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Socialization and Attitudes: Effects of Religion, Political Identification, and Class, 1972-2002

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by
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Abstract
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This study analyzes the effects on culture wars attitudes of socialization into religion, political identification, and class on culture war type attitudes. Stepwise OLS and Logistic regression models were used to determine which of the three social institutions would have greatest impact on the attitudes: *abortion for reasons beyond one's control*, *abortion for willful reasons*, *capital punishment*, *prayer in schools*, *interracial marriage*, *teaching sex education in schools*, *homosexuality*, *premarital sex* and *extramarital sex*. The findings support the theory that religion is the primary social institution involved in the development of culture war attitudes.

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The current 'moral' debates are an extension of competing belief systems that form out of the reciprocal relationship of structural forces and interaction-based meaning. These relationships elicit many questions surrounding the power of belief systems, the subsequent definition of morality, and the resulting passion by which these belief systems are defended. This study is the first step in an investigation into this connection on both the macro and micro level. I will investigate the impact of three social institutions (the macro) of socialization into those overarching entities on several of the current controversial attitudes held by individual members of society (the micro). This study will focus on the interpretation of statistical outcomes to objectively identify which process of socialization has the greatest impact: religion, political identification, or class as well as the relative impact on each other.

Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann's *The Social Construction of Reality* (1966), James Davidson Hunter's *Culture Wars* (1991) and Milton Rokeach's *The Nature of Human Values* (1973) provide significant inspiration for this line of thought. These three books lay a solid and clear theoretical framework and are therefore heavily cited. In fact, two quotes stand out as perhaps the most influential thoughts:

> The human organism is thus still developing biologically while already standing in a relationship with its environment. In other words, the process of becoming man takes place in an interrelationship with an environment. This statement gains significance if one reflects that this environment is both a natural and human one. That is, the developing human being not only interrelates with a particular natural

> environment, but with a specific cultural and social order, which is mediated to him by the significant others who have charge of him. Berger and Luckmann, (1966, p. 48)

and

> …politics is, in a large part, an expression of culture (competing values and ideals and, often, interests based on values). At the heart of culture, though, is religion or systems of faith [these can include secular faiths]. And at the heart of religion are the claims to truth about the world. (Hunter, 1991, p. 57)

Although each theorist approaches the causes and consequences of cultural conflict from somewhat different perspectives, something of a synthesis can be constructed to provide ample ground for connecting the expression of attitudes, belief systems, and the overall structure of society.

Beginning with Berger and Luckmann (1966), the individual is a product of a specific cultural context. This specific context is taught through the complex process of socialization that begins in childhood and essentially ends in death. Berger and Luckmann do not hold the idea that socialization is such a strict process that individuals become like robots, instead it is a complex relationship between the individual and the individual's social and physical environment.

Socialization is, essentially, both an end product of the socially constructed reality and a perpetuator of that reality. Berger and Luckmann (1966) state "all human activity is subject to habituation (p 53)." These habitual actions become institutionalized and reified, in short, real. These 'real' structures in society are then the subject of socialization for the next generation. This process is not a simple duplication; it is, again,

a complex relationship between the micro and macro levels of society, technology, environment, and the like. This process allows for outside influences including new 'significant others' such as peers and teachers and allows for the introduction of new ideas. It is through the introduction of ideas, or variations of those ideas, that create nuances in the social institutions.

Through this process of habituation, institutionalization, reification and socialization, what we have constructed *becomes* an external reality, including the variations in that external reality. To emphasize, the institutions are, for all intensive purposes, *real*, meaning their significance and impact on our lives cannot be dismissed. Grounded in this external reality are the ideas and beliefs, in the package of social institutions that provide meanings for us and organize our lives. These institutions provide our social context. They provide the framework in which we live our lives and determine our attitudes and beliefs. It is from these *real* structures and the meanings ascribed to them that we develop our values.

These institutions provide the foundation for our interactions with others. We use the same resources and have the same guiding social institutions that shape our reactions to these institutions and society as a whole. Because of this, members of society must establish a system of interaction that will facilitate continued collaborative existence. Part of how we do this is through a shared set of values. Most people are in favor of leading a quality life as they define it. At the risk of being overly optimistic, members of society generally want what is 'best'. It is this determination of what is defined as 'best' where the divergence begins. The underlying assumptions that are based in the social institutions facilitate this definition. The nuances of the social institutions will create

certain shared values within segments of the population while the need for social cohesion would in a sense require a prevailing set of underlying assumptions. From here, Hunter's (1991) notion that "cultural conflict is ultimately about domination" (p. 52) makes perfect sense.

Hunter (1991) defines "cultural conflict… as political and social hostility rooted in different systems of moral understanding…they are not merely attitudes that can change on a whim, but basic commitments and beliefs that provide a source of identity, purpose, and togetherness for the people who live by them." (p. 42) The 'correctness' of the different systems of beliefs that are the basis for morality are in almost direct contrast with each other. This creates intense discord between the members of society in the most basic of ways, how to keep the 'right' moral system the dominant system. The desire to dominate is, therefore, about who gets to define and control the values on which social structures, social institutions, and the overall norms of society stands. This ability to define is very powerful, not just politically and legally, but the kind of power that lets you sleep peacefully at night.

The rhetoric in daily life concerning the culture wars inevitably brings values into the conversation. In this debate, people will comment that a person or group of people 'have good values' or that 'they don't have values …". This kind of statement is inaccurate. Instead, different values are in competition.

Values are defined by Rokeach as "an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end states of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end state existence". (1973, p. 5) He states values are: ranked by the individual; serve a variety of functions; are potential predictors of

behavior; and are generally long lasting. His theory contends that values are essential to how we organize our world and are an integral part of who we consider ourselves to be. They are also formed by the social institutions into which we are socialized. This base level of values is central to how we interact with ourselves and the external world. Connecting this with cultural conflict, to exist in disharmony with ones values, i.e. your values are not reflected in your society, leads to seemingly chronic uneasiness, restlessness, etc. that would make it hard to live your own life. Therefore, one would want their values to be primary in the social institutions.

Rokeach states that one of the functions of values is to utilize them as standards to guide our behavior. These standards "lead us to take particular positions on social issues…predispose us to favor one particular political party or religious ideology over another…evaluate and judge ourselves and others…to ascertain whether of not we are as moral or as competent as others…and are employed to persuade and influence others, to tell us which beliefs, attitudes, values, and actions of others are worth challenging…" (1973, p. 13). Each of these standards suggests a dedication to the values held and a commitment to share these values with other members of society. This sharing will perhaps increase social cohesion, increase collaborative living with other members of your society, and place your values as the mainstream culture.

Hunter divides culture into public and private. Simply put, private culture is what guides us though our daily life; it incorporates our simple decisions such as what to wear and what to eat to our complex understandings of our truths. While public culture includes the functioning of the state (laws, bureaucratic functioning, etc.) including the idea of how much the state should be involved in our personal lives and "is reflected in

the shared standards by which the actions of individuals or communities as well as the actions of other nations and communities with whom it deals are evaluated and judged as whether good or evil, right or wrong, just or unjust…and (it) embraces the collective myths surrounding its (nations) history and future promise." (p. 55).

Values are at the heart of culture. As Rokeach indicated, a value is a type of belief. He defines a value system as "and enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct of end states of existence along a continuum of relative importance." (1973, p. 5) Although not necessarily equating a value system to a belief system, the relationship is evident. A value is defined as a belief and a system of values is essentially a system of beliefs. Hunter uses the word 'faith' and 'moral' to describe what Rokeach calls 'values'. These values are inherent in what Berger and Luckmann call the universe of meaning or symbolic universe. Fundamentally, these terms are describing the same underlying concept.

Hunter proposes that these beliefs (values, components of the universe of meaning, morals) are what link public and private culture. Rokeach suggests that these beliefs (values) provide the foundation for attitudes, or more specifically, attitudes are the manifestation of values. However, since attitudes are the manifestation of a set of values, it is not possible to predict with absolute certainty which values underlie which attitudes. In addition, there are certain social institutions that have specialized values and corresponding attitudes. "Values that can be identified as being within the specialized concern of a particular institution should be the best predictors of those attitudes and behaviors that are also within that domain." (Rokeach, 1973, p. 96)

For an oversimplified summary, the reality of society is constructed through a complex process and produces, among other things, social institutions that generate valuated belief systems. Value beliefs are transmitted to the next generation through the process of socialization into social institutions and belief systems. The resulting manifestations are attitudes and behaviors.

Religion, political identification, and social class have been identified as essential, long lasting, and substantial social institutions. These specific structures are said to have distinct belief systems that are solidly grounded in values.

Religion

Religion has been an integral part of the American culture since the early colonial days and a part of all society since the beginning of recorded time. It has been the basis for our laws, served us with moral constraints, and provided a social network. Religion can function as a tool for social integration, a tool for social conflict, a tool for establishing meaning, or depending on the situation, can be all three at once. The complicated nature of religion makes it particularly interesting when addressing socialization. The varying types of religion promote a vast difference between groups regarding social issues. For example, Steensland, et al, (2000) found that Evangelical Protestants taught "strict adherence to particular religious doctrines [e.g., sexual conduct] while Jews "have a strong pro-choice and liberal sexual attitudes"

There are many ways to be 'religious' and not all are based on a deity. When talking about beliefs or religions, Hunter includes "any more or less formal system of faith." (1991, p. 57) Of the religions commonly and traditionally associated with the United States, we can very generally conceive of multiple Protestant denominations,

Catholic, Jewish, and the 'other' category which would include, but is certainly not limited to atheists, agnostics, Muslims, Buddhists, Pagans as well as the secular systems.

Generally speaking, it is appropriate to assume that the members of the more conservative religions will have more socially conservative attitudes and the same trend with the more liberal religions. According to Hunter (1991), this leaning toward conservative and liberal beliefs will pervade all other aspects of life. "It nearly goes without saying that those who embrace the orthodox[1] impulse are almost always cultural conservative, while those who embrace progessivists moral assumptions tend toward a liberal or libertarian social agenda." (1991, p. 46) For example, a study done by Songer and Tabrizi (1990) found that "evangelical judges were substantially more likely to cast conservative votes than their mainline Protestant brethren even after the effects of party…were accounted for. Catholic judges were also more likely than mainline Protestants to support conservative outcomes, but they were less conservative than the Protestant evangelicals. Jewish judges had voting patterns that were similar to those of mainline Protestants" and, in matters of obscenity, Catholic Judges and Jewish judges "appear to be slightly more liberal than mainline Protestant Judges."

Politics

Political identification is a belief system. Currently, Republicans are seen as favoring conservative attitudes and Democrats are seen as favoring liberal attitudes. Pew Forum (August 30, 2005 edition) reported that "by a wide margin, the Republican party is seen as most concerned with protecting religious values…the Democrat party is perceived as most concerned with protecting the freedom of citizens to make personal

[1] Hunter defines orthodoxy as "the commitment on the part of adherents to an external, definable, and transcendent authority and progressive as "the tendency to resymbolize historic faiths according to the prevailing assumptions of contemporary life" page 44 and 45

choices." The identification with one of these foundational beliefs will guide voting behaviors. The extension can be made that voting behaviors reflect an active method of expressing one's attitude.

The legislation of morality as defined by the 'winning' dominant belief system is one of the most significant consequences of the culture wars. The realm of the actual act of legislation lies, for the most part, in the political system. This would indicate the importance of political ideology in the fight over legislative power to define what belief system that will encapsulate the American society. A prime example of this would be the past presidential election, 2004. The BBC article (November 3, 2004) discusses the division exposed by the controversy of the election. In this election, the victor was essentially determined by one state, Ohio. Ohio lost significant jobs during the time preceding the election leading to very uncomfortable economic conditions. Several months before the election, the Republican leadership in Ohio introduced a 'pro-family' bill that would define marriage as 'between one man and one woman'. Ohio voters voted for in favor of the Republican party based on that proposition, rather than in favor of their economic needs that were being addressed by the Democrat party.

The political nature of the United States has not been consistent. There have been changes in what each party represents, parties have come and gone, and the significance of being a member of a political party has reduced. The beginning of last century saw a much stronger emphasis on political party as membership or commitment to a belief system than now. Every four year, during presidential election, a resurgence of political party identification occurs. The literature addressing political realignment highlights the 'moods' of the American society. In aligning with a political party, the voter is claiming

an ideology that is in line with their values. Joel Sibley (1991) discussed the political realignment history by identifying periods of time during which specific trends of political behavior are evident. The current 'era' would include voter cynicism and political de-alignment. In addition, Ladd (1991) suggested that realignment "involved the emergence of new social needs and breakthroughs in partisan responses to them, as well as demographic shifts that gradually transformed the electorate." This suggests that although this is a time of cynicism and a lack of adherence to a political party, the underlying belief systems remain in tact. Therefore, the political identification of a person is still important in relation to the culture war attitudes.

Class

Like the other intuitions discussed, class has a long historical component and is pervasive in its implications. Class can be described in several ways; simply based on economics, based on authority levels in one's job, status and prestige, or a combination of all of these. No matter how class is categorized, there is vast literature describing characteristics for each level of stratification. Kerbo (2003) discusses at length these varying characteristics and Kohn (as cited in Mortimer and Simmons, 1978), among many others, discusses the effects of socialization based on those specific characteristics (e.g., middle class members will socialize their children to be more creative than working class members).

Marx is perhaps the best known classical theorist to address the significance of class. In his view, class is related to the means of production and is the primary social institution. In the German Ideology (2001[1846]) he states "…this mode of

production…is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite part of expressing their life…as individuals express their life, so they are…the nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production" (p 42) Fantasia (1989) suggests that those who study class, class consciousness to be more precise, forget Marx's focus on the relational component of class consciousness. He suggests that the class members do not actively share a 'consciousness' until it is necessary, or until the tensions within the division of labor are intense enough to warrant an uprising.

Weber, on the other hand, says ideas are what push social change. In *The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, he identifies the nature of the economic system created and that the economic system is supported by ideas (religion in this case). In other works, he proposes that one's status is what provides the basis for solidarity. Either way, an understanding of where one fits in the stratification of society in relation to others has a group feel, meaning there is shared values and ideas that link people of similar circumstances together. Lukas (as cited in Ritzer, 2004) offers the "class consciousness in neither the sum nor the average of individual consciousness; rather, it is the property of a group of people who share a similar place in the productive system." (p. 134) This notion of a class having a 'property of a group' suggests that the similarities in the group are established and passed to the next generation of people occupying that class.

There appears to be considerable interplay between these three social institutions and their resulting belief systems. The attitudes of an individual can be explained by each of these systems just as reasonably. We are created, by a complex process of interacting

and understanding our environment through the process of socialization by these institutions which include our values, belief systems, and ways of making sense of our world. This blurring of the lines of the structures poses the question: which belief system has the greatest impact on the development of those beliefs?

The institutions that are used in this study are: religion, political identification, and social class. The attitudes used to look at the impact of socialization are those surrounding abortion, sexual attitudes, prayer in school, and race relations. I chose the variables because they are inherently based on values and for the most part are contested in the legal and political system, in that the behaviors of these attitudes are potentially legislated.

Theoretical Predictions

The argument between these can be reduced to three hypotheses:

Hypothesis One: Religious variables representing religious ideology and affiliation will explain the greater portion of culture war attitudes than political identification and class.

Hypothesis Two: Political ideology variables representing political views and affiliation will explain the greater portion of culture war attitudes than religious identification/ideology and class.

Hypothesis Three: Class affiliation and determinates of class will explain the greater portion of culture war attitudes than religious identification/ideology and political ideology.

Data

This analysis utilized the General Social Survey 1972 through 2002, a national survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center located in the University of Chicago. This survey is currently conducted every two years by randomly selecting adults across the nation. Data is made available through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). (GSS Codebook, 2006)

Dependent Variables

The dependent variables for this study were selected because they represent culture war issues. Each concept represented by the variables has been intensely debated in recent years. Abortion is a highly volatile subject, evidence of which is more than available in everyday life, even if only paying attention to bumper stickers on passing cars. Sexual attitudes are also passionately debated, especially the issues surrounding homosexuality. Legislation has been introduced in several states that will define the civil liberties of those members of society who are not monogamous married heterosexuals. Racial issues have been a concern since the beginning of the country. Attitudes regarding capital punishment are divided and a source for collective action (e.g. protests outside prisons on 'death' day). Prayer in schools seems to be advocated by those adhering to a more fundamental religion and adamantly opposed to by liberal and non religious groups. A recent parallel was the debate over requiring students to recite the pledge of allegiance with "one nation under God".

Variables were recoded to make the conservative response high in order to make interpretation consistent. Those variables with a yes or no response were recoded to make the conservative answer, either yes or no, 1 and all else 0. Responses for all dependent variables 'don't know', 'not applicable', or 'other' were recoded as missing. Those variables with multiple responses were recoded to make the conservative response high; e.g. (4) always wrong, (3) almost always wrong, (2) sometimes wrong, (1) never wrong (or not wrong at all) .

Independent variables

The independent variables were split into groups that serve as predictors or offer potential explanations for the resulting attitudes (dependent variables). These groups are religion, political identification, class, and control/region. The details for each variable can be found in Appendix 1.

Included in the religion group are *fundamental/liberal continuum*, *change in fundamentalism since age 16*, *strength of religion*, *change in religion since age 16*, *black Protestant*, *evangelical Protestant*, *Catholic*, *Jew*, *conservative other Protestant*, *liberal other Protestant*, *other Protestant*, *other religion*, *no religion* with *mainline Protestant* as the reference variable. The breakdown of the specific religions is based on Steeland et al's (2000) conception of religious differentiation, RELTRAD. The creation of this variable places religions with similar ideology, etc. in groupings that are more descriptive than those available through the standard GSS religion variable. Although the issues discussed by Steensland, et al, (2000) suggest reasonable problems with the variable measuring the fundamental liberal continuum, the self categorization of fundamental and

liberal is important to this study, as is the self determination if there is a change in levels of fundamentalism since age 16. A respondent's change in religion since age 16 was determined simply by comparing the identified religion versus the religion the respondent identified being at 16. The measurement of strength of a respondent's adherence to their chosen religious principles was considered to be very important.

Included in the political identification group are *political views*, *Republican*, *Democrat* with *Independent* as the reference variable. For the political identification predictor set, the measure for political views is based on self categorization and is presented in the GSS with conservative high. The potential limitation with this variable is that it does not indicate 'social' or 'economic' political views. The party identification is simply addressed by self categorization of Republican, Democrat, or Independent.

Included in the class group are *level of education*, *family education*, *families occupational prestige*, *change in prestige since age 16*, *lower class*, *working class*, *upper class* with *middle class* as the reference variable. In the class predictor set, income was not used. Although income is an element of defining class, it is one among several. Jackman (1979) states "the way Americans associate occupations with classes suggests that they are more sensitive to socioeconomic hierarchies based on occupational prestige, education, skill, income, job authority, and task discretion…" This study focuses on general class mind-sets and therefore, does not require a variable for each particular element of what would define class, that level of investigation should be conducted in a separate study. Therefore, I made a decision to not include income based on the general

knowledge that the variance in income levels between regions for the same occupation[2] as well as the difference in income levels across time created enough inconsistency to warrant not using it in this study. Income correlated with prestige (r=.396), education (r=.394), and class (r=.333) at a moderate level indicating it can be used in conjunction with the other variables measuring class. However, based on a more Weberian slant, and with the inconsistencies of income across time and region, I chose not to include income in this study as measure of class, relying on education, subjective class categorization, and prestige scores.

A family prestige score was created by selecting the higher prestige score between respondent and respondent's spouse. The parent's prestige score was created by selecting the higher prestige score between mother and father. The GSS had changed coding during these years from prestige in 1970 to prestige in 1980. I used the overlap in years 1988 to 1990 to make all occupational prestige scores current. The individual classes are based on subjective class self categorization. These specific class variables are not determined by economic factors, prestige scores, or any other measure, only through the respondent's self identification. The change in prestige since 16 compares the respondent's parents prestige and the family prestige level.

Included in the control group are *male*, *white*, *age*, *married*, *year in survey*, *change in region since age 16*, *Pacific*, *Mountain*, *East*, *South*, with *Midwest* as the reference variable. The specific region variables were derived from the GSS variable 'region'. I compressed the regions into a more classically conceived set of regions for

[2] An assistant manager in San Diego for Taco Bell will receive 26,000 to 34,000 as a base pay while the same position in Peoria will only receive 24,000 to 29,000 (Taco Bell, website). This is one small example of the differences in income levels that could pose a problem in this study.

both at current and at 16. In addition, I created a change in region since 16 to assess any differences that a change in region could create.

In this study, I found it important include a measure for the combined effects of groups that are represented as sets of dichotomous variables – i.e. religion, political party, and social class. Heise (1972) offers a "sheaf coefficient" to do so, and uses the differences in R^2 values to compute the significance level. For each model, I include the sheaf coefficient along with its components for comparison with other effects. I also included sheaf coefficients for region in the control and the composite models.

Another, perhaps somewhat unique, statistical matter in this study is the use of year. In order to measure the effect of time, the variable *year in survey* was used to detect any overall trends in time. For example, since the variables were recoded for each to have the conservative response high, if the year in survey had a consistent positive or negative beta, it can be thought that the trend for that attitude is either becoming more conservative or more liberal. In order to make sure this is an acceptable usage of this variable, *year in survey* was broken down into dummy variables, used in a regression, and compared to *year in survey* regression analysis (see Appendix Four for a sample). There did not appear to be enough of a difference in results to warrant eliminating *year in survey* in the way it is used from the models. The patterns of coefficients appear to support a linear assumption.

Methods

This study used both OLS regression and logistic regressions. For outcome variables that are continuous, OLS regression analysis was used. The outcome variables that are categorical were also analyzed with an OLS regression with the underlying

assumption that, although categorical, there is a normal distribution underlying the responses (Bollen, 1989). A logistic regression analysis was used for the four outcome variables that are dichotomous. The results from the logistic regression were standardized allowing for a consistent interpretation within the models; however, the results are model specific and should not be compared to the other logistic regression outcomes in this study. Ordinarily, the results for a logistic regression would have been converted into a percentage of contribution rather than a standardized coefficient.

Models

The models consist of six steps: correlation, control/region, religion, political identification, class, and composite. The correlation step involves the zero level correlations of each independent variable, including all predictor variables to the specific dependent variable. The second step is a regression of the dependent variable on the control independent variables. The third, fourth, and fifth steps are the regression of the dependent variables on religion, political identification, and class. The final step is a full regression of the dependent variable on all of the independent variables.

This process allows for each step in the process to have its own r-squared, thereby allowing for an individual assessment. The composite step allows for a comparison between each independent variable in relation to each other.

When reading these findings the term ‘negative’ will be used to indicate a negative beta while the term ‘positive’ will indicate a positive beta. These terms can be generally equated to conservative for positive and liberal for negative. These terms were used since they, positive and negative, are more accurate descriptions of the results than

the value laden terms conservative and liberal. Those terms will be used in the discussion section simply as a general descriptive, not to suggest extremes.

Abortion for reasons beyond one's control (abnowill)

This variable was constructed from three abortion variables that measure attitudes of a woman aborting for reasons beyond her control (birth defect, mother's health, and pregnancy as a result of rape). It is analyzed using an OLS regression. This variable is measuring attitudes against abortion.

Descriptive Table: Attitudes toward abortion beyond one's control

	Frequency	Valid Percent	Mean	Std. Deviation
None	23456	76.42	0.43	0.89
One yes	3334	10.86		
Two yes	1719	5.60		
Three yes	2185	7.12		

All variables correlated at the significant level except: *change in region*, *other religion*, *democrat*, and *change in prestige*. The highest correlation occurred between *strength of religion* and *level of fundamentalism*, both with r=.20. The second highest correlation (r=.16) was *political views*.

The explained variance for the control model is .02, indicating that the controls do not explain much of the variation regarding abortion for these reasons. Of the variables that were significant, *male* (β=-.02), *white* (β=-.07), *pacific* (β=-.06), and *east* (β=-.06) indicate a more tolerant relationship to this type of abortion while *age* (β=.04), *married* (β=.04), and *year in survey* (β=.04) indicated a less tolerant view of this type of abortion. The *sheaf coefficient of region* and *white*, both with a β=.07 and significant, contributes the most to this step in the model.

The addition of religion to the model contributes the highest R^2 =.10 of each of the types of intermediary variable sets. *Strength of religion* (β=.25) contributes the most

to the model. Second in contribution is the *sheaf coefficient for religion*, β=.21. With the introduction of religion, *south* became significant as did *mountain*. *Pacific* and *east* remained significant although did not contribute much to the model. Of the specific denominations, *black protestant* (β=.08), *evangelical protestant* (β=.15), *Catholic* (β=.19), *conservative other protestant* (β=.10) and *no religion* (β=.17) were significant.

When political identification is added, it provides little explanation for the attitudes against this type of abortion with an R^2= .04. The highest contributor with a β=.16 was *political views*, indicating that there is a relationship between self identification of conservative or liberal and attitudes toward this type of abortion, with the more conservative viewpoint exhibiting a less tolerant view of this type of abortion. The contribution to the model of identification to a particular political group was not significant, indicating no relationship between political identification to a specific political party and attitudes regarding this type of abortion. Of the control variables, *white* remained the largest contributor (β=-.08) to more tolerant views, with *east* (β=-.06) second highest contributor.

The addition of class contributes very little to the overall attitudes regarding this type of abortion with an $R^2$of .03. The highest contributor to this model was *education* (β=-.07) followed by control variables *white* and *east* (β=-.06 for both). *Lower class* (β=.03) and *working class* (β=.02) were significant, although did not contribute much. The *sheaf coefficient for class* (β=.04) was significant indicating an overall relationship between class and attitudes toward this type of abortion, but not necessarily a strong relationship.

The composite $R^2$is .12. Overall, this combination of variables does not offer a strong explanation of the attitudes toward this type of abortion. The highest contributor to the model was *strength of religion* (β=.24) with *sheaf coefficient of religion* next (β=.21). In this model, many variables were significant, although did not contribute much to the overall explanation. Aside from the denominational variables, *strength of religion* and *political views* contributes the most, both in the individual models and in the composite model.

Overall, *strength of religion* contributes the most (β=.24 composite, β=.25 religion model). The *sheaf coefficient for religion* contributes more than any of the specific denominations, with a β=.21, nearing that of *strength of religion*. This combination suggests that religion is the best predictor of attitudes toward this type of abortion of these models. The contribution of *white* reduced with introduction of the religion variable set, increased with the removal (political and class variable sets) and decreased again in the composite. *White* remained significant throughout the entire model. This might suggest some relationship with race and religion, when looking at the most obvious religion variables addressing race, *black protestant* (β=.08) and *evangelical protestant* (β=.15) and *Catholic* (β=.19) are significant. *Evangelical protestant* and *Being Catholic* are large contributors to the model and both are primarily white with 92%[3] of the Catholic population identifying self as white and 93% of the evangelical population identifying self as white. Throughout the step models, *year in survey* remained significant and positive indicating a change in attitudes over the years to a more conservative view.

[3] Percentage gained by crosstab of variables

Table One. OLS Regression of attitudes against abortion for reasons beyond one's control (birth defect, mother's health, rape) on religion, political identification, and class†

	Correlations		Control		Religion		Political		Class		Composite	
Male	-0.02	*	-0.02	*	0.00		-0.02	*	-0.01		0.00	
White	-0.07	**	-0.07	**	-0.03	**	-0.08	**	-0.06	**	-0.03	**
Age	0.04	**	0.04	**	0.03	**	0.02	*	0.01		0.01	
Married	0.03	**	0.04	**	0.03	**	0.03	**	0.04	**	0.02	**
Year of survey	0.04	**	0.04	**	0.04	**	0.03	**	0.06	**	0.04	**
Change in region since age 16	-0.01		-0.01		0.00		-0.01		0.00		0.01	
Pacific	-0.04	**	-0.06	**	-0.05	**	-0.05	**	-0.05	**	-0.04	**
Mountain	0.00		-0.01		-0.02	*	-0.01		0.00		-0.01	
East	-0.05	**	-0.06	**	-0.06	**	-0.06	**	-0.06	**	-0.06	**
South	0.04	**	0.00		-0.02	*	-0.01		-0.01		-0.02	**
Sheaf Region			0.07	**							0.06	**
Fundamental/liberal continuum	0.20	**			0.03						0.02	
Change in fundamentalism since 16	-0.04	**			0.00						-0.01	
Strength of religion	0.20	**			0.25	**					0.24	**
Change in religion since age 16	-0.04	**			0.02						0.02	*
Black Protestant	0.06	**			0.08	**					0.08	**
Evangelical Protestant	0.11	**			0.15	**					0.14	**
Catholic	0.09	**			0.19	**					0.19	**
Jew	-0.06	**			-0.01						0.01	
Conservative Other Protestant	0.09	**			0.10	**					0.10	**
Liberal Other Protestant	-0.03	**			-0.01						0.00	
Other Protestant	-0.03	**			0.01						0.01	
Other religion	0.00				0.00						0.00	
No religion	-0.10	**			0.17	**					0.18	**
Sheaf Religion					0.21	**					0.21	**
Political views	0.16	**					0.16	**			0.12	**
Republican	0.04	**					0.01				0.02	*
Democrat	-0.01						0.00				-0.02	*
Sheaf Party ID							0.01				0.03	
Level of education	-0.10	**							-0.07	**	-0.04	**
Family education	-0.08	**							-0.03	**	-0.02	
Families occupational prestige	-0.04	**							-0.01		0.00	
Change in prestige since age 16	-0.01								-0.01		0.00	
Lower class	0.04	**							0.03	**	0.03	**
Working class	0.05	**							0.02	**	0.02	**
Upper class	-0.02	**							-0.01		-0.01	
Sheaf Class									0.04	*	0.04	*
R-squared			0.02		0.10		0.04		0.03		0.12	

N=19253

† Results are standardized * significant at .05 level, ** significant at .01 level

Reference variables are: Region, Midwest; Religion, Mainline Protestant; Party ID, Independent; Class, Middle class.

Abortion for reasons in one's control (abwill)

This model is an OLS regression on attitudes against abortion for factors considered within a woman's control. This variable was developed with abpoor (abortion if poor), absingle (abortion if the woman is single), and abnomore (abortion if the woman wants no more children). The attitudes toward abortion that are thought to be controllable are considered different than those factors that are not within the woman's control.

Descriptive Table: Attitudes toward abortion considered within one's control

	Frequency	Valid Percent	Mean	Std. Deviation
None	11630	38.07	1.62	1.38
One yes	2231	7.30		
Two yes	2827	9.25		
Three yes	13864	45.38		

The majority of variables correlated at a significant level except *mountain*, *other religion*, and *democrat*. The variables that correlated the highest were *fundamental/liberal continuum* (r=.28), *strength of religion* (r=.26), *political views* (r=.20) and *level of education* (r=-.20).

The R^2 for the control step is .04. This indicates that the control variables do not explain much of attitudes toward this type of abortion. Of the control variables, *sheaf coefficient of region* is significant and contributes the most to the model (β=.15). This indicates a considerable variance in attitudes between regions. Second to this is *east* (β=-.12) and *pacific* (β=-.11). Significant variables, although not high contributors are *male*, *white*, *age*, *married*, *year in survey*, and *change in region*.

The addition of religion results in the highest r squared (.15) of the intermediate variables. The highest contributor is *strength of religion* (β=.22), second is the *sheaf*

coefficient of religion (β=.18). The regions of *pacific* and *east* (both β=-.09) remain significant. Also significant is *fundamental/liberal continuum* (β=.11).

When political identification is added the R^2 is .08, suggesting that this combination of variables does not offer much to the overall explanation of attitudes toward this type of abortion. The highest contributor in this model was *political views* (β=.19) and although both *republican* and *democrat* were significant they contribute little (both β=.03). The second highest contributors to this step are *pacific* and *east* (both β=.11).

The R^2 when class is introduced is .09, indicating that class variables do not provide much explanation for attitudes toward this type of abortion. The highest contributor to this model is *education* (β=-.14). The second highest is *east* (β=-.11). In this step, of the control variables, *age* lost significance *white* decreased (β=.05 to .02) and *year of survey* increased (β=.05 to .10). The other variables in the class step, except *father's occupational prestige*, were significant but did not contribute a great deal.

The composite of all variables results in an R^2 is .19. This indicates that this combination of variables offers some explanation toward the attitudes for this type of abortion. The highest contributor is *strength of religion* (β=.22) with the *sheaf coefficient of religion* the second highest (β=.16). Next in line is *Catholic* (β=.14) followed by *political views* (β=.12) *education* (β=-.11) and *sheaf coefficient of region* (β=.10). In this model *male* lost significance as did *married* (as well as went from positive to negative).

Overall, y*ear of survey* increased with the introduction of the class variables and then decreased again in the composite model (β=.05 to β=.10 to β=.08). This increase in the importance of year indicates that as time goes by the population seems to be become

more conservative. There was not a large amount of variance between the religious variables in the religion model or class model and the composite model. There was some change in the control and political models. *Democrat* lost significance and *male* lost significance, *married* lost significance and changed direction. The *sheaf coefficient of region* remained significant but decreased from β=.15 to .10 with the addition of the other variables.

Table Two. OLS Regression of attitudes against abortion for reasons in one's control (poor, wants no more children, single) on religion, political identification, and class†

	Correlations		Control		Religion		Political		Class		Composite	
Male	-0.03	**	-0.03	**	0.00		-0.03	**	-0.03	**	0.00	
White	-0.05	**	-0.05	**	-0.03	**	-0.06	**	-0.02	**	-0.03	**
Age	0.07	**	0.07	**	0.05	**	0.04	**	0.01		-0.01	
Married	0.06	**	0.07	**	0.04	**	0.05	**	0.07	**	0.04	**
Year of survey	0.05	**	0.05	**	0.06	**	0.05	**	0.10	**	0.08	**
Change in region since age 16	-0.07	**	-0.07	**	-0.05	**	-0.07	**	-0.04	**	-0.03	**
Pacific	-0.11	**	-0.11	**	-0.09	**	-0.11	**	-0.10	**	-0.08	**
Mountain	0.00		-0.01		-0.01		-0.01		0.00		-0.01	
East	-0.10	**	-0.12	**	-0.09	**	-0.11	**	-0.11	**	-0.09	**
South	0.10	**	0.02		-0.01		0.00		0.01		-0.01	
Sheaf Region			0.15	**							0.10	**
Fundamental/liberal continuum	0.28	**			0.11	**					0.08	**
Change in fundamentalism since 16	-0.04	**			0.01						0.01	
Strength of religion	0.26	**			0.22	**					0.22	**
Change in religion since age 16	-0.06	**			0.02						0.02	*
Black Protestant	0.05	**			0.02						0.01	
Evangelical Protestant	0.18	**			0.11	**					0.09	**
Catholic	0.08	**			0.14	**					0.14	**
Jew	-0.14	**			-0.08	**					-0.05	**
Conservative Other Protestant	0.07	**			0.06	**					0.05	**
Liberal Other Protestant	-0.06	**			-0.04	**					-0.02	**
Other Protestant	-0.03	**			-0.01						-0.01	
Other religion	-0.01				0.00						0.00	
No religion	-0.18	**			0.08	**					0.09	**
Sheaf Religion					0.18	**					0.16	**
Political views	0.20	**					0.19	**			0.12	**
Republican	0.05	**					0.03	**			0.03	**
Democrat	0.00						0.03	**			0.01	
Sheaf Party ID							0.03				0.03	
Level of education	-0.20	**							-0.14	**	-0.11	**
Family education	-0.16	**							-0.08	**	-0.06	**
Families occupational prestige	-0.08	**							-0.02		-0.02	
Change in prestige since age 16	-0.02	**							-0.02	*	-0.02	*
Lower class	0.04	**							0.02	**	0.02	**
Working class	0.10	**							0.04	**	0.03	**
Upper class	-0.05	**							-0.02	*	-0.01	
Sheaf Class									0.04	*	0.04	*
R-squared			0.04		0.15		0.08		0.09		0.19	

N=19130

† Results are standardized * significant at .05 level, ** significant at .01 level

Reference variables are: Region, Midwest; Religion, Mainline Protestant; Party ID, Independent; Class, Middle class.

Capital punishment (cappun)

This model is a logistic regression for attitudes in favor of capital punishment. This variable measures attitudes in favor of capital punishment.

Descriptive Table: Attitudes regarding capital punishment

	Frequency	Valid Percent	Mean	Std. Deviation
Disapprove	9290	25.94	0.74	0.44
Approve	26527	74.06		

Capital punishment correlated significantly with all variables except *male*, *other religion*, and *republican*. The highest correlation (r=.18) was *white*.

The control R^2 is .05. Only *east* and *married* are not significant. The highest contributor to this model is *white* (β=.81) second is *male* (β=.52). The *sheaf coefficient of region* is significant and contributes the third highest β (.32) to the model. This suggests that being white is more important to attitudes toward capital punishment than other factors. There is a relatively large variance between regions regarding capital punishment, with *south* and *mountain* both being more conservative in viewpoints than the other regions.

When religion is introduced, the R^2 is .05. The highest contributor is *white* (β=.70) with *sheaf coefficient of religion* (β=.63) second, followed by *male* (β=.54) and *strength of religion* (β=.36). Interestingly, the specific religions that were more liberal in view points were not significant, while each of those with a conservative view point are significant. With the *sheaf coefficient of religion* significant coupled with the variations of the specific religions indicates a major difference between the specific religions in view points regarding capital punishment.

The introduction of political identification results an R^2 of .07, the highest of the predictor variables in this model. *White* (β=.72) is the highest contributor followed by *political views* (β=.61). The *sheaf coefficient for party id* (β=.53), *male* (β=.52) and *republican* (β=.42) each contribute to this step much more than the other significant variables. The significance of the *sheaf coefficient of party id* and the contribution and significance of *republican*, it is clear there is a substantial difference between the specific political parties regarding capital punishment.

The addition of class resulted an R^2 of .05. The highest contributor is white (β=.86) second is male (β=.53). These contribute relativity more than the next set of significant variables, *year in survey* (β=.36), *education* (β=-.35) and *mountain* (β=.28). Overall, this step does not provide much of an explanation to the overall attitudes in favor of capital punishment. The significance of year in survey in this step indicates a general trend of favor for capital punishment in relation to class, in spite of the level of education in the US increasing.

The composite R^2 is .08. This low R^2 indicates that this set of variables contributes little to the overall explanation of attitudes in favor of capital punishment. *White* contributes the most (β=.65) in this model again followed by *political views* (β=.57) *male* (β=.52). The *sheaf coefficient of party identification* (β=.55) was the highest sheaf coefficient in this model, followed by the *sheaf coefficient of religion* (β=.51), *sheaf coefficient of region* (β=.29), and finally *sheaf coefficient of class* (β=.15).

Overall, *white* and *male* are consistently high contributors, with *white* being the highest throughout all the steps. In investigating further, I ran a simple crosstab to see the connection between political identification and white. Of those who self identified as

white, 26% also identified as conservative as opposed to the 6% of those identifying self as non white and conservative. In addition, 78% of white respondents to this question are in favor of the death penalty, while only 61% of non white respondents are in favor. Variation between highest contributors came only in the political step and composite steps. Although *white* remained the highest, what followed was *political identification* instead of *male* or any of the religion variables. *Age* did not become significant until the composite step, where it also increased in its contribution. The introduction of the class set of variables generally increased the contribution of the control variables. The only exception was *change in region*, which decreased in contribution and then stayed at that level in the composite model. A *change in region* indicates a more liberal view throughout the model. *Male* did not show a significant relationship with capital punishment in a correlation, however, all the βs were significant and often contributes heavily to the models. The change in the class set of variables from the class step to the composite step changed the contribution of *level of education* (decreased), *families occupational prestige* (increased), and *working class* (increased). *Lower class* lost significance.

Table Three.Logistic Regression on attitudes in favor of capital punishment on religion, political identification, and class†

	Correlations		*Control*		*Religion*		*Political*		*Class*		*Composite*	
Male	0.10		*0.52*	**	*0.54*	**	*0.52*	**	*0.53*	**	*0.52*	**
White	0.18	**	*0.81*	**	*0.70*	**	*0.72*	**	*0.86*	**	*0.65*	**
Age	0.01	**	*0.02*		*0.02*		*-0.04*		*-0.05*		*-0.10*	*
Married	0.07	**	*0.31*	**	*0.29*	**	*0.25*	**	*0.30*	**	*0.23*	**
Year of survey	0.03	**	*0.28*	**	*0.29*	**	*0.24*	**	*0.36*	**	*0.31*	**
Change in region since age 16	-0.04	**	*-0.22*	**	*-0.20*	**	*-0.22*	**	*-0.17*	**	*-0.16*	**
Pacific	0.00	**	*0.13*	**	*0.16*	**	*0.16*	**	*0.16*	**	*0.19*	**
Mountain	0.04	**	*0.27*	**	*0.25*	**	*0.26*	**	*0.28*	**	*0.26*	**
East	-0.03	**	*-0.02*		*0.02*		*0.00*		*-0.01*		*0.02*	
South	0.01	**	*0.23*	**	*0.20*	**	*0.19*	**	*0.21*	**	*0.18*	**
Sheaf Region			*0.32*	**							*0.29*	**
Fundamental/liberal continuum	0.00	**			*-0.02*						*-0.07*	
Change in fundamentalism since 16	-0.01	**			*-0.08*						*-0.11*	*
Strength of religion	-0.01	**			*-0.36*	**					*-0.41*	**
Change in religion since age 16	-0.01	**			*-0.04*						*-0.02*	
Black Protestant	-0.15	**			*-0.20*	**					*-0.17*	**
Evangelical Protestant	0.06	**			*0.05*						*-0.01*	
Catholic	0.00	**			*-0.18*	**					*-0.13*	*
Jew	-0.01	**			*-0.15*	**					*-0.04*	
Conservative Other Protestant	0.03	**			*0.09*						*0.06*	
Liberal Other Protestant	-0.04	**			*-0.20*	**					*-0.15*	**
Other Protestant	0.01	**			*0.00*						*0.00*	
Other religion	0.00				*0.00*						*0.01*	
No religion	-0.04	**			*-0.56*	**					*-0.49*	**
Sheaf Religion					*0.63*	**					*0.51*	**
Political views	0.14	**					*0.61*	**			*0.57*	**
Republican	0.15						*0.42*	**			*0.47*	**
Democrat	-0.14	**					*-0.13*	*			*-0.11*	
Sheaf Party ID							*0.53*	*			*0.55*	*
Level of education	-0.03	**							*-0.35*	**	*-0.30*	**
Family education	0.00	**							*0.03*		*0.02*	
Families occupational prestige	-0.01	**							*-0.08*		*-0.13*	**
Change in prestige since age 16	0.02	**							*0.06*		*0.04*	
Lower class	-0.03	**							*-0.08*	*	*-0.07*	
Working class	0.02	**							*0.09*	*	*0.12*	**
Upper class	0.00	**							*0.06*		*0.04*	
Sheaf Class									*0.14*		*0.15*	
R-squared			*0.05*		*0.05*		*0.07*		*0.05*		*0.08*	

N=24656

† Results are standardized * significant at .05 level, ** significant at .01 level

Reference variables are: Region, Midwest; Religion, Mainline Protestant; Party ID, Independent; Class, Middle class.

Prayer in Schools (rprayer)

This analysis was conducted though a logistic regression.[4] This variable measures attitudes of people who disapprove of a legal statement that states that "no state may require the reading of the Lords Prayer or Bible verses in school" (GSS question 119A). When interpreting this data, the positive betas will be the more conservative or pro-prayer in schools stance while the negative betas will indicate a more separatist's stance. This is the best measure available in the GSS to determine attitudes regarding prayer in school.

Descriptive Table: Attitudes regarding prayer in schools

	Frequency	Valid Percent	Mean	Std. Deviation
Approve	8660	39.74	0.60	0.49
Disapprove	13129	60.26		

The majority of variables correlate at a significant level, with the expectation of *Catholic*, *Other protestant*, *Other religion*, *Democrat* and *Change in prestige*. The highest correlation is *education* (r=-.23) followed closely by *fundamental/liberal continuum* (r=.22). Interestingly, *family education* (r=-.21) was followed very closely by *strength of religion* (r=.20).

In the control step, *age* has the greatest contribution (β=.76) with the *sheaf coefficient of region* second (β=.62) followed by *south* (β=.49) and *white* (β=-.44). This indicates a variation in attitude between regions.

The introduction of religion resulted an R^2 of .12. This explains 12% of the variance regarding attitudes toward this variable. Of the betas, the *sheaf coefficient of religion* was the greatest (β=.80) with *age* (β=.71) second. *South* continued to be a high contributor with a β=.41. *Fundamental/liberal continuum* (β=.35) and *strength of religion*

[4] The results are standardized and are used for comparison in this model only, not to be used in cross model comparison.

(β=.31) were close in their contribution. Of the specific religions, being *Jewish* contributes the most (β=-.54) followed by *liberal other Protestant* β=-.29. In this step, the variation between religions is significant with the results of each religion showing a distinction between conservative views and liberal views.

With the introduction of political identification, the R^2 is .08 which is much lower than the religion r-squared. The highest contributor was *age* (β=.69) followed by *political views* (β=.53). *Republican* was significant here (β=.22) but *Democrat* was not. Of the remaining control variables, *white* (β=-.48) and *south* (β=.45) contribute relatively heavily.

When class was introduced, the R^2 became .10, which is greater then the political set, but not as great as the when religion was introduced. The highest contributor is *age* (β=.58) followed closely by *education* (β=-.51). Each of the specific classes are significant with *working class* contributing the most (β=.12). For the class set, *level of education* is by far the greatest contributor.

The composite R^2 is .15, which explains 15% of the variance in attitude toward this variable. By far, *the sheaf coefficient of religion* contributes the most (β=.70). This indicates that there is a variance between the religious groups is great, which suggests that not all religions are in favor of a requirement for prayer in schools. This was followed by *age* (β=.52), being *Jewish* (β=.-.47), *education* (β=-.42). Other relatively large contributors are *political views* (β=.36), *south* (β=.39) *strength of religion* (β=.33), and being *white* (β=-.29).

Across the models, the effects of *age* steadily declines. *Male* becomes less significant and reduces in the amount of contribution with the introduction of the

religious variables. The greatest contributor to this model is the *sheaf coefficient of religion* when it was introduced (β=.80 and in the composite (β=.70). This indicates that there is significant variance between religions regarding this attitude. In addition, the r-squareds were higher when controlling for religion, supporting the link between religion and attitudes toward prayer in school. *Year in survey* fell out of significance and reduced its contribution to the model drastically with the introduction of the class set of variables, since *education* was the highest contributor in this set, it may be said that this drop has some connection to education, perhaps due to the increase in the education levels in the US.

Table four. Logistic Regression on attitudes in favor of prayer in school on religion, political identification, and class†

	Correlations		Control		Religion		Political		Class		Composite	
Male	-0.04	**	*-0.17*	**	*-0.08*	*	*-0.18*	**	*-0.17*	**	*-0.09*	*
White	-0.09	**	*-0.44*	**	*-0.31*	**	*-0.48*	**	*-0.32*	**	*-0.29*	**
Age	0.17	**	*0.76*	**	*0.71*	**	*0.69*	**	*0.58*	**	*0.52*	**
Married	0.05	**	*0.22*	**	*0.15*	**	*0.16*	**	*0.28*	**	*0.17*	**
Year of survey	-0.04	**	*-0.22*	**	*-0.16*	**	*-0.24*	**	*-0.04*		*-0.05*	
Change in region since age 16	-0.05	**	*-0.27*	**	*-0.20*	**	*-0.27*	**	*-0.15*	**	*-0.11*	**
Pacific	-0.10	**	*-0.25*	**	*-0.15*	**	*-0.26*	**	*-0.21*	**	*-0.13*	**
Mountain	-0.05	**	*-0.07*		*-0.03*		*-0.08*	*	*-0.05*		*-0.01*	
East	-0.02	*	*0.01*		*0.14*	**	*0.03*		*0.04*		*0.15*	**
South	0.14	**	*0.49*	**	*0.41*	**	*0.45*	**	*0.47*	**	*0.39*	**
Sheaf Region			*0.62*	**							*0.43*	**
Fundamental/liberal continuum	0.22	**			*0.35*	**					*0.21*	*
Change in fundamentalism since 16	-0.03	**			*0.13*	*					*0.12*	*
Strength of religion	0.20	**			*0.31*	**					*0.33*	**
Change in religion since age 16	-0.07	**			*-0.05*						*-0.02*	
Black Protestant	0.10	**			*0.10*						*0.09*	
Evangelical Protestant	0.15	**			*0.27*	**					*0.19*	*
Catholic	0.01				*0.10*						*0.09*	
Jew	-0.13	**			*-0.54*	**					*-0.47*	**
Conservative Other Protestant	-0.03	**			*-0.18*	**					*-0.20*	**
Liberal Other Protestant	-0.06	**			*-0.29*	**					*-0.24*	**
Other Protestant	-0.02				*-0.07*						*-0.09*	*
Other religion	0.00				*0.03*						*0.04*	
No religion	-0.20	**			*-0.29*	**					*-0.29*	**
Sheaf Religion					*0.80*	**					*0.70*	**
Political views	0.15	**					*0.53*	**			*0.36*	**
Republican	0.06	**					*0.22*	**			*0.25*	**
Democrat	0.01						*0.06*				*-0.05*	
Sheaf Party ID							*0.20*				*0.27*	*
Level of education	-0.23	**							*-0.51*	**	*-0.42*	**
Family education	-0.21	**							*-0.30*	**	*-0.26*	**
Families occupational prestige	-0.12	**							*-0.25*	**	*-0.28*	**
Change in prestige since age 16	0.01								*-0.18*	**	*-0.19*	**
Lower class	0.05	**							*0.10*	*	*0.11*	*
Working class	0.07	**							*0.12*	**	*0.13*	**
Upper class	-0.05	**							*-0.09*	*	*-0.05*	
Sheaf Class									*0.18*		*0.17*	
R-squared			0.07		0.12		0.08		0.10		0.15	

N=14671

† Results are standardized * significant at .05 level, ** significant at .01 level

Reference variables are: Region, Midwest; Religion, Mainline Protestant; Party ID, Independent; Class, Middle class.

Interracial marriage (rracmar)

This is a logistic regression analysis of attitudes toward interracial marriage. This variable measures the attitude of those in favor of laws banning interracial marriage. A positive beta (β) suggests an attitude opposed to interracial marriage.

Descriptive Table: Attitudes regarding interracial marriage

	Frequency	Valid Percent	Mean	Std. Deviation
No	21480	76.59	0.23	0.42
Yes	6564	23.41		

All variables except *male*, *other religion*, and *republican* correlate with attitudes against interracial marriage. *Level of education* (r=-.35) and *age* (r=.27) correlated the highest.

The R^2 for the control step is .16. This suggests that region, gender, marital status, age and year of survey alone account for a relatively large amount of the variations in attitudes toward interracial marriage. Of the regions, only *south* has a positive beta consistently throughout the model and contributes heavily to this step and all others. In order, *age* (β=1.81) *sheaf coefficient of region* (β=1.42), *year of survey* (-1.36) and *south* (β=1.07) contributes the most to this model. This indicates that the older a respondent is the less tolerant they are to interracial marriage; however, the general trend in society as indicated with *year of survey*, is toward a more accepting view of interracial marriage. Since both *sheaf coefficient of region* and *south* were high contributors and significant, it is evident that region is a factor in the attitudes toward interracial marriage.

With the introduction of religion, the R^2 is .18. *Age* was the largest contributor (β=1.83) followed by *year in survey* (β=-1.37), *sheaf coefficient of religion* (β=1.33), and *south* (β=.87). The *fundamental/liberal continuum* contributes more than any specific

religion, indicating it is the self identification of fundamentalism that is more important than the specific type of religion practiced. *Age* and *year in survey* continued to be high contributors, higher than any of the specific religions, although *sheaf coefficient of religion* is high.

With the introduction of political identification the R^2 is .17, slightly lower than the religion. The largest contributor is *age* (β=1.75) followed by *year in survey* (β=-1.35), *south* (β=1.04), all control variables, not political identification variables. Of the variables used to measure political socialization *political views* (β=.54) and *republican* (β=-.16) were significant although in relation to the control variables, do not contribute a great deal to the overall model. *Republican* is not significant in the correlation model, but became significant in this regression and contributes more than *democrat*, which was significant in the correlation model and not in this regression. This would suggest the relationship between *republican*, *democrat*, and attitudes regarding interracial marriage are related to factors other than just adherence to a specific political party.

With the introduction of class, the R^2 is .22. This is the highest of the predictor variables which may be solely due to the inclusion of *education* in the class variable set. *Education* is the highest contributor to this step (β=-1.61). The other significant variables in this step are related to education (*family education, father's occupational prestige,* and *change in prestige*), of these, *family education* (β=-.57) contributes the second highest. The actual class variables are not significant. In this model, *white* increases in its contribution from the control (β=.95 to β=1.30). *Age* (β=1.33) and *year in survey* (β=-1.02) also contribute heavily to this step.

The composite model R^2 is .24, which means that the composite set of variables explains 24% of the variance in attitudes toward this variable. This is relatively high. In order of contribution, *education* (β=-1.57), *sheaf coefficient of religion* (β=1.30) *age* (β=1.28) *sheaf coefficient of region* (β=1.11) *white* (β=1.03) and *year in survey* (β=-1.02) all contributes heavily to this model. In addition to the respondent's *level of education*, *family education*, and *prestige* which is partially based on an educational component are significant and moderate contributors to the overall model. This would indicate that education is the most important factor in predicting and/or explaining attitudes toward interracial marriage. The individual religions contribute about the same as the other variables measuring education. The *sheaf coefficient of religion* was second in strength indicating that a variation between religions regarding this attitude exists. *Change in religion* became significant in the composite model and increased in its contribution (β=.06 to β=.19) while the *fundamental/liberal continuum* reduces in contribution (β=.54 and highly significant to β=.26 and significant at the .05 level).

Across the model, *level of education* is the largest contributor. *South* decreases its contribution when the religion variables are included in both the religion and composite model. *East* decreases when controlling for religion in the religion step and loses significance in the composite. *White* increases in its contribution with the addition of the predictor variables (β=.95 in control, β=1.30 in class set, and β=1.03 in composite), especially the class set and in the composite. This would indicate that when controlling for class (most specifically, education), there is a relationship between race of the respondent and the respondent's level of education. *Age* is a large contributor consistently and of the control variables, although with the introduction of education, it reduces in

rank of contribution. In both the religion and the composite, *south*, although remaining significant, decreased in contribution to models and increased when not controlling for religion. This suggests that in this matter, religion and region have a relationship. The r-squared jumped from the mid teens to the lower twenties with the inclusion of *education*.

Table Five. Logistic Regression of attitude against interracial marriage on religion, political identification, class†

	Correlations		Control		Religion		Political		Class		Composite	
Male	-0.01		*-0.06*		*-0.02*		*-0.06*		*-0.07*		*-0.02*	
White	0.11	**	*0.95*	**	*0.82*	**	*0.99*	**	*1.30*	**	*1.03*	**
Age	0.27	**	*1.81*	**	*1.83*	**	*1.75*	**	*1.33*	**	*1.28*	**
Married	0.04	**	*-0.01*		*-0.07*		*-0.03*		*0.10*		*0.03*	
Year of survey	-0.19	**	*-1.36*	**	*-1.37*	**	*-1.35*	**	*-1.02*	**	*-1.02*	**
Change in region since age 16	-0.07	**	*-0.55*	**	*-0.44*	**	*-0.53*	**	*-0.32*	**	*-0.25*	**
Pacific	-0.11	**	*-0.49*	**	*-0.47*	**	*-0.49*	**	*-0.40*	**	*-0.37*	**
Mountain	-0.05	**	*-0.15*	*	*-0.15*	*	*-0.15*	*	*-0.08*		*-0.08*	
East	-0.07	**	*-0.33*	**	*-0.14*	*	*-0.32*	**	*-0.31*	**	*-0.13*	
South	0.18	**	*1.07*	**	*0.87*	**	*1.04*	**	*1.08*	**	*0.90*	**
Sheaf Region			*1.42*	**							*1.11*	**
Fundamental/liberal continuum	0.15	**			*0.54*	**					*0.26*	*
Change in fundamentalism since 16	-0.03	**			*-0.20*	**					*-0.18*	*
Strength of religion	0.11	**			*0.06*						*0.19*	*
Change in religion since age 16	-0.04	**			*-0.04*						*-0.01*	
Black Protestant	-0.07	**			*-0.29*	**					*-0.45*	**
Evangelical Protestant	0.19	**			*0.31*	**					*0.17*	
Catholic	-0.09	**			*-0.35*	**					*-0.54*	**
Jew	-0.05	**			*-0.43*	**					*-0.35*	**
Conservative Other Protestant	-0.02	**			*-0.14*	*					*-0.15*	*
Liberal Other Protestant	-0.03	**			*-0.24*	*					*-0.14*	
Other Protestant	-0.03	**			*-0.07*						*-0.13*	*
Other religion	-0.01				*-1.09*						*-1.04*	
No religion	-0.10	**			*-0.05*						*-0.11*	
Sheaf Religion					*1.33*	**					*1.30*	**
Political views	0.11	**					*0.54*	**			*0.35*	**
Republican	-0.01						*-0.16*	*			*0.07*	
Democrat	0.03	**					*0.14*				*0.16*	
Sheaf Party ID							*0.28*				*0.11*	
Level of education	-0.35	**							*-1.61*	**	*-1.57*	**
Family education	-0.25	**							*-0.57*	**	*-0.53*	**
Families occupational prestige	-0.08	**							*-0.28*	**	*-0.30*	**
Change in prestige since age 16	-0.04	**							*-0.50*	**	*-0.50*	**
Lower class	0.03	**							*0.04*		*0.03*	
Working class	0.05	**							*0.02*		*-0.02*	
Upper class	-0.02	**							*0.01*		*0.03*	
Sheaf Class									*0.04*		*0.05*	
R-squared			0.16		0.18		0.17		0.22		0.24	

N=17993

† Results are standardized * significant at .05 level, ** significant at .01 level

Reference variables are: Region, Midwest; Religion, Mainline Protestant; Party ID, Independent; Class, Middle class.

Teaching sex education in school[5] (rsexed)

This is a logistic regression model of attitudes toward teaching sex education in school. This variable is measuring attitudes opposed to teaching sex education in schools. A percentage of the population opposed is included in the appendices.

Descriptive Table: Attitudes regarding teaching sex education in school

	Frequency	Valid Percent	Mean	Std. Deviation
Not oppose	19987	85.35	0.15	0.35
Oppose	3431	14.65		

The highest correlation is *age* (r=.21) followed by *education* (r=.20) and *age* (r=.21), *political views* (r=.17) and *fundamental/liberal continuum* (r=.15).

The r-squared is .05 for the controls, indicating that this set of variables offers very little to the overall explanation of attitudes against teaching sex education in schools. The largest contributor is *age* (β=1.24). This is followed by *year of survey* (β=-.46) and *sheaf coefficient of region* (β=.45). Each of the specific regions are significant with the exception of *pacific* and of the specific regions, *south* (β=.35) is the highest contributor.

With the introduction of religion, the R^2 is .08, which, although the highest of the predictor variable sets, does little to explain attitudes toward sex education. The highest contributor to this step is *age* (β=1.22) followed by *sheaf coefficient of religion* (β=.87). Of the specific religions, *evangelical protestant* contributes the most (β=.80). *Strength of religion* (β=.78) is next, followed by *year in survey* (β=-.49).

With the introduction of political identification, the R^2 is .07, explaining very little of the variance of attitudes toward this variable. *White* became significant and increased in this step with an insignificant β=-.08 in the control step to a highly

[5] The percentage of population of people against teaching sex education in school range from 10% to 21%, see appendix 1. This may offer some reason for the r-squared to be low.

significant β=-.15 in this step. The highest contributor is *age* (β=1.17) followed by *political views* (β=.84) and *year in survey* (β=-.52). *Republican* was significant, and relative to this step, contributes moderately (β=.24), however, the *sheaf coefficient of party id* was not significant. This indicates that there is a component in the ideology of *republican* that is more opposed to teaching sex education in schools than other political identifications.

With the introduction of class, the R^2 is .07, the same as political views. *Education* is the highest contributor (β=-.72) among the class set of variables, with *age* in the control set the only higher contributor (β=1.00). In this step, those two variables are the major contributors to the attitudes toward teaching sex education, since the next highest contributor is *south* (β=.30) and *year in survey* (β=-.28), both of which have a relatively low level of contribution in comparison to *education* and *age*.

The composite R^2 .11, which suggests this set of predictors offer little to explain the attitudes toward teaching sex education in school. *Age* (β=.97) contributes the most to this model, followed by *strength of religion* (β=.79). *Evangelical protestant* (β=.71), *political views* (β=.69) and *education* (β=.68) followed in strength of contribution.

Across the model, religion had an impact on the region variables. When religion was introduced both in the religion step and in the composite model, the specific regions reduced and changed in levels of significance. Perhaps the most dramatic was the change in *sheaf coefficient of region*, which lost significance and dramatically decreased in the level of contribution. The *fundamental/liberal continuum* that correlated significantly and relatively high for this model, lost significance in the religion step and changed direction in the composite step. In addition, *pacific* correlated, although not strongly, but was not

significant in any of the steps. While the *sheaf coefficient of party id* gained significance and increased heavily on in contribution, the *sheaf coefficient of class* lost significance in the composite model. *Year in survey* decreased in contribution (β=-0.46 to -.28) with the introduction of the class variables. *Male* increases in contribution only with the inclusion of the religious variables, it begins with a β of .12 to a β of .23 in the religious set and a β of .21 in the composite. This may indicate that in this situation, there is a relationship between male and religion. Overall, this model suggests that the older a person and the stronger their connection to religion is, the less tolerant of teaching sex education in schools they are.

Table Six. Logistic Regression of attitudes against teaching sex education in school on religion, political identification, and class†

	Correlations		Control		Religion		Political		Class		Composite	
Male	0.02	*	*0.12*	*	*0.23*	**	*0.12*	*	*0.11*	*	*0.21*	**
White	0.00		*-0.08*		*-0.03*		*-0.15*	**	*0.07*		*-0.03*	
Age	0.21	**	*1.24*	**	*1.22*	**	*1.17*	**	*1.00*	**	*0.97*	**
Married	0.03	**	*0.09*		*0.02*		*0.04*		*0.18*	**	*0.08*	
Year of survey	-0.07	**	*-0.46*	**	*-0.49*	**	*-0.52*	**	*-0.28*	**	*-0.41*	**
Change in region since age 16	0.01		*-0.04*		*0.03*		*-0.05*		*0.07*		*0.10*	
Pacific	-0.03	**	*-0.07*		*-0.06*		*-0.08*		*-0.02*		*-0.04*	
Mountain	0.01		*0.15*	**	*0.09*		*0.14*	**	*0.18*	**	*0.13*	*
East	-0.04	**	*-0.14*	*	*-0.01*		*-0.11*		*-0.10*		*-0.01*	
South	0.07	**	*0.35*	**	*0.17*	**	*0.31*	**	*0.30*	**	*0.14*	*
Sheaf Region			*0.45*	**							*0.14*	
Fundamental/liberal continuum	0.15	**			*0.10*						*-0.05*	
Change in fundamentalism since 16	-0.01				*-0.11*						*-0.13*	
Strength of religion	0.13	**			*0.78*	**					*0.79*	**
Change in religion since age 16	-0.01				*0.13*						*0.17*	*
Black Protestant	0.02	*			*0.19*	*					*0.17*	
Evangelical Protestant	0.14	**			*0.80*	**					*0.71*	**
Catholic	-0.05	**			*0.23*	**					*0.26*	**
Jew	-0.04	**			*-0.22*	**					*-0.10*	
Conservative Other Protestant	0.05	**			*0.33*	**					*0.31*	**
Liberal Other Protestant	-0.02	**			*-0.23*						*-0.14*	
Other Protestant	-0.01				*0.11*						*0.07*	
Other religion	0.00				*0.02*						*0.05*	
No religion	-0.08	**			*0.45*	**					*0.44*	**
Sheaf Religion					*0.87*	**					*0.66*	**
Political views	0.17	**					*0.84*	**			*0.69*	**
Republican	0.07	**					*0.24*	**			*0.30*	**
Democrat	-0.02	**					*-0.06*				*-0.18*	**
Sheaf Party ID							*0.27*				*0.43*	*
Level of education	-0.20	**							*-0.72*	**	*-0.68*	**
Family education	-0.14	**							*-0.22*	**	*-0.17*	*
Families occupational prestige	-0.03	**							*-0.01*		*-0.08*	
Change in prestige since age 16	-0.03	**							*-0.21*	**	*-0.23*	**
Lower class	0.07	**							*0.24*	**	*0.23*	**
Working class	0.02	**							*0.13*	*	*0.15*	**
Upper class	-0.01								*0.05*		*0.04*	
Sheaf Class									*0.25*	*	*0.26*	
R-squared			0.05		0.08		0.07		0.07		0.11	

N=14671

† Results are standardized * significant at .05 level, ** significant at .01 level

Reference variables are: Region, Midwest; Religion, Mainline Protestant; Party ID, Independent; Class, Middle class.

Attitudes against homosexuality (homosx1)

This is an OLS regression analysis of attitudes toward homosexuality. This variable measures the attitudes against same sex sexual activity. Positive betas indicate a more conservative view while negative betas indicate a more liberal (tolerant) view.

Descriptive Table: Attitudes regarding homosexuality

	Frequency	Valid Percent	Mean	Standard Deviation	
Not wrong at all	4762	18.70	3.25		1.20
Sometimes wrong	1750	6.87			
Almost always wrong	1279	5.02			
Always wrong	17680	69.41			
Total	25471	100			

All variables, except *democrat* correlated at the significant level. *Level of education* and *fundamental/liberal continuum* both correlated at the highest level (r=-.28 and r=.28, respectively), interestingly in opposite directions. The next highest correlation is *strength of religion* (r=.26), *no religion* (r=-.24), and *family education* (r=-.23).

The control R^2 is .11, which offers little in the overall explanation of attitudes toward homosexuality. All control variables were significant except *mountain* with *age* contributing the most (β=.20), followed by the *sheaf coefficient of region* (β=.17) and *year of survey* (β=-.13). The highest specific region was *east* (β=-.10). This indicates that there is variance in the way specific regions view homosexuality, with those in the east and pacific being more tolerant than those in the south when compared to the Midwest.

With the introduction of religion, the R^2 is .19, the highest of the predictor variable sets for this model. The highest contributor is *sheaf coefficient of religion* (β=.19), followed by *age* (β=.20), *strength of religion* (β=.12), *Jew* (β=-.12), and *year of survey* (β=-.11). The specific religion that contributes the most is *evangelical Protestant*

(β=-.12). An interesting finding is the affect of having no religion (β=-.08), which although is not a large contributor, has a more conservative view, which is unexpected and may be explained by the relatively low numbers of respondents in that category. (Appendix Two)

With the introduction of political identification, the R^2 is.16. *Political views* (β=.21) contributes the highest followed by *age* (β=.17) and *year in survey* (β=-.11). When compared to independents, both *republicans* and *democrat* were significant, as was the *sheaf coefficient of party id*. This indicates that there is a significant variance between parties in views regarding homosexuality.

With the introduction of class, the R^2 is .15, explaining slightly less than the political variable set. The highest contributor is *level of education* (β=-.16), followed by *age* (β=.14), and *married* (β=.11). All other significant variables contribute little to the overall model. Interestingly, when compared to middle class, individually each class was significant, yet the *sheaf coefficient of class* was not, indicating that when looking at class as a whole there does not seem to be a significant variance between them. It is the level of education that explains the most regarding attitudes toward homosexuality.

The R^2 for the composite step jumps to .25, explaining a fairly large amount of the factors that contribute to attitudes toward homosexuality. The *sheaf coefficient of religion* (β=.15) and *political views* (β=.15) contributes the most followed by *level of education* (β=-.13) and *age* (β=.10). This indicates that there is significant variance between religions regarding homosexuality. The self identification of conservative or liberal is also an important aid in explaining attitudes. In this model, level of education is the highest liberal slant, and is far greater in contribution than any specific religion.

Controlling for each of the predictor sets decreases the contribution of year in survey from the control set, class more so than religion and political identification. This may be explained by the increased level of education over the years. *East*, *south*, and *pacific* each remain significant throughout the model, while *mountain* is only significant in the correlation step. Every other control variable remains significant throughout the model, including the *sheaf coefficient of region*. The *sheaf coefficients of religion* and *political identification* were also significant throughout, although the *sheaf coefficient of class* was not significant in either the class set or the composite. *Working class* and *Upper class* were significant, both time with equal contributions in opposite directions. *Democrat* did not correlate significantly yet was significant in the political step of the model. Overall, religion, region, political identification, age, year in survey and education were the important factors in this model.

Table Seven. OLS Regression of attitudes against homosexuality on religion, political identification, and class†

	Correlations		Control		Religion		Political		Class		Composite	
Male	0.02	**	0.02	**	0.05	**	0.02	**	0.03	**	0.05	**
White	-0.06	**	-0.08	**	-0.07	**	-0.09	**	-0.05	**	-0.06	**
Age	0.19	**	0.20	**	0.17	**	0.17	**	0.14	**	0.10	**
Married	0.12	**	0.10	**	0.07	**	0.08	**	0.11	**	0.07	**
Year of survey	-0.13	**	-0.13	**	-0.11	**	-0.14	**	-0.09	**	-0.09	**
Change in region since age 16	-0.07	**	-0.08	**	-0.06	**	-0.08	**	-0.05	**	-0.03	**
Pacific	-0.10	**	-0.07	**	-0.05	**	-0.07	**	-0.06	**	-0.04	**
Mountain	-0.02	*	0.00		-0.01		-0.01		0.00		0.00	
East	-0.11	**	-0.10	**	-0.06	**	-0.09	**	-0.09	**	-0.06	**
South	0.15	**	0.09	**	0.05	**	0.07	**	0.08	**	0.04	**
Sheaf Region			0.17	**							0.09	**
Fundamental/liberal continuum	0.28	**			0.06	**					0.04	*
Change in fundamentalism since 16	-0.04	**			0.00						0.00	
Strength of religion	0.26	**			0.12	**					0.11	**
Change in religion since age 16	-0.08	**			0.00						0.01	
Black Protestant	0.07	**			-0.01						-0.01	
Evangelical Protestant	0.21	**			0.08	**					0.06	**
Catholic	-0.05	**			-0.02						-0.02	*
Jew	-0.14	**			-0.12	**					-0.09	**
Conservative Other Protestant	0.06	**			0.05	**					0.04	**
Liberal Other Protestant	-0.07	**			-0.06	**					-0.04	**
Other Protestant	-0.03	**			-0.02	**					-0.02	**
Other religion	-0.02	**			-0.01	*					-0.01	
No religion	-0.24	**			-0.08	**					-0.07	**
Sheaf Religion					0.19	**					0.15	**
Political views	0.26	**					0.21	**			0.15	**
Republican	0.11	**					0.08	**			0.08	**
Democrat	0.00						0.03	**			0.01	
Sheaf Party ID							0.07	*			0.07	*
Level of education	-0.28	**							-0.16	**	-0.13	**
Family education	-0.23	**							-0.06	**	-0.05	**
Families occupational prestige	-0.11	**							-0.03	**	-0.04	**
Change in prestige since age 16	0.02	*							-0.03	**	-0.03	**
Lower class	0.03	**							0.01		0.01	
Working class	0.08	**							0.02	**	0.02	**
Upper class	-0.04	**							-0.02	**	-0.02	**
Sheaf Class									0.03		0.03	
R-squared			0.11		0.19		0.16		0.15		0.25	

N=16914

† Results are standardized * significant at .05 level, ** significant at .01 level

Reference variables are: Region, Midwest; Religion, Mainline Protestant; Party ID, Independent; Class, Middle class.

Attitudes against premarital sex

This is an OLS regression analysis of attitudes against premarital sex. This variable measures respondent's attitudes against premarital sex. A positive beta indicates a more conservative view while a negative beta indicates a more tolerant view.

Descriptive Table: Attitudes regarding premarital sex

	Frequency	Valid Percent	Mean	Standard Deviation
Not wrong at all	10423	39.54	2.27	1.25
Sometimes wrong	5795	21.98		
Almost always wrong	2646	10.04		
Always wrong	7496	28.44		

In the correlation step, *strength of religion* correlates at the highest level (r=.31) followed by *age* (r=.29), *fundamental/liberal continuum* (r=.27), *Evangelical Protestant* (r=.25), and *political views* (r=.24). The other significant correlations were not as strong as previously listed.

In the control step, the R^2 is .15, which means that the control factors alone explain 15% of the variance in attitudes toward premarital sex. All but *white* were significant, including the *sheaf coefficient of region*. *Age* (β=.29) contributes the most, followed by the *sheaf coefficient of region* (β=.17), *male* (β=-.12) and *south* (β=.10).

With the introduction of religion, the R^2 is .25, indicating that this step explains 25% of the variance in attitudes toward premarital sex. The major contributor is *strength of religion* (β=.28) followed by the *sheaf coefficient of religion* (β=.21). *Evangelical Protestant* (β=.14) is the next highest contributor and the highest, by far, of the specific religions. Interestingly, with *strength of religion* and *Evangelical Protestant* so high, the *fundamental/liberal continuum* is relatively light in its contribution (β=-.07).

With the introduction of political identification, the R^2 is .19, demonstrating that political identification explains less than religion of attitudes toward premarital sex. The

highest contributor is *age* (β=.27) followed by *political views* (β=.18) and *male* (β=-.12). Both *Republican* (β=.06) and *Democrat* (β=.02) were significant, as is the *sheaf coefficient of party id* (β=.06), however, contributes only moderately to the model; however, rather interestingly, both *Republican* and *Democrat* betas are positive.

With the introduction of class, the R^2 is .16, less than both the other predictor sets, meaning class explains less than religion and political identification. The highest contributor is *age* (β=.27), which is much greater than any other variable in this set. The second highest is *male* (β=.11) and both *married* and *south* (βs=.10). The only class that was significant is *Upper class* but is low in its contribution (β=-.03). *Education*, which has been a relatively robust contributor in other models, although significant, only has a beta of -.05.

The composite R^2 is .27. This is a rather large amount of variance in attitudes toward premarital sex that is explained by these variables. *Age* (β=.24) and the *sheaf coefficient of religion* (β=.19) lead in contribution. *Political views* (β=.13) and the *sheaf coefficient of region* (β=.10) follow in strength. With controlling for all predictor sets, *level of education* is quite low (β=-.03), unlike in other dependent variable models.

Overall throughout this model, age, strength of religion, political views, region, and being male are the most important in explaining attitudes toward premarital sex.

Table Eight. OLS Regression of attitudes against premarital sex on religion, political identification, and class†

	Correlations		Control		Religion		Political		Class		Composite	
Male	-0.11	**	-0.12	**	-0.08	**	-0.12	**	-0.11	**	-0.09	**
White	0.00		-0.01		-0.02	*	-0.02	**	0.00		-0.03	**
Age	0.29	**	0.29	**	0.26	**	0.27	**	0.27	**	0.24	**
Married	0.11	**	0.10	**	0.07	**	0.08	**	0.10	**	0.06	**
Year of survey	-0.06	**	-0.06	**	-0.06	**	-0.07	**	-0.05	**	-0.05	**
Change in region since age 16	-0.03	**	-0.06	**	-0.04	**	-0.06	**	-0.05	**	-0.04	**
Pacific	-0.08	**	-0.05	**	-0.04	**	-0.05	**	-0.04	**	-0.04	**
Mountain	0.01		0.02	**	0.01		0.02	**	0.02	**	0.01	
East	-0.12	**	-0.10	**	-0.06	**	-0.09	**	-0.09	**	-0.06	**
South	0.15	**	0.10	**	0.05	**	0.09	**	0.10	**	0.05	**
Sheaf Region			0.17	**							0.10	**
Fundamental/liberal continuum	0.27	**			0.07	**					0.06	**
Change in fundamentalism since 16	0.00				0.02	*					0.02	*
Strength of religion	0.31	**			0.28	**					0.27	**
Change in religion since age 16	-0.04	**			0.00						0.00	
Black Protestant	0.01				-0.03	**					-0.03	*
Evangelical Protestant	0.25	**			0.14	**					0.12	**
Catholic	-0.08	**			0.00						0.00	
Jew	-0.08	**			-0.05	**					-0.03	**
Conservative Other Protestant	0.11	**			0.09	**					0.08	**
Liberal Other Protestant	-0.04	**			-0.03	**					-0.02	**
Other Protestant	-0.04	**			-0.02	**					-0.02	**
Other religion	-0.01				0.00						0.00	
No religion	-0.20	**			0.12	**					0.13	**
Sheaf Religion					0.21	**					0.19	**
Political views	0.24	**					0.18	**			0.13	**
Republican	0.10	**					0.06	**			0.04	**
Democrat	0.00						0.02	**			0.01	
Sheaf Party ID							0.06	*			0.04	
Level of education	-0.16	**							-0.05	**	-0.03	**
Family education	-0.18	**							-0.05	**	-0.03	**
Families occupational prestige	-0.01								0.04	**	0.03	**
Change in prestige since age 16	0.03	**							0.00		0.00	
Lower class	0.02	**							0.01		0.01	
Working class	0.00								0.01		0.00	
Upper class	-0.03	**							-0.03	**	-0.03	**
Sheaf Class									0.04		0.03	
R-squared			0.15		0.25		0.19		0.16		0.27	

N=16831

† Results are standardized * significant at .05 level, ** significant at .01 level

Reference variables are: Region, Midwest; Religion, Mainline Protestant; Party ID, Independent; Class, Middle class.

Attitudes against extra marital sex

This is an OLS regression analysis of attitudes toward extra marital sex. The variable measures attitudes against engaging in extramarital sex. A positive beta indicates a more conservative view while a negative beta indicates a more tolerant view

Descriptive Table: Attitudes regarding extra marital sex

	Frequency	Valid Percent	Mean	Std. Deviation
Not wrong at all	705	2.66	3.62	0.75
Sometimes wrong	2150	8.10		
Almost always wrong	3687	13.89		
Always wrong	19998	75.35		

In the correlation step, the variable that correlates the highest is *strength of religion* (r=.22) followed by *fundamental/liberal continuum* and *political views* (both r=.16).

The control R^2 is .05, explaining 5% of the variance in attitudes toward extramarital sex. All variables are significant except *mountain*. The highest contributor to this step is *married* (β=.12) with *age* and the *sheaf coefficient of region* following (both β=.11) and *year in survey* (β=.09).

With the introduction of religion, the R^2 is .10 which, although is not substantial, is the largest of the predictor variable sets. The largest contributor is *strength of religion* (β=.14) followed by the *sheaf coefficient of religion* (β=.12). Although the specific religious variables are significant (except *Catholic*, *Black Protestant* and *other religion*), the *sheaf coefficient of religion* suggests that there is considerable variance between the attitudes of the various religions.

With the introduction of political identification, the R^2 is .07. This suggests that political identification does relatively little to explain attitudes toward extramarital sex.

The largest contributor is *political views* (β=.13) with *married* following (β=.11). Both *Republican* and *Democrat* are significant; as is the *sheaf coefficient of party id*, but none contribute much to the overall model.

With the introduction of class, the R^2 is .07, the same as political identification, and again, not necessarily substantial in providing an explanation for attitudes toward extramarital sex. The largest contributor is *married* (β=.12) directly followed by *year in survey* (β=.11). The class variables *working class* (β=.03) and *upper class* (β=-.04) are both significant, *lower class* is not. The *sheaf coefficient of class* is significant, however, only at the .05 level. *Level of education* (β=-.08) contributes more than any of the specific class variables and the *sheaf coefficient of class*. This would indicate that education is more important that class.

The composite R^2 is .12. This model explains 12% of the variance in the attitudes toward extramarital sex. The highest contributor is *strength of religion* (β=.14) followed by *married* (β=.12) and the *sheaf coefficient of religion* (β=.10) and *year in survey* (β=.10).

With the exception of family education and sheaf coefficient of party id, all the variables remained significant in the composite that were significant in other models. The *sheaf coefficient of region* and *political views* decreased in contribution while *year in survey* increased. Overall, *strength of religion*, *married*, and the *sheaf coefficient of religion* were the most noteworthy factors in this model.

Table Nine. OLS Regression of attitudes against extra marital sex on religion, political identification, and class†

	Correlations		Control		Religion		Political		Class		Composite	
Male	-0.08	**	-0.08	**	-0.06	**	-0.08	**	-0.08	**	-0.06	**
White	0.04	**	0.03	**	0.02		0.03	**	0.04	**	0.02	*
Age	0.11	**	0.11	**	0.08	**	0.08	**	0.08	**	0.05	**
Married	0.11	**	0.12	**	0.10	**	0.11	**	0.12	**	0.10	**
Year of survey	0.08	**	0.09	**	0.10	**	0.09	**	0.11	**	0.12	**
Change in region since age 16	-0.04	**	-0.05	**	-0.04	**	-0.05	**	-0.03	**	-0.02	**
Pacific	-0.06	**	-0.06	**	-0.04	**	-0.06	**	-0.05	**	-0.04	**
Mountain	0.01		0.00		0.00		-0.01		0.00		0.00	
East	-0.09	**	-0.09	**	-0.07	**	-0.09	**	-0.09	**	-0.07	**
South	0.07	**	0.02	*	0.00		0.01		0.02		0.00	
Sheaf Region			0.11	**							0.07	**
Fundamental/liberal continuum	0.16	**			0.03						0.01	
Change in fundamentalism since 16	-0.03	**			0.01						0.01	
Strength of religion	0.22	**			0.14	**					0.14	**
Change in religion since age 16	-0.06	**			-0.01						-0.01	
Black Protestant	-0.03	**			-0.03	**					-0.04	**
Evangelical Protestant	0.14	**			0.05	**					0.03	*
Catholic	0.00				0.00						0.00	
Jew	-0.08	**			-0.07	**					-0.05	**
Conservative Other Protestant	0.05	**			0.03	**					0.02	*
Liberal Other Protestant	-0.04	**			-0.05	**					-0.04	**
Other Protestant	-0.02	**			-0.03	**					-0.03	**
Other religion	0.00				0.00						0.00	
No religion	-0.19	**			-0.05	**					-0.04	**
Sheaf Religion					0.12	**					0.10	**
Political views	0.16	**					0.13	**			0.09	**
Republican	0.07	**					0.05	**			0.03	**
Democrat	0.01						0.05	**			0.04	**
Sheaf Party ID							0.05	*			0.04	
Level of education	-0.12	**							-0.08	**	-0.07	**
Family education	-0.09	**							-0.03	**	-0.02	
Families occupational prestige	-0.03	**							0.00		-0.01	
Change in prestige since age 16	0.01								-0.01		-0.02	
Lower class	0.00								0.00		0.00	
Working class	0.05	**							0.03	**	0.03	**
Upper class	-0.05	**							-0.04	**	-0.04	**
Sheaf Class									0.05	*	0.05	*
R-squared			0.05		0.10		0.07		0.07		0.12	

N=17561

† Results are standardized * significant at .05 level, ** significant at .01 level

Reference variables are: Region, Midwest; Religion, Mainline Protestant; Party ID, Independent; Class, Middle class.

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to evaluate which of the identified social institutions has the greatest impact shaping socialization. The following is an overview of the findings.

As a general statement, attitudes toward premarital sex were explained the most by these predictors. This was closely followed by attitudes toward homosexuality and interracial marriage. The predictors did not do a good job of explaining attitudes toward capital punishment and only a moderate job of explaining the remaining variables.

Results by grouping

Table Ten: Composite level R-squared by Predictor Variable set

R-Squared	Control R-square	Religion Adds to control	Political Adds to control	Class Adds to control	Composite Adds to control	Composite R-square
Abortion (no will)	0.02	+0.08	+0.02	+0.01	+0.10	0.12
Abortion (willful)	0.04	+0.11	+0.03	+0.04	+0.15	0.19
Capital Punishment	0.05	+0.01	+0.02	+0.00	+0.03	0.08
Prayer in schools	0.07	+0.06	+0.02	+0.03	+0.09	0.15
Interracial Marriage	0.16	+0.02	+0.01	+0.06	+0.07	0.24
Sex ed taught in schools	0.05	+0.03	+0.02	+0.02	+0.06	0.11
Homosexuality	0.11	+0.08	+0.05	+0.04	+0.14	0.25
Premarital sex	0.15	+0.10	+0.04	+0.01	+0.13	0.27
Extra marital sex	0.05	+0.05	+0.02	+0.01	+0.07	0.12

<u>Religion</u>

Religion, with the exception of attitudes toward interracial marriage and attitudes toward capital punishment, is the strongest determinant in each model and often rather considerable in its magnitude in comparison with the others. This data clearly supports Hunter's notion that religion (including secular 'faiths') is the base for these types of moral attitudes.

Several of the specific religions were in direct contrast with one another. This did not appear to diminish the impact of the overall importance of religion. The only specific religion to be constantly positive (conservative) is Evangelical Protestant and Liberal Other Protestant and Jew are the only consistently negative (liberal) specific religions when not controlling for the other predictor variable sets. There are slight changes in these when controlling for the other predictor sets, but the trend continues.

In looking at the components factors, the strength of one's religion seems to contribute more than almost any specific religion for any of the attitudes, and always in the conservative direction. The fundamental/ liberal continuum only offered explanation in some attitudes. This may lend support to the critique of the measure by Steenland et al, (2000) that the negative feel to the word 'fundamental' may deter more accurate responses from respondents. With the exceptions of attitudes against interracial marriage and prayer in school, the strength of one's religion outweighed the self categorization of liberal or fundamental. That, with the relative irrelevance of a change in level of fundamentalism since 16 and the consistent high contribution to the models, suggests that the way a respondent views his/her commitment to a religious ideology is more important than the type of ideology.

The change in religion since age 16 seemed not to have an impact on attitudes since it was generally not significant. This could suggest a couple of ideas; however, seems to fit best with Newport's (1979) statement that "… it is actually a rather small percentage of Americans who change from one religion to anther during their lifetimes, which means that the best single predictor of an individuals adult's religious preference is

still the simple knowledge of his or her parent's religion." Or, perhaps it is simply an indication that socialization into a general religious belief system works, and works well.

The sheaf coefficient of religion was also consistently significant and consistently high in contribution. This strongly supports the notion that there are considerable differences in the attitudes expressed by the specific religious doctrines. This difference in variation between the religions, along with the consistent magnitude of contribution of these religious ideology measures, upholds the notion that the underlying assumptions of these types of belief systems contribute heavily to attitudes.

Party Identification

The effects of political identification usually came in second in level of explanation of variance for the attitudes. Political views were significant in every model and often contributed heavily to the variance in explanation. Therefore, for these components, the primary indicator of attitude is the self categorization of conservative or liberal. Although often significant, the individual party identifications do not contribute as much as political views. The sheaf coefficient supports this general lack of variance between political parties. The sheaf coefficient was only significant sporadically. In only two models (homosexuality and capital punishment) was it significant both at time of introduction and in composite model. These components, aside from self categorization in the conservative/liberal continuum, appear to have little to do with explanations of attitudes.

Class

The effects of class explained the majority of variance for only one attitude, interracial marriage. The highest contributor for interracial marriage was education.

Education is the variable that consistently contributes the most to any given model containing the components of class. The level of education for the family and father's prestige were periodically significant, indicating that there is relationship between attitudes and education. In every model, the divisions between self selected classes, although often significant, did not contribute much and certainly not as much as the education variables. The sheaf coefficient of class was rarely significant, indicating a lack of clear and distinct ideological differences in attitudes between classes. This lack of distinction is in direct contrast with many stratification theories and needs to be investigated further.

This lack of contribution to the explanation of attitudes was slightly surprising, although, although is does tend to lend some support to Fantasia's notion of a relational class consciousness. The differences in classes may not be important until there is an event or situation that brings the difference to the forefront. The vast amount of scholarly work completed that addresses the issues of class stratification would lead to the belief that class would be more robust in its contribution. These results do not support the idea that class position, in and of itself, is important in the formation and variation of attitudes. There are glaring questions with this finding, primarily with the self selection of class. This alone may pose difficulties, especially if the general idea of a lack of class consciousness is assumed. These findings, along with Fantasia's ideas, and Jackman's (1979) statement that "a wide spread tendency to define class membership more broadly than by objective status characteristics alone" points to a need to explore the relation of class to these variables in more detail in a future study.

Control/Region

In the original conception of this study, region was to be considered only as a control variable. Hunter suggested the importance of region especially tied to the historical nature of settlement. Lieske (1993) stated that there are "ten distinctive subcultures that are relatively homogeneous and contiguous." Although his breakdown was not used in this study in lieu of a smaller list, the idea of regions being subcultures is supported by this study. Having said this, the overall impact of region in this study was somewhat surprising. As seen in Table Ten, the r-squared were often competitive with both political identification and class.

The consistent significance of the sheaf coefficient suggests that the difference between regions is substantial. In comparison with the Midwest and with some exceptions, the South tended to lean toward the conservative while the Pacific region and the East tend to be less conservative. The Mountain region was less consistent in the results.

The other components of explanation used in each model added interesting results. Male was relatively consistent across all models, demonstrating some level of significance for each attitude except interracial marriage. The effects of being white were fairly consistent and were especially important to attitudes regarding capital punishment. For this attitude, being white contributed heavily to favorable attitudes of capital punishment. The effects of being older were rather consistent and tended to be more conservative. Age did not seem to have an affect on capital punishment and seemed to contribute more to the models in attitudes regarding premarital sex, interracial marriage, and teaching sex education in schools. The effects of being married, however, generally

resulted in high levels of significance but did not contribute greatly to the overall variation in attitudes. The exception to this is extra marital sex, where it was a heavy contributor to the model. Being married did not seem to have an impact on attitudes regarding capital punishment and interracial marriage.

The year in survey also provided some interesting results. It indicates a general conservative trend over the years in attitudes regarding abortion, capital punishment, and extra marital sex. It also suggests a more tolerant view over the years of teaching sex education in school, interracial marriage, homosexuality and premarital sex. This is an interesting split in conservative and liberal trends.

Conclusion

Religion appears to provide the most explanation for attitudes regarding these culture war issues, especially the strength of one's religious connection. Education was consistently high as well. Often, strength of religion and education would be very close in their levels of contribution, but in opposite directions. There is an inverse relationship[6] between strength of religion and number of years of education. This suggests that although in this study the impact of socialization of religion obviously contributes more to the current morality debates, the level of education a person obtains may be nearly as powerful in shaping their views. In addition, there are nuances within the attitudes that point to the impact of other structural factors on specific attitudes, such as race for capital punishment and age for many including interracial marriage and premarital sex.

Because of the considerable differences between religions, as seen through the sheaf coefficient, religion is still a powerful agent of socialization. This is seen more in

[6] See Appendix Two for percentage of population difference between levels of education and strength of religion.

attitudes of sexuality, prayer in schools, and abortion than in the others. Hunter is correct in his statement "[politics is the expression of culture]…at the heart of culture, though, is religion, or systems of faith. And the heart of religion are its claims to the truth about the world." (p. 57) Yet, the results of this study do not offer the magnitude of explanation hoped.

The impact of political party, considering its essential role in the legislation of morality, was just not that great. Of these components of political identification, simply self identifying as either liberal or conservative has more of an effect on attitudes than anything else. This could have immense consequences such as a lack of party unity that may deteriorate social cohesion. In the past, when a person referred to themselves as a Democrat there was a fairly reliable understanding of what that meant. That unifying set of principles that will likely sway voting behaviors is no longer in tact. These results suggest that it is not possible to predict the attitude one will have based on party identification.

The overall lack of importance of class was interesting and somewhat surprising. Education was included in class because it is an element of status. Education, both in the measures used to define class and in the overall study, had a major impact. The issue of self identification of class membership may contribute heavily to the lack of explanation. The consequence of this is the lack of predictability of attitudes based on class identification. According to the results of this study, there is not enough difference between classes to assume a unified set of beliefs. This could be supportive of Fantasia's idea that class is relational and not membership. Class only become salient when it's coercive nature is evident. These results need to be investigated more fully. Possible

modifications in the construction of the model, such as identifying additional measures of class, may provide more extensive explanations of the role of class in these attitudes.

Clearly, the effects of religion offer the greatest explanation of the variance in the attitudes regarding these contested issues. However, if the socialization of religious value systems were as commanding as it is sometimes suggested, the models would have explained more of the variance in attitudes. Furthermore, if the socialization into all three of the social institutions in combination were as powerful as thought, the composite models would explain more than they do. Perhaps another social institution not explored in the study is more (or just as) influential than religion, political identification, or class. Or perhaps personal experience or incomplete socialization as Berger and Luckmann would call it, also contributes highly to these moral attitudes.

The GSS is overall a good data set but there were issues regarding the lack of information available across time. In addition, the actual wording of questions were sometimes problematic. Another possible way to explore these issues is through a time series. With these results alone, each model could be thoroughly explored in much more detail than in this study. One interesting finding that was not explored in detail, the conservative and liberal trends for specific variables would make a good study.

This is the first step into the connection between the micro and macro relationship regarding morality and belief systems. Since this is an initial step, there is much more to be explored. For now, the question of what other factors contribute to these attitudes is perhaps one of the most prevalent. Other questions include: a deeper look at what makes a conservative and liberal family and to what extent does that simple identification as such impact attitudes? What is really the difference between those who adhere to a

‘divine being’ assumption and those who do not? How much have attitudes really changed over time and why, how? What, really, is morality and to what extent does morality impact our social lives?

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Appendix One

Variable List

Sex (male)	Recoded from sex, 1=male, 0=female
Race (white)	Recoded from 'What race do you consider yourself?' (1=White, 0=else) and head of household (2002). Race was not asked in 2002 GSS.
Age (ageg)	Recoded from age to age categories: Ages 1=18-22; 2=23-33; 3=34-40; 4=41-44; 5=45-55; 6=56-60; 7=61-65; 8=66- 90
Marital status (married)	Recoded from marital: Are you currently--married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been married? (Married =1, else=0)
Year of survey (year)	Year respondent took survey
Change in region since age 16 (changereg)	Constructed: if region at 16 is different than current region; 1=yes, 0=no.
Pacific (rpac)	Recoded from region: if 1=pacific, 0=else.
Mountain (rmount)	Recoded from region: if 1=mountain, 0=else.
East (reast)	Recoded from region, 1=East (New England, Middle Atlantic), 0=else.
South (rsouth)	Recoded from region, 1=South (South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central), 0=else
Midwest (rmidwest)	Recoded from region, 1=Midwest (East North Central West North Central), 0=else.
Fundamental/liberal continuum (rfund)	Recoded from FUND (how fundamentalist is respondent currently?).1=liberal; 2=moderate; 3=fundamentalist
Change in fundamentalism since at 16 (chgfund)	Constructed: if fund16 is different than current fund; 1=yes, 0=no.
Strength of religion (reliten1)	Recoded from RELITEN, 4=strong; 3=not very strong; 2=somewhat strong; 1=no religion
Change in religion since age 16 (chgrelig)	Constructed: if religion at 16 is different than current religion; 1=yes, 0=no.
Black Protestant (blckpro)	Recoded from reltrad (see Steensland et al, 2000): if 1= Black Protestant, 0=else.
Evangelical Protestant (evanpr)	Recoded from reltrad: if 1= Evangelical Protestant , 0=else.
Catholic (cath)	Recoded from reltrad: if 1= Catholic, 0=else.
Jew (reljew)	Recoded from reltrad: if 1=Religious Jew, 0=else.
Conservative Other Protestant (conoth)	Recoded from reltrad: if 1=Conservative Other Protestant, 0=else.
Liberal Other Protestant (liboth)	Recoded from reltrad: if 1= Liberal Other Protestant , 0=else.
Other Protestant (othprt)	Recoded from reltrad: if 1=Other Protestant, 0=else.
Other religion (otherrel)	Recoded from reltrad: if 1= Other religion, 0=else.

No religion (norel)	Recoded from reltrad: if 1= No religion, 0=else
Mainline protestant (mainprot)	Recoded from reltrad: if 1= Mainline protestant, 0=else
Political views (polviews)	We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from 1=extremely liberal, to 7=extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale?
Republican (repub)	Recoded from partyid: Independent, close to Republican, Not very strong Republican, Strong Republican=1, else =0
Democrat (democ)	Recoded from partyid: 1=Strong Democrat, Not very strong Democrat, Independent, close to Democrat, 0=else
Independent (indep)	Recoded from partyid: 1=Independent (Neither, No response), 0=else
Level of education (educa)	Recoded from education: 1=0 thru 8th, 2= 9th thru 11th, 3= 12/high school, 4=Associates, 5=BA/BS, 6=Graduate
Family education (fameduc)	Constructed from father's level of education and mothers level of education. (padeg and madeg)
Families occupational prestige (papres)	Recoded from 1972-1994 occupational codes and 1980-2002 occupational codes using overlapping years to bring past current.
Change in prestige since age 16 (chgprestige)	Constructed: if respondents current level of prestige is different than father's level of prestige
Lower class (lowerc)	Recoded from class, 1=lower class, 0=else
Working class (workc)	Recoded from class, 1=working class, 0=else.
Upper class (upperc)	Recoded from class, 1=upper class, 0=else
Abortion for reasons beyond one's control (abnowill)	Variable measuring attitudes regarding abortion for reasons considered not to be within a woman's control. Constructed as sum of three abortion variables: A woman should be able to obtain a legal abortion: If there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby?; If she became pregnant as a result of rape?; If the woman's own health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy? (each response is 1=No, 0=Yes).
Abortion for reasons within one's control (abwill)	Variable measuring attitudes regarding abortion for reasons considered within a woman's control. Constructed as sum of three abortion variables: A woman should be able to obtain a legal abortion: If she is married and does not want any more children? If the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children? If she is not married and does not want to marry the man? (each response is 1=No, 0=Yes).
Capital punishment (cappun1)	Variable measuring attitude regarding capital punishment. Recoded from cappun: Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? 1= favor, 0=oppose
Teaching sex education in school (rsexed)	Variable to measure attitudes regarding teaching sex education in school. Recoded from sexeduc: Would you be for or against sex education in the public schools? 1= against, 0=oppose

Prayer in school (rprayer)	Variable to measure attitudes regarding prayer in school. Recoded from prayer: The United States Supreme Court has ruled that no state or local government may require the reading of the Lord's Prayer or Bible verses in public schools. What are your views on this--do you approve or disapprove of the court ruling? 1= disapprove, 0=approve
Interracial marriage (rracmar)	Variable to measure attitudes regarding interracial marriage. Recoded from racmar: Do you think there should be laws against marriages between (Negroes/Blacks/African-Americans) and whites? 1=yes, 0=no
Homosexuality (Homosx1)	Variable to measure respondent's view on homosexual sexual relationships, recoded from HOMOSEX to make 1= not wrong at all; 2= sometimes wrong; 3=almost always wrong; 4= always wrong.
Premarital sex (Premarsx1)	Variable measuring respondent's view on premarital sex, recoded from PREMARSX to make 1= not wrong at all; 2= sometimes wrong; 3=almost always wrong 4= always wrong.
Extra marital sex (Xmarsx1)	Variable to measure respondents view on extra marital sexual relationships, recoded from XMARSX to make 1= not wrong at all; 2= sometimes wrong; 3=almost always wrong; 4= always wrong.

Appendix Two
Percentages of Population

Abortion for reasons beyond one's control, number of 'yes' responses to three variables creating question

	None	One	Two	Three
1972	73%	10%	7%	9%
1973	78%	12%	5%	5%
1974	79%	11%	4%	5%
1975	78%	11%	5%	6%
1976	77%	12%	5%	6%
1977	79%	9%	6%	6%
1978	77%	10%	5%	7%
1980	78%	11%	5%	7%
1982	81%	9%	3%	6%
1983	75%	12%	7%	7%
1984	74%	12%	6%	8%
1985	74%	11%	7%	8%
1987	74%	12%	6%	9%
1988	74%	11%	7%	8%
1989	77%	10%	6%	7%
1990	78%	11%	4%	6%
1991	80%	9%	5%	6%
1993	77%	10%	5%	8%
1994	78%	9%	5%	7%
1996	78%	10%	5%	7%
1998	73%	12%	5%	10%
2000	73%	12%	7%	8%
2002	72%	14%	7%	7%

Abortion for reasons considered within one's control, number of 'yes' responses to three variables creating question

	None	One	Two	Three
1972	34%	10%	10%	46%
1973	42%	8%	10%	41%
1974	41%	10%	11%	38%
1975	40%	9%	10%	41%
1976	42%	8%	9%	41%
1977	39%	11%	11%	39%
1978	33%	9%	12%	46%
1980	41%	8%	10%	41%
1982	42%	8%	9%	41%
1983	32%	8%	10%	50%
1984	37%	7%	8%	47%
1985	34%	7%	10%	50%
1987	36%	6%	9%	49%
1988	34%	5%	10%	51%
1989	39%	6%	9%	46%
1990	38%	8%	10%	44%
1991	39%	7%	9%	46%
1993	42%	6%	8%	44%
1994	43%	5%	8%	44%
1996	39%	6%	8%	46%
1998	37%	5%	7%	50%
2000	35%	5%	8%	52%
2002	38%	5%	9%	49%

	Capital Punishment	
	Disapprove	Approve
1974	34%	66%
1975	36%	64%
1976	31%	69%
1977	28%	72%
1978	30%	70%
1980	28%	72%
1982	22%	78%
1983	23%	77%
1984	25%	75%
1985	20%	80%
1986	25%	75%
1987	26%	74%
1988	24%	76%
1989	22%	78%
1990	21%	79%
1991	24%	76%
1993	23%	77%
1994	21%	79%
1996	23%	77%
1998	27%	73%
2000	31%	69%
2002	31%	69%

	Prayer in Schools	
	Approve	Disapprove
1974	306803%	55%
1975	287418%	45%
1977	275382%	39%
1982	280704%	42%
1983	276514%	40%
1985	253545%	28%
1986	258334%	30%
1988	265634%	34%
1989	249676%	26%
1990	263596%	33%
1991	268019%	35%
1993	261008%	31%
1994	254219%	28%
1996	250513%	26%
1998	261215%	31%
2000	257785%	29%
2002	251413%	26%

	Laws opposing interracial marriage	
	No	Yes
1972	61%	39%
1973	62%	38%
1974	65%	35%
1975	61%	39%
1976	67%	33%
1977	72%	28%
1980	70%	30%
1982	70%	30%
1984	75%	25%
1985	74%	26%
1987	76%	24%
1988	77%	23%
1989	79%	21%
1990	81%	19%
1991	82%	18%
1993	83%	17%
1994	86%	14%
1996	89%	11%
1998	89%	11%
2000	90%	10%
2002	90%	10%

	Teaching sex education in schools	
	Not opposed	Opposed
1974	82%	18%
1975	79%	21%
1977	79%	21%
1982	84%	16%
1983	86%	14%
1985	84%	16%
1986	84%	16%
1988	87%	13%
1989	88%	13%
1990	90%	10%
1991	88%	12%
1993	85%	15%
1994	88%	12%
1996	87%	13%
1998	87%	13%
2000	87%	13%
2002	88%	12%

	Attitudes regarding homosexual sex			
	Not wrong at all	Sometimes wrong	Almost always wrong	Always wrong
1973	11%	8%	7%	74%
1974	13%	8%	5%	73%
1976	16%	8%	6%	70%
1977	15%	8%	6%	72%
1980	15%	6%	6%	73%
1982	15%	7%	5%	73%
1984	14%	7%	5%	73%
1985	14%	7%	4%	75%
1987	12%	7%	4%	77%
1988	13%	6%	5%	77%
1989	16%	6%	4%	74%
1990	13%	6%	5%	76%
1991	16%	4%	4%	75%
1993	22%	7%	4%	66%
1994	23%	6%	4%	67%
1996	28%	6%	5%	60%
1998	29%	7%	6%	58%
2000	29%	8%	4%	59%
2002	33%	7%	5%	55%

Attitudes regarding premarital sex

	Not wrong	Sometimes wrong	Almost always wrong	Always wrong
1972	27%	24%	12%	37%
1974	31%	24%	13%	33%
1975	33%	24%	12%	31%
1977	36%	23%	9%	31%
1978	39%	20%	12%	29%
1982	41%	21%	9%	29%
1983	39%	24%	10%	27%
1985	43%	20%	8%	29%
1986	40%	23%	9%	28%
1988	41%	22%	11%	26%
1989	41%	23%	9%	28%
1990	40%	23%	12%	26%
1991	44%	19%	10%	28%
1993	42%	21%	10%	27%
1994	43%	20%	10%	26%
1996	44%	23%	10%	24%
1998	43%	21%	9%	26%
2000	42%	21%	9%	28%
2002	44%	20%	8%	27%

Extra Marital Sex

	Not Wrong	Sometimes Wrong	Almost always wrong	Always wrong
1973	4%	12%	15%	70%
1974	2%	12%	12%	74%
1976	4%	11%	16%	69%
1977	3%	10%	14%	73%
1980	4%	10%	16%	70%
1982	3%	10%	13%	73%
1984	2%	9%	18%	71%
1985	3%	9%	14%	75%
1987	2%	8%	16%	74%
1988	2%	6%	13%	79%
1989	2%	7%	13%	78%
1990	1%	7%	13%	79%
1991	3%	7%	14%	77%
1993	2%	6%	14%	77%
1994	2%	7%	13%	79%
1996	2%	5%	15%	78%
1998	2%	6%	12%	79%
2000	3%	7%	11%	79%
2002	2%	4%	14%	80%

Political Views and Race

	Not white	White
Extremely liberal	34%	66%
Liberal	30%	70%
Slightly liberal	26%	74%
Moderate	24%	76%
Slghtly conservative	20%	80%
Conservative	19%	81%
Extrmly conservative	25%	75%

Capital Punishment and Race

	Oppose	Favor
Not white	39%	61%
White	22%	78%
Total	26%	74%

Years of education and strength of religion

	Strong	Not very strong	Somewhat strong	No religion
0	58%	33%	1%	6%
1	54%	38%	8%	0%
2	49%	33%	11%	7%
3	51%	30%	11%	6%
4	55%	30%	9%	5%
5	52%	32%	11%	4%
6	47%	36%	9%	8%
7	47%	37%	10%	5%
8	47%	38%	10%	5%
9	36%	44%	10%	9%
10	34%	45%	11%	9%
11	33%	46%	10%	11%
12	37%	43%	11%	8%
13	37%	42%	11%	10%
14	37%	42%	10%	11%
15	35%	40%	11%	13%
16	38%	38%	11%	12%
17	40%	36%	10%	13%
18	39%	35%	11%	15%
19	40%	36%	8%	15%
20	38%	37%	9%	16%

Appendix Three
Sample of Year in Survey Regression Results using specific years

Year in survey for attitudes regarding homosexuality, composite model

year1974	0.03
year1976	0.01
year1977	0.02
year1980	0.04
year1982	0.04
year1984	0.03
year1985	0.04
year1987	0.05
year1988	0.04
year1989	0.03
year1990	0.04
year1991	0.03
year1993	-0.01
year1996	-0.03
year1998	-0.04
year2000	-0.03
year2002	-0.03

These move from positive to negative, or from a conservative trend to a liberal trend.

Year in survey for attitudes regarding abortion for reasons in one's control, composite model

year1974	-0.02
year1975	0.00
year1976	-0.01
year1977	-0.01
year1978	-0.01
year1980	-0.01
year1982	-0.03
year1983	0.00
year1984	0.00
year1985	0.00
year1987	0.00
year1988	0.01
year1989	0.00
year1990	0.00
year1991	-0.01
year1993	0.00
year1996	-0.01
year1998	0.03
year2000	0.02
year2002	0.03

These move from a negative to a positive or from a liberal to a conservative trend.