solidarity," as described in a paper by Randy Hodson, Sandy Welsh, Sabine Rieble, Cheryl S. Jamison, and Sean Creighton, all of Indiana University (Hodson et al 1993.) Additionally, I will draw on a "positive theory of goals and organization" as described in Robert S. Lynd's 1946 paper titled, "Planned Social Solidarity In The Soviet Union.

***Structural Conduciveness:*** I use this term to loosely describe the specific structural conditions in which Solidarnosc emerged. I use the term in reference to the large number of industrial workers in Poland in the 1980s (which were the main constituents of the movement) and in reference to certain socio-cultural attributes of these workers. This second reference (to certain socio-cultural attributes) blends into the notion of "elements of solidarity" as described by Hodson et al.(1993). Smelser's term, "culturally defined behavior," (1962: 6) [which he attributes to Herbert Blumer] denotes behavior that is considered outside the realm of collective behavior, as per Blumer's definition of such, and which is apparently in contrast to Blumer's notion of "spontaneously occurring" collective action. However, "culturally defined behavior" seems a good term to describe the results of the "elements of solidarity" and "determinants of solidarity" elaborated on by Hodson et al.

In Smelser's *Theory Of Collective Behavior* (1962: 15 - 21) he describes structural conduciveness as one element of the "value-added" process. According to this theory, when certain combinations of elements occur together, the *possibility* increases that collective behaviors will occur. Structural conduciveness simply means that social conditions are present that are *conducive* to the potential for collective behavior. Earlier perspectives, such as those of Mead in the 1920's and of Blumer in the 1950s were based on psychological behaviorism; on the notion that internal psychological drives or external social coercion resulted in "emergence" of collective behavior. Mead and Blumer's ideas seemed little more than a step past biological notions of stimuli/response patterns as demonstrated, for instance, by Pavlov's dogs. "Panics, fads, and fashions," as well as "the craze, the riot, and the revolution," were imagined to "spontaneously occur" under the right conditions. Smelser made the distinction that several determinants must combine to create conditions *favorable* for collective action, but even with this, no 'guarantee' existed (Smelser 1962; Ritzer 2008.) Below are listed a simplified version of Smelser's six criteria (1962: 15 - 17) based on his explanations and on elaborations by Sztompka (2004):

1. *Structural conduciveness* – things that make or allow collective action possible or more probable (such as, spatial proximity or similar economic and/or political interests, existing organizational patterns ) - the potential for collective action is there, however, people must be aware of some common problem and have the opportunity to act and connect with each other in order to solve the problem - such as, by forming a social movement
2. *Structural strain* – something (inequality, injustice, economic dysfunction) must strain society, and existing power holders are unable or unwilling to deal with the problem - consciousness of this may lead to perception of relative deprivation
3. *Generalized belief* - the general population must have an understanding of what the problem is. The problem should be clearly defined and this definition widely agreed upon by potential participants. (framing the issues)

4. *Precipitating factors* – something brings events to a climax and action is taken - sometimes a specific event , such as a riot, an act of violence, or a economic trigger - perhaps a political opportunity arises or a charismatic leader emerges

5. *Mobilization for action* – people organized labor, communication, resources in preparation to act (resource mobilization)

6. *Failure of social control* - how the authorities react (or don't) - High level of social control by the power holders (government, police, military) obviously make it more difficult for collective action to begin - activists may have to use innovative means in highly controlled situations

***Elements Of Solidarity And Determinants Of Solidarity:*** Hodson et al., are referring to general social solidarity of groups, not to the labor union, Solidarnosc (Solidarity.) They state that, "the foundation of solidarity is shared experience at work and the sense of involvement and attachment that arises from these shared experiences" [Goffee 1981] (Hodson et al. 1993: 399.) They list several general categories which they call, "determinants of worker solidarity," and "elements of solidarity" (described below.) These seem to manifest themselves in "culturally defined behaviors," to use Smelser's/Blumer's terminology (the specific culture for the purpose of this thesis may be called " industrial culture.") I contend that certain aspects of this culture facilitated social solidarity within the constituents of Solidarnosc, who were mainly heavy industrial workers - the "industrial proletariat," to use the Marxist term - working in shipyards along the Baltic Coast and in steel mills, coke and chemical plants, foundries, mines, etc., across Poland.

This idea is *not* that social solidarity "spontaneously emerges" at various times or under certain circumstances (as Fantasia 1988 seems to imply) any more than it is that collective action "spontaneously emerges." The idea is more along the lines of Smelser, in that certain cultural constructs make the potential for social solidarity *more likely*, and if collective action is

undertaken (*not* a spontaneous event) by a group with strong social solidarity it is more likely that positive results will occur ( because social solidarity prevents the group and its goals from being broken up by conditions or other actors that are opposed to the group and its goals.) Rudolf Heberle (1951) distinguished between spontaneous events (like those covered by Fantasia; wildcat strikes, walk-outs) and long-term social movements (which the Solidarity Movement was):

"Short-lived, more or less spontaneous mass actions, such as wildcat strikes or riots, while not regarded as social movements in the strict sense of our concept, are nonetheless worthy of study because they do occur within the framework of genuine social movements; in fact, they are usually among the first symptoms of social unrest, and they also form part of the tactical devices of a movement" (Heberle 1951: 7.)

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Below are descriptions of characteristics that Hodson (et al 1993: 399- 406) cite as general facilitators of social solidarity within workplace culture, (determinants of solidarity) or, as clarified above, conditions that make the potential for social solidarity more likely; I only discuss those that pertain to the analysis of Solidarnosc in this thesis. The first four are *elements of solidarity*, or the behaviors displayed by groups that are considered to be cohesive:

1. *Cohesion*, defined by Hodson et al. (399) as "a fundamental precondition for solidarity...In a noncohesive group, workers are relatively indifferent to each other. In cohesive groups, friendship networks provide an essential mechanism for the development and implementation of collective strategies."

2. *Mutual Defense*, refers to the collectivity of the workgroup standing up for individuals within it. When conflicts or grievances arise against those that have power, authority, or control over the workers (employers, bosses, foreman; or in the case of Solidarnosc, the State/Communist Party) a group that displays strong social solidarity will defend itself and individual workers (Hodson et al: 399.)

3. *Leadership*: Hodson et al. (400) states that, "Without leadership, solidarity is restricted to isolated, noncumulative episodes. The emergence of group leadership evidences a more durable basis for collective action (Fantasia 1988: 109). Strong leadership typically does not emerge until a group needs to take some collective action...Leadership thus reflects a relatively high level of solidarity."

4. *Group Boundaries*: This refers to recognition of the work group as a definite entity in opposition to or in some way separate from others; for the purpose of this thesis, it refers mainly to the demand of the Solidarity Movement to create a union independent from the State. Opposition to the threats of management (for example, layoff, pay cuts, shortened hours, demands to intensify work output, etc.) can intensify social solidarity through the praxis of resistance. Solidarity's resistance to the threats of the State (evidenced in its highest form by the outlawing of Solidarnosc and imposition of martial law) was analogous to management threats against workers.

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The next three items are work place characteristics that Hodson et al. cite as being conducive to development of social solidarity. I list only those that I apply to analysis of Solidarnosc. Hodson

et al. call these "Determinants of Solidarity." I paraphrase descriptions of these below from Hodson et al. 1993: 400 - 402, and elaborate on the last item with reference to Scott (1942) and Walesa (1987):

5. *Unionization*: "Unions are the most commonly identified foundation for solidarity among workers. Unions provide both a mechanism for collective action and the countervailing power that shelters workers' collective actions from management reprisals" (Hodson et al: 400.) The presence of established, unionized workplaces within a community is a positive factor in the development of a "culture of solidarity" (to use Fantasia's term from his 1988 book, *Cultures of Solidarity*.) Poland's heavy industrial base (along with nearly all other large scale enterprises) was unionized, albeit by state controlled unions. One of Solidarnosc's main demands was recognition of itself as a union, independent of the state unions. By virtue of the fact that the processes of collective action and collective representation were already in the experiences of Solidarnosc's members (again, through the state unions; despite their failings) I contend that this constitutes another facilitating factor for the movement.

6. *Stability of the labor force*: Hodson et al cites this factor as "...an important precondition for solidarity" (400.) By the very nature of its definition, social solidarity is social cohesion within a group. Groups of individuals with similar goals, needs, or interests are more likely to form in permanent worksites rather than in temporary situations. Workers in permanent industrial sites are more likely to demonstrate a higher degree of social solidarity (evidenced by unionism or any other collective action) than, for example, migrant farm workers; the structural fact of permanence verses temporality allows cohesive groups to form and to eventually evolve into formal organizations.

7. *Dangerous Working Conditions*: "...mutual defense and support can be galvanized by physical dangers in the workplace as easily as by management threats" (Hodson et al 401 - 402.) As in item number four (above), *Group Boundaries*, in which threats by those in authority over workers results in facilitation of social solidarity, a similar phenomenon occurs when workers are exposed to the threat of danger on the job. As with soldiers who experience and survive the danger of combat, a collective bond unites them. Those who survive hardships in most any circumstance will feel a certain cohesion of a "brotherhood" of sorts. An 'artificial' incidence of this bond is created through the practice of hazing or initiation rites in fraternal organizations. In heavy industrial jobs, as pertains to factors discussed in relation to social cohesion within *Solidarosc*, a plethora of hazardous and/or dangerous situations existed. Workers in such conditions literally put their lives in each other's hands on a daily basis through absolute trust in fellow workers (for example, in simple "materials handling" processes on industrial sites - craning or mechanized movements of large, heavy objects regularly puts laborers' lives in the hands of machine operators by virtue of close-quarters conditions.)

A certain "comradeliness" develops among mine workers, for example, exposed to both the potential dangers of the job (mine collapse, fire, entrapment) and to daily health hazards (inhalation of coal dust, for example.) A common *negative* statement of "comradeliness" among West Virginia coal miners is, "We're killing ourselves just to live." This refers to the shared understanding of the health hazards involved in mine work along with the shared knowledge of few alternatives to such work in remote mining communities. Similar cultural patterns, no doubt, existed in mines and other heavy industrial sites in Poland; the factor of remoteness or isolation may have been replaced by lack of training in other fields as was the case for many industrial workers in the U.S.



The lack of alternatives due to lack of training was exacerbated in socialist nations as evidenced in John Scott's book, *Beyond The Urals* (1942). Scott describes work and schooling in the planned socialist town of Magnitogorsk in Stalinist era Russia (he gives a first-hand account as a welder working on a foreign visa in Magnitogorsk.) General education and vocational training were 100% free to all citizens, however, a single career track was to be chosen and little deviation was permitted. This was due to the notion of the trained worker as an "investment" of the State and not as a private indulgence through unnecessary schooling; education was to be functional, as per chosen field, in conjunction with ideological training which further facilitated identity as a Socialist Worker ( Scott 1945: 208 - 244.) Lech Walesa attests to similar practice in Poland in describing his training at the "agricultural mechanization school" at Lipno in the late 1950s and early '60s (Walesa 1987: 36 - 39.)

***Popular Ideology:*** The above mentioned "indoctrination/academic or vocational training" received by all citizens in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet Bloc nations (Poland included) was intended, as already stated, to instill within each individual the identity of being a Socialist Worker. A common terminology for this is encapsulated by the phrase, "*fraternal proletarian solidarity*," and similarly (mockingly) as "*Homo Sovieticus*." These phrases are taken, respectively, from Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs (1970 and 1974) and from Alexander Zinoviev's (1982) book of the same name. Zinoviev's term means literally, "New Soviet Man," and in his book he mocks the Stalin regime's effort to artificially create such by use of social programs, propaganda, and slogans. I propose in the introduction of this thesis (factor # 2) that, "*social solidarity within the Solidarity Movement was facilitated by the existing sociocultural construct of "fraternal proletarian solidarity."* This idea, I believe, did enter common Polish culture and may be described as a form of "*popular ideology*."

I include here a brief description of George Rude's notion of popular ideology from his 1995 book, *Ideology and Popular Protest*: He says that it is a mixture - not a pure form- of inherent and derived ideas. The inherent ideas come from tradition, direct experience, folk-memory, or oral tradition. The derived ideas are formal propositions - "scientific socialism," for example. Popular ideologies evolve at the intersection of direct experience and formal proposition and become embedded within a culture as an accepted worldview. In such circumstances the "...derived ideas, in the course of transmission and adoption suffer a transformation...its nature will depend on the social needs or the political aims of the classes that are ready to absorb them" (Rude 1995: 30.)

In short, I propose that the "derived" ideology of fraternal proletarian solidarity intersected the direct experience of the Polish working class and facilitated creation of social solidarity. In the course of its transmission it was altered, in that cohesion or solidarity of the working class was maintained, but loyalty was *not* engendered toward the Soviet Union (as was the derived aim.) Interview data will later be used to back this contention in discussion of "factor two."

***Positive Theory Of Goals And Organization:*** This theory comes from an article published in The American Journal Of Sociology in 1945 by Robert S. Lynd, titled, "Planned Social Solidarity In The Soviet Union." It proposes a number of "aggregative devices in Soviet society" aimed at generating and maintaining social solidarity. Many of these aggregative devices (such as education based propaganda, 'socialist competitions', cultivation of nationalism, etc.) were in common use in The Peoples' Republic Of Poland. They are generalized as being collective activities that lead to realization of collective goals and in doing so facilitate social solidarity. Lynd generalizes the activities and the goals they are intended to facilitate as the, "positive

theory of goals and organization" (1945: 184.) These are elaborated on in the discussion of "factor two" in reference to the part they played in facilitating Solidarnosc.

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**Charismaticism:** Finally, I include Max Weber's notion of "the charismatic leader." This perspective will be used specifically in explaining the role of Lech Walesa as a facilitating factor in Solidarity's success. This will be elaborated on later in conjunction with its use in chapter five. I include it under the general category of "collective behavior theories," as, according to Weber, it is the followers who empower the charismatic leader; that is, charisma, in Weber's terms, comes from mass belief (Weber 1915 [1947]: 359). George Ritzer (2008: 245) summarizes this nicely:

"To put Weber's position bluntly, if the disciples define a leader as charismatic, then he or she is likely to be a charismatic leader irrespective of whether he or she actually possesses any outstanding traits. A charismatic leader then can be someone who is quite ordinary. What is crucial is the process by which such a leader is set apart from ordinary people and treated as if endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least exceptional powers or qualities that are not accessible to the ordinary person."

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Throughout the discussions of factors one and two, reference will be made to the above, earlier mentioned theoretical perspectives; the final item, charismaticism, will be used in explaining factor five. Primary and secondary data sources will be referred to in attempt to validate the claims made in all sections.

## Chapter Five

### Literature Review

A vast amount of literature is available on the Polish Solidarity Movement and this review is by no means complete. English language accounts range from lengthy books that describe or analyze the entire movement from various perspectives, to scholarly journal articles that focus on a single aspect of the movement, to news magazine stories that feature prominent and influential individuals that shaped the movement. The movement can also be traced in newspaper articles as it was thoroughly covered by Associated Press reports all through the 1980s. Compilations of historic documents translated from Polish to English are also available. These range from the complete text of the Gdansk Agreement of August 31, 1980 to General Wojciech Jaruzelski's declaration of martial law on December 13, 1981, to historic letters written by Pope John Paul II in support of Solidarity.

In addition to formally written materials there exists, mostly still in Polish, a plethora of *samizdat* publications (illegal self-published literature discussed at length in chapter 3) that range from strike bulletins, to newsletters, to lengthy articles on a wide range of topics pertaining to the movement. Cornell University's Slavic and East European Studies Department has some 3000 samizdat articles written between 1970 and 1989 which include personal memoirs and interviews, copies of underground newspapers, illegal books, and personal letters. Only a handful of this invaluable data has been translated to English.

This review, however, will focus on attempts at comprehensive historical/sociological treatment of the Solidarity Movement. In general, most works can be classified under one of five themes: 1) journalistic accounts, 2) historical accounts, 3) participant accounts, 4) accounts

that focus on one or a few main factors that facilitated the movement, 5) accounts that focus on specific individuals or groups that influenced the movement. The section below will briefly summarize a few of the important works on the Solidarity Movement, especially in areas relevant to the focus of this thesis, and will attempt to highlight the main contribution to the topic in each case:

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*The Polish Revolution: Solidarity*, was written by Timothy Garton Ash, and was first published in 1983 and updated in 1991, 1999, and 2002. Ash, a British historian, gives a first-hand, journalistic account of the movement from its beginnings in the summer of 1980 to the declaration of martial law in December 1981. The book also includes an historical background and the later editions bring the reader up to date with events that occurred after Ash's initial account. The book focuses on the main events that occurred at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk: the strikes, negotiations, agreements, formation of the labor union *Solidarnosc*, and its eventual demise under martial law. Much of it is written in the first person as Ash was an observer at the shipyard strike and was a witness to the signing of the Gdansk Agreements. The book includes a chronology, appendix of Polish abbreviations (for the many political, labor, and government groups involved), and is extensively documented as to the sources of its data. This is the "definitive story" of Solidarity, from which most of the names, events, places, and dates discussed in this thesis were initially drawn. Ash's account emphasizes the Polish peoples' dissatisfaction with the illegitimate, dysfunctional, and hypocritical Soviet system that emerged in Poland after WWII, as the primary cause for the revolution of the 1980s.

Padraic Kenney's, *A Carnival Of Revolutions: Central Europe 1989*, was published in 2002 and gives an historical view of the diversity of opposition groups and resistance styles swirling around Central Europe in the late 1980s. Kenney is an American historian and made extensive use of Polish, Czech, and Ukrainian samizdat citing nearly 100 different samizdat publications, as well as extensive interviews with Polish, Czech, Ukrainian, Hungarian, German, Slovenian, and Western European informants. Most of the interviews were conducted in the late 1990s.

Whereas Ash focused on the mainstream events specifically in Poland (such as the Gdansk shipyard strikes, the official meetings between Solidarnosc and the Polish government) , Kenney's main focus is on detailing the more eclectic opposition groups throughout Central Europe. He describes the workings of artists, musicians, grassroots groups, students, and environmental activists in the late 1980s. His thesis is that "a carnival of revolutions" occurred across a wide geographic area, which in their totality caused the democratization of Central Europe. (Kenney prefers the term "Central Europe" over "Eastern Europe" as his term includes the former western republics of the USSR as stated on page 3 of his book. Most other authors use the term, "Eastern Europe.")

Lech Walesa's book, *A Way Of Hope*, (1987) provides a first-hand account of events in Poland from the 1970 massacre of shipyard workers at Gdansk, to the Gdansk Agreements of 1980, through the years martial law. Obviously, it is written out of the experiences of the main leader of Solidarnosc, and provides a wealth of detailed information about conditions that lead to the strikes in Gdansk, the birth of the Solidarity Movement, details of the Gdansk Agreements, life under martial law, and details of Walesa's private life.

Whereas the above mentioned accounts of the Solidarity Movement credit a wide array of participant groups in facilitating its success, Laba's 1991 book, *The Roots of Solidarity*, is steadfast in its "anti-intellectual thesis," and seeks to credit only "the working-class" with the movement's success. Ash credits a combined effort on the part of workers, the Church, and intellectual groups, Walesa credits the same, and Kenney credits an even more eclectic assortment of influences.

In agreement with the findings of most researchers, all individuals interviewed in this thesis project, four of which had been active participants in the daily workings of the movement, attributed many diverse groups with Solidarity's success. Laba's research, however, seems to be intent on denying this reality and concerned mainly with polarization.

Penn's book, *Solidarity's Secret*, (2005) details the contribution of women and the production of samizdat as prime facilitators in Solidarity's success. Unlike Laba, Penn conducted many interviews in Poland with former and current Solidarnosc members, most of them women. Thus Penn also gains a unique perspective on the "forced emancipation" of women in Sovietized countries. Polish women, according to Penn, identify feminism with certain policies and goals of the Communist Party which were exploitive and humiliating (for example, due to post-WWII labor shortages many women had little choice but to take dirty and demeaning jobs in heavy industrial works, abortion became a means of birth control, and the ideologically correct notion of equality with men - when it came to wages and hours spent on the job - amounted to little more than lip service.)

Thus, Penn found, Polish women had a cynical conception of the Western term, "feminism" - as in their reality it had been a negative thing. However, the dedicated and courageous work of

women, especially in the work of maintaining the Solidarity movement through samizdat publishing, was as progressive and liberating as any Westernized feminist undertaking. As most of the vocal leaders of Solidarnosc were men, the outlawing of the group under martial law meant that many of these men were sent to jail. This left many women activists to maintain the movement underground by clandestine publishing. These were "liberated" women, in Western terms - independently pursuing societal goals of their own accord. Gender equality was evident in the important role these women played, but "official" feminist discourse was not trusted by them as it was identified with Soviet intentions to "use" women. This unique and insightful perspective makes Penn's book very readable.

Maryjane Osa's book, *Solidarity And Contention*, (2003) also gives a unique focus on the movement by showing how prior attempts at organizing opposition against the government in Poland left an "organizational residue" that cumulatively facilitated the ultimate success. In each failure at resistance, over a long period of time (from the 1950s onward), according to Osa, dissenters learned valuable lessons and formed networks of opposition that eventually facilitated the final victory.

Another unique perspective on the Solidarity Movement is found in Kubik's, *The Power Of Symbols Against The Symbols Of Power* (1994.) Kubik analyzes the movement from an anthropological perspective, concentrating on the role of symbols in the building of political power and legitimacy. The book is an elaboration on Kubik's doctoral thesis, "The Role of Symbols In The Legitimation Of Power: Poland, 1976 - 1981." He argues that the Solidarity Movement was much too complex to be categorized into a single genre such as a trade union movement, a social movement, or a political movement. As an eyewitness to the 1980 events in Gdansk, Kubik was taken by what he describes as, "...a gigantic pageant of images and symbolic



performances" (1), which he eventually condensed into the construct of the, "Solidarity Culture" (2). According to Kubik, by considering, holistically, this construct - supported through, expressed in, and legitimated by symbolism - one can best understand the complexities of social, political, economic, and cultural arenas that constitute what we call the Solidarity Movement.

Kubik used a vast amount of data in producing his study . The bibliography section, for example, is 22 pages long, but he also includes interview data, his own direct experiences in Gdansk, public accounts of events in Poland connected to the movement, samizdat accounts, and a review of an archive of photographs taken during the movement. The result is a very complex and detailed study, invaluable to any researcher of the Solidarity Movement.

Neal Ascherson's book, *The Book Of Lech Walesa*, (1982) does not attempt an holistic analysis of the movement as does Kubik. Instead, Ascherson uses memoirs, letters, interviews, and manuscripts of Polish authors to describe the charismatic leadership of Lech Walesa. Through these personal, first-hand accounts, he creates a biography of Walesa, revealing, for example, how Walesa's simple and sometimes chaotic speeches appealed to the crowds, or how personal acquaintances of Walesa perceived him and his self-appointed leadership role in Solidarnosc. The basic thesis of this book, as is one contention of this thesis, is that Solidarity was greatly facilitated by the charismatic appeal of Walesa.

Two books by Gale Stokes were often referred to in writing this thesis: *From Stalinism To Pluralism: A Documentary History Of Eastern Europe Since 1945*, (1996), and, *The Walls Came Tumbling Down* (1993).

The first, provides copies of historic documents covering events ranging from the 1945 Yalta Conference to the 1991 resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev. Stokes also includes memoirs and essays written by first-hand observers and participants in the course of events affecting Eastern Europe stretching from the end of WWII to the collapse of the Soviet Union. It includes many documents directly pertaining to Solidarnosc in Poland, such as a letter written in a Gdansk prison by Adam Michnik, a reprint of the Gdansk Agreement, a transcript of General Wojciech Jaruzelski's declaration of martial law, and a speech given by Pope John Paul II in Warsaw. It also includes items from Hungary and Czechoslovakia which capture the essence of these nations' involvement in the Solidarity Movement.

The second book by Stokes takes a detailed look at the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe from political and ideological perspectives. It begins with the 1968 "Prague Spring" events and carries on through the early 1990s and the turmoil in Yugoslavia that resulted from democratization. Both of Stokes books provide comprehensive histories of the region and the era in which Solidarity emerged and thoroughly discuss the consequences of the movement.

*The Polish August*, edited by Oliver McDonald, (1981) similar to Stokes' comprehensive documentary history, is a compilation of documents specific only to Poland. Many were taken from the British journal, *Labor Focus*. McDonald also includes transcripts of interviews with Gdansk Shipyard workers, samizdat newspaper articles, shipyard bulletins, and copies of specific factory and shipyard agreements made between Solidarnosc and the government representatives of these facilities. This book provides very specific details on the contracts themselves and also provides background material on the events and circumstances leading up to the agreements, mostly through other documents, letters, and reports from negotiators. McDonald offered this compilation as a first-hand account of Polish/English translated material which documents, as he

puts it, "one of the greatest events of the Twentieth Century...", in which, "... the people of Poland are attempting nothing less than to take full control of their modern industrial society...that they built but do not control" (169).

Barbara Wejnert's (editor) book, *Transition To Democracy In Eastern Europe And Russia*, 2002, likewise, is a compilation, not of historical documents, but of academic articles on the subject. This book moves past the events of the 1980s in Eastern Europe and focuses on the overall societal shift to democracy in this region. It includes sections concerning the shift in terms of political, economic, and cultural change, and in terms of social problems and policy issues. In many cases dysfunction and eventually disillusionment came out of the hopeful expectations that Solidarity, and the Solidarity movement in general, had promised. The democratic shift in governments, while restoring many human rights and the ability of individuals to attempt to make their own destinies in life, also left many people without the social safety net of Communism. Thus, greater economic inequality, joblessness, homelessness, crime, drug and alcohol abuse, and other societal problems have increased in some parts of the former Communist world. The articles in this book detail the problems encountered in the rapid changes that followed Communism's downfall.

Finally, Vaclav Havel's lyrical book, *The Power Of The Powerless*, (1985) gives a philosophical and ideological argument against the Communist system in Eastern Europe, and a critique of the dysfunctional political systems that maintained it. In his book, Havel was speaking not only to Czechoslovakia but to all activists in Eastern Europe and to all who believed in the human rights agenda of the Solidarity Movement. His message was for all who imagined a better future to unite in solidarity and to maintain that solidarity until the Leninist/Stalinist ideological era was finally put aside. He begins with a reference to Marx, saying that, "a spectre is haunting

Eastern Europe...", not of communism but of dissent against communism. His observations proved historically accurate.

## Chapter Six

### Elaboration On The Proposed Factors

**Factor 1) The emergence of the Polish labor union, *Solidarnosc*, was facilitated by the structural conduciveness of a society based on a heavy industrial economy.**

This paper contends that specific structural qualities of the above mentioned system, in conjunction with specific sociocultural attributes of the workers within the system facilitated Solidarity's emergence and contributed to the social solidarity necessary to maintain the movement through adversity.

The theoretical perspectives from the "Collective Behavior" section apply here, specifically, structural conduciveness and culturally defined behaviors. Additionally, the "determinants of solidarity" as per Hodson et al. (1993) (cohesion, mutual defense, leadership, group boundaries, unionization, stability of the labor force, and dangerous working conditions) are apparent throughout the analysis of factor one.

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**A. *Social solidarity was facilitated by Sheer number of "pre-organized" workers:*** Workers at heavy industrial sites (steel mills, chemical and coke plants, shipyards, coal mines) formed the core of the Solidarity Movement. Laba (1991: 3) states that Solidarity's constituent base was in "...the industrial working class [and] its organizational strength in interfactory strike committees." Hundreds of thousands of individuals were thus "pre-organized" by virtue of simple, physical aggregation (huge numbers held long-term jobs on-site), by the informal social

networks inherent in this situation, through formal networks (for instance, in publication and distribution of plant newspapers that later evolved into samizdat publications), and through formal membership in "State operated unions." These conditions facilitated social solidarity.

A similar example of this concept comes from a 1995 study of the decline of European Social Democracy by Jonas Pontusson. He theorizes that the social cohesiveness necessary for maintaining this system was due in part to the structural phenomena of large concentrations of industrial workers which facilitated class consciousness. Pontusson (1995: 499) states, "The Marxist tradition suggests that working-class consciousness thrives in large units of production and that capitalism paves the way for socialism, not only by turning the vast majority of people into proletarians, but by also concentrating proletarians in ever larger units of production." He sees the inverse of this concept as a factor for the decline in collective organization in advanced capitalism ( his study being specifically in Sweden and Britain), stating that, "...the hypothesis that private, nonindustrial employment is a source of social democratic weakness can be directly related to, and viewed as in part derivative of, the hypothesis that large units of production are a source of social democratic strength" (504.) He believes that three causal mechanisms may be at work in structural conditions of heavy concentrations of industrial employment. First, the (above mentioned) Marxist notion of worker consciousness within large work groups; secondly, in such large groups the "relative cost of collective organization" is small; and finally, within such groups exists a "relative homogeneity of worker interests" (499.) These concepts aptly fit the conditions in Poland's industrial base during the time of Solidarity, and were replicated on an enormous scale.

A brief look at nearly any U.S. newspaper during the 1980-81 and 1988-89 waves of Polish unrest will indicate the huge numbers of industrial workers involved in collective action. For example:

*Rock Hill (South Carolina) Herald, August 3, 1981. p.18.* An Associated Press article states, "Nearly one million workers paralyzed 2000 coal mines, factories, and businesses during a four hour strike today in Poland."

*Lodi (California) News Sentinel, December 24, 1981.p.5.* A United Press International article states that 3000 coal miners are on strike in Poland "holed up 1650 feet underground."

*New York Times, May 5, 1988. section 1A.* Times reporter, John Tagliabue, reports 32,000 workers on strike at the Lenin Steelworks of Nowa Huta in southern Poland.

*The Modesto (California) Bee, August 30, 1988. p4.* An Associated Press article states that in the Warsaw area "...about 20 enterprises employing 100,000 people were idled," and additionally, in at the Stalowa Wola Steel Mill in southeastern Poland 18,000 workers were on strike.

In addition to the sheer numbers of workers involved, informant "JB," who is currently associated with the Fundacja Centrum Solidarnosci, provided me with a list of steel mills and coke plants which he remembered to be very effective "strike tools" during the 1980s. These types of plants represent perfectly the structural conditions that facilitate social solidarity (huge concentrations of industrial workers with a homogeneity of interests) but also constitute what may be considered a "super-effective leverage" during strikes. "JB" described the situation as follows:

Unlike the shipyards on the Baltic Coast which received the most news coverage during the Polish strikes (because the negotiations between Solidarity and the Polish government occurred at the administrative building inside the Lenin Shipyard) the steel mills and coke plants were continuously operating process plants; the shipyards were more along the line of "job shops." A

strike at the shipyard simply meant the construction of ships stopped; tools were put away and workers left the hulls of ships in whatever stage of construction they happened to be in. The unfinished ships suffered very few adverse effects from the delay. However, with a continuous operation, such as steel or coke production, a strike could be disastrous in that it is necessary to maintain continuous heat in coke ovens and blast furnaces in order that these facilities remain intact. The operations of coke and steel plants are symbiotic - they fuel each other and together maintain the tremendous heat of the firebrick linings in both operations. Thus, if operators of these processes walk out on strike the managers of such facilities must immediately find at least a "skeleton crew" of knowledgeable workers to at least "keep the heat on" the ovens and furnaces; otherwise, if the process entirely stops, millions of dollars of damage to the facility may occur and re-starting the process may take months.

Thus, as described to me by informant "JB," the knowledge or the realization of the above described scenario by workers in continuously operating plants was an additional source of social solidarity. These workers understood how effective their solidarity was. In other words, striking shipyard workers may *delay* production - striking coke plant and steel mill workers may *destroy the means of production*, in that their walkout leaves a technologically mandatory continuous process unattended. "JB" listed the following plants as falling within this category of "super-effective" strike leverage due to worker realization of their critical role in maintaining a continuous process. He had no exact figures of the number of workers involved but estimated that "hundreds of thousands worked in these plants."

Koks Koku

Debiensko coke plant: Czerwionka - Leszczyny

Radlin coke plant: Radlin



Jadwiga coke plant: Zabrze

Wiktorija coke plant: Walbrzych

Zdzieszowice coke plant: Zdzieszowice

Przyjazn coke plant: Dabrowa Gornicza

Czestochowa Nova coke plant: Czestochowa

Carbo Coke: Bytom

Polski Koks (location ?)

Nowa Huta Coke and steel works: Nowa Huta

Huta Warszawa coke and steel works: Warsaw

Stalowa Wola coke and steel: (location ?)

Informant "Z" lived in Walbrzych during the 1980s (as mentioned in the above list, near the site of Wiktorija coke plant) and agreed with "JBs" assessment. "Z" pointed out that under communism, theoretically, "the means of production" were owned by workers, but in reality, "Z" claimed, workers did not care about their factories:

"I was born in coal-town Walbrzych, near the Wroclaw...My mum was working in the office in local mine, and there was also important solidarity "nest" over there. In my home the people from the underground had their meetings as well. I know 'Das Kapital' and 'Communist Manifesto' a little, and maybe idea seem excellent, but in life is impossible to do in proper way. Because of human nature, if we have '*no properties*' - if the things have '*no owners*', nobody cares for them! It was like that in Poland. People would not care the damage done to plant during strike."

Informant "JB," a former employee of the Lenin Shipyard at Gdansk, estimated the number of shipyard workers in the Gdansk - Sopot - Gdynia tri-city area to have been around 70,000 at its peak in the late 1970s or early 1980s. These huge concentrations of industrial workers were a

result of Stalinist-era economic planning and Stalinist-era technology lingering on into the 1980s without modernization. The "master economic plan" of all Sovietized economies was based on heavy industry with little concern for production of consumer items. In 1946, immediately after Communist takeover of Poland, rapid industrialization (and re-industrialization from WWII destruction) began in Poland as a strategy not only for building the economy but also for building socialism.

Stalin, as per Lenin, as per Marx, saw the proletariat - the *industrial* working class - as the most likely group to accept the ideology of communism due to their structural position in society. That is, they were urban, usually skilled, en-mass and easily indoctrinated (due to the efficiency of communication among masses of urban workers), and without ties to land, property, or inheritance. The official Party ideology endorsed a brotherhood between the industrial workers of the cities and rural farm workers. Ironically though, Marx is known to have commented on "the idiocy of rural life," and Stalin is known to have had great contempt for *kulaks* (the rural middle-class.) Informant "J", who described his grandparents as having been kulaks, told me that he believed *all* Russians hated rural people, a legacy, "J" believed, (obviously erroneously) that came from Stalinist propaganda. Thus, the very effective structural conduciveness to communist ideology within the urban/industrial setting (as theorized by Lenin) proved to be structurally conducive also to the ideology of Solidarity.

Ash (2002: 13) notes Poland's extreme dependence on heavy industry (which he calls an "irrational, lopsided political economy." Kubik (1994: 22 - 24) describes a "...wave of rapid extensive industrialization [that] swept Poland in the early 1950s," funded, in part, by "domestic accumulation," which was a type of 'forced savings' apparently a kind of 'worker owned' investment strategy, minus the expected returns for the individual worker; 'the building of

Socialism' was expected to be reward enough for the personal investment. Kubik adds, "The investment program was based on arbitrary ideological and political deliberations, not on economic calculus" (24). Penn (2005: 24 - 25) adds that "forced emancipation" of women into the industrial labor force also occurred; that is, many women were 'recruited' into heavy industry out of necessity to re-build the devastated post-WWII economy. Labor was needed and Socialist ideology insisted that all citizens must be workers (domestic work did not count), and as an 'incentive' wages were kept so low that both husband and wife had to work to earn enough to survive.

Another reason for the unusually large numbers of workers in heavy industry were the outdated technologies of the Polish plants. Being outdated and in many cases falling into a state of disrepair, Polish industrial sites were becoming both dangerous (from increased accident potential) and hazardous to health ( from exposure to industrial toxins.) This fact leads directly to a second point used to validate factor one:

***B. Dangerous/hazardous conditions in Poland's industrial sector facilitated social cohesion through creation of mutual defense and shared identity:***

As per Hudson et al. (1993), "...mutual defense and support can be galvanized by physical dangers in the workplace as easily as by management threats" (401 - 402.) Group boundaries and group identity are reinforced as individuals struggle together in trying conditions. The following will describe circumstances that led to such conditions:

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Due to the nature of heavy industrial infrastructure it has been common practice to "milk a plant for all its worth," so to speak, before it is finally shut down for good (from direct personal

experience, this is known to have been a common practice in the U.S. rustbelt through the 1980s.) One reason for this is that the building of large-scale, continuous operating steel/coke/chemical complexes, with rail, river, or sea access requires massive initial economic investment and completion time on such projects is measured in *years*. Shut-downs for repairs entails loss of production, hence loss of return on investment. Modernization is even more costly than repairs as it means not only loss of production but necessity of re-investment. Therefore, as heavy industrial facilities age they often become inefficient due to declining standards of plant maintenance (simplified, the thinking is: Why fix it if it will be shut down in a year or two?).

Conditions for workers in such plants deteriorate also; safety and health standards often are 'allowed to slide' along with infrastructure maintenance. Additionally, plants with older technologies required more workers as they were less automated to begin with; in dilapidated condition they require still more labor. This was exactly the situation in Poland, the USSR, and the U.S. in the 1980s (and in all countries with similar post WWII development patterns); the WWII era heavy industrial base had reached its natural lifespan. During this decade disinvestment in heavy industrial infrastructure within the U.S and reinvestment overseas often occurred. In Sovietized nations, unable to access international capital (due to the closed Soviet economy), and unwilling to merge with the capitalist world system, no reinvestment occurred. Conditions in the antiquated heavy industrial sector simply continued to deteriorate, efficiency and product quality continued to drop, and man-hour requirements continued to rise. The result: huge numbers of Poles worked in miserable conditions for ever-shrinking paychecks in unprofitable State owned industries; their sheer numbers and their job/living condition dissatisfaction contributed to Solidarity's success (by accepting Solidarity's ideology as an

alternative to State ideology with the hope that Solidarity could make positive changes in their life situations.)

For example, as evidence of the above described scenario, a 1989 New York Times article titled, "Can Poland's Steel Dinosaur Evolve?", describes the conditions at the Lenin Steelworks at Nowa Huta: "We need to modernize desperately," a union spokesman says, "We need \$450 million to modernize, and we need foreign investment if we're going to obtain that type of money..." The article describes the plant, built in the early 1950s, as "...a fossilized hulk of a burdensome Communist economy," where some 32,000 workers struggle to produce the same quantity of steel as would 7000 workers in a modernized, Western-designed plant (Greenhouse 1989.) However, the Lenin Works, was still *twice as productive* as the Soviet plant at Magnitogorsk. Another 1989 New York Times article claims the Magnitogorsk steelworks required a staggering *60,000 workers* to produce the same quantity of steel as would a modernized plant with 7,000 workers (Keller, 1989).

In his book, *A Way Of Hope*, Lech Walesa devotes an entire chapter to describing the conditions in the Lenin Shipyard at Gdansk; following are some excerpts from his description:

"Created in 1946 or 1947 from the merger of three separate companies, Gdansk shipyard had become a large-scale enterprise by 1960. Yet it lacked the most elementary accommodations for workers, such as proper lockers, changing rooms, or lavatories...When I arrived our shipyard looked like a factory filled with men in filthy rags, unable to wash themselves or urinate in toilets. To get down to the ground floor where toilets were located took at least half an hour, so we just went anywhere. You can't imagine how humiliating these working conditions were. "(43 - 44.)

Walesa also describes the dangerous situations created in the yard by rushed production schedules; rushed in attempt to make up for breakdowns, lack of materials, improper tools, and ineffective planning and management:

"...arrangements had been made to mobilize almost two thousand men to install the final fittings and equipment on a ship, [in attempt to make up for delays ] two hundred of whom were working overtime in the hold. Some had been working for thirty-six hours at a stretch on this vessel, which had already been filled with fuel, again, to save time in order to meet an overly exacting schedule... While cutting or welding a fuel pipe...fuel leaked out, causing an explosion, and because the hatchways in the hull were sealed off, the firefighting equipment was unavailable. Though workers attempted to cut through the sheet metal with acetylene torches, supplies of acetylene were inadequate for the task. Thus, twenty-two men were burned alive in the hold of the Konopnica" (52.)

In March, 2010, Informant "PZ" took the author of this paper into the actual working center of the Gdansk Shipyard. Much of the immense facility now sits idle and some of it has been torn down, as shipbuilding, like many other heavy industries, has generally shifted to Asia. However, even in its now very limited capacity, the positioning of steel ship sections weighing many tons by gigantic cranes, the constant rattle of forklifts shifting materials from place to place, the placement of enormous shorings to align ship hulls, the building of scaffolding several stories high as worker access to the ships - all of this activity made it quite obvious that this was a very dangerous work environment. "PZ," who began working in this shipyard in 1963 (he is now retired) was asked if he had considered his job dangerous. He replied,

"Yes, it could be dangerous - of course you see how things are moving here (he points to a tractor pulling a wobbly load of scaffolding on what looks to be an old farm wagon, and to a forklift rattling down a pot-holed road.) And this is nothing! The guys are mostly just making repairs! There is only one big ship under construction now - and you see how things are moving - imagine, when I was your age, we were building 30 or 40 ships per year in this yard! This is a handful of workers - then we had 10,000 in here!

Over there (he points to an abandoned building) was a big explosion - an accident - welding gas exploded. Two men were killed in there. I used to work there with them. So yes, you could get killed here."

Several cultural constructs and work situations inherent in heavy industrial settings would have facilitated social solidarity (as per Hodson et al.) and thus facilitated success of Solidarnosc. These include a shared worker identity through the common experiences of difficulties and hardships involved in heavy industrial situations (exacerbated by the inadequate conditions in Poland's economy and its deteriorating infrastructure.) Additionally, the necessity of shift work (which affects all family members); the necessity to work a scheduled shift on holidays (heavy industrial work is usually a continuous process and many Christmas Eves and Easter Sunday Mornings are spent in the plant); dirty, dangerous, unhealthy working conditions (common to all heavy industrial sites); socialization into "work gangs" or crews; (Often one's life is entrusted to fellow work gang members involving dangerous operations. Cooperation and inter-worker coordination is required to perform almost all tasks in heavy industrial plants. There is no room for "rouge individualism" as such may result in death.); and collectivization or creation of collective identity through safety and cooperation indoctrination (heavy industrial operations usually have regular "safety meetings" in which is stressed the importance of safety through cooperative effort, watching out for fellow workers, and collective action in getting jobs done.) The above mentioned examples were evidenced through discussions with informant "PZ" and are, as discussed later in this chapter, common to U.S. industrial settings as well.

An Associated Press news article titled, "*Special Privileges Promised Some Polish Workers: Over 2 Million In Dangerous, Taxing Jobs,*" ( Toledo Blade, January 2nd, 1982, Page 1) describes government attempts to pacify industrial workers (as well as other occupations) in such

jobs. A 5% increase in retirement benefits was proposed along with reduction of retirement age to 60 for men and 55 for women. Laba (1991: 121) describes the need for better working conditions in Polish industry during the Solidarity decade by citing the fact of "...high noise, dust, and chemical concentrations and constant danger of fire" in Polish shipyards, and he states that this was similar to situations in metal foundries and mines. During the author's visit to the Gdansk Shipyard, a friend of informant "PZ" provided an example of these conditions. He described the shipyard (when it was operating at full capacity) as producing much noise, welding smoke, and paint fumes - all of which even affected the local neighborhoods around the yard. He described cleaning the giant hulls of the ships in preparation for painting them as a "miserable, sickening job," due to use of huge volumes of oil-based solvent in the cleaning process.

Walesa mentions the social conditions in the shipyards: "Human dignity and the chance to be fully responsible for one's own life were not available options. We were constantly treated like simple day laborers, and force-fed slogans we couldn't relate to" (Walesa 1987: 57.) Thus, the deteriorating work place conditions and placation by government promises (as above, the only real benefits promised came after retirement - if one survived till then) also contributed to worker unity (in a negative sense) by pitting workers against the failed promises of the state.

This paper contends that these common cultural constructs in heavy industrial settings would have been facilitating factors to social solidarity. These constructs of collectivism and shared identity through common hardships and struggle stand out sharply in contrast to the individualism, personal competition, and general disunity often found today in service work, academics, business, and other post-industrial/information age fields.

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The above accounts are meant to demonstrate the massive numbers of workers that were involved in the heavy industrial sector in Poland in the 1980s, how these large-scale operations came into being, and the dangerous, frustrating conditions in the antiquated plants.

Four more points, made in the opening of this section, are below elaborated on in conjunction with the notion of "pre-organization" and networking in the industrial sector:

***C. State operated unions in Polish industry "pre-organized" workers:***

State operated unions existed in all heavy industrial plants, shipyards, and mines in Poland. These unions did not have the interests of the workers in mind; they were tools of the Party (as described in the Historical Background section of this paper.) In the final Gdansk Agreements of August 1980, in which Solidarity was (for a time) legalized, the Party did so with stipulation that the State Unions must remain intact alongside Solidarity (see the Gdansk Agreement in appendix.) Laba (1991: 33) aptly describes the ineffectiveness of the State Unions in a description of the 1970 Gdansk riots: In the chaos and disorganization someone shouts, "Where are the unions? Why aren't they leading the workers?" Although they did not lead the workers against the State, it may be presumed that, like all unions, regular meetings were held, publications were distributed, and dues were paid. Thus, to some degree, this process "pre-organized" worker, at least in the form of social networks that formed in conjunction with the workings of the State Unions.

***D. Factory newspapers "pre-organized" workers:***

Factory newspapers were another possible source of "pre-organization," uniting workers by a common communication network. Due to the sheer numbers of workers in the Polish industrial sector these factory newspapers had a huge circulation. Penn (2005) states that several of these factory newspapers evolved into the samizdat papers that helped keep Solidarity alive underground. This point will be elaborated on fully in a later section dedicated solely to the role of samizdat as a facilitator to Solidarity.

***E. Job permanence led to generational enculturation of workplace cultures of resistance:***

This idea relates to the Hodson et al concept of labor force stability as described in the theoretical section.

There would have been no involvement or understanding of the workplace strike as a tool for forcing negotiations under the State Unions of the Polish Communist Party. These unions served the Party, similar to the way "Company Unions" serve the interests of business in the U.S.; they function to validate and legitimize any proposal that benefits the company in terms of increasing profitability. Personal experience validates this statement concerning "company unions." The author of this paper worked for "Big D Construction," in Salt Lake City, Utah for a few months in 2001. "Big D" was just beginning its own "company union" and required all workers to attend its own "union classes" which were little more than company loyalty indoctrination sessions. Worker grievances in the "company union" were usually "addressed" by firing the aggrieved worker; collective action through strikes, or through formal bargaining was unheard of in the "company union" as would have been the case in the State Unions of Poland. These types of organizations existed solely to benefit the owners of the means of production.

This paper contends that an older generation of workers - those who had worked in heavy industry before the 1946 Communist Party takeover of Poland - passed on the ideas and techniques of workplace collective action to a younger generation which knew only State Unionism. The structural longevity and permanence of heavy industry allowed for this; that is, unlike residential construction, retail or wholesale trade, service jobs, light assembly work, office work, or any type of work that is conducted in inexpensive facilities (relative to heavy industrial infrastructure) heavy industrial facilities usually remain intact for more than one generation. This is due to the excessive cost of initially developing the facility. An example would be the comparison of the construction and opening of a department store (such as a new Walmart) that happens over a three month period at a cost in the hundreds of thousands of dollars versus the construction and startup of a steel mill or chemical plant which may take three to ten years to build at a cost in the billions of dollars. The point is that service economies do not generate the long-term community and generational commitments that long-term investments in heavy industry entail. Thus, multiple generations of workers are usually employed at heavy industrial facilities allowing for a continuity of workplace culture that does not occur with the rapid cycles of opening/closing in service economies.

It was a general practice in many U.S. industrial communities for multiple generations of workers to be employed at the same location over decades. Evidence of this similar pattern in Poland is found in statements by Lech Walesa in his description of the workings of the Lenin Shipyard concerning training of workers. He mentions the, "...old hands, many of them natives of Gdansk, some of whom had worked in the Scichau shipyard, which had been erected by German industrialist before the Second World War when Gdansk was known to them as the Free City of Danzig" (Walesa 1987: 45.) These "old hands" would have not only knew their trade

well enough to train young workers, they would have also had experience in the capitalist pre-WWII economy and may have had experience at strikes and collective bargaining (certainly more likely than those who entered the workforce post 1946.)

Informant "P" said, in Europe, due to much older development patterns (as compared to relatively recent settlement patterns in the U.S.) and due to damage from two world wars, that it was common to re-establish industrial works on old sites. He mentioned a nitrate plant in Kedzierzyn, (near Opole, where "P" visits family) re-built on the ruins of a pre-WWI industrial site. Thus, multi-generational industrial employment may be even more common in Europe than in the U.S. (by virtue of longer continuity of industrial development and utilization of several generations of local workers to operate the plants.) Therefore pre-Communist era workplace bargaining tactics could have been generationally transferred.

Historian Padraic Kenney mentions this generational transference of knowledge in regard to intellectual dissent and hints at the transfer of the above mentioned type of experience. Concerning the events, in general, that led to Solidarity's emergence, he says: "...the movements whose stories make up this book [referring to his book on Solidarity] did not spring from nowhere; most owed a great deal to the ideas and practices of their elders, even when they tried to keep their distance" (Kenney: 2002: 10.)

Reiterating, the contention of this section is that long-term operational nature of heavy industrial development created a structural condition (multigenerational employment patterns) that facilitated generational transfer of a culture of workplace resistance. Such would *not* have occurred in a short cycle service economy.

## Comparing Two Key Informants From Ironton, Ohio, and Gdansk, Poland

As mentioned in the methodological section of this paper, several interviews were conducted with former employees of large U.S. industrial complexes, in order to compare constructs proposed to contribute to social solidarity in similar situations in Poland. In the process, it became apparent that an informant in Ironton and an informant in Gdansk had remarkably similar attitudes toward their former workplaces and coworkers. They displayed through their comments the attitudes consistent with a proposed "*industrial culture*."

The relatively recent (within the last 25 - 30 years) globalization of capital and the resulting de-industrialization of traditional manufacturing areas worldwide has left within de-industrialized communities a generation of individuals that the author contends are carriers of a culture specific to the now (nearly) extinct heavy industrial sector. It may be that certain characteristics of this "industrial culture" were facilitating factors in the social solidarity of work groups, labor unions, and of the communities in general. These contentions are based on information obtained from open-ended interviews, group discussions, observations, and oral histories conducted in Ironton, Ohio and Gdansk, Poland. The author also bases these contentions on 30 years of direct personal experience in the industrial sector, in commercial construction work, and in labor union participation.

In general, the findings of this small-scale study demonstrate that the constructs in question, that is, social cohesion, group loyalty, union solidarity, dedication to company, craft, or job - constructs that the author relates to the conception of industrial culture as remembered through

participation in this sector - are easily recognizable within the dialogue of informants from both Poland and the U.S.

However, these constructs are *not* uniform in their degree of intensity; that is, some informants expressed through their conversations with the author, stories, anecdotes, and memories that would indicate a great deal of the above mentioned attributes, and other informants expressed much less commitment to these constructs (as evidenced earlier in this chapter by comments from informant "Z"). Further research would be necessary to determine how widespread are the constructs in question among this population.

However, as mentioned above, two informants, one in Ironton and one Gdansk, demonstrated remarkably similar attitudes concerning their former workplaces and former co-workers. Their degree of commitment to their respective jobs and to their co-workers was so intense that the author believes it comprised a major element of their personal identity. Both men, now elderly and retired, had endured much hardship, brutal working conditions, injustice, and loss during the course of their careers. However, these negative incidents and memories *were not* the focus of their present lives; instead, both men remembered their jobs as very positive and fulfilling expressions of themselves through their contribution to the greater good of the plant/ship yard and to the community/society. Both had been fascinated, for lack of a better word, by the elaborate and complex systems of their respective workplaces, in terms of both the physical and social organization of the immense industrial complexes in which they had worked. Their deep understanding and appreciation of these processes as a whole was evident in their enthusiastic desire to make clear to the interviewer details of their experiences.

Additionally, both informants maintained into retirement close personal connections with former co-workers. This demonstrates, on a very personal level, an example of the proposed constructs of group loyalty and social cohesion that are important factors in the success of labor unions. These two informants will be discussed in greater detail shortly.

Certain social and material characteristics of industrial-based communities and of industrial workplaces may also be contributing factors to the proposed constructs of industrial culture. For example, both Ironton and Gdansk had very large numbers of residents employed in the industrial sector, resulting in similar life histories and workplace experiences for many individuals. Workplace conditions and routines were similar in both cities, with dangerous working conditions the norm and group solidarity high as a result of this (in certain operations individuals literally trusted their lives to fellow workers.) In general, these and other social and material factors can be generalized through the "structural conduciveness" paradigm, described in the theoretical section of this paper.

In the following discussions and comparisons the aim is to demonstrate how these individuals are similar and how both display the assumed traits of "industrial culture." Additionally, both men displayed a high degree of "worker autonomy," a seemingly contradictory attitude in relation to general worker solidarity, as discussed by Hodson et al. 1993. Following are brief descriptions and background information of these two informants. Fictitious names are used to protect their identity. The author intentionally shifts to first person form in order to better convey a more humanistic style apparent in the interviews of these key informants.

"Paul" was 85 years old when I interviewed him (February 2010) and was born in Ironton, Ohio in 1925. He worked many different jobs within the Allied Chemical Semet-Solvay coke plant during his 34 years of employment at the site (1948 - 1982). Paul did not graduate from high school but volunteered for the army at age 17 (he lied about his age) and served four years during WWII in the Pacific. He proudly showed me a wallet-sized copy of his honorary high school diploma from Coal Grove High School given to him in a ceremony in 2002. He lived his entire life within a mile of the Allied Chemical plant, at Coal Grove, Ohio (the plant is located at the Ironton/Coal Grove city limits; the village of Coal Grove and the city of Ironton blend seamlessly into each other along South 3rd street.)

When Paul was hired by Allied Chemical in 1948 his pay was 86 cents per hour. Today, he considers himself very lucky to have both social security payments and a moderate pension from Allied Chemical Company; many of his friends, including all the former workers of the Dayton Malleable Iron Foundry, received no retirement benefits what so ever from their company as it declared bankruptcy. According to Paul, Allied Chemical Corporation has totally abandoned the chemical business but now is called "Allied Signal" and makes specialized engineered materials. During our conversation, one of Paul's friends pointed out (from a rather coarse and obviously colloquial point of view) that, "Allied Chemical was run by Jews, and they knew how to manage money. They got out of the chemical business and started makin' high-tech stuff. That's why we got a retirement from 'em. The Malleable (Dayton Malleable Iron Company) just fucked their guys- said they were bankrupt, closed her down, and said, "Good Luck! See ya!" All the men present agreed with this statement (by nods, and general statements of agreement) and seemed to have great respect for the "wisdom" of Allied Chemical as opposed to the "stupidity" of Dayton Malleable Iron.



At age 85 Paul is very thin and frail and carries an oxygen bottle on a strap over his shoulder. Plastic tubes carry oxygen to his nose and he has to stop talking quite often to catch his breath but he obviously loves talking about "the plant." He still drives an old pickup truck and loves to drink coffee with his former coworkers at McDonald's. His comments will be compared to those of "Pavel's" later on.

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"Pavel" is 67 years old (as of March 2010) and was born in Gdansk in 1943 during WWII. He "attended some schools", worked as a carpenter during his teen-age years, and in 1963, at age 20 went to work in the Lenin Shipyard (now Stocznia Gdanska; Gdansk Shipyard). He started out in the shipyard as a carpenter, mainly building scaffolds for ship construction, but also repaired buildings, and did general labor. He wanted to learn an industrial trade, "something of use to the shipyard," he told me, and so he learned to be an electrician by working with the electricians at the yard. He proudly told me that he worked with Lech Walesa, who also was an electrician. Pavel showed me pictures of Lech Walesa at a meeting during the negotiations of Solidarnosc with the Polish Government. He showed me the old shop where he and Walesa used to work within the ship yard along a street named for the electricians. The ship yard was so big that it had several streets within it, all named for various trades. "See, you have the street of welders, street of painters, street of pipe fitters, etc. It was like a city here. We had our own hospital and cafeteria here. We even had our own sports teams!" Pavel was obviously very proud of the old ship yard.

He also showed me some old newspapers with articles about *strajks* (strikes) at the ship yard and was very pleased that I recognized the word *strajk* in Polish and understood the importance of *strajks* as a form of resistance. I told him that my own former union, the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers union, had supported Solidarnosc during the 1980s (by financial contributions) and he was very pleased to know this. "Many people, many unions, many churches, all over the world supported Solidarnosc. We could not have survived without the peoples' help," he said.

He also showed me pictures of his wife, now deceased, whom he misses very much. He said they were married in 1970, at which time Pavel had worked in the ship yard for 7 years but still could not afford to buy a suit; "I worked hard every day and I was still poor," he commented. Like Paul, from Coal Grove, Pavel lived within walking distance of his place of work and had done so all his life. Like Paul, Pavel considered himself lucky to have a small retirement from the ship yard, but he is worried that it will end as the ship yard may be totally closed down soon. Another informant, the director of the Gdansk local of Solidarnosc, told me that the ship yard retirees have nothing to worry about as the State now supports their pensions, not profits from the ship yard. This point, however, did not convince Pavel.

Unlike Paul, Pavel seems to be in excellent health. He is a short, gray-haired, jovial character with sky blue eyes, who, like Paul, obviously loves to discuss "the yard" and tell stories about "strajks" and the struggle of Solidarnosc. Pavel walks very fast for a man 67 years old, and on a cold March day, he soon took me to meet some of his friends for coffee and cookies at an office of the ship yard retirement committee.

## **Co-Worker Networks: Inside Stocznia Gdanska**

In the retirement committee office large portraits of Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI were hanging on the wall over the director's desk. Pavel introduced me to several of his friends here, all former or current employees of the ship yard. Pavel wanted to be sure that I understood, through his and others' very basic and broken English, and through the proper English/Polish translation of Marta (again a fictitious name for the sake of privacy) that, "This is my family." Pavel made sure, Marta later told me, that she had correctly interpreted this to me; he obviously wanted to impress upon me his close connections to the group. Marta speculated that the connections were much more than common friendship between old coworkers. Pavel had told her that he felt like they were all his family due to what they shared over the Solidarity years, and what they went through in defying the police, the military, and the governments of Poland and the USSR during the strikes and negotiations of the 1980s.

The above scenario is a perfect demonstration of several of the constructs described in the theoretical section of this paper: group cohesion, mutual defense, distinct group boundaries, and the process of forming and defending a union. The continued close ties of friendship and trust into retirement due to these constructs are indicators of the proposed "industrial culture." Paul's coworker network showed similar attributes in Ironon.

## **Co-Worker Networks: Allied Chemical Retirees**

Paul and his coworkers went through several strikes at Allied Chemical over the years. Striking workers got only very limited and sporadic financial help from the national level of the union during these times. "We might get a tank of gas or a few groceries," he told me. "Mostly

we just had to fend for ourselves." But without union solidarity the workers knew they would never achieve any of their goals; pay raises, safety concerns, retirement benefits, etc. were among the goals of strikes over the years. Workers helped each other as best they could to financially endure the strikes as this was their only bargaining tool once company/union negotiations came to a standstill. The following story illustrates a similar social cohesion due to shared hardships in Ironton as I observed in Gdansk. Paul's friend, Ken, told this story as we all discussed how the group made it through long strikes:

{Ken} "One strike was nine months long - I think it was in 1967 - when you get my age you can't remember. Me and Tom (another group member) went out and built porches, and everything - did remodeling jobs, handyman jobs, odds jobs, to survive. I had four kids then - I had to try to make a living."

{Paul} "Yeah - that was a long strike! And we had several more - maybe three or four months long over the years. But we always stuck together and got through 'em. The men really stuck together during the strikes. The union gave us a little bit of money - they had a little strike fund- it wasn't much at all."

As in Gdansk, workers who collectively endured financial hardships (and in some cases physical danger) often formed social bonds as strong as family networks and maintained these networks into retirement. The resulting group solidarity achieved through successfully enduring one strike facilitated success and solidarity in future strikes. This was the case in both Ironton, and Gdansk. There was no mention of crossing the picket line, of conceding benefits, or of abandoning the strikes; these ideas were inconceivable to this generation of workers. The common practice was to attempt to "stir up some other kinda work" till the strike was over. At times this meant leaving wife and children at home during extremely long strikes, and going out of town to take seasonal or temporary work in order to make enough money for house or car payments. My informants knew of several cases in which this happened to other workers during

very long strikes but this particular group was always able, through networks of friends, to "stir up enough work in Lawrence County to make it by."

### **Physical Danger In Industrial Settings:**

Hodson et al. (1993) lists "dangerous working conditions" as another "determinant of worker solidarity." This is often evidenced by the "pulling together" of a community during a time of loss, for instance, during a mine disaster (especially in remote communities when nearly all members' families are involved). Both the Ironton coke plant and the Gdansk Shipyard were dangerous places to work and in both cases the workers made up very large percentages of the local populations. This factor contributed to worker solidarity and was an element of "industrial culture."

Paul and Pavel gave nearly identical answers to the question, "was your job dangerous?"

{Paul} "If you wasn't watchin', yeah, it was dangerous.

{Pavel} "Yes - it could be - see how things are moving here? You had to watch out."

The next implication of both men was that not only did each individual "have to watch out" for himself but each individual had to watch out for his fellow workers as well. Both informants told stories of incidences when this did not happen; when deadly accidents occurred through neglect of approved safety practices. Paul told a horrific story of a "young girl" hired in and put to work on the coke ovens without (in his opinion) sufficient training. She was killed the first week of work, "Burnt up - burnt alive. She stepped on one of the caps on top of three battery

[coal charging hole covers atop the coke ovens] and the cap blew off and it burnt her up -  
(*click* - he snaps his fingers) - just like that."

Pavel told a story of two men killed in an explosion of welding gas in an area in which he used to work: "Over there - (he points to a small brick building in the ship yard) - was a big explosion. Two men were killed here that I used to work with. I used to work in there with them - so yes, you could get killed here." The implication was that Pavel himself could have been killed in the explosion if he had been in the building at the time. He also indicated, through Marta's translation, his disapproval of how this accident happened, as, I believe, he felt it occurred through neglect of safety rules or ignorance of safety procedures.

Several other informants in both Ironton and Gdansk told stories of the dangers involved in their jobs. Cooperation, awareness, trust, and group enforcement of norms (in this case the norms are safety rules and "watching out" for fellow workers) are all common constructs concerning work in dangerous conditions. These constructs are probably universally observable in other "industrial cultures."

### **Worker Autonomy And Job Satisfaction In Ironton and In Gdansk:**

Worker autonomy seems a contradictory construct to worker solidarity and the collectivist notions associated with "industrial culture." However, Hodson et al. (1993) found that worker autonomy had no negative effects on worker solidarity. Hodson reports the contradictory opinions of other labor researchers (401), such as Rankin (1990) who views worker participation programs "as subtle control strategies which undermine worker solidarity and manipulate workers' minds and hearts so they pursue management goals even at the cost of their own jobs

(59). On the other hand, Hodson also reports (401) that Walton and Hackman (1986) argued that workers experience increased solidarity under more participatory workplace environments.

Paul and Paval seemed to express a great deal of both worker autonomy and worker solidarity. I believe that worker autonomy contributes a great deal to job satisfaction, ability to network, to move about, and in the process, to communicate with other workers. Hodson (1993) found that "mobility or freedom of movement" contributes to worker solidarity; thus, autonomy and mobility may be connected and together may facilitate worker solidarity and job satisfaction. Some explanation and excerpts from interview transcripts will clarify this notion:

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Both the Allied Chemical plant and the Gdansk Shipyard were huge facilities sprawling over many acres and containing 1000s of workers. Primary industrial facilities, that is heavy industrial sites, such as steel mills, chemical plants, foundries, coke plants, and ship yards by no means resemble the reductionist notion of assembly lines manned by mindless, unskilled, miserable drones, practically chained to their workstations, as popularized by high school textbooks, TV documentaries, dramas, or even sitcoms; heavy industrial sites more resemble small, contained cities with a plethora of various tradespersons performing highly skilled tasks over large spatial areas. Freedom of mobility is necessary, within the general section of the plant or yard, and often such industries had cafeterias, hospitals, or meeting halls (for company sponsored meetings, such as safety meetings). The Gdansk site was so large that a "fleet" of company bicycles - aging, rusting, single speed, bikes of all makes, colors, and conditions - was available to employees *within* the ship yard. Work sites may have been located nearly a mile from ship yard entrance gates. The bikes were simply communal property that allowed for more rapid travel within the

ship yard, and were still in use when I toured the yard, despite its reduced capacity. Thus, mobility over very large areas was common as was contact with a wide range of different employees, of different trades. Such mobility, no doubt, led to opportunities for networking and communication and made the work site a much less boring place than that of assembly line workers. The mobility and communication also fostered the spread of ideas - in the case of Stocznia Gdanska, the ideas of Solidarnosc were made available to 1000s of workers within the yard.

Workers were also encouraged by management to learn various jobs within the plant and usually had specifications in union contracts that allowed for "bidding" on various jobs. The Allied Chemical Plant was represented by the OCAW and the Gdansk ship yard was organized by a state-sponsored, Communist trade union before Solidarnosc emerged. In the Allied Chemical plant, "bidding," however, did not refer to a bid on a pay scale - the scale for all jobs was predetermined for the duration of the contract. "Bidding" simply meant the employee was requesting an opportunity to fill a job opening within the plant. Training was provided on-site and highly skilled jobs were heavily "bid on." Employees usually won a bid simply by seniority; thus, new employees may start out as laborers and, over time, "bid up" to skilled jobs, such as welders, electricians, or plant systems operators.

The above background is meant to set the stage for comments by Paul and Pavel that demonstrate the high degree of worker autonomy, job satisfaction, interest, and personal fulfillment they experienced at their respective worksites. As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, I believe the personal identities of both Paul and Pavel were greatly defined by their participation in the Allied Chemical Plant and the Gdansk Ship Yard respectively.



Paul loved "the plant," as he and his friends called it. "I worked about all the jobs up there," he told me, "shift repair, flue tender, machine operations - the last 12 years I run the switch engine moving coal cars around - that was a good job - it got me off the ovens!" He emphasized that the jobs and the plant operations were *learned*; taught by someone who already knew the job. "You stood right by them and helped, watched, learned - and they kept you from gettin' hurt - from causing a fire or explosion or something." The training lasted a minimum of six weeks and often much longer with more "sensitive" jobs, like the job of flue tender. This job, Paul reported, amounted to keeping a balance on the backpressure of highly explosive coke oven gas on the batteries of ovens; there was no room for error and no second chance in judgments - "Otherwise you could blow up the whole battery and kill everyone working on it." No doubt, during the long training process of jobs like this, were transmitted not only specialized technical knowledge but also attitudes that I contend constituted the "industrial culture."

Paul took great pride in understanding the workings of the plant as a system. The coke plant was connected to other local plants by pipelines that carried excess coke oven gas produced as a by-product of the coking process for use in other industries. For example, the Allied Chemical Nitrogen Division fertilizer plant at South Point, Ohio was supplied with coke oven gas as were Armco Steel, Dayton Malleable Iron, and "the brick yard." During one of the interviews, Paul got into an argument with his friend, "Wells," over knowledge concerning the destination of coke oven gas:

{Wells} "They never sent no gas to the brickyard from the Solvay. That old brickyard didn't need no gas. It run off natural gas."

{Paul} "The hell it did! I *sent* the gas to the brickyard - I turned the valve that sent it there - I remember doin' it. That brickyard took a lot of our gas. Don't tell me I don't

remember. I've forgot more about the plant than you ever did know - ya dumbass - stupid fuck. I know what I did in that plant and how it *all* was run!"

Likewise, Pavel took great pride in the ship yard - in its history concerning Solidarity, in the scale of the operations, and in the workmanship of his craft. For instance, he told the following story, I believe, to illustrate the ingenuity of Poles over Russians and to relate to me the amount of pride in craftsmanship taken at the ship yard:

"We built all kinds of ships here - military ships, commercial ships, fishing ships. The best ships we built went to Germany. After the 1980 strikes the Russians made it hard for our yard. We needed parts for the ships from Germany. We could no longer get them. They said, "everything you need will come from Russia now." But it was slow to arrive and often the wrong stuff or bad, defective parts came. We had to try to fix them before we could use them, or figure out a way to make them work. But we did it! They (the Soviet Union) were mad at us over the strikes. They wanted to make it as hard for us as they could. But we could still our build ships!"

Pavel seemed to delight in telling to me and Marta the stories of Solidarity, his involvement in the movement, and showing to us the exact locations in the ship yard where important events occurred. For example, he showed us the place where Lech Walesa "jumped the fence," during the earliest days of the movement, and assumed leadership of the movement. Walesa had been fired from the Gdansk yard earlier for organizing strikes. As the ship yard director tried to calm down a group of workers angered over the firing of a coworker just weeks short of retirement, Lech Walesa jumped the fence into the yard, climbed up onto an excavator parked nearby, and unofficially took control of the event and all following events. Pavel insisted that I take several pictures of this site, as the fence (actually a wall), may be soon torn down. This incident, and many similar ones, demonstrate the pride that Pavel took in the history of Stocznia Gdanska.

In summary, the above discussion and descriptions were meant to demonstrate the degree of pride and satisfaction both Pavel and Paul took in their overall places of employment and in their jobs. They both had a great degree of autonomy in that they were able to do several different jobs within the facilities, were able to travel about within the facilities (Pavel told stories of even visiting nearby ship yards on company business when he was promoted to a foreman), took great pride in knowledge, craftsmanship, and histories of their workplaces, and apparently derived great satisfaction from the personal relationships formed among coworkers - relationships lasting well into retirement years. These constructs, I contend, are part of the proposed "industrial culture" and contribute to worker solidarity within that culture. Job satisfaction and autonomy do not detract from worker loyalty to fellow-worker or to union causes. In fact, a final comparison of worker/management relations demonstrates this:

Despite many strikes during the course of their employment at Allied Chemical, Paul and his friends considered the plant management to be fair and in some cases to give very good treatment to workers. A distinct line was drawn between union and management personnel, but, in general, there was no "us against them" mentality. Strikes occurred, contracts were negotiated and settled, and life went on; deep polarization and "revenge tactics" were not part of the company culture or the union culture at Allied Chemical. Paul's friend, Wells, told this story:

"They (Allied Chemical) were good to the men most of the time. If we worked over or were on a call out - you know - we might be there for 16 hours straight - yeah, they'd let us take a nap somewhere. They'd say, "Take a little nap somewhere. As long as I know where you're at - I'll call ya if we need ya." Yeah, we got along OK, most of the time. And the foremen would jump in and help ya if we got behind. It's not like that now at most plants, buddy! Its dog eat dog - every man for himself!"

Pavel commented also on relatively good worker/management relations, ironically, even though Solidarnosc was in a long-term battle with the Communist Party of Poland and the State/Party was, theoretically, management for the ship yard. Still, personal relationships and loyalties must have played an important role in mitigating many conflicts. For example, Pavel was arrested during martial law for passing out illegal samizdat newspapers in support of the outlawed Solidarnosc. He was put in jail for 6 months and after his release the ship yard told him he no longer had a job there due to absenteeism. "But they knew I was in jail - they knew I was passing out papers for the union and against them too. Eventually I was re-hired because the bosses knew me and knew I was a good worker and they actually helped me get back in!"

Obviously, not all industrial workers or workplaces are similar to Paul/Allied Chemical and Pavel/Stocznia Gdanska. These individuals/workplaces are perfect examples of the proposed "industrial culture" in two very distant locations. However, my informants from the Dayton Malleable Iron Foundry, just adjacent to Allied Chemical Semet-Solvay, enjoyed no such good worker/management relations and told no stories of generosity or cooperation from management. In general, these former employees were very bitter against "The Malleable," and used many profanities in describing the work place and its management. Obviously too, was the fact that these workers did not receive a retirement from Dayton Malleable Iron; all benefits, insurance, pension, severance pay - everything was cancelled with little warning. Thus, under such conditions, no fair assessment of "industrial culture" could be made for the Dayton Malleable Iron site

**Factor 2) Social solidarity within the movement was facilitated by the existing sociocultural construct of "*fraternal proletarian solidarity*," as cultivated by the USSR. Solidarnosc became an alternative object of fraternal loyalty.**

This section describes the notion of a collectivist culture (as opposed to a culture of individualism), as intentionally cultivated by the Soviet Union within its borders and within its sphere of influence. Generically, this construct may be referred to as "fraternal proletarian solidarity," (as discussed in the introduction and historical chapters of this thesis) or as "planned social solidarity." This was accomplished by a number of "*aggregative devices*," to use Lynd's phrase from his paper, "Planned Social Solidarity In The Soviet Union" (1945). The Peoples' Republic Of Poland was subject to this same effort for some forty years through mass indoctrination (State controlled mass media) and through the State directed school curriculum (evidence for this is detailed in this section, below). The ultimate aim of creating fraternal proletarian solidarity was creation of a population united in goals and ideology, this being the building of a classless society under the "dictatorship of the proletariat." A truly collectivist oriented society was created in Poland; however its loyalty *was not* to the USSR (although, in legal terms, the constitution of the Polish Peoples' Republic, according to Ash (2002: 20), claimed Poland's "unshakeable fraternal bonds with the Soviet Union.")

This paper contends that the cultural construct of fraternal proletarian solidarity was a facilitating factor for Solidarnosc as workers with a highly developed sense of collectivism are obviously much more likely to participate in collective action events, as opposed, for example, to modern American workers steeped in an individualist culture that glorifies self and views collectivism as dependency, weakness, or lack of self-initiative. This section contends that Solidarnosc co-opted this existing collectivist construct and used it to their benefit. Over time then, loyalty to Solidarnosc became an "alternative form" of fraternal proletarian solidarity.

This is *not* implying that overt loyalty or allegiance to the USSR was somehow directly "switched" toward Poland - no such loyalty ever existed. Solidarnosc simply tapped into an existing strongly collectivist-oriented cultural construct and offered itself as the object of fraternal loyalty in place of the Communist State.

The most general "frame" (as per the notion of issue framing in social movement theory terms) of the Polish Solidarity Movement was that Solidarnosc was an *alternative* to the dysfunctional State-operated unions to which virtually all Polish workers belonged. Over and over, in interviews conducted for this paper, the benign slogan, "*ewolucja nie rewolucja*" (evolution not revolution) was used by interviewees to describe the intentions of Solidarnosc. The very first point in the 21 points of The Gdansk Agreement takes this same position, clearly stating that Polish workers will have a choice - an alternative - of remaining in the old State unions or joining Solidarnosc. The Agreement even claims to anticipate cooperation between the two unions: "...Workers will continue to have the right to join the old trade unions and we are looking at the possibility of the two union structures co-operating" (MacDonald 1981: 102; translated copy of Gdansk Agreements).

Thus, Solidarnosc was attempting to "broaden the range of options" for Polish workers; it was *framed* as a "non-threatening option" or alternative object of fraternal loyalty. Of course, this was complete heresy in a Soviet-modeled state; it was actually the beginning of pluralism in a single-party system (as the State-controlled unions were direct extensions of the Communist Party and Solidarnosc was billed as "an alternative"). However, this attempt at "evolution" to pluralism was a much wiser and safer choice than revolution; attempts at violent revolution within Eastern Bloc nations had ended with Soviet military intervention. By framing itself as an "alternative" and not as a "replacement" to the authority of the state-sponsored unions,

Solidarnosc could attempt to justify itself as an equally deserving object of fraternal loyalty. Using examples taken from historical accounts, journal articles, and news items that demonstrate "creation of fraternal proletarian solidarity" in Poland, and with addition of data from personal interviews and personal communications, the sections below will support this claim.

First, several items will be mentioned that indicate a strong collectivist orientation among members of the Solidarity Movement and later several specific items will be described that demonstrate intentional creation of this attitude. No claim is made that "collectivist attitudes" could be measured. Evidence is given that describes a prevalence of this attitude in Polish society as well as examples of the direct cultivation of this attitude and these factors can only be compared, in qualitative terms - not quantitative, to societies which have had no such influence. To reiterate, the overall point of this section is that "fraternal proletarian solidarity" was a facilitating factor to the success of the Solidarity Movement.

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**A. *Politically, Solidarnosc was a socialist-oriented group:*** This is *not at all* to say that Solidarity advocated Soviet-style socialism; Solidarity was seeking "the middle way," so to speak, a social democracy as opposed to single-party, authoritarianism with a command economy. In fact, Ash (2002: 235) says that for most Poles "...the word 'socialism' was utterly discredited by what the Soviet Union and their authorities since 1945 had done in its name." Still, Ash insists, (speaking of an economic program proposed by Solidarity) "...the majority [of Poles were] was still for 'social ownership' of the means of production. But they restored to this

socialist principle a literal meaning: 'social ownership,' they said, means 'ownership by society,' not ownership by the socialist state (236 - 237.)

Additionally, Ash states, "Since the 1950s Polish sociologists had found a large and growing majority of their respondents against free enterprise in medium and heavy industry" (236). Poles had fully accepted the notion of socialized enterprise and were aware of its potential benefits (by means of funding social programs). However, they were also aware that the Soviet version of this, as it operated in Poland, was more exploitive than it was beneficial. Many Poles believed their country to be a sort of economically "exploited periphery" of the USSR ( to use Wallenstein's terminology here for clarification only) as described in the historical background section of this thesis. Poles favored socialist benefits and socialist enterprise, as described in a 1980 Time Magazine article titled, "We Want A Decent Life," but were fed up with shortages of basic material goods which they believed were in short supply because the Soviet Union expropriated them:

"...the state provided the usual panoply of Communist benefits: guaranteed jobs, free medical care, factory-sponsored vacations. But this was not enough. Poles were tired of standing in endless lines: for meat, flour, sugar, and other staples...tired of shoddy, overpriced goods...tired of waiting eight to ten years for an apartment, and almost half that long for a car that cost 20 months' wages. As one striking worker put it last August, "We don't want to run the government. We just want a decent life." (Smith 1980.)

Lech Walesa describes the desire of Poles to 'have the best of both worlds,' that is, to retain a collectivist culture and a strong welfare state but to be free of the hypocritical Soviet version of socialism:



"For the majority of people, socialism boils down to things we are accustomed to, which we pay no more attention to than the blood circulating in our veins: social benefits, hospitals, schools, and so on - the essentials. But of course, there must be money for these things and honesty must be the rule. What we have stressed in order to make socialism acceptable is that all that is best in the economy and in the domain of social welfare is socialist, even if it was part of the socialism we have known up till now (and which, frankly speaking, was merely bogus socialism)" (Walesa 1987: 172 - 173.)

Informant "JB," who is currently associated with the Fundacja Centrum Solidarnosci in Gdansk, (a group which promotes the ideology of the Solidarity Movement and which consists of a collection of labor union which fragmented from Solidarnosc in the 1990s) is well versed in the political rhetoric of Solidarity. He is personally acquainted with Lech Walesa, as both worked together in the Lenin Shipyards for many years. He made this personal comment about Walesa in regards to the exact political orientation of Solidarnosc:

"Social democracy was what we wanted - Walesa wanted the union to be a social party. He called it socialism *not* communism. He said, "yes - socialism - OK - but not the bad points of the regime. Still, we did not want to provoke attacks on the regime - we wanted to use the good points of socialism. The State should take care of families, provide medical care, pay for time off if you are sick, provide for you if there is no employment - yes - we wanted these things!"

***B. Collectivist orientation and "communist sympathy" were apparent in many individuals who most strongly supported Solidarnosc:***

Penn (2005) notes that some of the most effective and dedicated samizdat authors actually grew up as part of Poland's communist elite, or "red bourgeoisie." Their education and idealism were assets to their work for Solidarity. Some realized that they were part of a "privileged class in an allegedly classless society" (Penn 2005: 115). Their own social position, they realized, was

analogous to the hypocrisy of the Soviet version of communism. They did not seek to create a competitive, capitalist system in Poland but to make a Polish version of "socialism with a human face," as Hungary had attempted in the 1950s.

Penn relates the experiences of three women that she interviewed, all of which fit this description. All three were daughters of high-ranking party bureaucrats and all three became heavily involved in samizdat publishing. The point here, as with the previous discussion concerning Solidarity's socialist agenda, is to demonstrate the collectivist orientation that 40 years of Soviet propaganda instilled in the population. Penn's informants relate the following, similar life-stories. Statements of all three informants are compiled below:

"We belonged to a communist elite, which allowed us to feel protected and secure in our thinking...We were reformers, not opposers. We were leftists...We were conditioned to be 'true believers.' We were idealist youth, raised on utopian notions of the collective good...We grew critical of Stalinism but remained committed to communism...Our parents had sacrificed material and spiritual needs in the name of the future. By the 1960s, when we looked ahead into the future, we thought that 'true socialism' could unfold and basic freedoms would be restored" (Penn 2005: 116 - 117.)

Although the actual number of former "red bourgeoisie" members actively involved in the Solidarity movement was probably small, their effect was great; they used their knowledge of political ideology effectively and carried on samizdat publishing during the martial law period. Their influence on the working class by means of their publications was no doubt considerable.

Informant "AF," who now operates a business in Gdansk, appeared to have an appreciation for the "Communist style management training" of his school days, which still apparently serves him well today. He was an active member in Solidarnosc and is a good example of those with both obvious "socialist style" schooling and a collectivist attitude mixed with the pluralist tendencies of the Solidarity Movement. Two quotes from my interview with him reveal this:

"We had "State Economy" as a class in school. It was about the Marxist-Leninist style of management and the Socialist style of state. Then I went to management seminars later - I understand how business works - how economy works...business must operate same in capitalist or socialist countries - it must make money."

I then asked "AF" directly about my notion of a societal or cultural "collectivist orientation" as possibly being a facilitator to the unity of purpose that was evident in the Solidarity Movement; he responded:

"Well, I will show you something. Over a gate to the old downtown of Gdansk is written this: '*With unity small states join together and become great. Without unity, great nations dissolve.*' I think this gate was made in the 1600s - so, yes - I think we are "collectivists!" (laughs)

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Again, to reiterate, I contend that existing collectivist cultural constructs (as those mentioned above) facilitated Solidarnosc's ability to achieve and maintain social solidarity. The remainder of items in this section are given as examples of how this fraternal proletarian solidarity was generated. Some Polish examples are exact duplications of those that Lynd (1945) deemed "aggregative devices in Soviet society."

**C. *Fraternal proletarian solidarity was generated through Poland's educational system:***

A plethora of examples exist supporting this claim. From elementary school, secondary school, through college and post-graduate school, a socialist orientation was the *only* accepted academic perspective in Poland between 1945 and the mid 1980s. Until Stalin's death in 1953 and the beginnings of the "Khrushchev thaw" and de-Stalinization a few years later, "vulgar Marxism" dominated all Polish academic institutions and was used "...for the sake of purely expedient considerations, and applied in a purely instrumental fashion to support and legitimize the autocratic and bureaucratic regime..."(Kwasniewicz 1994: 27.) Kwasniewicz describes the

situation as being in an "ideological straightjacket," (31) in that job advancement in academic circles, or even continued employment, depended on professing a strict Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist orientation.

Lukasz Kaminski notes that the "ideological supervision over education" actually resulted in historical revisionism with "party historians" rewriting history; "The number of researchers who were ready to fulfill every single wish of the communist party was very large. They did not flinch from any lie or abuse" (Kaminski 2009: 1 - 4.) Still, Kubik (1994: 28) reports a shortage of "ideologically reliable teachers" by the early 1970s. It is clear from such accounts that individuals who taught for a living in the Peoples' Republic of Poland - from elementary school to college level - were under close ideological scrutiny by their supervisors.

Kubik (1994: 28) describes the manipulation of Poland's educational system during the Gierek administration of the 1970s as follows:

"A special commission of twenty-four experts on education, led by a prominent sociologist loyal to the authorities, Jan Szczepanski, prepared a report that recommended the introduction of a uniform ten-year curriculum in all elementary schools... propagation of the official ideology became an important element in the curriculum...Historical material, for example, was selected to illustrate exclusively the Marxist point of view..."

Ash (2002: 30) mentions the effects of what he terms a "socialist education" and claims that it instilled such a sense of egalitarianism in a generation of workers that the mounting inequalities of the 1970s were perceived as deeply offensive to most Poles. This awareness also fueled anger toward the Communist Party. Poles indoctrinated to believe in a 'classless society' and to work for the good of the collective were becoming more and more frustrated as they stood in lines to buy bread while Party bureaucrats apparently had access to all available consumer

items. Informant "J" told me that during his time in Poland special stores existed in Warsaw and other major cities that sold practically any item one might find in a U.S. supermarket; the only 'catch' was that one had to have a Communist Party card to shop there.

An Associated Press article of July 20, 1973 describes an intensification effort in Polish elementary schools. The article carried by the Pittsburg Post Gazette (and many other AP papers) says that plans were underway to extend school hours to 6:00 or 7:00 pm. The Primate of the Polish Catholic Church, Stefan Wyszynski, was reported to be denouncing the government proposal as he believed it was an attempt to isolate children from traditional Catholic schooling. The Church conducted its own classes for elementary age children in the late afternoon, he said, and the extended public school time would prevent children from attending church sponsored classes.

The above item is an example of the alternative schooling that many Poles received in addition to public schooling. In the section in this thesis on the role of samizdat in facilitating Solidarity, other alternative forms of education will be discussed.

The above described incidences of socialist indoctrination through education are exactly in-line with Lynd's (1945) discussion of "planned social solidarity." On page 188 he describes the special emphasis the Communist Party placed on education in all its domain. Literacy under Marxist-Leninist inspired socialism, Lynd claims, was not defined by simply a population that reads a daily newspaper, but by "...a population universally engaged in study." This tradition was used in a very positive manner, obviously, as an educated population is a benefit to any nation. However, it was also used as a tool of indoctrination toward fraternal proletarian solidarity, which, ultimately, this section contends, facilitated Solidarity in its social cohesion.

***D. Fraternal proletarian solidarity was generated by direct propaganda and "re-education":***

In order to influence the general population (those not enrolled in some type of school) the Communist Party of all Sovietized nations spent a great deal of time, effort, and money in mass-media propaganda. The aim of this, as in general public schooling and college courses, was creation of a collectivist attitude and loyalty to the socialist cause. For older citizens this was known as "re-education." This paper contends that this kind of propaganda was so prevalent for so many years that it in effect socialized Polish citizens with a collectivist attitude that facilitated the cohesion of Solidarnosc.

Lynd (1945) describes the "approved practices" or common practices of ideological indoctrination that were applied in the Soviet Union and several authors (such as, Coste 1951; Havel 1985; and Kovaly 1989) describe the dissemination of Soviet propaganda in Eastern Europe in very similar terms. Kubik's book, *The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power*, (1994) describes in detail the attempt to re-make Polish culture in the Soviet image through symbolic propaganda. Following is Lynd's description and some examples of application of this technique.

Lynd describes "re-education by propaganda as follows" :

" Use everywhere and on all occasions of pictures of Stalin, Lenin, and to a lesser extent, three or four other leaders, all Communist party members. This is reminiscent of icon worship."

"Use of quotations from Marx, Lenin, Stalin in the authoritative ipse dixit sense to confirm the rightness of Soviet policies...it is difficult to find a single important statement on any subject that does not contain a reference to some statement by "Comrade Lenin."

"Re-education by propaganda and participation: media of communications are closely controlled by the Party and carry a tremendous volume of propaganda...an elaborate network of "local correspondents" ...is continually developed by the press" (Lynd 1945: 191- 193.)

Lynd elaborates that these "local correspondents" are paid if their news stories align with official Party ideology or are referred to "the appropriate commissariat" if otherwise.

The aim of all this, Lynd states, is to create a society that is, "...organized to do big things in the public interest and to secure wide, active co-operation in doing these things, and it aims to enlist everybody and to find concrete roles for everybody. In other words, there is a very positive structure for social aggregation" (193.) This is the "positive theory of goals and organization" as used by Lynd, in a nutshell; "aggregative devices" are constantly used to create social solidarity and are reinforced, in praxis form, by utilizing "the masses" to build socialism. This refers not only to ideological building socialism but to physically building the infrastructure of socialist communities (true praxis, that is, "practical action.") For example, Lynd describes "mass activities" such as "volunteer subway building, road building, city reconstruction, etc., in free rest-day time" (192.) This is said to be in honor of Lenin's notion of volunteering on week-ends to do the manual work of "building socialism in one country." (Ash 2002: 324, cites a Polish joke on this subject: "Rabbi, can one build socialism in one country? "Yes, my son, but one must live in another." This reflects the general feeling of Poles in the 1980s that the USSR was exploiting them economically.)

Likewise, Coste (1951) in his article, "Propaganda To Eastern Europe," clarifies that younger people were more susceptible to Soviet propaganda (which he calls, "the most systematic and tenacious conditioning ever known" [624]) but that anyone who actually experiences the reality of its enforcement by the Soviet military has a different picture altogether. This is, again, the

dual notion (as with Penn, above) that Marxist ideology in Eastern Europe resulted in strengthening social cohesion *within* Sovietized nations but was ineffective in generating loyalty to the USSR. Coste (642) states that one idea is "...constantly hammered into their minds" [into the minds of the people in Soviet dominated nations], and that is, "the victory of the Soviet and communism is inevitable." Yet, communist propaganda and communist achievements, he states, had won very few Eastern Europeans over to the ideology (Coste was writing in 1951.) By the 1980s, especially in Poland, not even the propagandists believed the propaganda; in fact, the *resistance* to the excessive propaganda, was perhaps yet another factor in strengthening social solidarity in favor of Solidarnisc.

Vaclav Havel writes very eloquently about the power of Marxist-inspired propaganda in his book, *The Power of the Powerless* (1985.) He acknowledges that the Soviet system, albeit a "dictatorship of a political bureaucracy," as he calls it, was originally founded on principles with great meaning and great potential (he specifies: "I am thinking of the proletarian and socialist movements of the nineteenth century" [25].) The ideology of this system, Havel says,

"...in its elaborateness and completeness, is almost a secularized religion. It offers a ready answer to any question whatsoever; it can scarcely be accepted only in part, and accepting it has profound implications for human life...In an era when...people are being uprooted, and alienated and are losing their sense of what this world means, this ideology inevitably has a certain hypnotic charm. To wandering humankind it offers an immediately available home; all one has to do is to accept it, and suddenly everything becomes clear once more, life takes on new meaning, and all mysteries, unanswered questions, anxieties, and loneliness vanish" (Havel 1985: 25.)

Of course, Havel goes on to describe the negative consequences associated with this ideology, its "monstrous corruption" by Joseph Stalin, and the hypocrisy of the Soviet bureaucracy. The point is that this ideology was *very effective* and *very convincing* to millions of people in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet Bloc, *at least in its potential as a unifying force for the working*



*class*; it did, as Khrushchev stated, create "fraternal proletarian solidarity." The great irony is that the leaders of the democratic movements in Eastern Europe, such as Havel and Walesa, personified the collectivist attitude of socialist ideology in their plea for social solidarity in overcoming a socialist system that had went terribly wrong. They used fraternal proletarian solidarity as a base to build their social movements on.

**E. Fraternal proletarian solidarity provided an identity base for "konkretney activists" :**

In his book, *A Carnival of Revolutions*, Padric Kenney describes the internal pluralism of Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and the work of the "*konkretney activists*" in organizing opposition to the various Communist governments in the Soviet Bloc. Solidarnosc was not alone in the struggle for social and political change. A variety of groups with varying agendas (such as, environmental activists, anti-nuclear activists, peace activists) and different nationalities were inspired by the Polish Movement and made their own contributions toward change. Keeney calls these groups *konkretney activists*:

"*Konkretney* meant focused on reality: on everyday problems and on realistic, effective means of overcoming, or at least exposing them. *Konkretney* meant someone who knew how to organize a demonstration, or to use the media, and who could implement ideas effectively. The opposite...would be someone who enjoyed analyzing the communist system or the opposition and believed in the power of a devastating critique. Truth - about the workings of the communist system or the promise of, say, liberalism - was for such activists a prerequisite to opposition. It had become clear, though, by the mid-1980s that the time of the "truth tellers" had passed, giving way to what I call the konkretney generation" (Kenney 2002: 13.)

Of course, the konkretney generation was in debt to an earlier generation of activists who could *only* battle the communist system ideologically; this tradition even went back to Russian

samizdat writers in the 1930s (to be discussed in detail in the section of this thesis on samizdat.) The konkretney generation was taking advantage of a political opportunity created, in part, by all other forms of activism that had went before it. The point here, for this thesis, is that a common identity - again, a fraternal proletarian solidarity- across borders and across generations united the huge numbers of supporters in all of Eastern Europe for the Solidarity Movement and for Kenney's "carnival" of revolutions.

Additionally, this section contends, the millions of people united in opposition to the Soviet Union - united by the fraternal proletarian solidarity the Soviet Union intentionally created - were also united by a "popular ideology," to use George Rude's term.

As described in the theoretical section of this thesis, in the "collective behaviors" section, Rude's idea of popular ideology applies to the evolved ideologies of the Solidarity movement. That is, Solidarity was, ideologically, built on collectivist ideas and on collective action (as were the strategies of Keeney's konkretney activists.) The ideology emerged from the intersection of direct experience and formal proposition (from life in the Peoples' Republic of Poland under "scientific socialism.") Just as Rude states, "...derived ideas, in the course of transmission and adoption suffer a transformation...its nature will depend on the social needs or the political needs of the classes that are ready to absorb them" (Rude 1995: 30.) The praxis of the konkretney generation was built on the ideological dissent of earlier activists, just as Solidarity's ideology was built on the *original* ideology of socialism as a collective liberation of humankind (as per Havel, above, in his clarification to the "proletarian and socialist movements of the nineteenth century.") Thus, fraternal proletarian solidarity not only facilitated Solidarnosc in creating a pre-existing social solidarity, it also contributed to identity formation and ideological similarities across national borders and across generations. It was expressed in a unity of purpose that could

have never evolved in a plural, individual-oriented society such as the U.S. Ironically, a socialist, collectivist ideology facilitated the downfall of a Communist government.

***F. Fraternal Proletarian Solidarity Provided A Unifying Worker Identity:***

Informant "AF" was very critical of the former Communist government in Poland (as evidenced throughout this paper by his negative comments) which he equated with the Communist government in the Soviet Union. He felt the Polish government had simply been an extension of Moscow, and that the post-WWII regime had been nothing short of an occupation by a foreign power. I asked "AF" about his feelings toward the Russian people in general. One may assume, from the historical record of conflict, wartime atrocities, mistrust between the two countries, and from the obvious exploitation of Poland by Russia throughout the post-WWII era, that there would be a general animosity toward Russians. "AF's" surprising answer, I believe, was an indication of the effectiveness of the creation of fraternal proletarian solidarity even across national boundaries. His answer also reflects a cultural identity closely tied to a personal identity as a worker (however, other informants *did* voice active hostility not only toward the Soviet system but also toward Russian people in general):

"Well, hostility toward Russia was just toward the government. Of course terrible things - from history - Katyn, Warsaw - but this was Stalin who did these things. And after WWII he set up Communist party here. The Russian people - the Polish people - you know, we are Slavic. You know the saying, "the Slavic Soul"...what it means? We are brothers - we are working people - we have suffered together - only their government was using us. Of all things I am - good or bad, right or wrong - I am Slavic - I am a working man. "

Kotkin (1997: 150) mentions the "centrality of labor in personal identity" as an attitude purposely cultivated within "the socialist city," or "the Soviet city." Kotkin notes that this particular city type, though difficult to specify exactly, was exemplified in planned industrial cities, with an objective of "...maximum socialization of everyday life" (116.) "AF's" comments certainly reflect the intended fraternalism and his life-experiences in the industrial neighborhoods of Gdansk may be the source of his attitudes.

Gdansk's infrastructure was planned and built, not only for "maximum socialization of everyday life," but for maximum efficiency of armies of industrial workers. Worker housing was built, quite literally, up to the perimeter walls of the shipyards. Pedestrian bridges 16 foot wide carried masses of workers across railroad right-of-ways to the industrial facilities built along the Baltic Coast. "Superblocks" of Soviet-era apartment buildings, roughly built of poured concrete - gray, still unpainted, and streaked black in the dirty snow by coal dust from a nearby power plant (the coal-fired plant being located within the city limits) were still occupied in 2010. In this black and white world, only clotheslines of frozen laundry on apartment balconies added color. Informant "AF" told me the apartments have no washer and dryer facilities and laundry is done in the kitchen sink. The buildings do not have parking lots as industrial workers living in the superblocks were transported to the coast by mass rail transportation. In short, the coastal area of Gdansk exemplified the "planned socialist city," and in such material conditions the ideological notion of fraternal proletarian solidarity was intentionally cultivated and workers' personal identity revolved around this construct. This identity, I contend, was a facilitating factor in the success of Solidarity.

In relation to "AF's" comments, above, Informant "Z" likewise expressed contempt not only for Russia but also for Germany. Still, "Z" , like "AF" criticized only these nation's governments,

not the citizens, and like "AF" noted how Poles and Russians "understand each other," from common experiences:

"...Russia had always imperialistic 'appetite' and it never will change. For country like Poland is still very dangerous. Especially with our second 'lovely' neighbors Germany...both treat Poland like second category - like less of a nation. We must be wise with our politic with these two! But we have good relations with the ordinary people - I think so, yes - Russian people - we know them - we understand them. Only politic is awkward."

***G. Fraternal proletarian solidarity was inadvertently intensified by equality of conditions:***

Unlike the economic segmentation in advanced capitalist societies, in which a huge pay gradation and very dissimilar living conditions coexist (as in the U.S. with compensation ranging from minimum wage to millions of dollars per year), in The Polish Peoples' Republic nearly everyone (except high-ranking Party members) was frustrated by low pay, poor working conditions, and shortages of basic consumer goods. Thus, the huge industrial working class (and nearly all other workers) were united by their "common poverty" and by their opposition to the government which they blamed for their poverty. The capitalist idea (often a myth used to justify inequality and/or as an incentive to motivate harder work) that better economic conditions existed for those who worked hardest, were most skilled or talented - as supposedly evidenced by great differentiations of conditions in capitalist nations - did not pertain to Poland; Poles were basically all poor and no amount of self-initiative was going to elevate their condition, as evidenced to them by the general poverty of the country as a whole. Informant "B" commented on this:

"We were supposed to be classless, but it was building of strong classes - a small elite class and everybody else. The Party people had all they wanted - the rest of the people got by - sometimes, I don't know how they lived. Everyone was in the same package. University professors made same salary as plumber or laborer. All in economic trouble. This hurt the Party - the people saw it was all lies. Because they (the common people)

were all together in this. My pay was so small that I had to sew clothing at nights to make a living - and work all day too.

Interviewer asks: "So the idea of classless society - it must have backfired on the Party?"

"Thinking back, *a lot of things* backfired on the party - yes it did! Making everyone equal allowed everyone to unite with each other. I remember, factory workers going to mandatory 'cultural events' - made by the Party - to teach their ways. But some of the events - what they saw in a movie or play, or were taught in a class - well, this they used to fight *against the Party!* (Laughs)

Thus, the creation of a "classless society," a general Marxist-Leninist goal, in effect backfired against those who had sought to create it (the Party) as the common poverty of the large working class was a major source of frustration that led to the protests, riots, strikes, and eventually to the demands of the Gdansk Agreement. Poland, as a whole, became a "*class in itself and a class for itself,*" to use the Marxist terminology. This seldom happens in a plural society as too many competing ideological claims and economic classes constantly interact. For example, in the U.S. (currently), local trade unions are lucky if they can achieve a *regional* social solidarity (as in the territorialism of U.S. construction unions); *national* unity would be unthinkable as structural conditions and general worker attitudes do not facilitate it as they did in Poland in the 1980s. Social solidarity among the working masses was inadvertent intensified through the general, nationwide disillusionment with the Communist Party, and the State sponsored unions; ironically, the intention had been to generate loyalty and solidarity toward the State.

Eventually, as Solidarnosc became well organized, the government of the Peoples' Republic of Poland may have become the 'official' opposition. In December, 1981, Solidarnosc was outlawed and Poland came under martial law; this further ensured "equality of conditions," albeit in a very negative form. During this time, the Polish government may have even been considered an oppositional movement, in that it not only opposed Solidarnosc, legally and ideologically, but

it actively worked to discredit it. Solidarnosc members, even under martial law, made rather innovative protests against the Polish government. This scenario seems to support the notion of an ongoing movement and a counter movement. Both informants "PZ" and "JB" described this:

PZ: "The news - the State ran the news, you know - tried for years to make like Walesa was a gang leader or trouble maker. He was the one stirring up the strikes. The strikes were why the country was in financial trouble. They tried to tell us - of course, we knew this was wrong. It was a stupid thing to do. That only made us more against the government. We knew the strikes were against the Communist system and they were not the cause of the problems. When they did things like this it just made the union stronger...Finally, they put Poland under military orders..."

Interviewer says, "This was martial law? The time under martial law - Right?"

PZ: "Yes. And all Solidarnosc was outlawed - people jailed. And if you protest the police sprayed you with a colored water - bright blue. It stained your coat, your clothes - you cannot get it off. If people ran away - before arrest - they may find you from that blue stain. You could not buy new clothes everyday - no new coat. If police saw you, they would arrest you later.

But we remembered those arrested. We lit a candle every evening and put it in the window. Then other people did this. It was to show solidarity - resistance against martial law - to encourage each other and to keep Solidarnosc alive."

**Factor 3) The Solidarity Movement was facilitated and maintained (particularly during its outlawed period when Poland was under martial law) by persistent and intentional use of "samizdat" or "bibula" (illegal, self-published communications) as well as by other nonconventional means of communication.**

This section describes the role of *samizdat* publishing (illegal, self-publishing), couriers, messengers, and "bill-stickers," (activists who posted organizational announcements) and "flying universities" (underground schools) in facilitating the success of the Polish Solidarity Movement. It also contends that samizdat publishing evolved, over time, in technological complexity but

devolved in ideational content. Early versions were often hand-copied, philosophical or ideological critiques of the Soviet system, the content thereof comprehensible only to academics. Activists of the Solidarity Movement created much more utilitarian versions - a "samizdat of the People," so to speak. They effectively used this medium as a practical resource mobilization tool, whereas the early versions were simply dissent through abstractions or theoretical arguments.

In a 1988 paper, *The Solidarity Movement In Relation To Society And The State: Communication As An Issue Of Social Movement*, Kuczynski and Nowak (128 - 129) draw on Touraine (1965, 1973, 1974, 1981) in arguing that societal change is more than benign adaptation but involves an intentional creative process. For effect, Kuczynski and Nowak mention the introduction of Touraine's 1981, *The Voice and the Eye: The Analysis of a Social Movement*, which begins with the Marxian phrase, "Men Make Their Own History." As Kuczynski and Nowak observe, Touraine leaves out the well-known second part, that men cannot make history as they please or under circumstances of their own choosing, (Marx in Calhoun et al. 2007) signaling to us that history can be made intentionally, and as Kuczynski and Nowak argue, is done so, in the modern era, through class conflict expressed "... mainly through the actions of social movements "(130.)

The intended historical change as expressed through the overall aim of the Solidarity Movement was the restoration of human rights and democratic government in Poland. This process (officially) began with the Gdansk Agreement of August 31, 1980, which called for the establishment of trade unions independent of State control, guaranteed freedom of expression and of publication, and union access to the mass media outlets as to inform the general public of the organization's demands (Ash 2002). The method of Solidarity - the intentional creative



process by historical actors- to use Touraine's terminology, was to change history/society by building, first, an ideological alternative to the Soviet system - a system that had dominated communication, education, and the economy in Poland since the end of WWII. Solidarity's goal, as several interviewees commented, was "evolution not revolution" (*ewolucja nie rewolucja*); creation of a "critical mass" of followers, in true solidarity, in peaceful opposition to the State. Thus, as Kuczynski and Nowak argue, "...Solidarity's key issue was to influence communication process" (128). They add that it was "...a social movement of public opinion independent of the state," and that, "...the most valuable heritage of Solidarity remains the independent circulation of ideas connected with underground public opinion..."(142). This section describes how these ideas were circulated and how the ideas and their dissemination facilitated Solidarity's success.

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The mobilization of resources for any social movement depends on efficient and effective communications. From the complexities of issue framing to the mundane task of coordinating a strike, rally, or meeting at a scheduled time and place, modern communication systems and the right to use such systems are often taken for granted in liberal democracies. In the Polish Peoples' Republic of the 1980s, all public forms of communication were controlled by the State, under the direction of the "*Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza*", the Polish United Workers' Party; this was the Polish communist party, which, "indissolubly linked" Poland and the USSR in December 1948 (Dziewanowski 1976: 214). In effect, "The Party" and "The State" in Poland were the same entity, ideologically and politically linked to Moscow. As all open dissent against

the Party and its ideology was suppressed, the networking, organizing, and communications necessary for mobilization of labor, time, and material resources was extremely hindered. As the State controlled communications, obviously, there was little possibility of using conventional communications with the intent to generate collective action against the State.

Additionally, in the 1980s, current personal technological conveniences (such as cell phone networks, email, computer printing, etc.) were non-existent in Poland, constituting an additional hindrance to mobilization (relative to current use of such technology.) Thus, activists of the Polish Solidarity Movement were forced to devise unconventional and innovative methods of communication in order to effectively coordinate the activities of their movement.

### **General Description of *Samizdat* and Variations On The Theme**

*Samizdat* is a Russian word that literally means "self-published," and in context, implies also, "in opposition" to official publications. Both informants "J" and "P" believed the word to be "made up," that is, a play on the word, "*gosizdat*," which "P" described as, "...a Soviet publication promoting the Communist way." From the simple hand-copying of documents, the practice evolved over time in technique, style, content, and in mode of transmission.

In purest form *samizdat* referred to actual printed documents - illegal for lack of State approval - the possession of which constituted a crime in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc nations. Informant "P," had spent six months in jail in 1983 for distributing samizdat in the form of informational bulletins at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk (now called Gdansk Shipyard, or *Stocznia Gdanska*). "P" carried the bulletins in his lunch box and passed them out to coworkers. He considered himself lucky, as some individuals, according to "P," spent up to three years in jail for this. The crime of circulating samizdat was not limited to direct distribution by Solidarity

activists. Wawro (1995) mentions a Wroclaw librarian imprisoned for lending uncensored materials. Informant "O" remarked that the punishment varied; "...it was very dangerous, samizdat. You could have a stay in prison or in the "crazy house" after getting these books!"

By the late 1980s the samizdat idea had broadened to include "open" rebellion, that is, if one could read between the lines, so to speak. For example, informant "M" described,

"...cultural festivals - music festivals - and during Solidarity everyone was going who was a musician or was not a musician! (laughs)... through music even, they expressed the need for freedom - music, which is another media from print - another means of expression. Also through art, through satire, through theater - theater was very important - yes, making fun of what was happening! It was like 'in between the lines,' you could read what was the truth. Between the lines was the content. The theaters were very popular. The people were going just to have education - to have the truth!"

Kenney (2002: 11) mentions this same phenomena:

"Music outside the accepted mainstream existed in a literal underground: it spread by word of mouth and spawned samizdat publications and informal associations. Punk music, which was the most articulate in Poland and Slovenia, was the most powerful example. Underground music was like the church: it was not a form of opposition in itself but was a milieu where some people could discover opposition, and a resource (of contacts, and of strategies) for that opposition."

Informant "J" mentioned illegally recorded music (as opposed to live music festivals), known as "*magnitizdat*" ( samizdat in the form of magnetically recorded cassette tapes ) and translated the lyrics of one such song called, "*Music Brought Us Together*," ( *музыка нас связала* ). This was, according to "J," a popular, though "outlawed," song in Russia during the late 1980s (where "J" was working at the time) which was considered "too rebellious" by State censors. The lyrics, however, describe nothing more than a young person rebelling against parents and fleeing to be with friends to listen to music. This example demonstrates the extreme

form of censorship and official social conservatism common in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc nations in this period.

It also demonstrates the popularity of circumventing such censorship, which had, according to informant "J," "...become rather silly...it was like a joke...how stupid was this to ban a teenage pop song!" Informant "O" remarked that Western music was not officially banned or illegal, but that it was very difficult to get (hence the popularity of "fringe" Russian bands). Outlawed and "fringe" music became popular as home-made cassette copies of them were circulated from friend to friend. Early samizdat texts were often hand copied and circulated in this same manner. Penn (2005: 165 - 166) describes "the principle of fives," a sort of 'samizdat-chain-letter,' in which five copies of an illegal manuscript were expected to be made by a reader, then passed to five friends, who would do the same. Penn states that this practice was probably learned by the Solidarity network from former anti-Nazi resistance participants (166).

"J" also mentioned, "*detizdat*," which implied a form of children's storybook intended, like *gosizdat*, to promote Communism. Informant "M" said that such indoctrination began for all Polish school children in the second grade, along with compulsory Russian language classes. Other informants described high school classes in Marxist/Leninism and business management classes in "State Economy." Collectively then, *samizdat*, implied dissent or opposition to this kind of official ideological indoctrination as well as general dissent against the State and its censorship.

Finally, Kenney (2002: 9) mentions yet another form: *tamizdat*, literature published "over there," in emigration. This would refer, for example, to the later works of such authors as Alexander Solzhenitsyn, as published in exile.

Philosophically speaking, the above described versions of, "*izdat*," (that is, publishing; *izdatel'stvo* means roughly "publishing house," in Russian, as per translation by informant "J") appear to be a means of doing "ideological battle," in a society in which the State feels the compulsion to control "truth." For example, in describing the post-WWII Polish public school curriculum, Informant "M" said that history was literally re-written to portray the Red Army as a savior and liberator of Poland. "M" described how the public school history books glorified Russia's role as "liberator" but neglected to mention a number of atrocities committed by the Soviets, such as the Katyn massacres, mass deportations, imprisonments, ("M"s grandfather died in a Soviet prison) and the intentional "stalling" of the Red Army at the Vistula River while German troops nearly burned Warsaw to the ground. Informant "M" said,

"In the textbooks I never learned of this. The whole history, literature, had to be re-written after the war by people who were brought to Poland from Moscow. They were trained in Moscow how to do this. They redesigned information in the textbooks."

Interviewer asks "M": "You mean they rewrote the school textbooks?"

"Oh, yes! They re-wrote the history books! They re-wrote everything!"

This practice was so common, in the USSR proper and in all of its "sphere of influence," that it had a name: *lakerovka*, which Tokes (1975: 7) defines as "the official meddling with the facts." Taubman (2003: 474) mentions that *Pravda* reporters sometimes even filed their reports before events actually occurred, and would scramble to change noticeable details, such as weather conditions, in attempt to maintain the illusion of real reporting.

Apparently the practice of *lakerovka*, and its effect on daily news reporting, was commonly know by citizens. Informant "J" spoke about enduring many shortages, "But we were never short of toilet paper - *Pravda* was sold every day!" (*Pravda*, of course being the Russian

newspaper whose name translates ironically as, "truth.") "And *Trybuna Lud*", ( jokingly referred to as the "Polish Pravda", actually translated as "The Peoples Tribune"), "J" commented, "was a *very* good paper - very good to start fires with!"

Informant "A" commented on the State's attempt at total control of information, from school curriculum to radio and TV content:

"There was a minister of education responsible for sovietizing of Polish education and culture. Everything had to fit the Communist ideology - if history did not fit they just changed it! Yes, they were trying to change our way of thinking - either by fear or by propaganda in schools and on TV. And you could not see a movie or hear music or radio or TV from Western Europe - they kept it blocked. You see that big hill where the cross is on? (he points to a hill overlooking Gdansk, called *Gradowa Wzgorze*) There was tower up there that blocked all radio and TV - all you get is what that tower sends - nothing else!"

The point here is that citizens of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were isolated from the outside world and from objective realities by blatant manipulation of *all* forms of communication. Even the most mundane printed items had to pass official State inspection. For example, Kubic (1994: 42) states that, "In the 1970s in Poland every printed text (including bus tickets) had to be approved by the Główny Urząd Kontroli Prasy, Publikacji i Widowisk (Main Office for the Control of the Press, Publications, and Public Performances)." Thus, in such a restricted society, where literally all printed material was subject to State inspection for approval, several alternative forms of communication arose and became important organizational tools for the Solidarity Movement.

### **Technological Evolution Of Samizdat Publishing**

From hand-written manuscripts reproduced a single copy at time (from Czarist days through the 1950s, according to Saunders, 1974 and Tokes, 1975) to the carbon-copies of the 1960s,

("...when samizdat came pouring out like a spring flood...", as noted by Alexander Solzhenitsyn 1974: 252) the practice eventually progressed to small-scale print shops which turned out a few hundred copies of simple pamphlets or bulletins. Eventually, large-scale printing operations were set up. Large presses were often hidden, as "M" recalled, in church basements. Informant "A" said that small, antique hand-operated presses were often hidden in city apartments, in barns in rural areas, and in the attics of both rural and urban homes. Informant "P" said that several small-scale printing shops were operated in conjunction with the network of shipyards along the Baltic Coast. "P" said the presses used home-made ink made from laundry detergent and black paint taken from the shipyards. These produced informational and organizational literature for Solidarnosc, as well as strike bulletins and the reports on negotiations of the Gdansk Agreements. "P" said they also produced "samizdat how-to brochures", which told how to make ink, obtain large amounts of paper on the "black market" (much paper mysteriously went missing), and how to connect with other printers through existing social networks.

Like Solzhenitsyn, Wawro (1995) notes a similar "spring flood" of samizdat (she calls it a "veritable explosion") during and after the December 1981 imposition of martial law. Wawro notes the paper "Z Dnia Na Dzień" (From Day To Day), "...began publication the morning after martial law was imposed and was put out three times per week until 1990. The average edition of "From Day To Day" was four pages long, with 40,000 copies printed" (Wawro 1995:2).

Likewise, Penn notes that the underground newspaper, *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, (Regional Weekly) has a circulation of up to 80,000 copies and was,

"...by far the largest circulation of all the underground newspapers and, according to all accounts, was the most important and popular among them. Thousands of hands created each issue, with typewriters, public phones, hand-delivered messages, and private apartments replacing the computers, office phones, telexes, and office space that had been confiscated in police raids. Twenty-two pages of conventional type were squeezed into four legal-sized pages. Dense and portable, like the underground itself, *Tygodnik*

*Mazowsze* offered Poles a concrete example of what uncensored news looked like" (Penn 2005: 149).

A Time magazine article from December, 1977 (Starkowski), three years before the Gdansk Agreements and the founding of Solidarnosc, listed six well known Polish samizdat publications: *Opinia* (Opinion) and *Robotnik* (The Worker) were working-class newspapers, *Zapis* (Record) was a literary quarterly popular among intellectuals, *Bratniak* (Fraternity) was printed by university students, *Postep* (Progress) was a magazine about the problems of Poland's farmers, and *Puls* (Pulse) dealt with censorship in the Polish movie industry. With each publication having circulation in thousands, and with *Robotnik*, in the tens-of-thousands, such large-scale operations could not have gone unnoticed by government officials. Starkowski says that,

"Thus far the government has been reluctant to crack down heavily on the samizdat publications for fear of stirring up even more popular unrest and making martyrs of the underground writers. Polish officials dismiss the dissident writing as insignificant, but they regard its proliferation with dismay" (2).

However, only a few years after the above mentioned article was published, Polish officials' opinion of samizdat publishing was much more serious. They realized that the large-scale newspapers, such as *Robotnik*, were powerful communication and organization tools at the disposal of Solidarity. They were practical too; Ash (2002: 20- 21) reports that *Nowa*, an illegal large-scale publishing house in Warsaw, was distributing "...a pocket-sized handbook giving instructions for dealing with the secret police." Wawro (1995:2) also mentions seeing copies of the book in Wroclaw and translates its title as, "Citizen and Secret Service." "It contained laws guaranteeing civil rights extracted from the official Polish codes, as well as advice on proper behavior in encounters with police and secret police" (Wawro 1995: 2).



Thus, in an effort to control Solidarity's communication and mobilization through samizdat, the Polish government began a major crackdown. When Martial Law was declared in Poland in December, 1981, not only the leaders of Solidarnosc were rounded up and imprisoned, but many known samizdat publishers were also arrested. Penn (2005: 101) says that the hope was "...for Solidarity to slip into silenced obscurity."

It did not, and samizdat publication continued and even increased its circulation (as mentioned above, Wawro cites a "veritable explosion" *incited by* martial law). Networks were broadened and new participants emerged to fill the places of those imprisoned. Penn's 2005 book, "*Solidarity's Secret*," focuses on the fact that samizdat newspaper publishing was done almost entirely by women after the major crackdown and arrest of nearly all male participants. It was maintained, according to Penn, with the willful, determined aim of simply preserving the movement; of intentionally *not* allowing Solidarity to slip into obscurity as the State had wished.

Thus, the intentional effort of those involved with samizdat and the technological advancements (from hand copying to full-scale publishing ) in the production of samizdat were facilitating factors to the success of Solidarity. This reflects Tourain's thesis mentioned at the opening of this paper: "men (in this case women) make their own history," through willful, intentional, creative acts. Social movements are one such act, and are prime drivers of societal change.

### **Ideational *De-evolution* Of Samizdat Content**

This de-evolution involves the content becoming less philosophical and abstract and becoming more utilitarian. The Polish Solidarity Movement, in effect, co-opted the Soviet version of dissent through literature, altered the traditional "lofty intellectual style" (as evidenced

by the English translations of samizdat by Tokes [1975] and Saunders [1974] ) and made samizdat the "Peoples' version" of protest literature. As mentioned above, this even included "how-to" books, in this case, how-to deal with arrest by secret police.

No claim is made as to an organized content analysis of a specific body of samizdat. However, in conducting a very limited study of samizdat materials, a trend was noticed, as mentioned earlier. In content, that is, in ideational form, samizdat "de-evolved" from complex philosophical commentaries and Marxist-inspired critiques of the State, to simple, sometimes even humorous, utilitarian communications.

In this study, access to the huge body of samizdat literature was limited to English translations and to Polish informants' general descriptions of samizdat content. Informant "P," for example, a former employee of the Lenin Shipyard, showed many old "strajk biuletyns, (strike bulletins) and shipyard newspapers and described the content. Translated compilations of Soviet samizdat, such as those by Tokes (1975) and Saunders (1974) were reviewed, as were "popular" samizdat books (several by Alexander Solzhenitsyn), MacDonald's (1981) compilation of Polish samizdat, essays by Poland's Adam Michnik, and many excerpts in various books and articles on the Solidarity Movement, nearly all of which have some reference to or excerpt from a samizdat publication. Kenney's *Carnival Of Revolution* (2002), for example, is based (to a great degree, along with other sources) on a huge body of Polish, Czech, Ukrainian, and GDR samizdat publications, interpretations of which add to my overall understanding of the evolution of samizdat content. Both notions, technological evolution and ideational "de-evolution", are relevant as further facilitating factors toward the overall success of the Solidarity Movement.

As a general starting point, Saunders (1974:7) traces the origin of circulating written, clandestine documents in opposition to political authority (in the Russian tradition) back to the

time of Czarist censorship. He mentions the following items as being "privately circulated, usually in manuscript form: nonconformist poetry and fiction, memoirs, historical documents, protest statements, trial records, etc." Penn (2005: 8) substitutes the word, *bibula*, for the Russian, *samizdat*, citing that "...*bibula* had the advantage of being a Polish word." Penn's sources may have used the term, *bibula*, in an attempt to deny or negate the Russian origin of the term/practice. However, informant, "M", a native of Poland and activist in the Solidarity Movement, did not associate *bibula* with *samizdat*; "We called it *samizdat*," "M" said, when directly asked to distinguish between the two terms. On the other hand, informant "O", also a native of Poland, insisted, like Penn's sources, in using the term *bibula*. For consistency, this paper generally uses the term, *samizdat*. It appears that the two words are interchangeable in meaning, but one has "Russian overtones," which perhaps do not appeal to some Poles.

Although the idea of producing and distributing written documents opposing political authority is not unique to Soviet Bloc nations, (for instance, underground oppositional material was distributed in many Nazi occupied European nations; and, technically speaking, oppositional documents printed during the American Revolution, such as "The Virginia Resolves," and anti-Stamp Act tracts, could be considered "American *samizdat*") there is a direct historical tradition of the practice in Eastern Europe which Kenney (2002: 10) describes as the language of "dissident intellectuals," and Oleszczuk (1982: 544) calls, "...the first tendrils of international cooperation by the dissidents of the area..." Oleszczuk continues (545), "There has even been a suggestion by Sakharov for the development of a joint human rights program on the part of the dissidents in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union."

Oleszczuk's definition of *samizdat* as, "...political thought of intellectuals who try to grasp the essentials of their countries' circumstances in order to change them" (527), is case in point; up

until the early '80s samizdat was generally the work of intellectuals and was written in academic style, or occasionally (as in the case of Solzhenitsyn's famous, *One Day In The Life Of Ivan Denisovich*) in novelistic form. Solidarity altered the samizdat tradition by producing newspapers and informational bulletins with the objective of informing working class people of issues directly affecting them (the people) and called on the people to act, in solidarity, to address these issues. The "intellectual versions" of samizdat had approached Soviet dominance, exploitation, and censorship from a purely abstract position.

For example, Oleszczuk (1982: 528) describes the position taken by samizdat writers in the English translations by Rudolf Tokes (Tokes published a collection of samizdat writings in 1975) as "...posit[ing] as the basic cause of dissent the irreconcilability of Marxist egalitarianism with the reality of increasing social stratification." By contrast, informant "M," if Oleszczuk's academic terminology is applied, 'posited the basic cause of dissent, ' to be material realities of everyday life, such as the fact that:

"The people were starving in the cities. There was nothing on the shelves (in grocery stores) but tea and macaroni - that's all! Everything was gone - empty shelves!...I mean even like shoes, clothes, too - nothing for us!"

Interviewer asks "M" if he thought that all the food and consumer goods were being expropriated by the Soviet Union:

"I don't think - I know! I know it was! In those days was discovered the trains full of Polish goods - meat, butter, potatoes, other products - going east. To Russia. It was put into the trains, on trains was the label, "paint!"

Interviewer asks, "Paint? What do you mean?"

"Like paint for houses - house paint. They want people to think the train had in it paint. But some railroad workers stopped the train - for some reason - and one of the cars was opened up, and they realized it was full of food! That lead to strikes when the people start to know about this."

The point is, the samizdat papers in Poland published stories such as "M"s that had direct meaning to the people, *not* vague Marxist-based critiques of ideological issues, as the "intellectual versions" of samizdat had done. Solidarity-backed newspapers used the samizdat tradition to engender direct public support for its cause by acting as a *genuine* newspaper, not as a "Polish Pravda," and not as space for academic dissertation on the problems with Marxist doctrine.

Still, the content of the samizdat shipyard bulletins, for example, produced by Solidarnosc was not strictly on the level of a "trade union consciousness," to use Lenin's term. Informant "P," who was jailed for distributing samizdat produced by Solidarnosc commented:

"This was not just about wages. This was about our freedom. It was about the whole nation - not just shipyard workers. This was about *big* changes - the demands of the Agreements - the Agreements of Gdansk...well, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right to strike, right to have independent trade unions free from the control of the State - No, *not* simple demands for more pay only. We wanted a better way of life in Poland!"

### **Source of Polish Samizdat Tradition**

This paper contends that Solidarity was the first group (in the Soviet dominated world) to shift the samizdat tradition from an intellectual content to a news and organizational content, and thus make use of samizdat as a resource mobilization tool. However, the earliest samizdat writers of both Poland and Russia were of the "intelligentsia" class. But to note the transformation of samizdat from a purely academic tradition to a form of mass communication (in effect, not only resource mobilization but also issue framing) is *not at all* to lessen the intellectual tradition of

those who published it; quite the contrary, this "de-evolution" was an intentional project for a specific purpose: the survival of Solidarity.

Rawin (1968) demonstrates the ideological merger between a newer, post WWII technological intelligentsia emerging out of the Polish working class with the traditional 'elitist' intelligentsia. This merger was a channel or conduit of thought that eventually linked the earlier, more ideological versions of samizdat thinking with the practical, concrete content supporting the issues of Solidarity.

Rawin explains that the term "intelligentsia" originated in Russia and, "...it was under Russian influence that the term, and the concept, came into use in Poland...", but the Western usage equating this term with 'intellectualism' or 'professionalism', "...does not seem to reflect its East European significance" (335). Rawin claims this term implies origins in aristocracy or gentry along with high educational status. It would imply, in its original usage, members of a highly educated, landed elite, perhaps more analogous, in Western terms, to a highly educated version of Antebellum gentry. Both informants "J" and "M" described this group of 'landed gentry' as "*kulaks*," or upper-class, rural families ("J" used the term in reference to rural Russia and "M" in reference to rural Poland.) Lewin (1994: 122) describes Russian kulaks (rather negatively in literature he reviewed) as, "...village extortioners, the "skinnners alive," those who "eat up the commune..." or as, "peasant entrepreneurs." As this group came into decline due to Stalinist collectivization of agriculture in Russia and Ukraine (starting in the 1930s) and by a shift toward industrialization and urbanization in Poland, "...a new strata of professionals and non-manual workers recruited from the impoverished gentry" [kulaks impoverished by forced collectivization and/or the trend to urbanization] "were forced to leave their ancestral homes and to move to the city in search of employment. The core of the intelligentsia was provided by what later came to

be known as the 'creative intelligentsia' - writers, journalists, artists, scientists, and educators" (Rawin 1968: 357). However, after WWII the Communist Party (more specifically, Joseph Stalin) became increasingly worried that this class, formerly "well-to-do," now posed a threat to political solidarity. Being educated and articulate, this group had potential to disseminate its cause against socialism (if such an agenda actually existed or was a figment of Stalin's paranoia).

Thus, in Poland, after 1945, the older, traditional intelligentsia, at work in managerial jobs, education, and other professions was "phased out" and replaced by "...a new 'working class intelligentsia' - a managerial elite that would be committed to the Marxist outlook (Rawin 364). This often meant that the Polish working class had an advantage, as those with "proletarian roots," as opposed to "*kulaks*," were thought by the Party to be more worthy and loyal. Informant "M" said that such individuals were even "spotted" a few extra points on college entrance exams. Early on, this policy resulted in situations in which a person with a high school education and a year or two of college ended up as a plant manager and another (from a *kulak* background) with an advanced engineering degree was demoted to a laborer. Obviously, this caused outrage on the part of the old intelligentsia and in many cases animosities existed for years against members of the newly emerging "technological intelligentsia."

Over time, the new and the old versions of Polish intelligentsia merged combining the best elements of both. Rawin claims that the old version - humanistic, of 'noble origin,' with intellectual roots in Enlightenment philosophy "...did not disappear entirely or lose its attraction, but next to it appeared the model of the 'new intelligentsia' - the expert manager, usually seen as a first generation professional"(Rawin 1968: 368). The merger of these two groups was facilitated by an apparent need on the part of the younger technical intelligentsia to validate itself in relation to traditional status of the older traditional intelligentsia. Rawin states that, "...the

technical intelligentsia identifies with the traditional intelligentsia; it is from this identification, rather than from their occupational function, that the technical experts derive validation of their status " (372). Apparently this was a cultural construct carried over into post-war years despite communist 'modernization' of education (that is, addition of Marxist indoctrination classes at all levels of schooling.)

Thus, the post WWII Polish "intelligentsia" (intelligentja), was a "hybrid" of sorts, steeped in communist rhetoric yet tempered by affinity for, and an association with, the old-school intellectuals. This new generation (which would ultimately be the Solidarity generation) discarded the elitist attitude of exclusionism but retained a respect for and an interest in higher levels of philosophical learning attained by the traditional intelligentsia. They combined real-world, technological problem solving - the order of the day in modern Polish universities under communism - with an admiration, interest, and curiosity in the intellectual world of their predecessors. They were the first highly educated working class generation in Poland. The result: this generation bridged the gap between the abstractions of traditional academic samizdat writing and utilitarian usage of the same; they understood samizdat as a means of furthering a concrete cause but they also understood the ideational significance of their work.

This group comprised much of the KOR (*Komitet Obrony Robotnikow*: Workers' Defense Committee) which informant "M" description as,

"...intellectuals and academics...who were working underground and helped the students publish (samizdat) newspapers. It was through this network (KOR) that communication and legal action was organized...many were lawyers, *not* in the party system (not involved with the Communist Party) and some were mad at the Party system - not promoted - they couldn't be a judge or something. "



This group understood the Solidarity Movement was about much more than wage increases, strikes, and better working conditions. They supported workers and their grievances, but also saw the "big picture" of much needed, long-term, societal change. When the interviewer asked informant "M," for example, how Solidarnosc survived despite being legally outlawed, its leaders jailed, the nation put under martial law, whereas during the 1980s American labor unions were collapsing within a liberal democracy, "M" said:

"It was not just a labor union. It was about the idea of change, political and economic change for the future - for the next generation - it was a vision for the future - for our children. Not just economic goals - not just short term goals. It had much higher goals and this is what held people together."

"We were thinking about the future - to redesign society - the whole structure. The Soviet Union had tried to redesign but they did it wrong! They wanted to re-shape culture - and they did! But it went back against them!"

Thus, the "de-evolution" of samizdat content was, as explained in the above section, an intentional act by a well educated generation that used the underground media as a tool for resource mobilization. This generation understood the deeper intellectual versions of samizdat - the orthodox Marxist arguments against the Leninist/Stalinist system they had grown up in - but they chose to bring these arguments down to concrete terms and use samizdat to fight for the survival of Solidarity. They even used humor in their effort. A final example as given by Keeney (2002: 221) will close this section. It is taken from a samizdat flyer distributed to draw support for striking shipyard workers at Gdansk:

"Next to a large drawing of a masturbating elephant (and the slogan "Don't think only about yourself!") was this appeal, almost apologetically bridging two cultures:"

"If you are not at this moment drunk, stoned on grass or television, or exhausted from love, then listen up: The Gdansk shipyard and a few other factories are on strike. You should give a shit, because WE - your beloved, ever-faithful, loyal friends from WIP - are

among those helping out. Victory in this zadyma will also be our victory...From the first day of the strike, there has been a support group at St Brygida's Church. Show up there. And if that place, or the idea of working in a group doesn't work for you, then paint walls [with graffiti], shout by the ship yard, vibrate, dance, or play the harmonica - but do it for the STRIKERS!"

### **Curriers, Messengers, "Bill-Stickers," And Other Alternative Means Of Communication**

In their analysis of the Polish Solidarity Movement, Kuczynski and Nowak (1988) argue that, "...Solidarity's key issue was to influence communication processes" (128), and they offer this remark (along with two other main points) to support their thesis:

"In the mid-1980s, the most valuable heritage of Solidarity remains the independent circulation of ideas connected with underground public opinion that is being nourished intellectually by a group with a narrowly defined ethos" (143.)

They are referring, obviously, to the underground publishers, but much communication was also carried out by word-of-mouth; that is, by direct face-to-face interaction between Solidarity members as a means to coordinate events supporting Solidarity (strikes, demonstrations, protests) and to gather information as content for the underground papers. There were two main reasons for this: first, (especially relevant after martial law was declared in December, 1981) communications against the State and in support of Solidarity were illegal (punishable by jail time), and secondly, practically no form of telecommunications existed in 1980s Poland. There was no World Wide Web or cell phones, and desktop "computers" (the few available) were little more than word processors with no "sending ability." In fact, telephones were rare. Informant "M" said:

"We had no communications. I mean zero communications during martial law. You couldn't travel to other cities. And there were no phones. People didn't have phones anyway. You might wait 25 years to have a phone in the house. And you'd never get it anyway - only the political people got phones. So you couldn't call anybody, you couldn't communicate - there were no computers."

" So, the only communication was just visiting. And during Solidarity they appointed special messengers - curriers - they were the ones working to make communications. It was the same with labor unions and student unions. They were walking, the curriers - or travel by train, to say that you will strike this day. That's how they got it out! The students actually copied this from the labor unions. As soon as the guys went on strike, because of Anna Walentynowicz - you know, she was the first one fired at Gdansk Shipyard - they started this - started the messengers."

"And you were able to pull the strikes, like the students did, on a particular day, time - so that all schools or all factories just stopped! They shut them all down! And without communications [without technological communication] the word was spread by these people- the messengers - the messengers who traveled."

" The messengers worked in 1989 to bring democracy to other countries - that's how they met with Havel in the mountains. In their backpack were carrying the illegal newspapers, exchanging somewhere in the forest during talks."

Interviewer asks, "You mean during the Round Table talks? That's how the Czechoslovakians - Vaclav Havel - that's how they learned the news?"

"Yes, that's how news traveled in those days!" (laughs)

As mentioned above by informant "M," university students and workers alike were forming alternatives to State-sponsored organizations in the early 1980s. Informant "M" had been an active participant in an independent student association. Like workers, students in pre-1989 Poland had State-sponsored unions. However, the aim of these unions was to support Communist Party ideology in both the workplace and in schools. "M" remarked that both university student curriers and labor union curriers were indispensable to communication, because the official mass media gave no coverage at all to the Solidarity Movement (Informant "JB" said that the media did, but all coverage was very negative). "M" said that communication between universities and

labor groups in different cities was carried out by curriers but "M" also mentioned that "bill-stickers" aided local communications.

"Bill-stickers" were students that simply posted signs or papers all over their towns containing slogans or information about Solidarity or its associated groups. The content of these signs may have been as simple as the date, time, and place for a march, strike, or rally, or a simple slogan that informed the general public of the movement's agenda. This was a risky job, as even posting such a sign could result in jail time if the bill-sticker was caught by police. However, it was essential for mobilization and organization, because, as "M" pointed out, *all* communications concerning the Solidarity Movement were alternatives to the official channels.

According to Baur and Gleicher (1953), in their article based on the Harvard Project On The Soviet Social System (extensive open-ended interviews with over 300 Soviet refugees) alternative communication in Soviet-controlled nations existed as "...an informal, unofficial oral communications side by side with the controlled, official media" (298), and, after citing much evidence to prove their point, the authors, "...feel warranted in making our earlier statement that unofficial word-of-mouth communication must be considered a major channel for the transmission of news in the Soviet Union" (300). Apparently little had changed in Soviet dominated Poland and other Eastern European nations over the thirty years from Baur and Gleicher's study until the time of informant "M"'s 1980s era experience; the surest form of news, at least the *trusted* form of news, was still word of mouth communications.

Baur and Gleicher state that word-of-mouth communications offer to citizens living in censored regimes not only an alternative network but a form of release (by side-stepping "official" and expected political positions) as well as a sounding board for gauging others opinions; in this manner, new and trusted person-to-person networks are formed. No doubt, this

level of trust (Bauer and Gleicher, for example, state that even "telling a joke with the wrong political implications" could result in a labor camp sentence [298] ) engendered a form of social solidarity in itself; Solidarity's messengers would have experienced this same sort of bonding due to the risks they were taking in passing information under martial law.

Graffiti was another alternative method of communication. One informant pointed out that twenty years after Solidarity gained official recognition and legalization, Solidarnosc graffiti is still visible on buildings and walls in Gdansk. The author of this paper saw small-scale examples of this at ground level but was more impressed by a gigantic string of letters, each perhaps five feet tall, in which "Solidarnosc" was scrawled across the gable-end of a huge building inside the Gdansk Shipyard. The gable faces the city of Gdansk (as opposed to the Baltic Sea) and is visible for a great distance.

Informant "JB" mentioned still another unique form of communication. He said that after the signing of the Gdansk Agreements (August 31, 1980) until the enactment of martial law (December 13, 1981) - that is, during the first legalization of Solidarnosc, the union was so coordinated that city-wide strikes could be called by the ringing of church bells. A specific time and date for a strike was decided upon by Solidarnosc leaders, this was relayed to the various churches in the "tri-cities" (Gdansk, Sopot, and Gdynia, which are located along the Baltic coast) church bells were rung at the decided time - and all industrial work came to a halt. This was no small work-stoppage; "JB" estimated there were some 70,000 shipyard and industrial workers in the tri-city region at this time. This method was used in many other Polish cities as well, and according to "JB," Lech Walesa had once commented that Solidarnosc could literally shut Poland down at will, simply by the ringing of church bells.

"JB" and "PZ" also described two other unique forms of what might be called "symbolic communication" during the time of martial law: the placing of lit candles in windows of homes as remembrance of those arrested for activism in the Solidarity Movement, and "passive protest" against State sponsored news broadcasts by mass boycott. The dialogue below clarifies these notions:

PZ: "... Solidarnosc was outlawed - people jailed. And if you protest the police sprayed you with a colored water - bright blue. It stained your coat, your clothes - you cannot get it off. If people ran away - before arrest - they may find you from that blue stain. You could not buy new clothes everyday - no new coat. If police saw you, they would arrest you later."

" But we remembered those arrested. We lit a candle every evening and put it in the window. Then other people did this. It was to show solidarity - resistance against martial law - to encourage each other and to keep Solidarnosc alive."

JB: "Yes, they always talked shit about Walesa, about the union, on the news! They wanted to blame us for everything. During martial law there was 8:00PM evening news - well, 20:00, military time - yes! Main news of Communist Party - that's all it was! We were allowed to be on the streets till 9:00PM. Was curfew, 9:00PM till 6:00AM. But, to show protest, we would all go out and walk the streets from 8 till 9 to show we did not like the news they tried to give us. Yes, we were protesting against them that way! OK - its 8:00PM - let's go out for walk - even if its freezing and snow to your ass deep (he holds his hands almost to his waist to demonstrate) - *we take walk!* (much laughter)

### **"Flying Universities"**

Informant "M" described the so-called "Flying Universities" (uniwersytet latajacy) as informal, private gatherings - study groups or discussion groups - that met with intentions of preserving Polish national traditions, Polish history, and, at times, even the Polish language. They were "flying," in that their location changed very often. "M" said that they were revived in the late 1970s in response to the earliest attempts to organize trade unions, but had been part of

Polish heritage for at least a century. "M" speculated that these groups first emerged under Russian, German, or Austrian partition of Poland prior to WWI.

Keen and Mucha (1994) mention a general tradition in 19th century Slavic countries similar to "M"s description of the Polish version. They use the term *Maticas* (2005: 5) which were private organizations devoted to cultural studies, folk traditions, education, and publishing. According to Keen and Mucha, the *Maticas* were formed as alternatives to mainstream universities in Eastern European countries as universities did not consider culture and traditions as true scholarship. A general societal tendency of 19th century Eastern Europe as noted by Keen and Mucha was, "...a delayed sense of national identity (and) a persistent sense of religious identity" (2.) Both versions - "flying universities" and "Maticas" - were apparently instrumental in creating and maintaining this cultural and religious identity. During the Solidarity Movement these groups also acted as hubs of communication and organization. As the "flying universities" helped maintain the cultural identity of Poland, Solidarity linked itself to this identity as a means of facilitating its legitimacy.

Both Ash (2002: 21) and Walesa (1987: 118) mention these groups as (apparently) secular organizations, meeting in private apartments (Ash says the meetings had a formal name, *Towarzystwo Kursow Naukowych* - "Society of Academic Courses.") Informant "M", however, immediately associated "flying universities" with the Church. Below is a long quote from informant "M" that provides a holistic picture of overall communications in Poland during Solidarity, as well as some background information on the notion of "flying universities." To "M" the Church was the center of communications; the center of traditional Poland and the refuge where new Poland was to be born out of the struggle for Solidarity:

"People were going to churches for the "flying universities" - underground schools - teaching the true history of Poland. During the partition time when there was no Polish language they had classes in Polish language. So Church was instrumental many times in the history of Poland."

Interviewer asks, "You mean Polish language was outlawed at one time?"

"Oh yes! More than once - because you have to learn occupants language - which were Russia, Austria, Germany- And they didn't want the people to speak Polish anymore. They want to change the peoples' cultures, and what culture was kept was religious culture."

Interviewer says, "You mean this was long ago - not during Solidarity?"

"During the partition time, when Poland didn't exist at all as independent country - this was before first world war."

"But it was *always* the Church that kept us alive - kept alive language, folk beliefs, folk art. And the language - well, Mass was always in Latin, but the teaching and religious classes were in Polish."

"The dissident press was there too [inside some churches]. When I was a student we had meetings, sometimes I went, it was like evening Mass. But it was underground, in the basement - special teachings, of students in the true way - true history again. Which we couldn't have otherwise. And also, it let us know what was going on in Poland, what the workers were doing."

"All of the knowledge was passed - *not* - through mass media because that was censored - *not* - through phones, because they didn't exist - it was all through the Church - through "flying universities," teaching after mass, students meeting to produce illegal newspapers - samizdat. Yes, that is how Solidarity was kept alive!"

Informant "PN" seemed to believe that the "flying universities" had been "agitation groups" rather than places that maintained Polish traditions. "PN" said:

"The priests were the only ones who could criticize the Party and get away with it. Some priests even wanted violent actions - some were radical and wanted revolution. In one town they got the people so stirred up that the police had to restore order. I think these groups were doing more to stir up anger than teaching Polish culture!"

Informant "JB's" opinion of "flying universities" was more in line with that of "M." He believed they had been very positive contributions to maintaining Polish tradition and he



especially emphasized the role they played in facilitating communications. However, he associated the groups with Solidarnosc - the labor union - rather than with the church. "JB" commented:

"Many people were interested in this during Solidarity time. Meetings could not get all the people in the building - everyone came. Solidarity leaders were not paid anything then - all were volunteers. If they had a day off, they worked for the union."

Interviewer asks "JB," "You mean Solidarnosc conducted the meetings? The *uniwersytet latajacy*?"

Informant "AF" clarified the point to "JB," to be sure he understood interviewer's attempt to say "flying universities" in Polish.

"Yes," "JB" replied, Solidarnosc had meetings of information for the people. There they talked about the movement, the Church, the union - what ever needed to keep alive the struggle. During martial law this was especially dangerous. People were took to jail for this."

Although "JB" apparently understood the "flying universities" as extensions of Solidarnosc, and tools of the union's organizing scheme, he made an interesting comment that partially attributes the movement's success to Poland's collective national character. "JB" said:

"This could not have happened anywhere else (speaking of the Solidarity Movement in general). Why it happened right here in Poland ? How we managed to do it? Well, I'll tell you. Generations of Polish have had to fight. To fight against different governments - different nations who want to take over our country. It couldn't have happened in Russia or Germany - it is not their history to fight against the government - *but to follow it!* (much laughter from "JB" and "AF.")

The informants apparently had different perceptions of the notion of "flying universities." Regardless of the exact nature of the groups, it is apparent that they facilitated the success of Solidarity by providing direct communication and networking necessary for mobilizing the

movement and by perpetuating Polish cultural traditions. Additionally, as "JB"s comments demonstrate above, they also may have also helped to create a Polish national identity. As Solidarity aligned its frames with Polish culture, these groups worked to maintain knowledge of this culture, and helped create a Polish identity that served to unite Solidarity activists and to pull others into their social networks.

## **Summary**

To reiterate, this section contends that the above mentioned communications methods - by messengers, carriers, and bill-stickers, by samizdat publishing, through "flying universities," and other innovative means - were essential to the success of Solidarity as they allowed for the mobilization of resources through the transfer of information necessary for organizing collective action. They also acted as trusted sources of news in contrast to official (State censored) sources. These unconventional methods of communication countered the State's "monopoly on truth" and played a very significant part in Solidarity's success. The interview data excerpts provide a direct description from movement participants, and are valuable and unique contributions to the oral history of the Polish Solidarity Movement, and its use of innovative communications within a repressive regime. Each method was a form of "creative action," to use Touraine's term, as movement participants "made their own history." These actions are listed below. The list is limited to actions directly discussed by informants interviewed for this paper; probably many other unique and creative actions were used by Solidarity activists:

\* Creative use of samizdat publications (not restricted to dissent through ideological argument) as practical resource mobilization and communication tools

- \* Practical use of samizdat in "how-to" format (books on "how- to" handle arrest by secret police, "how-to" do printing at home)
- \* Material creativity out of necessity (use of home-made ink in illegal printing, reviving antique printing presses, carbon-copy by manual typewriter, personally distributing samizdat from workers' lunch boxes, passing organizational messages and news through face-to-face communication)
- \* Creation of independent student unions
- \* Creatively distributing alternative ideas and outlawed communications through "bill stickers" and couriers
- \* Creative use of music, drama, and art (including graffiti) as resource mobilization tools (contacts and networking occurred at "oppositional" concerts and plays during "the carnival of revolution" [Kenney's term; 2002]; no doubt, issue framing also occurred through these outlets)
- \* Creatively circumventing oppositional authority as a form of protest (spreading outlawed music by magnetizdat, protesting State-sponsored news broadcasts by "taking a walk" during broadcast time, lighting candles in remembrance of jailed activists)
- \* Innovative mass communications methods (such as ringing church bells at a specific time to signal a strike)
- \* Offering alternative education through "flying universities" and all that this entails (preservation of culture, history, and language, networking opportunity for activists, material support for activists and their oppositional agenda)

**Factor 4) Solidarity was able to overcome severe limits to resource mobilization by use of super-effective cultural/ ideological framing.**

As discussed in the Introduction of this thesis, Solidarity was forced to rely on unconventional methods of resource mobilization due to the many limitations it faced in the Poland of the 1980s. This paper contends that by aligning the movement's agenda with established cultural and ideological constructs, the difficulty of resource mobilization under an

oppressive regime was greatly facilitated. As one informant put it, "We didn't really have to do that much organizing; Solidarity organized itself, because the people were ready for it." The following sections will demonstrate the effectiveness of linking a social movement to deeply held and emotionally charged beliefs:

**A. *Solidarity linked its ideology and its intention with that of the Polish Catholic Church:***

More precisely, Solidarity linked itself to Pope John Paul II and John Paul crafted his message to facilitate success for Solidarity. It can be argued that the ideology of the Solidarity Movement as a whole and of Solidarnosc as a labor union *was* the ideology of Pope John Paul II, and the agenda of both the Pope and of the movement were the same. Woodward (2005: 38 - 39) remarks on the power and legitimacy the Pope brought to the movement:

"He (Pope John Paul II, Karol Wojtyla) saw...that a unified Catholic Church, with its deep roots in Polish history and culture, was the only institution that stood up to a totalitarian state. Yuri Andropov, head of the Soviet secret police - the KGB - was right when he warned Polish leaders in 1979 that they had made a big mistake in allowing the Polish pope to return to his homeland. Wojtyla's concept of "solidarity" became the banner under which the Polish workers rallied and eventually wrested power from communist overlords. By awaking the latent "Pan-Slavism" of Eastern Europe, "this Slav pope," as he called himself, boldly challenged the legitimacy of communist governments."

The encyclicals of September 14, 1981, *Laborem Exercens* (On Human Work), and of June 2, 1985, *Slavorum Apostoli*, (The Apostles Of The Slavs) are in effect elaborations on two general themes preached by the Pope and pursued by Solidarity. A website of The United States Conference Of Catholic Bishops ([www.nccbuscc.org/pope/writings/html](http://www.nccbuscc.org/pope/writings/html)) gives the full text of these encyclicals in English.

In his book, *A Way Of Hope*, Lech Walesa mentions that he was present in Rome, on his first visit to meet with the Pope, when the *Laborem Exercens* was being written. Walesa says he

spoke with Pope John Paul concerning his (the Pope's) backing of Solidarity which the Pope declared to be, "...a common impulse to promote the moral good of society" (164.) Their discussion shaped Solidarity's ideology and agenda, and Walesa directly states, "I can say, therefore, that I was present at the birth of this document (the *Laborem Exercens*) which points the way to some long-term solutions to the difficult problem of labor" (165.)

First, are the themes which include "the dignity of labor," and "the priority of labor over capital," (regardless if the capital is owned by the State or privately owned) as detailed in the 27 chapters of the *Laborem Exercens*, and include chapters titled: Worker Solidarity, Work and Personal Dignity, The Priority of Labor, and The Importance of Unions. A reading of these reveals an obvious aim at the injustices of the Communist Party in Poland (though given in generic terms) but does so in what can be considered "Marxist language;" the Pope was condemning the hypocrisy of a socioeconomic system which claimed to be liberating but was not. For example, in chapter 14 of *Laborem Exercens*, under the subtitle, "*III. Conflict Between Labor and Capital In The Present Phase of History 14. Work and Ownership*," Pope John Paul II writes:

"...merely converting the means of production into State property in the collectivist system is by no means equivalent to "socializing" that property....They cease to be the property of a certain social group, namely the private owners, and become the property of organized society, coming under the administration and direct control of another group of people, namely those who, though not owning them, from the fact of exercising power in society *manage* them on the level of the whole national or the local economy."

And in the same encyclical, under the subtitle, "*II. Work and Man 8. Worker Solidarity*," he discusses impoverishment due to "proletarianization" (using that exact Marxist terminology in his writing):

"...the condition of social groups... and conditions of living are undergoing what is in effect *proletarianization*. ...the "poor" appear under various forms...in many cases they appear as a result of the violation of the dignity of human work: either because the opportunities for human work are limited as a result of the scourge of unemployment, or because a low value is put on work, and the rights that flow from it, especially the right to a just wage and to the personal security of the worker and his or her family."

Luxmoore (2005: 14A) notes the Pope's use of Marxist theory to disclaim the Leninist version of Marxism, saying that,

"...Father Wojtyla had become unusual among Polish priests in managing to combine his classical Thomist training with a detailed reading of Marxism....By 1989, the wheel had turned full circle from 1848, when Karl Marx and Frederic Engels first identified the papacy in "The Communist Manifesto" as a "power of the Old Europe." In their day, opposing the church had been justified as a means of ridding humanity from bondage. In Eastern Europe, communism had transformed the Church into a symbol of human dignity and liberty."

Pope John Paul also used less formal and 'non-Marxist' essays and sermons to indirectly disclaim the Communist Party during the years leading up to the re-legalization of Solidarity. Theoretical Marxism contained utopian ideas of creating a perfect and egalitarian society on earth. As mentioned by Kovaly (1997: 55) the ultimate aim of communism was often implied in propaganda literature of the post- WWII era as, "bringing the Kingdom of Heaven to earth." 'True believers' thought this possible by human effort and the idea is mentioned in a 2005 documentary by David Hoffman, *Sputnik Mania*, ([www.thehoffmancollection.com](http://www.thehoffmancollection.com)) featuring Sergei Khrushchev, the son of Nikita Khrushchev. He is quoted as saying, "People must be equal. Rich must share wealth with poor and then we will build a society where everybody will have their share. So it was the same that Jesus Christ told 2000 years ago and he was crucified for this belief." Pope John Paul challenged the secular visions of utopia as demonstrated in the following excerpt from a 1980 message, "On Christian Vocation."

"When people think that they possess the secret of a perfect social organization which makes evil impossible, they also think that they can use any means, including violence and deceit, in order to bring that organization into being. Politics then becomes a secular religion that operates under the illusion of creating paradise in this world; but no political society - which possesses its own autonomy and laws - can ever be confused with the Kingdom of God." (Pope John Paul II in Durepos 2003:195.)

This statement may be interpreted as a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the Communist Party in relation to the Church, and obviously is a reference to Party-backed 'means to an end' that often resulted in violence. On May 13, 1981, a Turkish sniper shot Pope John Paul II three times as he was greeting a crowd of some 10,000 people in Vatican Square (Tanner 1981.) 'Conspiracy theorists' still speculate that the assassination attempt was ordered by the Soviet Union in retaliation for the Pope's outspoken stance against communism. This stems in part from a statement the Pope made as he was being rushed to a hospital immediately after the shooting. In an article by Henry Tanner in a special edition to *The New York Times* (May 14, 1981), the Pope was quoted as saying, "How could they do it?", implying that he believed more people were involved than the gunman. The event martyred the Pope and his efforts to confront Communism, and as discussed in the next section, added 'supernatural legitimacy' to the cause of Solidarity.

Secondly, the other broad theme of the Pope was unification of Eastern Europe, or "Pan-Slavism," as detailed in *Slavorum Apostoli*. The Pope's encyclical goes into great historical detail in attempt to tie together those of "...Hellenic culture and Byzantine training," with all those who "are Slavs at heart" (*Slavorum Apostoli* IV. "They Planted The Church of God"), and makes constant mention of the contributions of Saint Cyril, who evangelized Russia (and created the Cyrillic alphabet.) His (overt) aim seems to be to unite Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism as well as those of Jewish faith, and apparently Russians as well, on the grounds of a

shared regional and historic culture; the (not so) covert aim, as the 1985 release of this encyclical coincided with the beginnings of perestroika and glasnost, may have been an attempt at facilitating social solidarity across national and religious lines in anticipation of relaxing Soviet political and economic domination under Mikhail Gorbachev. The Pope summarizes by quoting Saint Paul from the New Testament in claiming that, "...there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus" (*Slavorum Apostoli* III." Heralds of The Gospel".)

Luxmoore claims the Pope went farther than "Pan-Slavism," and in a 1987 message in France, called for a, "Europe united from the Atlantic to the Urals." Luxmoore says the Pope "denounced the logic of Blocs and compared the Eastern and Western versions of Christianity as "lungs of a single body" (2005: 14A.)

Ash describes the same theme in a papal message nearly a decade earlier when John Paul II first returned to Poland (June, 1979), and gives a lyrical description of how he, "...expounded his personal vision under the blazing sun..." (to a ) "...vast congregation on the meadows of his beloved Krakow" (2002: 31.) Ash continues:

"...he progressed across the country, addressing hundreds of thousands in Warsaw's Victory Square, in Gniezno, the cradle of Polish Catholicism, before the Shrine of the Black Madonna at Czestochowa, inside Auschwitz...In beautiful, sonorous Polish, so unlike the calcified official language of communist Poland, he spoke of the 'fruitful synthesis' between love of country and love of Christ. At Auschwitz, he gave his compatriots a further lesson in the meaning of patriotism, recalling, with reverence, the wartime sacrifice of the Jews and Russians, two people whom few Poles had learned to love....He spoke of the special mission of the Slav Pope to reassert the spiritual unity of Christian Europe, east and west, across all political frontiers" (2002:31).

These two themes, the dignity of labor, spelled out in the *Laborem Exercens*, and the unity of Europe, as detailed in the *Slavorum Apostoli*, became (unofficially) the condensed ideology of



the Solidarity Movement. The influence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe through governments controlled by the Communist Party stood in the way of realization of these goals. Changing this situation was *not* feasible by violent revolution - history had proven this. It was accomplished by means of long-term, peaceful, "evolution, not revolution," as quoted by several interviewees, and done so with respect to the Social Gospel of the Catholic Church. The legitimacy accounted to Solidarnosc by the Pope's 1979 visit to Poland and by his messages and encyclicals was enormous. Lech Walesa commented on this:

"At the moment when the Pope (John Paul II) was elected, I think I had at most 20 people that were around me and supported me - and there were 40 million Polish people in the country. However...a year after (the Pope's) visit to Poland I had 10 million supporters, and suddenly we had so many people willing to join the movement. I compare this to the miracle of the multiplication of bread in the desert" (Walesa as quoted by Luxmoore [2005:15A] from a 2004 speech in Kansas City.)

However, the linkage of Solidarnosc to the Church, that is, in social movement theory terms - the 'alignment of their frames' - was more profound, this paper contends, than just the conscious aspects of the beautiful orations of Pope John Paul or the working-class fumbling of Lech Walesa's impromptu speeches. The author believes that in this linkage, the activists of Solidarity tapped into an unconscious cultural element that greatly facilitated their agenda. This is based on observations made during visits to Gdansk (as described below in a short personal observation) and on specific interview data obtained during the visit (described in the next section of this chapter.) The following excerpt from the author's field notes attempts to capture this theme, as does the remainder of this chapter, which deliberately shifts to first person form for effect:

"Sitting in the Church of St. Mary in the heart of Gdansk - an immense gothic cathedral with high vaulted ceilings, massive columns, and soaring stained glass windows, the floor paved with the tombs of prominent Poles going back over 1000 years - one becomes aware of the ancient power of the institution of the Church. This is not evident in U.S. churches. It is the physical

embodiment of a continuity of power and authority that remains constant over changing political regimes. In an ancient church, with the skulls and bones of the Saints displayed in macabre artwork - the structure itself and all it contains - is a manifestation of an ancient power that predates Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. Sitting in the wintertime cold of a huge, unheated, medieval church, still active with the prayers of the faithful and the lighting of votive candles - in this context, it is easy to understand why the Communist governments were so intimidated by this institution. As I watched old people come in off the street, bow to their knees on the stone floor, and pray at the altar of the Black Madonna, their breath visible in the cold dampness, I realized the 'new religion' of State Socialism had held little legitimacy or validity to these people in contrast to their traditions and emotional connections with Catholicism."

This observation was substantiated by the interview data used in the next section:

**B. *Solidarity aligned its frames with existing cultural constructs:***

The most important of these was Solidarity's association with the icon of the Black Madonna of Czestochowa. I saw copies of this image on the gates of the Gdansk Shipyard in 2010 along with a makeshift altar, freshly cut flowers, and votive candles - evidence of still active devotion on the site of the signing of the Gdansk Agreements some twenty years later. Informant "JB" told me, "Walesa didn't carry the Polish flag around during Solidarity times - we seldom used flag. We used something else. He had a pin of Our Lady of Czestochowa that he wore always on his jacket. Polish people know what this means!" Ascherson (1982: 8) mentions that the first time he ever saw Lech Walesa, "...he was scribbling autographs and scattering little colored cards of the Madonna of Czestochowa." Walesa constantly identified himself and the cause of Solidarity with this icon.

No other image has such condensed meaning for Poles. According to Fr. Andrej Waszczenko, of Nativity Of The Blessed Virgin Mary Church, Cestohowa, Texas (established in 1873 by Polish immigrants to Texas from Czestochowa) the icon is said to have been painted by Saint Luke on the surface of a table top built by Jesus Christ. Many convoluted legends tell how the image ended up in Poland but scholars believe it arrived there in the mid 1300s. Two legends

explain why the Madonna's face is black: exposure to centuries of smoky votive candles, or that the icon was saved from a burning church. Two cuts across the face of the Madonna are said to have been made by the sword during an invasion on the city of Constantinople (when the image was kept there.) The attacking soldier is said to have fallen over dead after the second blow. Many other miraculous stories are associated with the image, most of which detail how cities were saved in battle or people were healed from sickness through dedication to the image. Pope John Paul II made several pilgrimages to Czestochowa during the 1980s to pray before the icon.

The Black Madonna is a symbol of Polish identity, that, like the ancient church I observed in Gdansk, pre-dates any secular attempts to define Poland. Solidarnosc identified itself with this icon by use of it at masses held at the gates of the Gdansk Shipyard, by use of the image in informational bulletins, by the carrying of the image at marches and demonstrations, and by Lech Walesa's constant wearing of a lapel pin of the icon. By association with the condensed meaning of the icon, Solidarity legitimated itself and asserted its authority far above and beyond that of the government of the Peoples' Republic of Poland, and for that matter, above any previous secular national identity (pre-Communist Poland.) Comments by informant "B" demonstrate the degree of reverence many Poles have for Our Lady Of Czestochowa and the belief in a great power associated with it:

"Walesa always had the Black Madonna pinned on him here ("B" indicates over the heart.) Pope John Paul came many times to see Walesa, and many times to pray before Black Madonna. Czestochowa - yes - it is very special place for me - for us all. Before I came to U.S. friends were saying, "You should go to Czestochowa before you leave the country, because you don't know if ever you will be back" (to Poland.) So I did. And it changed - it changed my life - step by step." ("B" pauses, overcome momentarily by emotion.)

"It never happened overnight - not right away. But was set in motion by the visit."

"During Communist times, the movement - the Church movement - was so strong that people were walking - and today they are still walking - from all over Poland on foot to

Czestochowa. Pilgrimages - it changes you. It is a spiritual thing that is very difficult to describe."

("B" now relates a story of a small phenomena observed at Czestochowa; of how photographs taken there at nearly dusk appeared to be in full daylight when the prints were developed.)

" It is these special places that kept Poland alive in religion during times when no Poland existed - when during partition, before first world war - during time Communists tried to outlaw religion - it was kept alive - very alive - at places like this and always in the Polish people. This is, of course, why Walesa used the icon. The people were ready for Solidarnosc, and the Church supported Walesa - there was little convincing needed!"

### ***C. Solidarity endorsed a 'supernatural agenda.'***

Pope John Paul II, Lech Walesa, and many common Polish people (and many Catholics the world over) believed that a series of certain events and prophecies were connected and that they were of supernatural origin. The idea stems from the Fatima Prophecies. The validity of the prophecies and events as being of supernatural origin is entirely irrelevant. The important issue is that so many Poles believed in the 'supernatural agenda' of the Pope, Walesa, and the ultimate success of the Solidarity Movement. I contend that Solidarnosc framed its agenda (partially) in 'supernatural terms', and by this generated a belief among the Polish people of the inevitable triumph of the movement over the Communist regime, not only in Poland but in Russia. This section will explain the prophecies and use interview data to support the beliefs. Informants "AF," and "JB," were fully versed on the details of the prophecies, and informant "B" had heard of them but was not fully aware of all the details. Informant "PZ" knew of the prophecies but refused to discuss them with me. Additionally, this section will include an eyewitness account of one of the "miracles" as told to me by one of my own family members.

The beliefs stem from a message reported to be given by an apparition of The Blessed Virgin Mary at Fatima, Portugal. According to an article in the publication, *Soul: The Official Publication of The Blue Army of Our Lady of Fatima* (vol. 56, no. 1, 2005: 1 - 12) the apparition appeared to three children in six different sessions between May and October of 1917. The messages were on three main topics: 1 - a vision of Hell (which contains horrific descriptions that to some are interpreted as destruction of civilization by atomic warfare; 2 - prophecies that predicted the start of WWII and the martyring of a future pope (interpreted as the 1981 assassination attempt on John Paul II); and, 3 - the consecration of Russia to the Immaculate Heart of Mary.

The messages were reportedly told by the three children to a local priest. They were said to contained dialogue and descriptions far beyond the verbal and intellectual ability of small children, thus prompting the priest to believe the claims by the children as to the supernatural origins of the messages. Eventually the messages were written down and were delivered to Pope Pius XI. Some of the messages were apparently very abstract, symbolic and elaborate, the interpretations of which are still debated. Other parts are quite literal. Some parts of the prophecies are said to still be withheld from public knowledge, the content being guarded by the Catholic Church, as they are speculated to contain details of a future Apocalypse. Below are excerpts from the Fatima Prophecies, relevant to this discussion, taken from the above mentioned source, page 3:

"...you have seen Hell where the souls of poor sinners go. To save them, God wishes to establish in the world devotion to my Immaculate Heart. If what I say to you is done, many souls will be saved and there will be peace. The war is going to end; but if people do not cease offending God, a worse one will break out during the pontificate of Pius XI. When you see a night illuminated by an unknown light, know that this is the great sign given to you by God that he is about to punish the world for its crimes, by means of war, famine, and persecutions of the Church and of the Holy Father."

"To prevent this, I shall come to ask for the consecration of Russia to my Immaculate Heart, and the Communion of Reparation on the First Saturdays. If my requests are heeded, Russia will be converted, and there will be peace; If not, she will spread her errors throughout the world, causing wars and persecution of the Church. The good will be martyred, the Holy Father will have much to suffer, various nations will be annihilated. In the end, my Immaculate Heart will triumph. The Holy Father will consecrate Russia to me, and she will be converted, and a period of peace will be granted to the world..."

Just after the last of the apparitions, in October, 1917, the Bolshevik Party, lead by Vladimir Lenin, took control of Russia. The first world war ended, and in 1922 the Soviet Union was formed, with atheism as its official stand on religion. These events were interpreted by believers to be the forerunners of the "night illuminated by an unknown light," which would be a sign of a soon-coming war greater than WWI. This night came on January 25, 1938. What actually occurred was a rare appearance of the Northern Lights, the Aurora Borealis, in the lower latitudes. The event was observed across Europe and North America. The New York Times reported the event on January 26, 1938, Late City Edition, page 25. The story begins as follows:

*Aurora Borealis Startles Europe, People Flee In Fear, Call Firemen, Britons Thought Windsor Castle Ablaze:*

Special Cable To The New York Times. London, Jan. 25 - "From 6:30 to 8:30 P.M. the people of London watched two magnificent arcs rising in the east and west from which radiated pulsating beams like searchlights in dark red, greenish blue, and purple...From an airplane the display looked like a shimmering curtain of fire..."

Several similar reports are given as related stories on the same page in the Times, directly under the London cable. These include reports from Grenoble, France, and Toronto, Ontario. The most southerly report is from Hamilton, Bermuda. The lights were apparently visible in different degrees of intensity and at different local times throughout a 24 hour period around January 25th. The Chicago Daily Tribune (January 26, 1938: p. 4) ran a story titled: "Aurora Borealis Glows In

Widest Area Since 1709," and reported the lights visible as far south as Texas. Millions of people saw the lights and many had no idea what was their cause. The report from Grenoble, France states that local authorities were swamped with calls asking if the display was, "...a fire, war, or the end of the world." The phenomena is sometimes referred to as the "Fatima Storm" ([www.solarstorm.org/SS1938.html](http://www.solarstorm.org/SS1938.html)).

As mentioned earlier in this section, four of my informants were knowledgeable of this occurrence, and discussion with them revealed that they had heard stories relating this event to the Fatima Prophecies. On September 1st, 1939, Germany invaded Poland, starting the second world war, 19 months after the "night illuminated by an unknown light." Informant "AF" took me to the exact spot, the Westerplatte Peninsula, where the Wisla River meets the Baltic Sea at Gdansk. A huge stone monument is built on a forested island there, to mark the invasion of Poland and as a memorial to all who died in the war. The monument is of the hilt of a sword, the blade being rammed into the ground; this represents an end to war. Here, "AF" said this about the Fatima Prophecies:

"Yes, I know about this. Here is where in 1939 Germany invaded Poland and the war began. Pope John Paul had a divine mission. He was part of this prophesy, I think. I know about the 'light stories.' Many people here believe this. Walesa believed in this - he saw himself and the Pope as making the prophecy come true. And it did, you know! The Pope made it happen - he dedicated himself to the cause - he gave himself to the cause. Yes, we used to pray for the conversion of Russia...that is what we were taught to do. It happened!"

I was told the 'light story,' as "AF" referred to it, as a very young boy, by my mother. She had saw the "night illuminated by an unknown light," as a small girl, and till her dying day believed the event to be supernatural. She told me the story at a shrine to Our Lady of Fatima, near Haverhill, Ohio, (approximately 5 miles west of Ironton, Ohio on Old U.S. 52, or "Gallia Pike")

where local legend has it that the Blessed Virgin Mary appeared in the form of an apparition bathed in a blue light around the time of the 1938 Aurora event (in an open field; the shrine was built later, in the 1950s). The family story goes as follows: My grandfather was at the time working as a repairman for the N & W railroad in northern Ohio. He and several other men were called-up in the night by N & W to repair tracks damaged by a minor derailment. Around 2:00 AM the men saw what was described by my mother as, "looking like the sun was getting ready to come up in the middle of the night." The story goes that the sky became blood red, so illuminated that you could see outside like dawn or dusk. My grandfather and the other workers were so frightened that they abandoned their rail repair job, went home, awoke their families, opened the local church, and the community was called to mass; they believed Christ was returning and his coming was illuminating the sky.

After this event - and after those who witnessed it learned it to be a natural occurrence of the Northern Lights - priests or religious scholars with knowledge of the Fatima Prophecies, quite possibly, 'connected the dots,' so to speak, and deemed this, "the night illuminated by an unknown light." Again, the point here is *not* the legitimacy of the events as being supernatural, but that *believers were made* by this event the world over. Solidarity used this established belief as part of a very effective framing construct that gave its agenda 'supernatural validity.' Perhaps years actually passed before the facts were strung together to make a coherent chain that entered common Catholic traditions through mass publications. For example, as late as 2005 an article in the *Fatima* publication mentioned earlier (vol. 56, no.1: 14 - 16) written by Bonnie Brewer Cavanaugh viewed the events of the 1980s and early 1990s in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as the literal culmination of the Fatima Prophecies. Cavanaugh wrote:



"On March 25, 1984, Pope John Paul II and the bishops of the Church consecrated Russia and the world to the Immaculate Heart of Mary. Soon after, the Iron Curtain fell and Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev traveled to Rome to meet with the Holy Father. The Immaculate Heart of Our Lady had triumphed..."

The May 13th, 1981 assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II further reinforced belief in the Fatima Prophecies. Believers associated this event with the phrase in the prophecy which states, "the Holy Father will have much to suffer." John Paul himself apparently took the event to be a fulfillment of the prophecies. In a book of his personal reflections, he was quoted as saying:

"Could I forget that the event in St. Peter's Square took place on the day and at the hour when the first appearance of the Mother of Christ to the poor little peasants has been remembered for over sixty years at Fatima, Portugal? For in everything that happened to me on that day, I felt the extraordinary motherly protection and care which turned out to be stronger than the deadly bullet" (Pope John Paul 2005: 184.) ref {Memory and Identity}

I related my own family story concerning, "the night illuminated by an unknown light," and its relation to prophetic events, to informant "JB," and he commented as follows:

"Oh yes, I know this story! The lights were supposed to mean war was coming. And war actually started - this made it seem real - yes? Then later - was it '82 or '83 - when the Pope was shot?"

"I think it was actually 1981," I replied.

"Well, this made it in the minds of believers - those devoted to Fatima - that all this was true. The Pope was suffering as in the prophecies - yes? And John Paul was convinced and so was Lech Walesa - that they 'had a mission!' (laughs) Well, if they believed, then we believed! You know, he (Walesa) always when talking to crowds said, 'our mission', 'our task', 'our divine goal'...stuff like that! "We can not fail if we keep the faith," he would say. He spoke in church - right across the street - St. Brygidy Church, across from Stocznia Gdanska. We met there all the time (referring to the workers from the shipyard). And the people, you would think, were hearing the Pope speak!

Walesa often took on a religious tone in his speeches and used the phrasing mentioned above by "JB" in his writing as well. In one particular essay, "From Romanticism To Realism: Our Struggle In The Years 1980 - 1982," he specifically uses the term, "supernatural circumstances," (as per the English translation) to describe the events leading up to the August 31, 1980 signing of the Gdansk Agreements:

"I had December 1970 strongly etched in my heart and memory. I prayed after those events that I would be given a chance once more to fight the battle. I already understood then that one had to use different methods. It was not enough to go out in the streets and demand one's rights. We needed a more effective means to employ against the totalitarian system. And with God's help, which came at an opportune moment, and because of *supernatural circumstances*, (my italics) August yielded such a harvest" (Walesa in Paczkowski and Byrne 2007: 1).

He then proceeds to use a very dramatic Biblical analogy (from the Book Of John, in which God's word becomes flesh through the birth of Jesus into this world) to situate Pope John Paul II into the same 'supernatural' field with himself and Solidarnosc:

"I would like to call to your attention one thing that was inconceivable in those days. A Pole became pope, came to Poland, and his word became flesh. "Solidarity" was born. And its power lay in the fact that for the first time in the post-war years all social groups gathered together under one banner..." (Walesa in Paczkowski and Byrne 2007: 2)

Apparently this sentiment was widespread during the 1980s. Penn (2005:7) states that, "Poles commonly said that the miracle of Wojtyla's election is what inspired the miracle of Solidarity."

One final example from the writings of Lech Walesa pulls together several items previously mentioned: devotion to the Black Madonna of Czestochowa, supernatural agenda, and a Poland unified by tradition and culture in collective effort. The excerpt below typifies the association of highly regarded cultural constructs with Lech Walesa's agenda, placing both in a supernatural

context. Contrasting the stress and tediousness of correctly wording political issues with the release of visiting the Jasna Gora Monastery at Czestochowa, Lech Walesa wrote:

"During the course of my travels, there were other moments in utter contrast with those political meetings: at Jasna Gora, for example, where I made my profession of faith to the Holy Mother of Czestochowa. In the midst of upheavals, unable to obtain satisfaction on numerous points, but persisting nonetheless, in our common aim, we had to understand ourselves better, to remain confident, and to look for help from forces beyond ourselves. The Primate himself had said: "The heart of Poland beats there." So, if that was the heart of Poland, I had to go to it, to become one with that heart; I wanted the whole country to beat in time to its heartbeat" (Walesa 1987:173.)

**Factor 5) Solidarity's success was due in part to the charismatic leadership of Lech Walesa:**

Twenty years after the historic events in Eastern Europe that culminated in the dismantling of the USSR, journalist Tom Brokaw said this about Lech Walesa: "You couldn't have created in anyway a better working class hero than Lech Walesa. They once described him as a shipyard electrician who short-circuited the Soviet Union" (Brokaw 2009.) In the 1980s Lech Walesa became this "working class hero" not only in Gdansk but worldwide. U.S. labor unions vigorously supported Walesa and the Solidarity Movement, as did, ironically, conservative politicians such as Ronald Reagan; the unions saw Walesa as a living embodiment of worker solidarity in the face of oppression - Neoliberals saw Walesa in their own image, as a fighter for capitalism in a battle against what Reagan had termed, "The Evil Empire." Neither perspective was wholly accurate. Yet, herein lies the perfect example of the Weberian version of a charismatic leader: people saw in Lech Walesa something extraordinary and in doing so *they* empowered him with charismatic authority and supernatural leadership ability.

This paper contends that the charismatic power and authority instilled in Lech Walesa by his followers greatly facilitated the Solidarity Movement in its ability to mobilize resources and

labor. In quite simple terms, Poles believed in Walesa and the Solidarity Movement to such a degree that they were willing to risk the possibilities of police brutality, arrest, jail time, and even a military invasion by the Soviet Union, in order to see the goals of the movement fulfilled. Many American labor union members, Polish-American Catholic church groups, and various political groups so believed in Walesa's agenda that they donated large sums of money to the cause. From personal memory, OCAW Local 3 - 523, Ashland, Kentucky, for example, took up several "offerings" for Solidarity, likening it to a religious cause. It is also apparent that Walesa actively encouraged belief in a supernatural agenda attached to Solidarity (as described in "factor four" of this paper) which further enhanced his own charisma and helped generate and maintain faith in the movement despite great odds.

The sections that follow will first very briefly describe the notion of the "charismatic leader," as per Max Weber. Next, interview data will provide a first-hand account of personal perceptions of Lech Walesa by two of his former co-workers at the Lenin Shipyard, and by other individuals living in Poland during the events of the 1980s. Finally, secondary sources will be quoted to further elaborate on Walesa's charismaticism.

There are no quantitative measures of charisma. Like the constructs of social solidarity or class consciousness, charisma is a fluid variable that can "emerge" (or that can be endowed by followers on to a leader) in certain social situations and rapidly vanish in other situations (as in the several examples described by Fantasia, 1988.) Thus, the author believes, the simple descriptions given by informants and by other sources that demonstrate the charismatic appeal of Lech Walesa during the height of the Solidarity Movement will serve as the best validation for this contention.

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**Weber and Charisma:** In his book, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, (1915; Parsons' translation 1947) Max Weber mentions several general types of charismatic individuals, such as "the berserker," "the shaman," and "the prophet" (359). However, his main concern is not in typology. "What is important alone," Weber says, "is how the individual is actually regarded by those subject to charismatic authority, by his 'followers' or disciples" (359). The followers empower the charismatic leader by their belief in his exceptional abilities, sometimes first demonstrated, according to Weber, by a 'miracle,' or a 'sign.' Yet, Weber alludes that this type of charismatic - the type dependent on a sign or miracle - may actually end up being a false prophet; he mentions Joseph Smith, for example, the prophet of Mormonism, and speculates that Smith may have been, "...a very sophisticated type of deliberate swindler" (359). However, *genuine* charisma, Weber concludes, is not derived from supernatural acts or signs, but, "The basis lies rather in the conception that it is the *duty* of those who have been called to a charismatic mission to recognize its quality and act accordingly. Psychologically this 'recognition' is a matter of complete personal devotion to the possessor of the quality, arising out of enthusiasm, or of despair and hope" (359). Or as George Ritzer (2008: 245) nicely summarizes:

"To put Weber's position bluntly, if the disciples define a leader as charismatic, then he or she is likely to be a charismatic leader irrespective of whether he or she actually possesses any outstanding traits. A charismatic leader then can be someone who is quite ordinary. What is crucial is the process by which such a leader is set apart from ordinary people and treated as if endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least exceptional powers or qualities that are not accessible to the ordinary person."

Lech Walesa was indeed a very 'ordinary' charismatic leader; this paper contends that his simple, working-class style and true working-class background added yet another layer of appeal to his followers in that they (millions of working-class Poles and workers around the world) could so personally identify with him. Additionally, as Walesa aligned himself with The Black Madonna of Czestochowa, as discussed in "factor four" of this paper, he was in effect drawing to himself 'supernatural powers' that legitimized the charisma already attributed to him. As Weber put it in his book, *The Sociology of Religion*, "Whoever possesses the requisite charisma for employing the proper means" (he is referring to the proper means to coerce spiritual power) "is stronger even than the god, whom he can compel to do his will" (Weber 1922; Parsons' translation 1956).

Walesa, featured on the cover of *Time* (December 29, 1980) wearing his enameled pin of The Black Madonna, drawing from her always, apparently, a great measure of 'spiritual coercion,' can still be seen in 2010 on YouTube, wearing the same iconic pin and now pitching the city of Gdansk as a prime travel destination ([www.youtube.gdansk4u](http://www.youtube.gdansk4u)). He is still playing "the prophet," extolling the advantages of doing business in Gdansk, while reminding potential visitors that their pilgrimage will afford them the opportunity "...to see a thousand years of Christianity, the roots of Europe, and the culture of many nations - Hurry up! And come to Gdansk!", he says ([www.youtube.gdansk4u](http://www.youtube.gdansk4u)). Lech Walesa is still in the business of compelling others to supernatural duty.

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**Interview Data:** Informants "PZ" and "JB," as mentioned in the historical background section of this paper, were personal acquaintances with Lech Walesa. As mentioned, "PZ" took

great pride in telling me his story of how he witnessed Lech Walesa "take over" as Solidarity's leader (fully described in the historical background). "PZ" was adamant that I take pictures of the exact spot where this occurred - several pictures even - as he apparently revered the spot as nearly sacred ( the spot is along a now overgrown and graffiti-scarred perimeter fence of the Gdansk Shipyard). "PZ" also proudly showed me pictures of himself and Walesa at the Gdansk Agreement negotiations; again, his attitude was of both pride and reverence. I believe these are all indications of the charismaticism "PZ" still associates with Walesa and Solidarnosc. "PZ" told me the location of Lech Walesa's office in the Old Town section of Gdansk (Biuro Lecha Walesy in *Zielona Brama*, The Green Gate into *Ulica Długa*, the main street of the old medieval section) and suggested that if I was very patient I might "catch a glimpse of Walesa going in or out of his office." "PZ"s advice seemed more in line with instructions for catching a glimpse of a rock star, a yeti, or Christ walking on water. I began to wonder if such a glimpse might blind me, as was thought would be the case if one looked directly at the Pharaoh of Egypt. "PZ" demonstrated more reverence for Walesa than any other informant.

"JB" was more of a realist in his opinion of Walesa than "PZ." As mentioned in "factor four," "JB" understood the reverence that people had for Walesa, as evidenced by his comments about Walesa speaking in St. Brygidy Church, in which he compares this to a visit from the Pope (chapter 4 list page # here later. ) Still, "JB" did not think Walesa had been indispensable to the movement; he commented, "Without Walesa Solidarity would have been possible but it would have been born in a different way - maybe more of the 'revolution way' than the 'evolution way.'" His comments stressed the moderating effect that Walesa had on the solidarity movement. "JB" and "PZ," both witnesses to military and police violence at the Gdansk Shipyard during the course of the movement, were keenly aware that to push the movement too fast would have

resulted in use of deadly force by Soviet troops. "Walesa did not stir up anger - that was not our way," "JB" told me, "He mostly talked to the people as brothers and sisters - they believed him because he was a shipyard worker - a common worker, like them - and they listened to him."

Informant "PN" commented on Walesa also. "PN" apparently believed that Walesa was simply a spokesman for a larger cause. "PN" said:

"People identified with Walesa - he was one of the people. But there were other people behind him - "the brains." He wasn't that brilliant - but the people loved him."

"PN"s remarks were not a reference to "internet conspiracy theorists," who speculate on potential ties between Walesa and the CIA. "PN" clarified that he believed the KOR (discussed in "factor three") was "the brains" behind Walesa. "PN" was the least impressed of all my informants with Walesa.

Informant "B"s opinion was more in line with "JB." "B" commented as follows:

"Solidarity was not all about Walesa being the leader, no. It wasn't like Gandhi in India - no, Walesa was not the movement itself - it would have gone on without him. I think the desire of workers and the whole society of finally getting out of this Communist occupation - this was perceived as Soviet occupation - nothing more! This desire was so strong, it made no difference. He was a good leader, Walesa, very good, very genuine to all the workers, very accommodating to everybody...but I think the movement would have gone on eventually anyway. Because the strikes were started by someone who says, "OK - We won't give up - let's stay - let's strike." Yes, it took someone like that - Walesa was there - he was already unemployed, and he became the leader because he was at that place at that time. But - no doubt - if different leader - then different movement! Different results, different history!"

Informant "B" also commented on Lech Walesa's humane behavior toward his former opponents after he became president of Poland in December, 1990. "B" said that after democratization in some other Eastern European countries, many old Communist Party bosses



were marginalized and some were even jailed. But Walesa believed, per the comments of "B "

"...that everybody has freedom and everyone has rights - and rightly so. Maybe some of them (former Communist leaders) made mistakes - maybe some were accused wrongly. He did not try to get revenge - he wanted to make move forward."

Informant "AF"s comments on Lech Walesa were similar to "B"s. He believed the movement would have gone on with or without Walesa. But like the others, he commented on how personable Walesa was and how easily the working class identified with him. "AF" also commented that Walesa spoke, "very plain and not that good." This is a less harsh judgment than Ash, (2002: 137) who said that Walesa's "...speech is impossible to reproduce, disjointed, full of slang, wildly ungrammatical, at times almost nonsensical."

"AF" also remembered Walesa's calmness and reassurance. This apparently gave "AF" hope for the future for the first time. "AF" had mentioned that during the 1970s he simply could not imagine any way of life different than what he was experiencing - that is, poverty, hopelessness, and no alternatives. Solidarity gave "AF" hope, as it did millions who for the first time in their lives imagined for themselves and for their families a different future.

Some other informants and contacts in Gdansk were too young to remember the details of the Solidarity Movement, but three young people I talked with concerning the movement spoke very respectfully of Lech Walesa and commented that they often heard stories from their parents of those days. One young person pointed out to me that it is still possible to see Solidarnosc graffiti on many buildings in Gdansk some 20 years later. Another pointed out to me a wall on which Gdansk art school students are memorializing Solidarity by painting a mural. From my short experience in Gdansk, I believe it would be difficult to find an individual with a negative

attitude toward Walesa and Solidarnosc. The charisma of Walesa is becoming "routinized," to use Weber's term, not in the continuation of a political office but in projects such as the shipyard murals, which convey to another generation the significance of the Solidarity Movement.

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**Secondary Sources:** Many examples that demonstrate Walesa's charismaticism are found in news articles and in books that recount his speeches, comments, or other's impressions of him. Use of such examples is meant as further evidence of Walesa's ability to generate belief in Solidarity's 'mission.' Again, Walesa often used terms such as, "our mission," "our task," or "our divine goal," (as per informant "JB" quoted in "factor 4" page 179) which by Weber's description of charismatic leadership, is an implication of duty toward the charismatic's followers. Additionally, this section will demonstrate that Walesa's speaking style (whether intentionally contrived or naturally occurring) was such that he drew his followers to him in such a humble, almost naive manner, that few doubted his sincerity and many identified with his humanity.

An example from Ash (2002: 71) illustrates this. Ash quotes Walesa's extemporaneous comments of August 31, 1980, as he addresses the crowd of workers at the Lenin Shipyard upon finalizing the Gdansk Agreement. His reference (below) to September 1st is a reminder that Germany invaded Poland on this date in 1939. He is invoking personal connection, patriotism, victory, and further duty in a few short, simple sentences:

*"Kochani!* [a word meaning literally, "beloved"] We return to work on 1 September. We all know what that day reminds us of, of what we think ...of the fatherland...of the family which is called Poland...We got all we could in the present situation. And we will achieve the rest, because we now have the most important thing: Our in-de-pen-dent self-governing trade unions. This is our guarantee for the future...I declare the strike ended."

The front cover of Kubik's 1994 book, *The Power Of Symbols Against The Symbols of Power*, shows Walesa's first official photograph as leader of Solidarity at the above mentioned conclusion of the 1980 strike. Unlike most victorious leaders who in the rush of their triumph might choose to pose with some degree of prideful arrogance - upraised fists, the flash of "V" for victory, or even a broad grin - the iconic photograph shows Walesa somberly standing under a crucifix holding three red roses in his hand. He is dressed in a simple black jacket, and a sweater, with no tie. Kubik says that Walesa *chose* this scene for his first official portrait (stated in an unnumbered photo caption in center section of Kubik's book.) This choice, and the photograph it generated, I believe, are very symbolic of the charismatic call to duty Walesa often invoked in his speeches. In presenting himself as a simple man of faith and humility, rather than a gloating victor, he began coalescing his devotion from his followers; it was nine years from the time the photograph was made till Solidarnosc was permanently legalized.

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Walesa used his negotiating style to draw even his opponents to his side. According to Ascherson (1982: 8) Walesa was the consummate compromiser, always leaving doors open for further negotiation and often attempting to make opponents his collaborators:

"...Walesa adored the actual business of negotiating...Many of his colleagues lacked this taste. They wanted to leave the negotiating table with all their demands won and no concessions made. But Walesa preferred a joint settlement, talked out until opponents became accomplices. *'Polak z Polakiem musi sic dogadac'* - 'Pole must talk things out with Pole,' he used endlessly to repeat."

However, this 'win-win' style of negotiating and political wrangling was also peppered occasionally with theatrics. In, *A Way Of Hope*, (Walesa 1987: 126 - 127) an unnamed writer

(identified only as "a friend and translator of Gunter Grass," a German author born in Gdansk; the writer is said to be a witness to the 1980 shipyard strikes) narrates Walesa's Christ-like carrying of a huge wooden cross, during the Gdansk negotiations, to the site just in front of the gates of the Lenin Shipyard where many workers were killed in a 1970 clash with police (see page ?? in history section). A picture of the cross and mass being conducted under it appears in the center photo section of Kubik's 1994 book. The cross looks to be at least twice the height of individuals standing near it. The sight of Walesa carrying this cross was no doubt a very 'staged' event; even during my 2010 visit to the Gdansk Shipyard, with its capacity cut some 80% from its most productive days, a multitude of all types of materials handling machinery was available for such tasks. Obviously, Walesa wanted to physically carry the huge cross as yet another symbolic gesture of duty. Later a permanent monument was erected here. Informant "PZ" told me that mass was conducted at this cross every day during the two-week negotiations of August, 1980. The cross was cemented into the ground and became a rallying point for the striking shipyard workers.

The same unnamed writer mentioned above then describes Walesa in near saint-like terms.

He wrote:

"Never, under any circumstances, did Walesa employ language of any kind against anyone. This was a feature of his speeches: his harshest remarks never jarred his listeners; even when expressing himself most vigorously, he was never offensive. He never used insults and never swore. This was no doubt the result of his civilized attitude to life, closely linked to his Christian faith" (Walesa 1987: 126).

This same source then describes a crowd of thousands shouting, "Lech, Lech, Lech," during the 1980 Gdansk negotiations, as they waited to hear a report from him. The description aptly demonstrates his charismatic appeal to the crowd:

"They (the crowd gathered outside during the negotiation) thought Lech knew everything, could achieve absolutely anything. He had become a myth, a legend. It was a naive faith which sprang from the fact that through his personality, his presence, his words, and his actions, Lech had cemented a movement previously diffused and achieved unity that had seemed impossible...."

"Walesa gathered the crowd in front of the building, It was the first time for this, but this time, all fear had gone; they held their heads high. The power was welling up in this crowd, it was almost tangible, flowing from one person to another, limitless" (Walesa 1987: 127).

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Sucharczuk (1994: 305) describes Lech Walesa to have been perceived as,

"...an "exemplary" personality: a devout Catholic, an excellent worker, a determined anti-Communist who took part in the worker's uprisings of 1970 and 1976, an energetic and committed organizer and agitator for the "free" trade unions who had, consequently, suffered greatly for his idealistic dedication to the workers' cause."

Sucharczuk continues by noting that, "A large part of the Polish population became in a sense an emotional "community" of Walesa's "followers" and "disciples" (306.) Sucharczuk mentions a Polish journalist (G. Fortuna) who analyzed the many letters Walesa received. "For the most part, these letters expressed adoration, affection, devotion and loyalty to Walesa, who is described as a great Pole, a great leader, or even as a Savior. Very often people confided in their letters to Walesa. They perceived him as a person of great compassion who could be trusted and who could help" (306 - 307.)

Ascherson (1982: 8 - 9) likewise notes the seemingly messianic appeal of Walesa to the crowds that followed him in Gdansk: "...the workers worshiped Walesa, they cheered him,

chanted his name, brought him little presents, reached out to touch him as he passed." Yet, this "messiah" was very human, and in this, the common people very much identified with him.

Sucharczuk, again, very aptly summarizes:

"His plain, direct style, riddled with mistakes and sounding like the talk of ordinary people appeared not only as revolutionary and refreshing after many years of propagandistic jargon, it also made Walesa an object of identification. This style emerged as the free and authentic expression (perhaps somewhat better formulated) of a simple leader of their own choosing and from their own part of the community" (304).

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In many ways Lech Walesa endeared himself to the people of his nation and to a large part of the world. Informant "B" mentioned the many gifts of food, clothing, medicine, and money that poured in to Poland from Western Europe and the U.S. during the worst years of the Solidarity struggle. These came by way of the Catholic Church and were distributed to those in need - especially to those with a family member jailed for activism in Solidarity - by the Church.

No doubt the world-wide news coverage of the charismatic Lech Walesa prompted this response. I personally remember a rally for Solidarity at the former Allied Chemical Semet Solvay plant in Ashland, Kentucky, sometime in the early 1980s. Big red badges were distributed with the Solidarity logo on them and donations were asked for in return. "Lech Walesa," the man with a funny sounding foreign name, was one of *us* - a union worker who was making history by defying the USSR. This remembrance is quite a testimony to the worldwide support Lech Walesa helped to generate for his cause. Never before had the name of an obscure working-class individual from a Communist Bloc nation been uttered by a group of uneducated chemical plant workers in Appalachia; not until August of 1980. I contend that this world-wide

support was to a great degree due to Walesa's charismaticism, and this factor greatly facilitated the success of the Solidarity Movement.

**Factor 6) A three-way coalition between the working class, the "Polska inteligencja" (that is, prominent public intellectuals, such as lawyers, academics, writers, filmmakers, etc.) and the Polish Catholic Church further contributed to social solidarity within the movement and each group contributed elements lacking by the others.**

Some analysts of the Polish Solidarity Movement (such as Laba 1991, Goodwyn 1991, and Murawski 1993) tend to emphasize the role of hourly workers in the success of the movement and downplay the contributions of other segments of society. The aim of Laba's entire book, for example, seems to be 'proving' that workers did more than intellectuals to facilitate Solidarity; little is said as to *why* the movement was necessary, *how* it came about, or *what* factors made it a success. Laba condemns what he calls "The Elite Thesis" (1991:3) apparently believing that to credit the educated class in Solidarity's success is akin to a Leninist attitude toward working people, that is, to assume that hourly workers can think only to a level of "trade union consciousness" (5). Goodwyn and Murawski take a similar stance against the 'intellectual class' and they even seem offended by analysts that credit the Church as a facilitator of the movement. My own findings, based on interview data from Solidarity participants, indicates that to take a divisive stand in 'crediting' or 'discrediting' certain groups is entirely against the historic reality of the events in Poland in the 1980s and also goes entirely against the philosophy or ideology of the current Solidarnosc organization in Gdansk - The Fundacja Centrum Solidarnosci.

All of my informants who were personally involved in Solidarnosc and/or with the student unions affiliated with Solidarnosc were very adamant in the notion that the Solidarity movement

was possible *because of* cooperation between different segments of Polish society. They understood and commented on the concept of social solidarity as the essence of the movement. Two informants made similar comments on the name of the movement itself in response to my questioning about reasons for the movement's success; they said it was, quite simply, 'solidarity' - social solidarity across classes, across geographic regions, even across national boundaries. Informant "B" mentioned that there really were no class divisions between intellectuals and workers in communist Poland, in terms of income, as, in "B"s words, "...college professors and plumbers both made about the same pay."

The following sections will use my informants' interview data to back the claim that workers, intellectuals, and the Church all shared in facilitating the success of the Solidarity Movement. Secondary sources will be tied-in to further support this contention.

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I interviewed a current high-ranking director of the labor union, Solidarnosc, in Gdansk at the Fundacja Centrum Solidarnosci. He is a contemporary of Lech Walesa and began his career working in the Lenin Shipyard as a laborer and later as a welder. He was involved in the formation of Solidarnosc from its very beginning and is personally mentioned in Walesa's 1987 book, *A Way Of Hope*, as an important contributor to the early organization of the union in the Lenin Shipyard. The union proper has in recent years become an 'umbrella' for several different specialized trade unions but the original union, Solidarnosc, still represents workers in the shipyards along the Baltic Coast (the Fundacja Centrum is the organizational umbrella for the various unions.) There is currently a project underway to extend Solidarnosc across Europe, uniting many separate trade unions under the Fundacja Centrum. The Gdansk "director" is



actively involved in this project, known as Europejskie Centrum Solidarnosci. The following excerpt from my interview with "the director", based on his personal involvement in the creation of Solidarnosc and on his current involvement in the union's expansion, demonstrates the society-wide origins of the movement, and its philosophy of inclusion:

I ask, "Why do you think Solidarnosc was so successful?"

"Director": "Well, we are not talking just about the trade union - *Solidarnosc is an idea!* If one person is poor and another is rich it is not solidarity. If one is working and another is not - not solidarity. If somewhere workers are having a bad way of life - bad conditions, low pay, dangerous environment - and others have good life - it is not solidarity. The idea is to help *everyone* have a good life. It is not just about wages - we try to keep wages close to same scale across industry...."

"Solidarity is needed across Europe - we include everyone - China, U.S., if they need us. The idea is to stand for *all* working people."

I ask, "Was Solidarity *only* a worker's movement? Were other groups involved?"

"Director": Solidarity was not a political party till 1990. When we were building it *everyone* was involved - millions of people. Seventy thousand shipyard workers were here along Baltic Coast, and many factories of the whole country. But also were writers, lawyers, scientists, even actors. Not just workers - all were members of Solidarnosc in 1980s. They worked with us, they paid dues - 1% of their income. And there were donations from all over the world too..."

I ask, "Was the Church involved?"

"Director": "The Church too, yes. The priests came to the shipyard to organize services for the workers - everyday during the strikes. Mass was here, everyday. Everyone came together and helped. We had all we needed. Even farmers came and donated food - I remember a wagon of potatoes! Women baked bread and brought it to the shipyard gates. They gave food to the workers on strike. Then under martial law, many men were put in jail. Solidarity leaders, in jail. Those who protest - in jail. How did their families live? Others donated - across Poland - across the world! Donations were sent to the churches from all over the world and the churches would use money to provide for those with family in jail."

To illustrate his point, "the director" gave me a magazine in which was an interview with Father Maciej Zieba, a priest who worked as an advisor to the union during the struggles of the 1980s. Father Zieba would have been considered both a representative of the Church and a member of the intelligentsia, as he is a published writer, theologian and philosopher. He is currently the head of the Europejski Centrum Solidarnosci. The interview is in both Polish and English. The priest's comments on memories of his involvement with Solidarity demonstrate the inclusiveness of its philosophy. Below are his comments about running into former Solidarity members some thirty years later:

"After all those years I happen to come across people who now are 50 or even 80 years old. The left, the right, Catholics, Jews, the agnostics, women, men - but all of them say the same: "It was the most beautiful time of my life." It was a war of fear and uncertainty but it caused a bigger motivation...."

"...our efforts are directed toward the promotion of Solidarity, which is always necessary - differently in Tibet, differently in Haiti or Sweden - but still necessary...We promote the idea of Solidarity and freedom through all our projects... We prove that the cruelties of the 20th century were not abstract, they really happened...If one has an idea, which is perseveringly promoted, then it is possible to get to people. Not by disputes or by force but with help from the truth and the exchange of experiences." (Zieba in Purzycki 2010: 6 - 7.)

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Informant "B" provided detailed information on the involvement of the KOR - *Komitet Obrony Robotnikow*, or Worker's Defense Committee - with Solidarnosc, a very important 'worker/elite' coalition.

According to Ash (2002: 20) this committee was first formed in 1976 after a number of workers were arrested in the city of Radom, near Warsaw. The workers were protesting a huge and unexpected price increase on food - averaging 60%, according to Ash. A riot broke out and the protestors set fire to the Communist Party headquarters. As a result, "...harsh sentences were handed down by civil courts; thousands of workers were sacked (Ash 2002: 19.) The workers could not afford legal counsel. A group of lawyers volunteered to represent them, and this was

the beginning of the KOR. Over time, many dissident writers, outspoken academics, actors and filmmakers joined KOR. A group of 64 KOR members were present during the negotiations of the Gdansk Agreements, acting as legal advisors to Solidarnosc. They played a critical role in balancing out the obvious advantages that Communist Party bureaucrats would have over a group of shipyard workers, in terms of legal knowledge. Lech Walesa is reported by Ash to have commented on the absolute necessity of the KOR legal counsel during the negotiations (2002: 55 - 56.)

Informant "B" had been associated with a university-level student union directly tied to Solidarnosc. "B" had detailed knowledge of the KOR, and in line with the above mentioned account of Ash, had considered KOR as a vital contributor to Solidarity's success. "B" mentioned that prior to the 1970s academics and lawyers had seldom become involved with worker protests. Over time they realized that the State's promises of economic reform and 'better days ahead' were empty gestures. Below are excerpts from "B"s comments on this topic:

"KOR was mostly lawyers and academics. They were independent thinkers who saw the government was not working - was never going to work. Poland was in big trouble - economic trouble. Some of KOR were Communists who turned against the system. Some were not promoted in system - some were lawyers who had wanted to be a judge and did not get the job. Some had been KGB lawyers! See, political reasons - that's why some turned to help workers . Others - academics, intellectuals, writers - were *not* in Party system. They were for change because they saw the failure, corruption, lies. They were the 'brain power' for the movement. These guys helped student movement - sometimes underground - helped students publish newspapers underground."

"Lawyers of KOR went with workers to negotiating table. They stood with them. The workers formed the demands - trade union free from State control, right to strike, free press, free flow of information - many things - the workers made list. They wrote this on big signs and hung on gates of shipyard - big wood signs - big red letters! But, it was the *lawyers* who made the *legal and official language*. Workers formed demands - lawyers put it on paper!"

"Also, some of these KOR had been in prison or had been banned from academic work. Like Vaclav Havel - had been put to some labor job - had to work in a factory. I knew one guy who because he participated in the strikes of 1960s, 1970s, he was put in prison. And received a ticket so he could never work in university again. Only job he could have was in a factory. But he said he was lucky - some guys like him, they send to forest to be logger!" (laughs) Everyone who had liberal ideas - who could think for themselves - something was planned to hold them back. Because they were dangerous. If you could think for yourself, the Party thought you were dangerous."

"B" also commented many times on the involvement of the Church with the Solidarity movement. Like the comments of "the director", earlier in this section, "B" mentioned the material help of the Church:

"When martial law started, many members of Solidarity were arrested. But many got away and were hidden by the Church - by priests. The churches were like rescue places. And the trust that people had! - if church said so - it was right! Because they were always with the people, and for the people."

"People identified with the Church almost like a political actor - as a political actor that brings opposition to the Party. Church was for freedom of religion, but also played a very political role, uniting people. After martial law came - and some families were without fathers or mothers - who were in jail - there was no bread winner, well, the Church encouraged everyone to give donations to help these families. It was a very trusted network. Gifts, donations, from Western Europe, from the States, all distributed through Church. Nothing was missing - all went straight to the people."

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Another example of worker, Church, and intellectual cooperation comes from Kenney's 2002 book, *A Carnival Of Revolution*. Cooperation between the various segments of society in Poland was not limited to the 'official' workings of the KOR and Solidarnosc in Gdansk. Kenney describes (40 - 42) small-scale, grassroots groups that emerged in the 1980s, centered around churches, and offering everything from legal services for workers, donations of food, classes in Polish history, assistance with housing, services of plumbers, electricians, or roofers, and even organized pilgrimages to important religious sites. These were important, materially, but ideologically as well; "(the cooperative groups) showed how easily one could in fact pass the state by" (Kenney 2002: 42).

Apparently most of these groups were informal and unnamed, however Keeney mentions "the most famous of all such ministries," located near Krakow and originating in the Lenin Steelworks (41). A mill worker, Kazimierz Fugiel, first organized the group in 1980 to help distribute donations of food from Western trade unions. It soon became connected with a local church and eventually became a center for neighborhood meetings that not only provided alternative means of meeting material needs but also, "...broke down the isolation and fear bred by martial law in Polish society" (41). The group became known as "The Social Fund For Workers' Self-Help," and was a collective with services that apparently ranged from legal counsel to rabbit breeding (humorously mentioned in Keeney 2002: 41). The group is a prime example of 'cross-class' cooperation in Poland during the Solidarity years.

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A final example comes from what Penn (2005: 50 - 51) terms the "telerevolution." This is described as cooperation between workers, members of Solidarity student groups, KOR members, English/Polish translators, and Western journalists. News related to the movement was relayed from Solidarnosc activists in the factories and shipyards, compiled and translated into English by university students, passed on to KOR members, who passed on the reports to Western news outlets such as the BBC and Radio Free Europe. In this way Western reporters gained access to news stories related to the Solidarity Movement, and, according to Penn, Poles also heard the news items broadcast back to them by the BBC and Radio Free Europe. Penn does not describe how the KOR activists were able to get the reports to Western journalists, but it is

assumed that as some of the KOR members were the 'elite' or 'inteligencja' of Poland, they had international contacts.

The accessibility of broadcasts by the BBC and Radio Free Europe, however, conflict with my research. My informant, "AF", told me that all radio and TV signals in Gdansk were blocked, except those officially approved by the Party. "AF" showed me a building atop Gradowa Hill, a high ridge on the outskirts of Gdansk, in which he claimed had been equipment used to block radio and TV signals.

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To reiterate the contention of this section, the above described coalitions - whether in the history-making legal negotiations of shipyard workers and the Communist Party at Gdansk, in grassroots, neighborhood co-ops spread throughout the country, or in the form of "telerevolutionists" - are all evidence of social solidarity across the various segments of Polish society, and each in their own way facilitated the success of the movement as a whole. Individual group effort was greatly enhanced by collective group effort, in that the separate groups helped each other in tasks that would have been difficult or impossible to accomplish without the specialized skills of the various segments. If there was indifference between the various segments of Polish society prior to the 1970s (as mentioned by "B" in relation to lack of worker support for 1968 student strikes and lack of intellectual backing of earlier worker strikes) then this attitude had apparently dissolved by the 1980s. Deteriorating economic conditions and desperation for resolve in all segments of society prompted the various groups to unite in solidarity and pursue common goals for Poland.

**Factor 7) Solidarity's success was due in part to the "Gorbachev Effect."**

This is, perhaps, the most critical factor, as without the political opportunity of Soviet liberalization it is doubtful that a 'bloodless revolution' would have occurred. The leaders of Solidarity were obviously aware of this reality and although they operated under the adage, "evolution not revolution," (as quoted by several informants) they, and the Polish people in general, lived with the dread of a Soviet military invasion.

This section will first use interview data to relate informants' opinions and firsthand observations concerning the political opportunity created by Mikhail Gorbachev's appointment as General Secretary of The Communist Party to the success of the Solidarity Movement. It will also demonstrate the precarious position that Poland was in prior to the "Gorbachev thaw," as remembered by informants. It will then use secondary sources to further explain the significance of the "Gorbachev Effect."

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I asked informant "B" how important he thought Gorbachev's role was in Solidarity's success. "B" felt that Gorbachev's liberal ideas had been *extremely* important in the overall democratization of Eastern Europe and the USSR. "B" also credited Gorbachev with facing the fact that the Soviet economic system was outdated and that no amount of reforms or 'improvement programs' would ever revitalize it. Poles in general had realized this many years earlier and their disillusionment with Party promises had, in part, led to the idea of Solidarnosc (as a political party) as an alternative to the Communist Party. "B" also credited General Wojciech Jaruzelski's decision to enact martial law as a deterrent to Soviet military action (as the lesser of two evils, so to speak.) Excerpts from "B"s comments on this subject are given below:

"In 1956, 1968, and 1953 people had tried this and it was stopped by Soviet military." ("B" was referring to attempts at violent revolts against the Soviet Union in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany.)

"So why did the Soviet Army not invade Poland? Well, it almost did happen during martial law. Jaruzelski - later in trial - he said, "I had to say we have martial law - I had to close everything - I had to do this, otherwise the Russian tanks will be coming" And I think this was true - because there were tanks on the border - ready - they were ready!"

"Gorbachev was a new breath - fresh breath on the political scene. Brezhnev was *very* old - he was just kept alive by medicine. (laughs) Gorbachev - his ideas - for first time he mentioned them - about democracy - he was almost thrown out of his position - I'm talking about 20 years earlier (than during his term as Party Secretary). He showed his intention, his view of the world was different - very different!"

"The system was corrupted - Gorbachev realized this. No goods in stores, starvation - some deny this - he knew it was real! Ukraine is good example." ("B" related a long story of how the Soviets had displaced experienced farmers in Ukraine with Soviet collective farm managers and after 30 years of poor agricultural production were still in denial of a problem.) "Gorbachev faced the facts and admitted the failures - he knew this all had to change! Yes, Solidarity's reemergence was at right time - with Gorbachev. Otherwise, we may have had to wait much longer."

Informant "JB" also gave much credit to Gorbachev. His opinions were very similar to "B"'s and his memories of the initial 16 month legalization of Solidarity (from the signing of the Gdansk Agreements to martial law) are vivid. Below, excerpts from an interview with "JB" provide a firsthand account of Solidarity's unity and the threat it posed to the Communist party which eventually led to martial law. Solidarity then 'went underground' until the Gorbachev era.

"Gorbachev was educated in Canada. He knew about different ways of life. He knew different viewpoints, different alternatives. Their system was failing - he knew this. If Brezhnev had died earlier, and Gorbachev had taken over, it would have been easier - it would have come sooner (the legalization of Solidarnosc would have come earlier.) But Andropov took over - Jaruzelski had to deal with Andropov! And Andropov was the guy who talked Khrushchev into invading Hungary. Andropov would have invaded Poland too - but he died! (laughs) There were already Russian soldiers kept in Poland and it is a miracle that Andropov did not use them. Jaruzelski held back this by making martial law."



" We were organized then - we had the whole country organized (Solidarity had the whole country organized). We would decide a strike will happen at noon today. At noon the church bells ring - workers leave the shipyard - put down their tools. Factories come to a stop. We could shut the country down if we wanted to! That scared them! (it scared the government). They realized they were in *big* trouble - Jaruzelski was in big trouble! With Gorbachev, it could be peaceful - with the other guys - no - I don't think it would have been a peaceful transition. No, could have been *very, very* bad!"

"JB" comments were in reference to the displays of Solidarity's unity in the spring and summer of 1981 that led up to the enactment of martial law in December of that year. According to a *Time* magazine report (Hornik 1981) the union was so well organized at that time that a nationwide strike was possible. Although Solidarity had been officially recognized by the Polish Peoples' Republic on August 31, 1980 (the date of the signing of the Gdansk Agreements) few of the union's demands had been addressed by summer of 1981. Hornik reported that a major clash between Solidarity protestors and police in the city of Bydgoszcz and growing nationwide impatience with the Polish government's delays prompted Lech Walesa to make a public statement calling for restraint. Hornik (1981) reported, "Walesa did his best to cool tempers during his visit to Bydgoszcz. "Not all the authorities are swine," the Solidarity leader said. Then he warned that "you must realize that a general strike would be the end of our struggle. One side has an army and we have none" ([www.time.com/article/9171925506-1.00.html](http://www.time.com/article/9171925506-1.00.html)).

Hornik also mentioned that some 40,000 Soviet troops already stationed in Poland at Legnica were put on alert and began "Soyuz 81 Maneuvers," which were a systems-test of Warsaw Pact military communications. Altogether, Poland was at the brink of a national crisis. With millions of workers ready to walk off the job at Walesa's orders and Soviet troops on alert, Jaruzelski was called to Moscow to give an account of the disorder.

Ash's description of this is chilling (2002: 154 - 155). He states that Jaruzelski was confronted by "seven of the most powerful men in the world," including Brezhnev, Andropov, and Mikhail Suslov, "the supreme guardian of ideological orthodoxy." Jaruzelski was questioned as to why he and his negotiating committee had given in to the language of the Gdansk Agreements, which, if actually followed, would be violations of basic Communist ideology. Jaruzelski was ordered to, "...turn the course of events and to remove the peril hanging over the socialist achievements of the Polish People." Ash says that this statement was perceived as even more ominous in Poland where it was translated to read, "reverse the course of events."

Jaruzelski, who as a loyal Communist, was also a Pole. According to informant "PZ", Walesa had trusted Jaruzelski and had even endorsed him as a reasonable and honest leader. Informant "PZ" showed me a cartoon picture of Jaruzelski as the Buddha. "PZ" said, "They called him, "The Buddha," because he was so calm. Or "The Welder" because he always wore these huge black sunglasses - like welding goggles. That is because he was almost made blind by snow in a prison camp. Yes, we made fun of him - but I think he saved us from the Russian army."

Thus, the above scenario and various comments by my informants demonstrates the precarious situation Poland found itself in prior to the "Gorbachev thaw" of 1985. Solidarity had succeeded in uniting the nation against Communist party control, Walesa had called for restraint, and Jaruzelski had been blamed for allowing this threat to Communist Party rule to go as far as it had. Informants "JB" and "AF" believed (in retrospect) that Jaruzelski's government never had intended to honor the Gdansk Agreements. They believed the signing of the Agreements had been yet another delay tactic while State economists tried to dream up more 'recovery plans,' and while Party bureaucrats tried to figure out how best to stop the Solidarity Movement. They also believed, looking back, that the events leading up to enactment of martial law by General

Jaruzelski had thoroughly shaken Soviet leaders in Moscow. "JB" remarked, "They knew it was a matter of time. We knew it was a matter of time. The people were ready. Walesa was wise to back off. He always said, "evolution not revolution." Solidarity's prime opportunity for evolution emerged as Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the USSR.

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This section will use comments from news sources in which informed observers remark on the importance of Gorbachev's role in facilitating the success of Solidarity. It will also include a quote from Gorbachev's Christmas Day resignation speech of 1991, in which he summarizes in a few paragraphs the failure of the Soviet System. His comments were perfect reflections of my informants' criticisms of the Communist system in Poland. His efforts to reform the system had failed and the Soviet Union was dissolved December 26, 1991. Without Gorbachev's initiatives of perestroika and glasnost the Polish Solidarity Movement and all it accomplished would have certainly been delayed, or perhaps would have never occurred.

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In an excerpt from a 1989 PBS News Hour report, posted online on the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, (November 9th, 2009 - <http://www.pbs.org/newshour>) several prominent politicians and academics discussed the reasons for the dramatic events that had recently occurred in Eastern Europe. News Hour host Jim Lehrer asked the group, "Would this have happened today (referring to the fall of the Berlin Wall) if there were no Mikhail Gorbachev?" Paul Nitze, an advisor to several U.S. presidents on Cold War issues, answered as follows:

"I believe not. I believe Mr. Gorbachev created ideas and forces in that part of the world which contributed to developments in the GDR as well as in the rest of Central Europe. So I am not at all sure that this would have happened under different circumstances."

Nitze goes on to explain his view that internal problems in the Soviet Union were greater than any external threat to the nation. Another interviewee, Walt W. Rostow, introduced by Leherr as a former State Department planner and noted historian, elaborated on Nitze's remarks:

"...I think there are very strong forces operating which have lead to the general position of Mr. Gorbachev. The stagnation of their economy since 1980, the new technologies which their whole apparatus finds great difficulty in getting ahold of, and the frustrations they've found in the world in which they've found nationalism a much more resistant force - and this has made it very expensive for them to carry on their activities...Mr. Gorbachev position is built on very hard facts and I believe his leadership has greatly accelerated the timetable for all of this."

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A British news story from the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, titled, "Mikhail Gorbachev - The Forgotten Hero Of History," (Beaumont 2009) describes the events of November 9th, 2009 in which Hilary Clinton, Lech Walesa, "and the star guest, Mikhail Gorbachev," attended a ceremony at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. Beaumont gives Gorbachev the central role in the celebrated events. He quotes Timothy Garton Ash, who also attended the ceremony, as he honored Gorbachev for his, "breathtaking renunciation of the use of force," and citing Gorbachev as, "a luminous example of the importance of the individual in history."

Beaumont mentions, "...the hard to define "Gorbachev Effect," and speculates that it consists of much more than Gorbachev's 'renunciation of the use of force,' as pointed out by Ash. It is, in

Beaumont's view, a mindset that evolved over time as Gorbachev faced the realities of the Soviet system's failures and imagined future possibilities for his country. Beaumont points out that this future was not the oversimplified notion popularized by some news sources at the time, which painted the collapse of communism as an automatic endorsement for unrestrained capitalism. He states:

"It was Gorbachev's accession to position of general secretary of the Communist Party in 1985 that finally would unleash ideas he had already been playing with during his rapid rise to power. It was not defined, as some misunderstood it, by a desire to emulate the west. Far from it. Instead, what he desired was to make more efficient and liberal a party that had lost its way."

Beaumont then quotes Gorbachev's close aide, Anatoly Chernyaev, who remarked that Gorbachev's liberal and modern ideas were not new, but the great significance lay in the fact that, "...a person who came out of a Soviet society conditioned from top to bottom by Stalinism began to carry these ideas." This seems to be the essence of "The Gorbachev Effect" - the acceptance and dissemination of the ideas of democracy, human rights, and economic modernization ([www.gauradian.co.uk/theobserver/2009/nov/08/observer-profile-mikhail-gorbachev](http://www.gauradian.co.uk/theobserver/2009/nov/08/observer-profile-mikhail-gorbachev)).

In a very similar vein, Informant "B" remarked to me that the absolute insistence on following traditional Communist Party ideology, regardless if it made good economic sense or not, had been a great source of frustration for him. "B" likened it to blindly following a religion or to a form of insanity. "I remember that was the biggest thing for me," "B" said, "I couldn't take it. I said I will always look for the truth - look for what works, what is practical. I can think for myself. The Party was set in ways of old men from a time that we no longer lived in. Gorbachev was one of few who saw this."

Finally, an excerpt from Gorbachev's resignation speech condenses the scope of the Communist system's problems and the hope he had for positive change. His criticisms of the past and his proposed agenda for the future were very much in line with those of Solidarity. Thus, I contend, his six-year-long office as General Secretary created the political opportunity that ultimately made the goals of the Polish Solidarity Movement possible. All of my informants speculated on the scenario of a solidarity movement without inclusion of the "Gorbachev Factor." All concluded, from their experiences during the initial formation of Solidarnosc, their time living under martial law, and their historic perspective of the USSR's past record with rebellious nations, that the Polish Solidarity Movement would have been *very* different without this significant advantage.

Below are excerpts from Gorbachev's speech titled, "We Opened Ourselves To The World," given on December 25, 1991, reprinted in Gale Stokes book, *From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe Since 1945* (1996: 292 - 293). Gorbachev first outlines the system's problems:

"Fate had it that when I found myself at the head of the state it was already clear that all was not well in the country. There is plenty of everything: land, oil, gas, other natural riches, and God gave us lots of intelligence and talent, yet we lived much worse than developed countries and kept falling behind more and more."

"The reason could already be seen: The society was suffocating in the vise of the command-bureaucratic system, doomed to serve ideology and bear the terrible burden of the arms race. It had reached the limit of its possibilities. All attempts at partial reform, and there had been many, had suffered defeat, one after another. The country was losing perspective. We could not go on living like that. Everything had to be changed radically."

He then outlines his vision for the future:

"...the totalitarian system that deprived the country of an opportunity to become successful and prosperous long ago has been eliminated. Free elections, freedom of the press, religious freedoms, representative organs of power, a multiparty system became a reality. Human rights are recognized as the supreme principle."

"...we live in a new world. The cold war has ended; the arms race has stopped, as has the same militarization that mutilated our economy, public psyche, and morals...."

"We opened ourselves to the world, gave up interference into other people's affairs, the use of troops beyond the borders of the country, and trust, solidarity, and respect came in response. We have become one of the main foundations for the transformation of modern civilization on peaceful democratic grounds."

## **Chapter Seven**

### **Conclusion**

Several observations will conclude this thesis. First, in researching this movement in terms of identifying various factors that facilitated its success, I was struck by the belief expressed to me by my informants of its inevitability. All interviewees expressed the belief that democratization and economic transformation in Poland would have occurred regardless of any "factor" that I inquired about - regardless, even, of Solidarnosc and the particular social movement it engendered. I do believe that the seven factors discussed in this paper were the most crucial or influential in Solidarity's success, however, the point is that my informants all believed that if not through the Solidarity Movement - or through the political opportunity created by Mikhail Gorbachev, or through the charismatic leadership of Lech Walesa, or by the worldwide recognition that Pope John Paul afforded the movement, etc., etc., - if none of these factors had materialized, all believed that eventually and inevitably transformation would have occurred.

This belief was based not only on my informants' recognition of the severe economic dysfunction of the entire Soviet system but also on their recognition (perhaps now from hindsight) that this system was in so many ways - from its basic organizational and operating form to its attempt at controlling communications and culture - simply outdated. By attempting to control so many aspects of its citizens' lives and in attempting to shape their lives into conformity with a static ideology, the regime had truly created a "second world," one without the capacity for change as was the case with the "first world." The bureaucratic "dynasty," for lack of a better word, of ageing Kremlin chiefs (Leonid Brezhnev was 60 when he became Party Secretary and his successor, Yuri Andropov was 69 when he took the job) who set the entire



system's agenda were steeped in industrial era economic policy and in Stalin era social policy. As my informants adamantly told me, Poland's leaders and economic planners all had to answer directly to Moscow for approval or permission of nearly every move they made, (as did the leaders of all Poland's neighboring countries in Eastern Europe) and thus no amount of innovation on their part could improve the failing system; the geriatric Kremlin crowd could only envision heavy industrial production with masses of loyal, semi-skilled proletariats at the controls as a viable scenario for "building socialism."

Through the 1950s, '60s, and '70s the Soviet and Eastern Bloc populations suffered for lack of basic consumer goods in the State's effort to reinvest as much as possible into heavy industrial facilities. However, by the 1980s, the system was also lacking in the emerging technological innovations that began sweeping over the Western world, and eventually resulted in the managerial and organizational shifts now expressed in the global capitalist system. My informants' stories of the severe lack of communication and information technology during the Solidarity era - and they were referring simply to basic phone service and pre-computer era printers - is a striking example of a failure to even begin the *material* shift from a post-WWII era economy to the information age. The *ideological* shift had already begun in the minds of Solidarity's activists and in the minds of millions of their followers.

It is ironic and unfortunate that the post-WWII generation of Eastern Europe labored so greatly in the development of a modern industrial society, as did the same generation in Western Europe and the U.S., but most Eastern Europeans never benefited from the wealth created in this era; no huge, semi-affluent middle class emerged in Poland as it did in the U.S. out of the industrial growth proceeding WWII. Yet, it was this generation in Eastern Europe that imagined

a better life, and as historical circumstances would have it, patiently worked to change their social, political, and economic systems in an attempt to attain that life.

What Poland lacked in economic and technological innovation it certainly made up for in innovative and eclectic methods of protest, resistance, and information dissemination during the Solidarity era. I was fascinated by my informants' stories of how strikes were called at a pre-planned hour by the ringing of church bells, how "bill-stickers" risked jail time to hang flyers calling for Solidarity rallies, how samizdat newspapers were carried across international borders to help expand the movement throughout Europe, how evening "walks" became a form of mass protest against government-endorsed news shows, and how religious ceremonies were used as non-violent, symbolic acts of resistance. In this area alone - in surveying the wide range of protest strategies used by Solidarity - there is much opportunity for further research. In addition to the range of strategies, the content of the messages of protest and resistance also offers potential for research. Content analysis of the many samizdat newspapers printed in Gdansk alone would be a major research project.

Potentially, each of the seven "facilitating factors" of this thesis could be elaborated on by further research. Obviously, a larger number of interviews would expand the range of individual perceptions of the movement, as would fluency in Polish or a 'full-time translator,' in relation to all the printed sources of available data. Also, the plethora of symbolism, ceremony, and tradition attached to Solidarity in its opposition to the State offers a world of potential anthropological interpretation. In examining any of the above, one may also ask to what degree each played in facilitating Solidarity. My analysis offers no such measure, but is mostly description.

Another interesting question open for investigation would be examining the delicate balance between protest and revolution, to a great degree maintained solely by Lech Walesa, which (apparently) prevented Soviet military intervention while at the same time prolonged the movement, allowing for further political liberalization in the USSR. Without this perfect balance the outcome of the Solidarity Movement could have been very different. Soviet military action could have silenced all dissent, or, on the other hand, too little action on the part of Solidarity could have resulted in the movement fading away from within.

It may also be said that Solidarity created its own political opportunity in offering its agenda as an alternative to that of the Communist Party. This perspective also invites further study, as does examining the movement from the Soviet perspective.

U.S. perceptions of the movement also call for investigation, especially in regards to the inaccurate notion that Poland (for that matter, the USSR as well) was eager to adopt unregulated, "wide-open" capitalism and fully reject socialism. Ronald Reagan, for example, and those of his neoliberal economic persuasion, seemed certain that they had convinced the world that "greed is good," and that all nations emerging from control of "the evil empire" were very anxious to practice "economic Darwinism." Reagan even seemed to take credit for the entire transformation of Eastern Europe and Russia. At his insistence that Mr. Gorbachev, "tear down that wall," so goes conservative mythology, Gorbachev did so! This distortion of history is an insult to the entire Solidarity generation in Eastern Europe and to generations of dissent in the USSR.

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In conclusion, I allow that my time in Gdansk was very limited and my language skills very basic. Still, I consider the interview data I collected to be a valuable contribution to the study of

the Polish Solidarity Movement, as my informants were eyewitnesses to the unfolding of this history changing era. Their stories - some in perfect English, some in a mix of Polish, simple English, and hand gestures, and some fully translated to me by acquaintances both arranged for and stumbled onto - answered for me questions I had thought about for some 30 years. Sharing my own story of our local OCAW union's small financial donations and big "moral support" for Solidarity during the 1980s, I believe, instantly opened doors - quite literally, the gate of the Gdansk Shipyard and the Gdansk Solidarnosc Local - to me. Every contact I made not only answered the questions I asked but went much further, sharing their own personal memories with me, pointing out places where certain events happened, and relating to me their part in facilitating Solidarity's success. I consider myself very fortunate to have heard their stories.

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## Appendix

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### 21 Demands Document

(Translated, paraphrased from copy available through Wystawa Drogi Do Wolnosci, Gdansk)

#### Strike Information Bulletin Inter-enterprise Strike Committee Gdansk, August 22, 1980

The Inter-enterprise Strike Committee also represents the personnel of enterprises and offices that have not joined the strike because their work is indispensable to society, and should not be disrupted. The committee's intention is to negotiate for all work forces on strike. The primary condition to opening negotiations with the government is their agreement to reconnect all telephone and telecommunications lines. The specific demands of the work forces on strike, as represented by the MKS, are as follows:

1. Recognition of the Free Trade-Union, independent of the Party and of employers...
2. Guarantee of the right to strike, and of the indemnity of strikers and their supporters.
3. Guaranteed freedom of expression and of publications...an end to the suppression of independent publications and the opening up of the mass media to representatives of all political and religious persuasions.
4. Restorations of rights to persons dismissed for having defended workers' rights...and to students excluded from higher education because of their opinions...Liberation of all political prisoners...and an end to repression for crimes of conscience.
5. Access to the mass media to inform public opinion of the creation of the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee and to make its demand public.
6. Initiation of efficient measures for relieving the country's economic crisis by mass circulation of all information relating to the socioeconomic situation...and opportunity of citizens to take part in discussions concerning economic reforms.

- 7. Payment to all strikers for days on strike...**
- 8. Monthly increase of 2,000 zlotys to every worker's base pay to compensate for the latest price increases.**
- 9. Establishment of salary scales for all positions.**
- 10. Assurance that all foodstuffs are available to the home market; export of surplus food only.**
- 11. Introduction of rationing (with books) for all meat products (until market stabilizes.)**
- 12. Suppression of government-sanctioned "floating prices" and the payment in foreign currencies for scarce items in special "hard currency" stores...**
- 13. Appointment of management staff according to merit, not to party membership. Withdrawal of privileges from militia, security forces, and Party members by making family allowances the same for all citizens...**
- 14. Lowering the retirement age (to pre-Revolution age.)**
- 15. Payment of pension funds (to post-Revolution level.)**
- 16. Improvement of working conditions and health services, plus full medical assistance for all workers and families.**
- 17. The creation of adequate day-care centers and nurseries for the children of working mothers.**
- 18. Paid maternity leave of three full years to allow mothers to raise their young children.**
- 19. Reduction of the waiting time for apartments.**
- 20. Increase in travel allowances and cost-of-living allowance...**
- 21. Saturday as a work-free day for all...Compensation for work on Saturday: extra vacation days or granting of other free days, with pay...**

Marshall University  
Informed Consent Template<sup>1</sup>

**Informed Consent to Participate in a Research Study**  
**An Analysis of The Polish Solidarity Movement**

Richard Garnett PhD, Principal Investigator

*Introduction*

You are invited to be in a research study. Research studies are designed to gain scientific knowledge that may help other people in the future. You may or may not receive any benefit from being part of the study. Your participation is voluntary. Please take your time to make your decision, and ask your research investigator or research staff to explain any words or information that you do not understand.

*Why Is This Study Being Done?*

It is being done to learn more about the Polish Solidarity Movement.

*How Many People Will Take Part In The Study?*

About 30 people will take part in this study. A total of 50 people are the most that would be able to enter the study.

### *What Is Involved In This Research Study?*

You will be answering some questions about your participation in the Polish Solidarity Movement and/or about your life in Poland prior to 1989. If you are an American you will be answering some questions about your participation in a labor union and about your experiences at your place of work. These questions will allow the researcher to compare and contrast the experiences of workers in American and Polish labor unions. If your answers are recorded on tape or digital recorder all of the recordings will be erased or destroyed at the end of the study.

### *How Long Will You Be In The Study?*

You will be in the study for about one year. There may be a follow-up interview that you can participate in if you wish.

You can decide to stop participating at any time. If you decide to stop participating in the study we encourage you to talk to the study investigator or study staff as soon as possible.

The study investigator may stop you from taking part in this study at any time if he/she believes it is in your best interest; if you do not follow the study rules; or if the study is stopped.

### *What Are The Risks Of The Study?*

There are no known risks to those who take part in this study.

### *Are There Benefits To Taking Part In The Study?*

If you agree to take part in this study, there may or may not be direct benefit to you. We hope the information learned from this study will benefit other people in the future. The benefits of participating in this study may be that the information you are contributing will help us better understand social movements.

### *What About Confidentiality?*

We will do our best to make sure that your personal information is kept confidential. However, we cannot guarantee absolute confidentiality. Federal law says we must keep your study records private. Nevertheless, under unforeseen and rare circumstances, we may be required by law to allow certain agencies to view your records. Those agencies would include the Marshall University IRB, Office of Research Integrity (ORI) and the federal Office of Human Research Protection (OHRP). This is to make sure that we are protecting your rights and your safety. If we publish the information we learn from this study, you will not be identified by name or in any other way.

If audio recordings of your interview are made they will be erased as soon as the researcher reviews them and records any pertinent data from them in the form of a written transcript. Any written transcript of your interview will be kept in a locked file cabinet accessible only by the researcher. If any of the



information you give us is used in writing up a research report your name will not be used, nor will any details be used that would allow any reader of the report to identify you.

### *What Are The Costs Of Taking Part In This Study?*

There are no costs to you for taking part in this study. All the study costs, including any study tests, supplies and procedures related directly to the study, will be paid for by the study.

### *Will You Be Paid For Participating?*

You will receive no payment or other compensation for taking part in this study.

### *What Are Your Rights As A Research Study Participant?*

Taking part in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to take part or you may leave the study at any time. Refusing to participate or leaving the study will not result in any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled. If you decide to stop participating in the study we encourage you to talk to the investigators or study staff first.

### *Whom Do You Call If You Have Questions Or Problems?*

For questions about the study or in the event of a research-related injury, contact the study investigator, at (304) 696-2800 or (304) 696-6700. You should also call the investigator if you have a concern or complaint about the research.

For questions about your rights as a research participant, contact the Marshall University IRB#2 Chairman Dr. Stephen Cooper or ORI at (304) 696-4303. You may also call this number if:

- You have concerns or complaints about the research.
- The research staff cannot be reached.
- You want to talk to someone other than the research staff.

You will be given a signed and dated copy of this consent form.

### ***SIGNATURES***

You agree to take part in this study and confirm that you are 18 years of age or older. You have had a chance to ask questions about being in this study and have had those questions answered. By signing this consent form you are not giving up any legal rights to which you are entitled.

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Subject Name (Printed)

---

Subject Signature

---

Date

---

Person Obtaining Consent (Printed)

---

Person Obtaining Consent Signature

---

Date

# Marshall University

## Szablon oświadczenia świadomej zgody<sup>2</sup>

### **Świadoma zgoda na uczestniczenie w badaniu naukowym**

### **Analiza Polskiego Ruchu Solidarność**

Doktor Richard Garnett, Główny Badacz

#### Wstęp

Zapraszam do udziału w badaniu naukowym. Celem badań klinicznych jest zgromadzenie wiedzy naukowej, która w przyszłości może pomóc ludziom. Uczestniczenie w badaniu może Panu(i) przynieść korzyści lub nie. Uczestniczenie w badaniu jest całkowicie dobrowolne. Proszę spokojnie przemyśleć swoją decyzję i poprosić badacza naukowego lub personel prowadzący badanie o wyjaśnienie wszystkich słów bądź informacji, których Pan(i) nie rozumie.

#### Dlaczego prowadzimy to badanie?

Badanie jest prowadzone w celu uzyskania większej wiedzy o polskim ruchu Solidarność.

#### Ile osób weźmie udział w tym badaniu naukowym?

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W tym badaniu weźmie udział co najmniej 30 osób. W badaniu będzie mogło wziąć udział wyłącznie 50 osób.

### *Co obejmuje to badanie?*

Odpowie Pan(i) na kilka pytań dotyczących Pana(i) udziału w polskim ruchu Solidarność i/lub swoim życiu w Polsce, przed 1989 rokiem. Jeśli jest Pan(i) Amerykaninem/Amerykanką odpowie Pan(i) na kilka pytań dotyczących swojego udziału w związkach zawodowych i o doświadczeniach w miejscu pracy. Pytania te umożliwią naukowcowi porównanie i przeciwstawienie doświadczeń pracowników w amerykańskich i polskich związkach zawodowych. Po zakończeniu tego badania, odpowiedzi nagrywane na taśmie lub w nagrywarce cyfrowej zostaną zniszczone.

### *Jak długo będę uczestniczyć w badaniu?*

Pana(i) uczestnictwo w badaniu potrwa około jednego roku. Może też być przeprowadzony wywiad uzupełniający, w którym może Pan(i) wziąć udział, jeśli wyrazi Pan(i) taką wolę.

W każdej chwili można się wycofać z badania. Jeśli postanowi Pan(i) wycofać się z badania, prosimy jak najszybciej porozmawiać z badaczem naukowym lub z personelem prowadzącym badanie.

Badacz naukowy może w każdej chwili przerwać Pana(i) udział w tym badaniu, jeśli uważa, że będzie to w Pana(i) najlepszym interesie; jeśli nie będzie Pan(i) przestrzegać regulaminu badania; lub jeśli badanie zostanie przerwane.

### *Jakie ryzyko jest związane z badaniem?*

Brak znanego ryzyka dla osób uczestniczących w tym badaniu.

### *Czy udział w badaniu wiąże się z jakimiś korzyściami?*

Jeśli wyrazi Pan(i) zgodę na uczestnictwo w tym badaniu, może Pan(i) na tym skorzystać lub nie. Jednakże, wiedza uzyskana z uczestnictwa może w przyszłości pomóc innym ludziom. Korzyści płynące z uczestnictwa w badaniu mogą być tego rodzaju, że przekazana wiedza pomoże lepiej zrozumieć ruchy społeczne.

### *A co z poufnością?*

Uczynimy wszystko, co w naszej mocy, aby zapewnić zachowywane danych osobowych uczestników. Nie możemy jednak zagwarantować pełnej poufności. Przepisy federalne nakazują nam zachowanie poufności danych uczestników. Pomimo tego w nieprzewidzianych i rzadkich okolicznościach, ma mocy obowiązujących przepisów możemy być zmuszeni pozwolić pewnym instytucjom przejrzeć Pana(i) danych. Do takich instytucji należy Marshall University IRB, Office of Research Integrity (ORI) oraz federalny Office of Human Research Protection (OHRP). Ma to na celu zapewnienie chronienia przez nas praw i bezpieczeństwa uczestników. Jeśli opublikujemy wiedzę zdobytą w tym badaniu, nie ujawnimy żadnych nazwisk ani innych danych.

Jeśli wywiad będzie nagrywany, takie nagranie zostanie skasowane po zapoznaniu się z nim przez badacza i po zapisaniu wszystkich danych związanych z badaniem w formie transkrypcji. Wszelkie transkrypcje z wywiadów będą przechowywane w zamkniętej szafie na akta, do której dostęp będzie mieć wyłącznie badacz. Jeśli jakkolwiek podana przez Pana(ią) informacja zostanie wykorzystana podczas pisania sprawozdania, Pana(i) dane nie zostaną użyte, tak samo jak i nie zostaną użyte żadne dane, które umożliwiłyby odbiorcy sprawozdania w zidentyfikowaniu uczestników badania.

### *Jakie są koszty związane z uczestnictwem w tym badaniu?*

Uczestnicy badania nie ponoszą żadnych kosztów. Wszystkie koszty badania, w tym za wszelkie testy wykonane w badaniu, materiały i procedury bezpośrednio związane z tym badaniem poniesie to badanie.

### *Czy otrzyma Pan(i) wynagrodzenie za uczestnictwo?*

Nie otrzyma Pan(i) wynagrodzenia ani innej rekompensaty za udział w tym badaniu.

### *Jakie prawa ma uczestnik badania?*

Udział w niniejszym badaniu jest dobrowolny. Może Pan(i) zdecydować nie wziąć udziału lub każdej chwili zrezygnować z uczestnictwa. W wypadku odmowy lub rezygnacji z udziału w badaniu nie poniesie Pan(i) żadnej kary ani nie utraci przysługujących świadczeń. Jeśli postanowi Pan(i) wycofać się z badania, prosimy najpierw porozmawiać z badaczem lub z personelem prowadzącym badanie.

### *Do kogo należy zadzwonić w przypadku pytań lub problemów?*

Pytania na temat badania lub w wypadku odniesieniu obrażeń w związku z badaniem, należy się kontaktować z badaczem pod numerem telefonu (304) 696-2800 lub (304) 696-6700. Do badacza należy również dzwonić w przypadku problemów lub skarg w związku z tym badaniem naukowym.

Pytania dotyczące praw uczestników badania naukowego należy kierować do Przewodniczącego IRB nr 2, doktora Stephena Coopera w Marshall University lub do ORI pod numer telefonu (304) 696-4303. Pod ten numer można też dzwonić, jeśli:

- o ma Pan(i) obawy lub skargi w związku z tym badaniem naukowym;
- o nie może się Pan(i) skontaktować z personelem uczestniczącym w badaniu;
- o chce Pan(i) porozmawiać z kimś innym niż personel uczestniczący w badaniu naukowym.

Otrzyma Pan(i) podpisany i datowany egzemplarz niniejszego formularza świadomej zgody.

### ***PODPISY***

Zgadza się Pan(i) na wzięcie udziału w tym badaniu naukowym i potwierdza, że ukończył/a Pan(i) 18 rok życia. Miał/a Pan(i) możliwość zadawania pytań na temat uczestniczenia w tym badaniu i uzyskał/a Pan(i) na nie odpowiedzi. Podpisując ten formularz świadomej zgody, nie ceduje Pan(i) przysługujących Panu(i) żadnych praw.

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Imię i nazwisko (drukowanymi literami)

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Podpis

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Data

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Imię i nazwisko osoby pobierającej zgodę (drukowanymi literami)

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Podpis osoby pobierającej zgodę

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Data

## Questionnaire in English

General Topics:

1. Solidarnosc
2. Daily life in Gdansk during Solidarity Movement

Martial Law

Work

Economy (alternatives?)

Communication (alternatives?)

Education

Religion

3. Comments about: Lech Walesa, Pope John Paul, Mikhail Gorbachev, General Jaruzelski,

General comments about any other person or topic

General comments comparing pre-1989 to current times

General comments about future of Solidarnosc, of Gdansk, of Poland in general

### **Solidarnosc:**

Were you a member of the union?

Were you an activist?

Did you participate in strikes, marches, protests? Any other activities? What were these experiences like?

What do you remember most about those days?

How was Solidarnosc funded? Were resources scarce? Did members pay dues?

Were people encouraged to join or participate in Solidarnosc? Were some people opposed to the movement?

Were there other unions...State sponsored unions? What were these like?

Why did you join or participate?

Did you receive any education or training from Solidarnosc?

How did Solidarnosc get its message or agenda out to the public?

What was the main message or agenda?

Why was the movement so successful?

What has the movement accomplished?

Is the union still active?

What are the most important lessons the world can learn from this historic era?

### **Daily Life In Gdansk During The Solidarity Movement: Martial Law, Work, Economy**

What was life like in Gdansk during the movement? What memories stand out most clearly?

What was life like during Martial Law?

Were there shortages? What kind? How severe?

Was housing in short supply? Did you have a house or apartment? Was it affordable?

Did you own a car? Were there restrictions on travel?

How does the pre-1989 economy compare with today's economy?

Were there alternatives to the regular economy? Did people, for instance, raise a garden or raise any livestock to supplement their income? Were items available on the "black market?"

Did people help each other by trading work or trading services or skills?

Were there any other innovative ways of supplementing income?

Where did you work during this time? What was your job like? Can you describe your place of work and your particular job?



Did you feel a sense of loyalty or obligation to your place of work...to your union (union before Solidarnosc)...to your co-workers...to your craft, or profession?

What kinds of benefits did your job have? Medical care? Retirement? Vacation? Sick leave? Maternity leave?

Were you paid well?

Were you ever unemployed?

### **Communication:**

To what extent were TV, radio, newspapers, journalism, etc. controlled by the State before 1989? Did this change under martial Law?

Was there access to news from external sources...Radio Free Europe, BBC, or any other source outside Poland?

Were personal communications censored? For example, were letters censored? Phone calls monitored? Did people freely communicate?

Was news about Solidarnosc censored? How was Solidarnosc portrayed by the news?

What was the most important method of communication for Solidarnosc?

Did Solidarnosc publish its own newspapers?

Were samizdat or bibula papers common? Did you read them? What were they about? Did they help to organize and spread the movement? Did they help hold the movement together while it was outlawed?

Were you ever involved in writing, printing, or distributing samizdat papers? Did you know anyone who was involved?

What kind of personal communications and printing devices were available in Poland during the 1980s...regular telephone service? Copy machines? Word processors? Typewriters? How was samizdat publishing done? How was it distributed?

What were "Uniwersytet Latajacy?" ("Flying Universities?") Were these important to the Solidarity Movement?

After 1989, did free and open communication begin immediately?

**Education:**

What was education like in Poland before 1989?

Do you believe that you got a good education?

Did the Soviet Union and Communist Party influence education? In what ways?

Were the ideas of Marx, Lenin, or Stalin presented in school? Were alternatives to these ideas presented?

Was Russian language mandatory?

Did you learn about the capitalist economy or democratic government in school?

Were there business management classes in schools? Were these based on State Economics or private enterprise?

How were Western nations - The USA, United Kingdom, Western Europe, portrayed in school?

How was Poland and Polish history presented?

Was general education free? Could everyone get college education? Was it expensive?

Did college students have considerable academic freedom? Were there ideological standards to meet?

In what ways has education changed since 1989?

Was Solidarnosc discussed in colleges and schools? Did many students support the movement?

**Religion:**

Did you regularly attend church during the Solidarity Movement? Still attend?

Was the Solidarity movement ever discussed in church?

Did the Church, in general, support Solidarnosc? In what ways?

Do you believe the goals of Solidarity were in-line with the teachings of Catholicism - with the general message and teachings of Pope John Paul II?

Do you believe that Pope John Paul had a supernatural or divine mission in supporting or promoting Solidarnosc? Did many people believe this?

Did Solidarnosc connect itself with the Church...that is, was the Church mentioned in publications or messages of any kind produced by Solidarnosc?

Did you ever see sacred images of the Church, such as The Black Madonna (Our Lady of Czestochowa) or Our Lady of Fatima, connected to Solidarnosc in any way?

**Comments about famous people of the Solidarity era:**

Lech Walesa, Pope John Paul, Mikhail Gorbachev...how important were these people to the success of the movement?

Would the Solidarity Movement have succeeded without these people?

Other important individuals?

Comments about General Jaruzelski? Any other influential people?

General comments about any other person or topic?

General comments comparing pre-1989 to current times?

General comments about future of Solidarnosc, of Gdansk, of Poland in general?

**General interview schedule for individuals who had previously (or still are) worked industrial jobs (this section used only in US interviews.)**

Were you (or are you) a member of an independent labor union?

In what kind of trade or industry did you work while in the union?

What was your job like? Can you describe your place of work and your particular job?

What were your relations with your co-workers like?

Did you feel a sense of loyalty or obligation to your co-workers...to your union...to the company you worked for?

Do you believe that your fellow workers would stand up for you or come to your aid in a time of trouble...let's say, if you had a grievance against the company, or if you had an injury or lay-off and could not work.

Are you working now? Is your new job unionized? How do you feel about your fellow-employees, your union (if unionized) and the company you now work for in terms of loyalty or obligation?

Were you ever involved in a strike while unionized? What was that like? Was the strike successful in terms of achieving its goals? Why or why not?

Why, do you believe, did your plant or industry shut down? Why, in general, do you think that so many plants are closing?

### **Questionnaire in Polish**

#### ***Uwagi na temat edukacji w Polsce przed rokiem 1980***

Gdzie uczęszczałeś do szkoły podstawowej lub średniej? W jakich latach chodziłeś do szkoły?

Jakie miałeś przedmioty?

Czy, ogólnie, ideologia Maksa, Lenina lub Stalina bądź komunistyczna była przedstawiana w szkole?

W jakim zakresie były te ideologia przerabiane?

Czy możesz podać konkretne przypadki?

Czy te ideologie były w programie nauki lub lekcji?

Czy możesz opisać, jak te informacje były przedstawiane – przez kogo? Jak? Na lekcjach, w książkach, na obrazach, w symbolach, muzyce?

Czy uważasz, że twoje doświadczenie było typowe w twoim pokoleniu? Jak to było u innych osób? Jak to było u innych pokoleń?

Jaką miałeś o tym opinię? Krytyczną?

Gdzie chodziłeś do college? W jakich latach chodziłeś?

Jak można opisać zakres wolności naukowej w college'u?

Czy istniały normy ideologiczne, które musiały być spełnione w twoim programie nauki?

#### ***Uwagi na temat organizacji Solidarności***

Gdzie mieszkałeś i pracowałeś w 1980 i 1981 roku?

W jaki sposób byłeś zaangażowany w działalność Solidarności? Jaka miałaś rolę?  
Jak zostałeś pozyskany? W jaki sposób przystąpiłeś?  
Dlaczego przystąpiłeś?  
Czy zachęcano ludzi do przystąpienia?  
Czy ludzie wszystkich, różnych klas lub zawodów byli zainteresowani Solidarnością?  
Czy różne klasy ludzi przystępowały z różnych powodów?  
Czy konieczne było płacenie składek miesięcznych?  
Jak dobrze była Solidarność finansowana? Czy wydawało się, że środki były niewielkie?  
Czy wiesz, jakie skąd się brały główne środki finansowe Solidarności?  
W jakiego rodzaju działalność w Solidarności byłeś zaangażowany?  
Czy możesz podać konkretne przypadki? Jakie masz inne doświadczenia? Inne role?  
Czy otrzymałeś w Solidarności jakieś przeszkolenie? Jakie? Kto cię szkolił?  
Czy było to szkolenie ideologiczne? Jaka była jego treść? Czy możesz je opisać?  
Czy szkoliłeś lub nauczałeś innych ludzi z tematu Solidarności? Jaka była jego treść?  
Czy dotyczyło ideologii? Czy była to próba rekrutowania ludzi?

### ***Uwagi na temat informacji w Polsce przed rokiem 1980***

W jakim stopniu w Polsce do 1980 roku były kontrolowane przez państwo środki masowej informacji – tzn. TV, radio, dzienniki, czasopisma? Czy to się zmieniło w stanie wojennym?  
Czy wiadomości na temat Solidarności były cenzurowane? W jaki sposób była Solidarność przedstawiana w wiadomościach?  
W jaki sposób przekazywała Solidarność swoje komunikaty społeczeństwu?  
Czy był dostęp do wiadomości ze źródeł zewnętrznych – wiadomości z Radia Wolna Europa lub BBC, na przykład, lub ze źródeł niekontrolowanych przez państwo?  
Czy Solidarność publikowała własny dziennik? Czy było to zgodne z prawem?  
Czy publikacje podziemne były powszechne? Czy je czytałeś? Jaka była ich treść?  
Czy publikacje państwowe były powszechne? Czy je czytałeś? Jaka była ich treść?

Czy byłeś zaangażowany w pisanie, drukowanie lub dystrybucję wydawnictw podziemnych?  
Czy znałeś kogoś, kto był?

Czy uważasz, że publikacje podziemne odgrywały ważną rolę w utrzymaniu zainteresowania Solidarnością w czasie stanu wojennego?

Czy uważasz, że publikacje podziemne były najważniejszym środkiem przekazywania informacji o Solidarności w stanie wojennym?

### ***Uwagi na temat roli Kościoła w Solidarności***

Czy w czasie istnienia ruchu Solidarności regularnie chodziłeś do kościoła?

Do którego Kościoła chodziłeś?

Czy w Kościele rozmawiano o ruchu Solidarności?

Czy twój Kościół, albo inny znany ci kościół, angażował się we wspieranie Solidarności? W jaki sposób Kościół to robił?

Czy uważasz, że cele Solidarności były zgodne z nauką Katolicyzmu – powiedzmy, w zgodzie ze słowem papieża Jana Pawła II?

Czy uważasz, że papież Jan Paweł II miał „nadnaturalną” lub „boską” misję w związku z jego współpracą z Solidarnością? Czy wiesz, czy wielu ludzi tak uważa? Czy Solidarność kiedykolwiek wspomniała o tym związku w swoich publikacjach lub innych informacjach?

Czy kiedykolwiek widziałeś obrazy świętych Kościoła, jak na przykład Czarnej Madonny lub Najświętszej Maryi Panny Fatimskiej bądź Najświętszej Maryi Panny Częstochowskiej w jakikolwiek związane z Solidarnością?

### ***Pytania ogólne***

Dlaczego według ciebie Solidarność odniosła taki sukces?

Dlaczego przystąpiło do niej tak wielu ludzi?

Jakie wpływy miał Lech Wałęsa, papież Jan Paweł II i Michaił Gorbaczow na ostateczny rezultaty działalności ruchu Solidarności?

Czy uważasz, że wynik byłby inny, jeśli jedna lub więcej z tych osób nie zajmowałaby swojego stanowiska?

Co postrzegasz jako największe osiągnięcie Solidarności?

Wymień najważniejsze rzeczy, jakie tamta epoka historyczna niesie światu jako lekcję?

**Ogólny harmonogram wywiadów z osobami, które poprzednio (lub w dalszym ciągu) pracowały na stanowiskach w przemyśle.**

Czy byłeś (lub jesteś) członkiem niezależnego związku zawodowego?

W jakiej branży lub w jakim przemyśle pracowałeś, gdy byłeś członkiem związku zawodowego?

Jaką miałeś pracę? Czy możesz opisać swoje miejsce pracy i pracę jaką wykonywałeś?

Jakie miałeś relacje ze współpracownikami?

Czy miałeś poczucie lojalności lub zobowiązania wobec współpracowników...związku zawodowego...firmy, w której pracowałeś?

Czy uważasz, że koledzy z pracy stanęliby w twojej obronie lub czy pomogliby ci w trudnych czasach...powiedzmy, gdybyś miał skargę przeciwko firmie lub gdybyś odniósł obrażenia lub zostałbyś zwolniony i nie mógł pracować.

Czy obecnie pracujesz? Czy w nowej pracy istnieją związki zawodowe? Jakie masz obecnie uczucia, jeśli chodzi o lojalność i zobowiązania, wobec swoich kolegów z pracy, związku zawodowego (jeśli w zakładzie istnieje związek zawodowy) i wobec firmy, w której obecnie pracujesz?

Czy będąc członkiem związku zawodowego brałeś kiedykolwiek udział w strajku? Jak to wyglądało? Czy strajk wywalczył zrealizowanie jego celów? Dlaczego tak lub nie?

Dlaczego według ciebie twój zakład został zamknięty lub przestała istnieć twoja branża? Ogólnie mówiąc, dlaczego według ciebie, tak wiele zakładów jest zamykanych?

Czy uważasz, że na twoim, lokalnym, obszarze dojdzie kiedyś do ożywienia gospodarczego? Dlaczego tak lub nie? Co według ciebie można zrobić, aby ożywić lokalną gospodarkę?



### **View Of Gdansk**

The shipyards stretch into the distance along the Baltic Coast. Workers lived in the brick apartment houses practically within reach of the grasp of giant shipyard cranes that have become a landmark of the city. At its peak in the late 1970s some 70,000 people were employed in shipbuilding in the "tri-cities" of Gdansk, Sopot, and Gdynia.





### **Looking Out Toward The Baltic Sea**

Although greatly reduced in capacity today, the remnants of the old Lenin Shipyard are nonetheless enormous. Industrial infrastructure lines both banks of the Wisla stretching out to the sea. Gdansk has been a center for shipbuilding since the time of Peter the Great.



### **Repair Yard At The Mouth Of The Wisla**

Drawbridges raise to lets ships pass into the Wisla from the Baltic Sea. Stocznia Gdanska is still a very active maintenance and repair yard.



### **Power Plant On The Wisla**

The stacks of a coal-fired power plant are seen in the background of this picture. The plant is on the Baltic Coast but lines up nearly with the center of Gdansk, and is only a few blocks from the main city center. It is joked to have been a "gift from Uncle Joe Stalin." Coal smoke and fly ash turned the winter snow black around the plant. Nearly all buildings in Gdansk are heated by steam generated at this plant. One way to distinguish Eastern Europe from Western Europe, I was jokingly told, was that in Eastern Europe there was not enough money to bury the steam pipes. These pipes do run above ground all over the city, and on the grounds of the power plant, local residents took advantage of the escaping heat from the transmission pipes to extend the growing season for vegetables....and to thus have something to eat during the dire food shortages of the 1970s and '80s.



### **The Syn Antares Under Construction**

At its peak in the 1970s Stocznia Gdanska produced an amazing 40 to 50 large, oceangoing ships per year - that's about a ship every week! Today, only one large ship is currently under construction, the Syn Antares, shown here (although several smaller ships are currently being built). It is a specialty ship, built to transport liquefied natural gas with a 9000 cubic foot capacity. It's being built for Antares Shipping, a global group with headquarters in New York and London.

For scale, note the man standing under the crane. These giants were built in 1970 by a Finnish company as an investment by the Soviet Union. They were intended to modernize the yard - at that time, called The Lenin Shipyard. However, an interviewee told me, the cranes were outdated at the time of their installation and never performed as the manufacturers claimed they would. Outdated technology was typical in most Soviet Bloc industries and was often compensated for with intensified human labor. There was no unemployment in the Communist system, but, as a 44 year veteran of the shipyard commented, "...the work was inhuman. After 10 or 15 years in this yard, a man's health was gone."



### **Inside The Sub-Assembly Building**

Ship subcomponents are built under-roof in gigantic buildings then assembled outside at the drydocks.



### **Welders At Work Inside Stocznia Gdanska**

I interviewed hourly workers, craft supervisors, a ship designer, and upper-level managers at the yard. A welding supervisor took me inside a large assembly building to show me how ships were pre-fabricated in smaller sections before outside assembly. A Ukrainian investment group now owns Stocznia Gdanska and employs about 2000 people. The aim of the Ukrainian company is to compete with Asian shipbuilding companies, not through cost, but through quality. The goal is to produce the highest quality ships in the world at the Gdansk yard. These will include ships for oil and gas exploration and ocean oil field maintenance with the most advanced technologies available as standard onboard equipment. The yard is also doing high-tolerance steel fabricating for the Baltic Coast's booming commercial construction business. They are also currently manufacturing columns for offshore wind turbines and are installing equipment to build the entire wind generator units - generators, blades, and all installation components.



### **Bases For Wind Generators**

The shipyard is transitioning toward construction and installation of offshore "wind farms" in the Baltic region. This is the first stage in construction of base columns for the wind generators.



### **A Shipyard Worker Gets A Laugh From My Attempts To Speak Polish**

Luckily, I had interpreters available! Several "higher-ups" at the shipyard spoke fluent English, but most hourly workers spoke only a few words of broken English, if that. Still, we communicated with a handful of Polish and English phrases, gestures, and the universal language among workers of laughter and a chance to take a coffee break on a cold day! Today, Polish TV is saturated with American shows, some subtitled and some voiced-over, giving all Poles somewhat of a daily "English lesson," and English is learned in school by most all young people. Prior to the late 1980s, Russian language was mandatory in all public schools and it was taught from 2nd grade on. This was a conscious and deliberate effort to "Russify" the population. University students following Solidarnosc protested to have the Russian language requirement dropped.





### **John Paul And Benedict Keep Watch In The Design Office**

Poland is the "most Catholic" country of all - you are seldom out of sight from symbols of Catholicism. Just the mention of the name, Jan Pawel Drugi, (John Paul II) very often brings tears to the eyes of Poles. Many regard John Paul with a sacred reverence unknown to Americans in relation to any religious figure - including Jesus Christ. John Paul was believed by many to have a "supernatural mission" to free Poland from the Communist Party and to "consecrate Russia to the sacred heart of Mary." These beliefs stem from the Fatima Prophecies and were legitimated by John Paul's dedication to this cause. Several of my interviewees attributed the support of John Paul for Solidarity as the most important factor in its success.



### Where Lech Jumped The Wall

John Paul may be a "sacred hero" to Poles, but Lech Walesa is a close second - however, he's certainly not viewed as sacred! This spot is where "Lech jumped the wall," as local legend goes. Lech was fired from the yard for passing out literature against the Communist sponsored trade unions and in favor of starting up an independent labor union. During a strike in August, 1980, he climbed over the shipyard wall (at the spot in this photo), jumped up on an excavator parked at the site, started spontaneously addressing the striking workers, and at that moment became the unofficial leader of what would become the Solidarity Movement. Workers all over Poland and all over the world identified with him, and his simple message of working-class dignity, solidarity, and social justice, regardless if sometimes the actual wording was "rather unusual." One of my contacts from the University of Gdansk had once translated a live speech by Walesa for some English journalists. She said:

"Walesa speaks his own language. He is impossible to translate fully into English - he is impossible even to fully understand in Polish! He uses all kinds of - well, I guess you'd call them - 'workers speech'....stories, phrases, jokes - things that made my face turn red,

and things I was at a loss to translate! But the workers absolutely loved him! They knew, by his speech, that he was one of them. There was no pretending - he said exactly what he felt, just as it came to his mind! I was terrified when I translated for him!"

The sign on the wall translates roughly to: *"No wall ever frightened Walesa."* This is a reference to barriers in general (perhaps his lack of formal training in politics and public speaking), the shipyard wall itself, and perhaps in reference to the Berlin Wall as a symbol of Communism and a wall against free speech.



### **Solidarnosc Graffiti**

Graffiti from the Solidarnosc era is still visible in many places in Gdansk. Here "Solidarnosc" is visible in letters three feet tall on the highest gable of an assembly building.



### **Winter Weather Does Not Stop Work At Stocznia Gadanska**

Looking past the farthest reaches of the shipyard out to the open Baltic Sea.



## Gardens

As described in this thesis, ramshackled gardens sprawled up the hillsides all around Gdansk. They were a source of food during the decades of shortages. The irony is that there was no unemployment in Gdansk - great wealth was generated by the shipyards and everyone worked long hours. The Soviet Union extracted this wealth in turn for supposed "trades" with Poland. The result was desperate shortages of all food items and consumer goods. Many alternative methods of producing or otherwise securing something to eat became commonplace in Gdansk. Gardens sprang up not only on hillsides, but in city parks and on the spare land surrounding the shipyards and the power plant. These drastic shortages of all necessities of life were the main reason for the strikes and unrest that led to formation of Solidarity.



### **Backyard "Terraced Gardens"**

In Gdansk every square foot of available land was used for private gardens during the severe food shortages of the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. Here metal scraps are used to create small strips of garden space up a hillside. Note the larger terraced strips in the background.



### **Homemade Greenhouses**

Like the gardens, greenhouses and sheds for small livestock extended up steep hills behind many houses in Gdansk. These sources of local food production supplemented the often empty store shelves.



### **Typical Neighborhood**

A typical neighborhood near the shipyard. Owner-built additions to houses, cobbled together with salvaged stones and bricks (following picture) became bedrooms for adult children and their spouses. Housing was in extreme shortage and it was common to wait for a decade to get an apartment. Most young couples in the 1970s and 1980s had little choice but to remain in their parent's home. Conventional building supplies were practically unavailable, so many "alternatives" emerged, including pilfered materials and assorted scraps from the many industrial plants in the region. The "room additions" shown below, are built of what looks to be salvaged corrugated metal, various grades and types of plywood, a mix of used brick and concrete blocks, and local, uncut rocks, plastered into the walls. Perhaps these rough rocks were removed from the hillside gardens behind the house.

Housing and food were not the only things in short supply. All basic household appliances and furniture required a long waiting list. Lucky housewives with a washing machine, one informant



told me, often made a little extra money by renting the machine by the hour to neighbors! Cars - even used cars - were a long-awaited luxury. A joke about this era was told to me by an interviewee and goes as follows:

"A man wanted to buy a car in Gdansk in 1970. So, after many months of paperwork and bribes with local Party chiefs, he obtained the correct forms to do so. He went to a place that sold a few cars and presented his paperwork. However, he was told he would be placed on a waiting list and his wait would be approximately 10 years. Still, he demanded to know the exact date he could buy his car. The dealer said, "In ten years...in ten years!" But the man was persistent and kept demanding an exact date, Finally, the dealer said, "OK, to shut you up, I'll give you a date. Come back on August 3rd, 1980." The man exclaimed, "I can't come that day! That's the day there coming to install my phone!"





### **Shrine Of The Black Madonna Of Czestochowa**

In the 1000 year-old Church of St. Mary, in downtown Gdansk, is located this shrine of the most holy icon in Polish Catholicism. It is fully explained in this thesis.




### **Students Taking Bread To Striking Shipyard Workers - 1980**

**(From a display at University of Gdansk)**

In 1968 University students across Poland rioted in protest of State-enforced policies that limited their academic freedom...few workers supported them. In 1970 workers protested high food prices and drastic shortages...few students supported them. By 1980 nearly everyone was working together in solidarity...students, professionals, and hourly workers. One elderly interviewee told me that the KOR (workers' defense committee) was, in his opinion, a very influential "bridge" between the various groups in Polish society, and greatly worked to unite all the various segments. He described the KOR as a group of lawyers, professionals, and academics - mostly Jewish, in his personal experience - who realized that total social cohesion was absolutely necessary in the fight against Communist Party domination in Poland. They also realized, as did Walesa, that this was going to be a very long battle - "evolution not revolution." Pope John Paul II had a similar vision - long-term battle, total unity. He even attempted to

include a notion of "Pan-Slavic unity" into his rhetoric, calling for all "Slavic people" to recognize their common cultural origins. This however, did not seem to work too well as Poles still had living memory of WWII and had daily experience of attempts at "Russification," as well as the daily frustration of living in the dysfunctional Soviet-dominated economy. If anything, Polish national identity was *defined* by opposition to Russia, so, I believe, the "Pan-Slavic" idea had little effect.



**Lech Walesa and an Unidentified Coworker During The 1980 Strike**

**(From a display at University of Gdansk)**



**Strikers at the Shipyard Gates**

**(From a display at University of Gdansk)**



### **Monument To Slain Workers**

This monument commemorates the December 1970 shootings of striking workers in Gdansk and Gdynia. State militia troops opened fire on unarmed workers who had gone on strike to protest steep increases in food prices. The exact number of deaths and injuries is not known, as the local police and militia harassed and threatened the families of the workers who were shot. Many families of victims were forced to move away from the local area as to suppress details of the shootings. Some workers simply "disappeared" and some were buried the same night without a funeral... "like dogs," as one interviewee told me. This interviewee was a witness to the shootings, as he was involved in the strike at the Gdansk shipyard the day this occurred. "Official" historic accounts vary from 44 to 88 deaths, but my informant says he estimates at least 1000 people were injured by police, ranging from gunshot wounds, to beatings, broken bones, and assault on crowds with vehicles (strikers were simply run-over with police vehicles.)

Most interviewees cite this day, December 16, 1970, as the "unofficial" day the Solidarity Movement actually began. It was a decade later before the Solidarity Union was formally organized and still another decade until it became legally and permanently recognized... "evolution, not revolution," was the movement's slogan.

I attended the memorial ceremony at this site, December 16th, 2010, on the 40th anniversary of the shootings. The following six pictures are from that ceremony:



**The Mayor of Gdansk Speaks at the Ceremony**



**Flags of Stocznia Gadanska**





**Wreaths To Honor The Slain Workers**



**A Large Crowd Attended The Ceremony As Hymns Were Sung**



**Decorative Lanterns Carried By Those Who Lost Family Members In The Shooting**



**Solemn Tribute To The Past - Each Lantern Represents A Life Lost**



### Stocznia 4-Ever

No explanation was found for the mix of Polish and English wording in this painting on the shipyard wall. Local university art students are painting these murals. The point is clear: over the girl's heart is the phrase, stocznia (shipyard) 4-ever. The iconic shipyard cranes, a landmark symbol of Gdansk, are in the background. Even the younger generation in Gdansk - those born after the 1989 transition - are proud of the Solidarity heritage, the shipyard, and the historic struggle tied to the city and its symbols. One young art student told me:

"The skyline with those shipyard cranes is beautiful to me! It's like a form of abstract art. When I was little, I'd pass by the shipyard and they would be moving - they looked alive, like some kind of huge animals! And at night they are lit up. Now I feel very proud of this city and of all that happened here, even though I know it just through stories from my mom and dad."



### Self Reflection

The mural painters ponder their work and their future in Gdansk.

