Violence, Statecraft, and Statehood in the Early Republic: The State of Franklin, 1784–1788

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Chapter 1

Violence, Statecraft, and Statehood in the Early Republic

The State of Franklin, 1784–1788

Kevin T. Barksdale

In December 1784, a small contingent of upper Tennessee Valley political leaders met in Washington County, North Carolina’s, rustic courthouse to discuss the uncertain postrevolutionary political climate that they believed threatened their regional political hegemony, prosperity, and families. The Jonesboro delegates fatefully decided that their backcountry communities could no longer remain part of their parent state and that North Carolina’s westernmost counties (at the time Washington, Sullivan, and Greene counties) must unite and form America’s fourteenth state.1 From 1785 through 1788, the leaders of the Franklin separatist movement struggled to secure support for their state from the U.S. Confederation Congress, the North Carolina General Assembly, high-profile national political figures, and their bitterly divided neighbors. Throughout the three-year effort to win Franklin’s admission into the union, violence and the threat of violence plagued the political movement.

Despite involving a relatively small number of western residents and the state of Franklin’s brief existence, Amerindian clashes, internal political factionalism, and divisive western political policies resulted in a high level of backcountry bloodshed in the upper Tennessee Valley. From supposed violent tendencies culturally engrained in the region’s Scotch-Irish residents to the anarchic impulses unleashed by mountain isolation, there is no shortage of explanations for Appalachian frontier violence. When the rise and fall of the state of Franklin and the corresponding level of regional hostilities are briefly examined, many of these earlier raisons d’êtres regarding postrevolutionary Appalachian violence are replaced with more compelling explanations grounded in specific historical circumstances and a complex collision of political and economic forces. The violence surrounding the
state of Franklin resulted from the intersection of three primary causes: national and regional postrevolutionary political instability, fierce regional and state economic and political competition, and finally skillful and determined Amerindian diplomatic and martial resistance to western encroachment. In the end, culture and physiography proved much less important factors than the struggle for regional economic and political hegemony in the chaos surrounding the state of Franklin.

Since the “discovery” and “invention” of Appalachia in the last decades of the nineteenth century, local color writers, missionaries, reformers, and scholars have offered their own ideas regarding the root causes of Appalachian violence. Two of the earliest and most persistently reoccurring arguments offered to explain the perception of a hyperviolent mountain culture by relying upon ethnic and cultural generalizations and a fundamental misunderstanding of Appalachia’s past, both of which are challenged by the socioeconomic conditions surrounding the state of Franklin. Beginning in the 1880s, the outbreak of feuds and labor militancy associated with the trauma accompanying rural industrialization resulted in the application of the principles of social Darwinism to Appalachia in order to decipher the underlying factors behind mountain violence. The fallacious notion that nearly all southern Appalachians descended from Scotch-Irish immigrants gave birth to the idea of the “Appalachian Highlander,” who carried a cultural and historical propensity to act “clannish”; live outside of the law; and, most important, repeatedly and unabashedly engage in acts of violence. In his 1989 work *Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America*, historian David Hackett Fischer updates the cultural comparison of southern Appalachia to the Scottish Highlands. Fischer argues that in what he labels as “border culture,” Highlands Scots, driven from their homes during the eighteenth-century clearances, carried their culture to Ireland (Ulster) and eventually on to the Appalachian Mountains. Fischer contends that several of the defining characteristics of this “border culture,” including individualism, “autarchy,” and “retributive justice,” created a “climate of violence in the American backcountry.”

Out of the search for an explanation for the perceived persistence of this violent and clannish “border culture” in the southern mountains emerged the theory of Appalachian isolation and the resulting cultural stagnation. In short, the absence of trade and transportation connections, geographic distances, and geological obstacles retarded cultural, political, and economic growth in the region. According to scholars, educators, and
of the Franklin militia George Elholm (Danish), and leading anti-
the opposition party (Tiptonites) belonged to these minority groups, in-
Huguenots.9 Many of the leading figures in the Franklin movement and
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survey conducted of the roughly 31,913 residents of the Tennessee country
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was relatively diverse and far from being homogeneously Scotch-Irish. In a
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Scotch-Irish bringing “fighting techniques like biting and eye-gouging to
the colonies,” preexisting frontier conditions in the areas they settled were
far more critical in determining the levels of backcountry violence than
were ethnic origins.7 Furthermore, “assumptions about the cultural homo-
genity” of southern Appalachia represent a “gross misrepresentation” of the
region’s ethnic diversity.8 A cursory glance at the socioeconomic conditions
in the upper Tennessee Valley during the Franklin separatist movement
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in 1790, approximately 83.1 percent were English, 11.2 percent were
Scotch-Irish, and 2.3 percent were Irish. Additionally, the 1790 census also
included Germans, Welsh, Dutch, Swiss, Alsatians, Africans, and French
Huguenots.9 Many of the leading figures in the Franklin movement and
the opposition party (Tiptonites) belonged to these minority groups, in-
cluding Franklin governor John Sevier (French Huguenot), adjutant gen-
eral of the Franklin militia George Elholm (Danish), and leading anti-
Franklinite Evan Shelby (Welsh).10

Of course, Appalachian scholars have spent the better part of fifty years
demonstrating that both the “Appalachian Highlander”/”border culture”
and isolation theories are at best exaggerated and at worst historically inac-
curate.6 As one historian notes, the Scotch-Irish were not nearly as cultur-
ally predisposed to violence as many scholars have asserted. Despite the
Scotch-Irish bringing “fighting techniques like biting and eye-gouging to
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eral of the Franklin militia George Elholm (Danish), and leading anti-
Franklinite Evan Shelby (Welsh).10

The “isolation theory” also proves historically inaccurate as an explana-
tion for Franklin-related violence. Appalachian scholars have effectively
demonstrated that Appalachia has never been isolated from the rest of
North America. Historian Wilma A. Dunaway convincingly argues that
from the moment of Euroamerican contact, Appalachia’s indigenous resi-
students participated in a “capitalist export economy” that linked the region to global pelt markets. As Euroamerican settlements developed and advanced across the mountain backcountry, local and regional markets expanded that connected Amerindian and Euroamerican mountain communities to local, regional, and international markets. These market connections served as the conduits for not only the exchange of goods and services but also the transference of culture, technology, and information. As geographer Gene Wilhelm contends, “The idea that the Appalachian Mountains acted as a physical barrier . . . hardly stands up against the evidence at hand.” In his examination of early eastern Tennessee, historian David C. Hsiung thoroughly debunks the idea that the antebellum upper Tennessee Valley was cut off from the outside world. He argues, “East Tennessee’s road system and economic ties should dispel any notions that the region has been like a fly trapped in amber, isolated and untouched for generations.”

Appalachian scholars’ identification of the existence and continued expansion of private and public roads, repeated demands for further internal improvements, and evidence of regional market connections across southern Appalachia have largely dispelled the antebellum “isolation theory.”

Ethnicity and geographic isolation ultimately do not explain the high levels of violence and fear that surrounded the Franklin statehood movement. However, postrevolutionary political instability within the national, state, and local governments and a high-stakes competition for control over the region’s emerging commercial economy and political system do stand as compelling causes underlying the anarchy of Tennessee Valley separatism. In his sweeping examination of the underlying factors behind America’s fluctuating homicide rates, historian Randolph Roth argues that frontier regions and communities were not intrinsically violent due to their cultural or ethnic composition. Instead, Roth identifies four historical variables that he believes determined the level of backcountry homicide rates: confidence that a government is “stable” and effective at defending person and property, belief in the “legitimacy” and integrity of a government, level of community cohesion fostered by socioeconomic and political bonds, and community acceptance of the authority of a ruling class. Roth’s analysis of the correlation between political stability and violence is particularly revealing when applied to the upper Tennessee Valley during the Franklin separatist movement. Roth states, “If no government can establish uncontested authority and impose law and order, if political elites are deeply divided and there is no continuity of power or orderly succession, men can . . . take up
arms on behalf of particular political factions or racial groups and kill without restraint."13

Following the American Revolution, the national government struggled under the weight of the severely restrictive Articles of Confederation, war debts, specie shortages (British pound), currency deflation, the loss of British markets, and the destruction of America’s urban centers of commerce and the merchant fleet. Additionally, the United States proved incapable of protecting its western frontier from Amerindian resistance movements, foreign threats (Spain and Great Britain), and Western separatists.14 The North Carolina state government found itself in a very similar situation during the postwar years. North Carolina’s political leadership confronted a growing postrevolutionary Cherokee resistance movement on its western fridges, significant war debt, and disaffected western communities.15 The dire economic and political situation of both the national and the North Carolina governments created a geopolitical climate in the upper Tennessee Valley that was clouded by uncertainty and fostered widespread citizen discontent.

The Franklin statehood movement emerged out of this political uncertainty and the policies enacted by both the Confederation Congress and the North Carolina Assembly aimed at solving these economic and diplomatic challenges. The beginning of the Franklin statehood movement was a direct result of a piece of North Carolina legislation aimed at ameliorating the state’s postrevolutionary economic crisis. One of the many strategies the national government developed to reduce the national debt required that states with sizeable tracts of western lands either cede their territory to the federal government or face the prospect of being saddled with steep taxes on these lands. The national government in turn planned to divide up the ceded western lands, sell the tracts, and use the proceeds to reduce the national debt. Beginning in 1780, several of these states, including New York (1780) and Virginia (1781), relinquished their western territory to the national government. North Carolina’s political leadership was divided over the western land-cession issue. Many of the state’s eastern political leaders argued that the state’s investments in infrastructural development and Indian diplomacy made the territory simply too valuable to turn over to the national government. However, with the intentionally obscured support of western political figures, including many future leaders of the state of Franklin, the state finally ceded its western lands with the passage of the Cession Act in April 1784.16
Despite the fact that many of the leading men of the upper Tennessee Valley lobbied and voted in support of the Cession Act, after the legislation’s passage, many of the region’s political and economic leading figures publicly criticized the legislation and used manufactured outrage to promote the creation of a new state out of their communities. The first official discussion related to the creation of an independent state occurred just four months after the passage of the Cession Act. During the legislature’s August meeting in Jonesboro, the forty delegates to the as yet unnamed Franklin Assembly decried their “abandonment” by the state of North Carolina with the passage of the Cession Act, relayed their fears that they were being thrown to the Indian “savages,” and expressed their desire to form an independent state. As news of the Jonesboro meeting reached eastern North Carolina, the state’s political leadership quickly realized that western political and business leaders had duped them into passing the legislation. A few months later, North Carolina repealed the Cession Act, a decision that unleashed a wave of partisan anger across the Tennessee Valley and left many western residents unsure about who held political authority in their own neighborhoods.17
The decision to repeal the Cession Act triggered the December 1784 Jonesboro meeting, in which the first signs of political factionalism developed among the leaders of the upper Tennessee Valley. Proponents of statehood argued that the formation of a new state would allow them to direct their taxes toward improving their own regional infrastructure, encourage emigration into the region, and create a state government responsive to the demands of westerners. Former Revolutionary War hero turned Tennessee Valley politician John Sevier, a man destined to serve as the state of Franklin’s only governor, initially led the opposition to the statehood proposal. Sevier and other statehood opponents warned that political separatism was a very radical proposition and asserted that North Carolina’s expansion of backcountry defenses and repeal of the Cession Act eliminated the primary grievances of western residents. Despite his initial reluctance to support statehood, William Cocke, one of Sevier’s most trusted advisors and the state of Franklin’s most skilled diplomat, ultimately convinced Sevier to join the movement. By the closing of 1784, North Carolina’s passage and repeal of the Cession Act had opened a deep fissure that polarized the Tennessee Valley’s communities. A region once united by Indian warfare, the struggle for American independence, and a shared political and economic agenda succumbed to the political chaos and partisanship fostered by the North Carolina Assembly’s wavering western policies and the manipulative political machinations of an ambitious cabal of Tennessee Valley political and economic leading men.¹⁸

The political partisanship and regional instability that began with the Cession Act and statehood debates intensified the following year with the implementation of North Carolina’s “divide-and-conquer” strategy, designed to peaceably defeat the separatist movement from within the region; the debate over the Franklin constitution; and the emergence and growth of a determined anti-Franklinite faction. Over the state of Franklin’s brief existence, three North Carolina governors, Alexander Martin (1782–85), Richard Caswell (1785–87), and Samuel Johnston (1787–89), oversaw the state’s strategy for derailing the separatist movement. The Martin administration determined that the most effective approach for confronting the Franklinite government was to directly challenge the state’s leadership and rank and file. In February 1785, Governor Martin dispatched one of his military advisors, Major Samuel Henderson, to travel to the upper Tennessee Valley and apprise the governor of the level of citizen support for the statehood movement. Henderson also carried a letter from Martin to newly
elected Franklin governor John Sevier demanding an explanation for the separatist actions and stating unequivocally that the actions taken by the Franklinites were unconstitutional. Governor Sevier’s response to Martin’s letter laid out a number of reasons for the Franklinites’ declaration of independence and encouraged Martin to throw his support behind the admission of Franklin into the confederation of states. Just a few weeks prior to being replaced as governor, Martin issued a threatening public manifesto to the leaders and supporters of Franklin, rejecting the reasons for separation and warning that “far less causes have deluged States and Kingdoms with blood” and that the actions of the Franklinites could set a precedent for other groups to engage in “dangerous and unwarranted procedures” that might ultimately topple the new American Republic. Martin’s manifesto exacerbated an already chaotic political situation in the Tennessee Valley, and the Franklinites accused Martin of attempting to “create sedition and stir up insurrection among the good citizens of this State, thinking thereby to destroy that peace and tranquility that so greatly abounds among the peaceful citizens of the new happy country.” Martin’s address to the residents of the Tennessee Valley also galvanized a growing minority faction of anti-Franklinites under the leadership of Washington County resident John Tipton. Tipton sent a response to Martin’s manifesto offering to “continue to discountenance the lawless proceedings of my neighbors.” The Franklinites’ expression of concern for the intensification of communal factionalism and the Tiptonite response reveal the disruptive effects of political instability within the communities of the upper Tennessee Valley.¹⁹

As Franklin’s leadership warned of “sedition” and “insurrection” and Tipton and his supporters aligned themselves with the state of North Carolina, Richard Caswell began his term as North Carolina’s governor. In sharp contrast to Governor Martin’s confrontational handling of the Franklin affair, the Caswell administration initiated a much less threatening policy, aimed at defeating the separatist movement from within and avoiding the outbreak of violence. In what can best be described as a “divide-and-conquer” strategy, Caswell engaged in direct diplomacy with the leadership of Franklin, supported a parallel state bureaucracy with the upper Tennessee Valley, and repeatedly made offers to pardon the Franklinites if they restored their loyalties to the state of North Carolina. If the Caldwell policy unfolded as planned, it would reduce anti-North Carolina rhetoric, expand the growing faction of anti-Franklinites, and topple the Franklin government without loss of life or disruption to the regional economy.
Richard Caswell’s policy was also influenced by two underlying factors: his close personal and business relationship with John Sevier and his own financial interests in the upper Tennessee Valley. Governor Caswell owned sizeable tracts of land in the region and even went as far as to jointly speculate in land during the Franklin affair with his friend John Sevier.²⁰

Despite the effort to rely on diplomacy to peaceably undermine the Franklin movement, the expansion of support for the Tiptonites and the political competition and civic disruption fostered by the existence of a competing internal bureaucracy ultimately resulted in an intensification of regional partisanship and elevated the likelihood of violence. Beginning with the state and local elections of 1786, North Carolina maintained its own regional courts, polling stations, law-enforcement officials, and militia in the upper Tennessee Valley. As one Tennessee historian explains, the residents of the upper Tennessee Valley “were presented with the strange spectacle of two empires exercising at one and the same time over one and the same people.” Unsurprisingly, John Tipton and his loyalist supporters dominated the North Carolina–backed elections and political offices. Both factions conducted their own discrete 1786 regional elections without any real incidents of violence. The Franklinites and the Tiptonites erected polling stations, and the statehood issue dominated the political climate as the sides rallied under the banners of “new state” and “old state” men. In the end, the Franklinites and the Tiptonites elected their own slates of representatives, but the results reveal an intensification of political polarization, further destabilization of the region’s communities, and the effectiveness of Caswell’s divide-and-conquer strategy.²¹

Following the 1786 elections, political rancor escalated across the region and eventually sparked the first physical confrontations between Franklinite and Tiptonite partisans. Much of the initial violence surrounding the Franklin government resulted from the competing state bureaucracies and the subsequent legal confusion and challenges to regional political and economic hegemony. Both the Franklinites and the Tiptonites understood the economic importance of controlling the region’s courts and political offices. From deciding on which road construction projects to fund to recording land sales, backcountry courts stood as the seats of political, legal, and of course fiscal power in the upper Tennessee Valley. Additionally, state and county officials exerted tremendous power over the region’s political economy, and controlling the offices was paramount for both regional partisans.
As both factions sought to assert their own dominance over the region’s judicial system and local offices, the county courts became the sites of violent altercations. In Washington County, John Tipton held court at Buffalo, and James Sevier simultaneously presided over the Franklin court, just ten miles away in the town of Jonesboro. In the winter of 1786, Tipton and a group of approximately fifty men burst into Sevier’s Washington County courtroom, destroyed legal documents, and forced the court to shut down. In retaliation, the Franklinites targeted Tipton’s Buffalo court, destroying court documents and disrupting the proceedings. Remarkably, the first and only direct confrontation between the states’ two leading protagonists, John Sevier and John Tipton, occurred in a Jonesboro courtroom. After a verbal altercation between Sevier and Tipton, John Sevier struck Tipton with a cane, and Tipton countered with a flurry of punches. Bystanders managed to separate the two combatants, but the frequency of these types of courtroom brawls led one Tennessee Valley resident to quip that “families took lessons in pugilism from each other at public meetings.”

The office of sheriff also took on a heightened degree of importance and danger as the hardening of political positions increasingly sparked regional violence in and out of courtrooms. One such “recounter” occurred in the summer of 1787, when North Carolina’s Washington County sheriff, Jonathan Pugh, attempted to arrest John Sevier’s son James for failure to pay North Carolina taxes. When Franklin’s Washington County sheriff, Andrew Caldwell, received word of the impending arrest, he confronted Pugh in Jonesboro. After he “violently struck and abused” Pugh, Caldwell arrested the North Carolina sheriff, then “put him in prison and shut the door.” The significance of the altercation between the two Washington County sheriffs dramatically increased after John Sevier publicly pronounced that the Franklinites “paid no obedience to the laws of North Carolina” and that he personally “despised her [North Carolina’s] authority.” The Tiptonites swiftly responded to the assault and abuse of Sheriff Pugh. Flanked by a sizeable group of armed men, Tipton entered Jonesboro in search of Andrew Caldwell. Unable to locate the Franklin sheriff, the Tiptonites again raided the Jonesboro courthouse and destroyed court documents. The Tiptonite raid nearly plunged the entire region into civil war when an erroneous report circulated that John Sevier had been arrested and was being held at John Tipton’s Washington County farm. The Franklinites quickly organized a large militia of two hundred men and made plans to assault the Tipton farm. Fortunately, John Sevier managed to get
word to his armed supporters that he was not being held by Tipton, but the narrowly averted raid and the rapidity with which the region’s citizen-soldiers mustered to the apocryphal report reveal the unintended consequences of North Carolina’s divide-and-conquer tactics and the growing specter of backcountry violence.  

By the opening of 1788, the Franklin statehood movement stood on the precipice of collapse. The Franklinite diplomatic effort aimed at securing support for the state’s admission into the union failed despite the repeated attempts of the state’s most skilled diplomat, William Cocke. The Caswell administration’s strategy for toppling the Franklin government by fomenting internal divisions, quietly supporting the swelling opposition, and repeatedly dangling pardons, lucrative state positions, and tax concession had paid huge dividends. The number of anti-Franklinites continued to increase as the Franklin government slowly watched regional support fade and key members of its leadership return their loyalties to North Carolina. Despite the occasional flare-up of localized violence and the visceral feelings of fear and uncertainty that shrouded the region, the Caswell strategy seemed to succeed in minimizing the potential threat of an all-out civil war. However, the events that occurred in February 1788 proved just how illusory the Caswell strategy’s successes had been.

Predictably, the climactic clash between the Franklinites and the Tiptonites began as a result of the bureaucratic uncertainty created by the existence of two parallel state governments functioning simultaneously in the region and the partisan anger built up after nearly three years of political and legal wrangling. At the end of February, John Tipton ordered Washington County sheriff Jonathan Pugh to travel to John Sevier’s Plum Grove plantation and confiscate Sevier’s slaves as payment for delinquent North Carolina taxes. Tipton directed Pugh to remove Sevier’s slave property to his own farm on Sinking Creek. It is almost certain that John Tipton knew that his actions would provoke Sevier and his supporters, and the anti-Franklinite leader retreated to his home with over 50 armed loyalists, awaiting Sevier’s response. News of the confiscation of his slaves reached John Sevier as he mustered the Franklinite militia in preparation for a raid on the Overhill Cherokee towns dotting the lower Tennessee Valley. Sevier immediately ordered the Franklin militia to Tipton’s farm to restore the governor’s property. Approximately 150 Franklinite troops reached the Washington County farm on the morning of February 27, 1788, and quickly surrounded the Tiptonites barricaded in the farmhouse.
turn of Sevier’s slaves served as the impetus for the standoff, but both sides
realized that much more was at stake that frigid morning than simply pri-

vate property and unpaid taxes. Bolstered by Governor Caswell’s support
for the region’s North Carolina bureaucracy and blinded by seething anger
fueled by political partisanship, John Tipton’s actions stood as a direct chal-

lenge to Franklin’s political and economic sovereignty. Once again, the
Tiptonites attempted to enforce North Carolina laws and collect North
Carolina taxes in the state of Franklin. As the Franklin government strug-
gled to survive the winter of 1788, Sevier and his supporters knew that what
was unfolding on Tipton’s farm would have significant consequences for
the future of their statehood movement and their own political and eco-
nomic positions within the region.

While the Franklinite forces paraded outside of the home of their chief
political opponent, John Sevier instructed Colonel Henry Conway to carry
a flag of truce, accompanied by a demand that the Tiptonites surrender to
the Franklin militia and accept the legal authority of the state of Franklin.
Tipton responded to Sevier’s ultimatum, stating that “he begged no favours,
and if Sevier would surrender himself and leaders, they should have the ben-

efit of North Carolina Laws.” There was no mention of slave property or
taxes in these initial exchanges, and each side simply demanded that the
other accept their political authority. As the two political factions finally

faced off on the banks of Sinking Creek, nothing less than political and
economic control over the upper Tennessee Valley was at stake. After the
initial exchange, the Franklin militia set up camp and continued to march
menacingly around the Tipton property. As the sun set on the first day of the
siege, John Tipton managed to get word to his supporters relaying his dire
predicament, and a small detachment of troops under the command of Cap-
tain Peter Parkinson set off from Jonesboro to reinforce the Tiptonite forces.26

As night fell on the Tipton farm, the outbreak of hostilities commenced
with Franklinite forces firing on Parkinson’s troops. Despite a hail of bul-
lets from both sides, three horses were initially the evening’s only casualties.
As the Franklinite and Tiptonite troops continued to exchange fire, two
women inside the Tipton home attempted to flee the “fiery fracas” under
the cover of darkness. One of these women escaped unharmed, but the
other, Rachel Devinsly, “received a ball through her shoulder” and became
the only human casualty of the opening round of the Battle of Franklin.
The next morning (February 28), additional North Carolina loyalist troops
from neighboring Sullivan County received word of the backcountry standoff. After dispatching a small force to halt the advance of these Tiptonite reinforcements, John Sevier sent a second flag of truce, requesting that the anti-Franklinites submit to the authority of the state of Franklin. Tipton again refused, informing Sevier that “all I wanted was a submission to the laws of North Carolina, and if they would acquiesce with this proposal I would disband my troops here and countermand the march of the troops from Sullivan.” Once again, these exchanges reveal the efforts of Sevier and Tipton to assert their state’s authority in a region gripped by three years of political instability. As each side proved incapable of breaking the diplomatic impasse, troops from both political factions made preparations for the impending pitched battle.27

As a strong winter snowstorm cloaked the region in a cover of whiteness, John Sevier dispatched a small detachment of troops commanded by his two sons, John and James, to intercept the Sullivan County reinforcements before they could rendezvous at the Tipton farm. Less than three hundred yards from the Tipton farm, the small expedition led by the Sevier sons encountered some of the Sullivan County Tiptonites. After briefly exchanging fire with a portion of the Tiptonite reinforcements, the Franklinite forces quickly reversed course and sped back through a blinding snowstorm to rejoin the main body of militia troops. The appearance of the Sullivan County reinforcements outside of the Tipton farm offered the anti-Franklinite men a long-awaited opportunity to attack Sevier’s Franklin militia and break the siege. A witness to the events that morning described what transpired next: “A great body of Sullivan men attacked him [Sevier] with heavy firing, and rushed among them, took a number of prisoners, arms, saddles, and dispersed the whole of the Franklinites.” As the Sullivan County forces engaged the Franklinites, John Tipton and the remainder of the barricaded Tiptonites “sailed out [of the farmhouse] and drove them [the Franklinites] from their ground without much resistance.” The rapid turn of events caught the Franklinites off guard and forced their leader John Sevier, who was a few miles from the farm at the time of the engagement, to “retreat without his boots.”28

Both factions suffered several casualties during the Battle of Franklin. Franklinite John Smith sustained a fatal shot to the thigh, and Henry Polley and Gasper Fant each received devastating wounds to their extremities. During their hasty retreat, the Franklinites’ delaying fire led to the deaths
of Washington County sheriff Jonathan Pugh and Sullivan County militiaman John Webb, as well as the wounding of Captain William Delancy and John Allison. Slowed by the driving snowstorm, the troops under the command of John Sevier and James Sevier finally reached the Tipton farm shortly after the Franklinite retreat. The Franklinites rode “up to the camp [with] Col. Sevier’s flag still flying,” unaware of the “sudden & complete change in affairs that had taken place during their brief absence.” As they approached the Tipton home, “a volley of guns arrested them and some few, amazed & wondering were pulled from their horses & called in to surrender, among them, James & John Sevier [Jr.] & their cousin John Sevier.” Shortly after their capture, Governor Sevier learned of the fate of his family and sent John Tipton a message “asking [for] his life [and that] of his parties” and agreeing to “submit to the Laws of the State” of North Carolina. After initially threatening to hang Sevier’s two sons, John Tipton released the members of the Sevier family and accepted John Sevier’s capitulation.29

Despite the repeated diplomatic failures, the crushing military defeat on the fields of John Tipton’s farm, the near-complete collapse of the state government, and Governor Sevier’s promise to restore his loyalty to North Carolina, the Battle of Franklin did not signal the end of either the upper
Tennessee Valley’s political instability or the violence surrounding the Franklinite movement. Throughout the remainder of 1788, significant support for Sevier and the separatist movement remained in the newest Franklin counties in the lower Tennessee Valley. Driven by valuable and contested land claims, Sevier, Blount, and Greene County residents continued to support the Franklin government. Even the replacement of moderate governor and Sevier associate Richard Caswell by political hardliner Samuel Johnston a few months prior failed to persuade Sevier and the Franklinite holdouts to submit to North Carolina’s authority. Bolstered by a significant faction of regional loyalists, and despite a warrant being issued for his arrest for treason by the state of North Carolina, John Sevier refused to uphold his promise to “abide by the laws” of North Carolina and even made a failed attempt “to raise a militia of their party to march against Colonel Tipton.” In response, John Tipton requested “a few volunteers to quell the Insurrection” and “save [the region] from future bloodshed” from neighboring Washington County, Virginia. The existence of an arrest warrant also did not deter Sevier from frequent visits to Jonesboro and its neighboring communities. The day before his arrest for treason, the former governor of Franklin (Sevier’s term expired in March 1788) entered the town of Jonesboro with a group of ten to twelve armed men on horseback. The group eventually stopped at the home of David Deaderick, who was being visited by former Franklin sheriff Andrew Caldwell. Deaderick described what unfolded that afternoon in a deposition taken by North Carolina justice of the peace William Cox. According to Deaderick, Sevier demanded “Whiskey or Rum” from him. Upon learning that Deaderick had no alcohol, Sevier asked Caldwell “nearly the same respecting Liquor,” and the former sheriff also “informed him he had none.” Sevier then became angry and “began to abuse this place, then its inhabitants without distinction.” Deaderick and Caldwell confronted Sevier, asking him “if he aimed that discourse or abuse at” them. Sevier answered, “Yes, at you or anybody else,” and then called Deaderick “a son of a Bitch.” Deaderick replied “[that Sevier] was a dead son of a Bitch, and stepped close to Sevier, who immediately drew out his pistol.” The altercation eventually spilled out into the Jonesboro street, where Sevier accused Caldwell of owing him money, pulled his pistol, and threatened to shoot him. As Sevier waved his pistol in the air at Caldwell, the gun discharged and wounded Richard Collier, an innocent onlooker. Sevier and his men quickly fled the scene of the shooting, but the incident highlights the continued threat of violence surround-
ing the separatist movement. The fact that Sevier turned his weapon on a former ally also reveals the political instability that continued to breed violence in the region’s communities.\(^{30}\)

Shortly after the Jonesboro shooting, John Tipton and a small posse of a dozen men, armed with a North Carolina arrest warrant, tracked Sevier down at the home of a Franklinite widow. With John Sevier accused of “High Treason in levying troops to oppose the Laws and Government of this State” and using “an armed force [to] put to death several good Citizens” by the Johnston administration, North Carolina and its Tennessee Valley loyalists finally arrested him. Tipton initially proposed hanging Sevier on the spot but eventually agreed to allow his political rival to be transferred across the mountains to stand trial in the eastern North Carolina community of Morganton. Despite Sevier’s appeal to remain in Washington County to stand trial, the Tiptonites shackled the Franklinite leader, paraded him in front of Tiptonite supporters, and finally transported him to the Burke County jail to await trial. The Tiptonites turned their prisoner over to Burke County sheriff William Morrison, a former Revolutionary War soldier who had fought under Sevier at the Battle of King’s Mountain; Morrison immediately released the prisoner from his irons and escorted him to the nearest tavern. A short time later, Sevier and a small group of Franklin supporters simply rode out of Morganton and returned to their communities in the upper Tennessee Valley. The former governor of the state of Franklin never stood trial for his participation in the Battle of Franklin or the Jonesboro shooting.\(^{31}\)

Sevier’s arrest signaled the effective end of the Franklin statehood movement and with it a decrease in violence within the Tennessee Valley communities. As former separatists, including John Sevier, returned their loyalties to North Carolina, with many reclaiming their former political and civic positions within state and local government, the political instability that had fueled regional violence subsided. However, the fear and threats of violence resulting from white encroachment, land speculation, and the former state of Franklin’s aggressive and uncompromising Indian policies continued to plague the region. Even as the Tennessee Valley communities experienced some level of internal political stabilization, the Overhill and Chickamauga Cherokees remained determined and defiant in the face of a rapidly expanding American population. Only slightly less significant than the impact of political destabilization and economic competition, this Am-
Amerindian resistance movement played a central role in creating the perception and reality of backcountry disorder.  

Relations between the upper Tennessee Valley’s white settlers and the region’s dominant Amerindian group, the Overhill Cherokees, remained confrontational throughout the eighteenth century. From the first appearance of Euroamerican settlers in the region, the Overhill Cherokees had struggled to defend their territory and villages from white encroachment by utilizing a sophisticated plan that combined strategic territorial and trade concessions, direct diplomatic engagement, and targeted martial resistance. The Overhill Cherokee policy directly led to the fragmentation of their own Tennessee Valley communities; served as an underlying impetus for the Franklin separatist movement; and, most important, contributed to the endemic fear and violence that dominated the trans-Appalachian backcountry.

Beginning with the 1773 lease agreement between the region’s earliest Watauga settlers, the Overhill Cherokee leadership embraced at least some level of territorial concessions to Euroamerican westerners in the Tennessee Valley. The first significant Cherokee-white land sale in the region occurred in 1775, when Richard Henderson, a former North Carolina judge and successful land speculator, secured twenty million acres from the Cherokees for two thousand English pounds and ten thousand pounds’ worth of trade goods. At that time, the Henderson Purchase stood as the largest private land deal in American history and initiated a wave of land sales between the Overhill Cherokees and the region’s leading land speculators. Not all of the Overhill Cherokee leadership agreed with the territorial transactions. Cherokee chief Dragging Canoe denounced the land deals and eventually broke away from the Overhill Cherokee alliance, establishing separate Indian towns on the banks of Chickamauga Creek. Under the leadership of Dragging Canoe, the Chickamauga Cherokees refused to accept the territorial treaties with American westerners and launched a bloody resistance movement that targeted Tennessee Valley western settlements, land surveyors, and mountain travelers.

The backcountry chaos reaped by Dragging Canoe’s Chickamauga warriors forced western settlers to expand and improve their backcountry defenses. As the intensity of the Cherokee-white conflict raged during the second half of the eighteenth century, increased western demands for funding for internal improvements in order to construct and bolster backcountry forts, pay and equip militia companies, and bribe Amerindian leaders
placed considerable strains on Euroamerican governments. This financial burden, created by western demands for internal improvements and the expenses associated with Indian diplomacy and warfare following the French and Indian War, served as one of the primary causes that led the British government to enact the Proclamation of 1763. One of the most important and controversial provisions of the 1763 colonial legislation established a boundary line, roughly following the Appalachian Mountain chain, between white western settlements and Native American territory. The colonial legislation reserved the territory west of the Proclamation Line for Amerindian residents and forbade western land speculation and settlement in the region. According to historian Woody Holton, these British colonial concessions to the indigenous westerners and the obstacles the policies presented to western land speculation served as one of the determining factors cementing backcountry resident’s patriot loyalties during the American Revolution.34 Following the Revolution, the new American government and several state governments resumed the British policy of Amerindian diplomacy and compromise. During the Franklin affair, the state of North Carolina passed legislation that attempted to establish and protect Native American territorial reserves from western land speculators and squatters. This shift in state Indian policy did not go unnoticed by the political and economic leadership of the upper Tennessee Valley and quietly emerged as one of the key factors behind the Franklin separatist movement. Although this was never stated explicitly, the leaders of the Franklin movement believed that the establishment of an independent state government would allow them to replace North Carolina’s conciliatory Indian policy with a much more aggressive strategy aimed at forcing further land concessions and eventually driving the region’s native people from the Tennessee Valley. The coupling of a sophisticated and determined Cherokee resistance movement, the national and the North Carolina governments’ Indian diplomacy, and Franklin’s aggressive and threatening Native American policy resulted in high levels of postrevolutionary Indian-white violence across the Tennessee Valley backcountry.35

A brief survey of Indian-white relations during the Franklin period illustrates the violent consequences of the collision of Indian resistance and Franklinite policies. Shortly after the establishment of the Franklin government, the Tennessee Valley separatists revealed their contentious Amerindian policy during their earliest Indian treaty negotiations. In the summer of 1785, a small delegation of Franklinites, including John Sevier, Joseph
Hardin, Luke Boyer, Ebenezer Alexander, Joshua Gist, and Alexander Outlaw, parlayed with Overhill Cherokee leaders at the mouth of Dumplin Creek in an effort to purchase a sizeable swath of Indian land. The negotiations surrounding the Treaty of Dumplin Creek established the basic contours of Franklinites Indian diplomacy. The Franklinites aggressively demanded land concessions from the Cherokee leaders and made few if any concessions of their own. The Franklinites all but guaranteed favorable treaty terms by excluding Cherokee leaders critical of further land sales from the negotiations and threatening violence if those chiefs in attendance failed to acquiesce to their demands. Whether the Indian representatives’ action was pragmatic or not, the huge Cherokee tract of land they sold at Dumplin Creek further enflamed Chickamauga Cherokee anger and emboldened Franklin’s political leaders.

As reports of backcountry violence perpetrated by both whites and Indians and the Dumplin Creek negotiations reached political leaders in North Carolina and New York, U.S. Indian agents drafted plans for a large Indian treaty council to be held at Hopewell, South Carolina. The negotiations and agreements reached at Hopewell provide a striking contrast to the Treaty of Dumplin Creek. First, the U.S. Indian agents and Cherokee diplomats did not include either the Franklinites or the Chickamauga Cherokees in the meetings. However, the U.S. government did invite all of the other tribal leaders, including over a thousand additional representatives from Cherokee towns. From November 18 through November 29, 1785, Benjamin Hawkins, Joseph Martin, Andrew Pickens, and Lachlan McIntosh, the congressionally appointed Indian commissioners, engaged the Cherokees in a series of talks that proved to be far more equitable and compromising than the Dumplin Creek parleys. While territorial issues remained at the forefront of these talks, the maintenance of peaceful backcountry relations also stood out as a diplomatic priority. Additionally, the U.S. negotiators at Hopewell accepted the concept of Cherokee territorial sovereignty and included a provision that allowed the Indians to force white squatters off of their lands.

Although the Treaty of Hopewell was perceived as a great diplomatic victory by the Cherokees, it created a backlash that accelerated backcountry violence across the Tennessee Valley. The treaty contained provisions that restored Overhill Cherokee lands in the region by disavowing earlier controversial and often coerced land cessions. The Hopewell negotiators also agreed to disallow the recently signed Treaty of Dumplin Creek and return
these lands to Cherokee control. The return of the Dumplin Creek lands to
the Cherokees meant that several of the state of Franklin’s most significant
towns and communities, including the new Franklin capital of Greeneville,
now rested in Cherokee territory. As news of the Hopewell Treaty terms
reached the state of Franklin, the state’s political leadership quickly rejected
the Cherokee land restoration and maintained the validity of the Dumplin
Creek land purchases. The Treaty of Hopewell and the resulting threats to
Franklinite land claims and individual wealth strengthened regional sup-
port for the separatist government and Franklinite resolve to maintain and
expand the state’s geographic boundary. Simultaneously, the treaty bol-
stered the Overhill Cherokees’ resistance efforts by dubiously giving the
tribe’s leadership confidence that they could count on support from the
United States and the state of North Carolina in their efforts to defend their
communities and lands. The diplomatic and economic reverberations from
Hopewell all but ensured the escalation of backcountry violence as both the
Franklinites and the Cherokees struggled to come to grips with the terms of
the treaty.\(^{38}\)

Throughout the remainder of the state of Franklin’s existence, the Over-
hill Cherokees and American communities experienced perpetual back-
country warfare and faced the constant threat of violence. The Franklinites
simply ignored the provisions of the Treaty of Hopewell and the United
States’ and North Carolina’s conciliatory Native American policies and con-
tinued to encourage their citizens to purchase and settle on Dumplin Creek
lands. Despite the protestations of Cherokee leaders, white encroachment on
Cherokee land continued apace. The inability (or perhaps unwillingness) of
the national and North Carolina governments to enforce the provisions of
Hopewell and remove Franklinite squatters from Cherokee lands predict-
ably led Chickamauga Cherokee leaders Dragging Canoe and métis John
Watts to initiate a series of backcountry raids across the Tennessee Valley. In
1786, Watts and a force of nearly a thousand Chickamauga Cherokee war-
rriors raided settlements near the community of Knoxville. In response,
Franklinite militia forces under the command of John Sevier attacked and
burned a number of Overhill Cherokee towns a few months later. This cycle
of retaliatory violence defined Indian-Franklin relations from 1786 through
1788 and left hundreds of Cherokee and American casualties and decimated
communities across the Tennessee Valley.\(^{39}\)

Amid the escalating Indian-white warfare, two significant events oc-
curred that further fanned the flames of backcountry violence. In the face
of increasing demands for additional Indian land transactions from regional land speculators and commercial farmers, the Franklin government initiated another round of treaty negotiations with the Overhill Cherokees in the summer of 1786. Relying on the same tactics of selective chief invitation and threats of violence, Franklin diplomats pressured Cherokee leaders into selling another large area of land. The Treaty of Coyatee not only governed the sale of Indian lands but also contained extraordinarily threatening language warning against any future Cherokee resistance to white encroachment. The Franklin diplomats warned the Overhill Cherokees in attendance not to resist their territorial expansion or “kill any of our people,” for the consequences of such actions would lead to the destruction of “the town that does the Mischief.”

The signing of the Treaty of Coyatee, the opening of a Franklin land office in order to divide and sell former Cherokee lands, and the renewal of Indian diplomacy with the Cherokees by both the U.S. and North Carolina governments triggered another round of Indian raids and American counterattacks during the final months of 1786. The year 1787 witnessed a further intensification of backcountry violence perpetrated by both whites and Indians that climaxed in the spring of 1788 with a particularly gruesome set of murders that eventually sparked outrage on both sides of the Appalachian Mountains and hastened the downfall of the Franklin government. In May 1788, a Cherokee named Slim Tom viciously hacked down eleven members of the Kirk family, living just a few miles from the Overhill Cherokee capital of Chota on the Tennessee River. According to the only surviving member of the family, John Kirk, Slim Tom, “with a party of Sattigo [Citico] and other Cherokee Indians,” fell upon his family; “murdered my mother, brothers and sisters in cold blood”; and mutilated the “smiling faces” of the Kirk children. In response, John Sevier mustered the Franklin militia and prepared to retaliate against Overhill Cherokee towns. Accompanied by a vengeful John Kirk and facing little resistance from the Indians, the Franklinite forces attacked a number of Overhill Cherokee towns. After burning several towns and killing dozens of Indians, the Franklinites turned their attention to the Overhill Cherokee town of Chilhowe, unfortunately the hometown of Slim Tom. After laying siege to the town, the Franklinites invited two Cherokee chiefs, Old Tassel and Old Abraham, who just happened to be meeting in Chilhowe at the time of the attack, to meet with them to discuss terms of peace. Both Cherokee chiefs, who were widely known to be among the Cherokees’ strongest proponents...
of peace, agreed to meet with the Franklinites in John Sevier’s tent. As the two Cherokee leaders and their party approached the Franklinitite encampment, “[John Kirk and James Hubbard] fell on the Indians, killed the Tassel, Hanging Man [sic], Old Abram, his son, Tassell’s [sic] brother, and Hanging-Man’s [sic] brother, and took in Abram’s wife and daughter—brought in 14 Scalps.” Under a flag of truce, the Franklinites cut down the two Cherokee leaders most dedicated to amity and effectively undermined any chance for the cessation of backcountry violence. Despite Sevier’s protestation that he was absent when Kirk and Hubbard murdered the Cherokee chiefs, the events that transpired that May morning were widely condemned by the U.S. administration and the political leadership of North Carolina. After receiving support from the U.S. Congress, North Carolina governor Samuel Johnston issued an arrest warrant for Sevier and the other members of the Franklin militia involved in the murders. Despite Sevier’s eventual acquittal of the crime, the Kirk and Cherokee chief murders derailed any possibility of ending backcountry violence in the region. Sadly, the ramifications of the Franklinitite Indian policies and the Cherokee resistance movement continued to breed violence, death, and destruction in the Tennessee Valley long after the collapse of the state of Franklin.

This brief history of the state of Franklin leaves little doubt that the separatist movement was engulfed in near-perpetual violence during its less than four-year existence. Racked by political instability and internal factionalism fostered by economic and political competition, North Carolina’s divide-and-conquer diplomatic strategy, and a determined and well-supported antistatehood faction; the communities of the upper Tennessee Valley constantly faced the threat of civil strife and bloodshed. The addition of a resolute and effective Cherokee resistance movement that relied upon diplomacy and warfare to halt territorial encroachment and to defend Cherokee backcountry communities further escalated the level of fear and violence in the region. Despite efforts to offer ethnic, cultural, and geographic explanations for the persistence of backcountry violence in the region, these are the primary factors that underlie the “effusions of blood” in the upper Tennessee Valley following the American Revolution.

Notes

The author wishes to thank Randy Roth for sharing his work and insight into the nature and causes of frontier violence.


12. There are a number of works that have advanced the argument of southern Appalachia’s antebellum market capitalism and regional and national economic, political, and cultural connections. These include John C. Inscoe, Mountain Masters: Slavery and the Sectional Crisis in Western North Carolina (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1989); Dunaway, First American Frontier; Dunn, Cades Cove; L. Scott Philyaw, Virginia’s Western Visions: Political and Cultural Expansion on an Early American Frontier (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2004); Robert D. Mitchell, Commercialism and Frontier: Perspectives on the Early Shenandoah Valley (Chattanooga: University Press of Georgia, 1977).


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Archives; Clark, State Records of North Carolina, 22: 642–47; Alexander Martin to John Tipton, Apr. 25, 1785, King’s Mountain Papers (DD); Sevier countermanifesto, May 14, 1785, “Letters concerning the independence of the State of Franklin,” North Carolina State Archives; “State of Franklin: A Proclamation,” May 15, 1785, Newspaper Abstracts (JJ), Draper Manuscript Collection; Williams, History of the Lost State, 72–73; Alexander Martin to John Tipton, Apr. 25, 1785, King’s Mountain Papers (DD).


26. Barksdale, Lost State of Franklin, 130–33; Alderman, Overmountain Men, 223–24; Cox and Cox, History of Washington County Tennessee, 87–88; Franklin Government, Lyman Draper, Draper’s Notes (S), Draper Manuscript Collection; Ramsey, Annals of Tennessee, 406–7; Williams, History of the Lost State, 198–201; Clark, State Records of North Carolina, 22: 691–93, 714; deposition from John
Tipton and others, Aug. 20, 1788; “Extract of a letter from a gentleman in the new State of Franklin,” Winchester Advertiser, Mar. 1788, Newspaper Extracts (JJ); Franklin Government, Lyman Draper, Draper’s Notes (S).

27. Barksdale, Lost State of Franklin, 133–34; deposition from John Tipton and others, Aug. 20, 1788; Clark, State Records of North Carolina, 22: 691–93; “Extract of a letter from a gentleman in the new State of Franklin,” Mar. 1788; Franklin Government, Lyman Draper, Draper’s Notes (S); Alderman, Overmountain Men, 224–25; George Maxwell and John Tipton to Arthur Campbell, Mar. 12, 1788, King’s Mountain Papers (DD); Williams, History of the Lost State, 201.


29. Franklin Government, Lyman Draper, Draper’s Notes (S); “Extract of a letter from a gentleman in the new State of Franklin,” Mar. 1788; deposition from John Tipton and others, Aug. 20, 1788; Maxwell and Tipton to Campbell, Mar. 12, 1788; Haywood, Civil and Political History of Tennessee, 192–94; Bond of Andrew Hains (Haynes), John Sevier Jr., and James Sevier, Mar. 1, 1788, Paul Fink Collection, W. L. Eury Collection, Appalachian State University; Clark, State Records of North Carolina, 22: 691–93.


