Document Type
Article
Publication Date
Winter 12-8-2014
Abstract
Recent work examines the market structure/racial earnings relationship for union and nonunion workers and finds that standardized union earnings protect black workers from market structure–driven earnings discrimination. This study examines the market structure/racial earnings relationship for low and mid-level managers in high- and low-union density industries. Our findings indicate that there is less market structure–driven discrimination of managers in highly unionized industries. We suggest that there is a spillover effect of reduced market structure–driven discrimination of managers in highly unionized industries that stems from standardized, more racially equitable wages of union workers.
Recommended Citation
Agesa, Jacqueline, and Richard U. Agesa. “Market structure-driven discrimination and the earnings of subordinate managers: An analysis by union density.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Winter 2007-2008): pp. 205-225.
Included in
Finance Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, Labor Economics Commons, Other Business Commons
Comments
This is an electronic version of an article published in Agesa, Jacqueline, and Richard U. Agesa. “Market structure-driven discrimination and the earnings of subordinate managers: An analysis by union density.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Winter 2007-2008): pp. 205-225. JOURNAL OF POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS is available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.2753/PKE0160-3477300204#.VwUd5I-cF9A. Copyright © 2008 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved.
doi: 10.2753/PKE0160-3477300204