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CONSENT AND THE SUBJECTIVE WORLD OF THE WORKER [1]

by

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CONSENT AND THE SUBJECTIVE WORLD OF THE WORKER

Marty Laubach and Michael Wallace
Research in Sociology of Work

Research Paper

Purpose:
This study tests three theories of determinants of workers' subjective response to work situations – structural factors (measured by individual, organization and job characteristics), general disposition, or informal work arrangements as constructed by Laubach's (2005) "consent deal."

Design/methodology/approach:
Data were obtained from the Indiana Quality of Employment Survey, a survey of workers covering general working conditions. We constructed 10 models regressing worker perceptions and attitudes (e.g. satisfaction, relations with supervisors, meaningfulness) on structural determinants. We then used structural equation modeling to identify an underlying factor representing a general worker response from elements of the attitudes and perceptions. Finally, we regressed a scalar version of the general response factor on the structural determinants using the previous models.

Findings: We identified a single second order latent factor underlying the 10 attitudes and perceptions which represented the "general subjective response" of workers. This supported the concept of a dispositional effect. We then found that structural factors had a minimal effect on the subjective response, but that informal arrangements had a very strong effect. This undermined the first two theories and supported the third.

Implications: Worker attitudes and perceptions are very resilient to different formal work arrangements but are highly influenced by the informal arrangements negotiated between workers and front-line management. Organizations can have the strongest effect on developing worker support by empowering front-line managers to make informal deals on workplace rules.

Originality/value: This study offers a means to probe the relationship between formal and structural and the informal and subjective worlds of the workplace.

Key words: workplace consent, worker subjectivity, formal structure, informal structure, structural equation models, second order latent factor.

INTRODUCTION

Consent is a recurring, but understudied, concept in the sociological literature on the workplace. In this chapter, we trace the intellectual history of worker consent as emanating from the informal organization of work and demonstrate how it affects the subjective experience of the worker. We argue that the "consent deal" results from tacit, ongoing negotiations between managers and workers in which managers exchange autonomy, schedule flexibility, and voice in decision-making in return for organizational commitment from workers. This consent deal results in a tripartite stratification of the workplace into (a) the "administrative clan"—a network of workers that cuts across hierarchical strata that is managed by normative control and who display high commitment; (b) the "conventional core"—the majority of workers who are managed by bureaucratic control and offer moderate commitment; and (c) the "extended periphery"—workers who are managed by strict personal or technical control and who return minimal commitment.

The administrative clan is a privileged social network that can be identified in almost every work site of sufficient size whose members effectively run the organization. Members of this network are characterized as having high levels of autonomy, flexibility, voice, and commitment despite having sometimes quite different formal job responsibilities and positions in the formal authority structure. Previous research has demonstrated that informal organization as measured by the consent deal has a significant positive effect on objective work outcomes like wages (Laubach 2005). In this chapter, we examine how consent structures the subjective rewards of the worker. Our findings suggest that the consent is a key factor in shaping workers' subjective experience—advantaging some workers and disadvantaging others—net of other

structural variables. We conclude by discussing the implications of our study for future research on the workplace.

THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE CONSENT DEAL

Ever since Mayo's (1933) famous aphorism that "a happy worker is a productive worker," organizational behaviorists have been motivated to learn more about workers' subjective experience of the workplace. Departing from Taylor's (1911) scientific management approach that prevailed in earlier decades, Mayo's human relations movement sought to design the workplace in ways that enhanced workers' job satisfaction in hopes that workers who felt they were performing meaningful, enjoyable, and important jobs would work more efficiently and profitably. At its core, Mayo's approach centered on manipulating the structural and physical conditions of work, but stopped short of granting workers genuine voice or participation in the work process, believing that to be the exclusive prerogative of management. Mayo's interest in job satisfaction spawned a growth industry of research on diverse aspects of workers' subjective experience, including organizational commitment (e.g., Mowday et al.1982; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990; Mathieu and Zajac 1990), organizational equity and justice (e.g., Leventhal 1980; Organ 1990; Greenberg 1990), and eventually a conception of organizations as systems of exchange, norms, and shared meanings constructed by management (see Pfeffer 1981). Within business management circles, this research motivated various initiatives designed to improve productivity such as "job enrichment," "worker participation," "supportive leadership," and "pursuit of excellence" – most of which met with similarly dubious results (see Hackman and Lawler 1971; Staw 1986).

Mayo's legacy continues today with research into such diverse areas as negative affectivity (Barsky et al 2004), psychological ownership (Van Dyne and Pierce 2004), workplace

empowerment (Laschinger et al 2004), and expectations of organizational mobility (Pearce and Randel 2004) – all reflecting Mayo's central assumption that management can improve productivity by tweaking the formal arrangements of work and making workers happier.

An opposing viewpoint argues that workers' subjective perceptions cannot be so easily manipulated by management to influence productivity (Staw and Ross 1985; Staw 1986; Staw and Cohen-Charash 2005). This approach argues that workers exhibit a constellation of workplace attitudes that are highly correlated with each other, but that these attitudes are dispositional rather than situational. In other words, workers are predisposed to be satisfied or dissatisfied, fulfilled or alienated, committed or uncommitted, and there is little managers can do to alter this fundamental disposition or personality trait. These theorists argue that such attitude sets display long-term stability in workers over time and across different jobs, which suggests that management interventions are unlikely to improve workers' job satisfaction. Staw (1986:44) frames this argument around advice given by a friend to his children: "their most important decision in life would be whether they wanted to be happy or not; everything else is malleable enough to fit the answer to this question."

Proponents of this dispositional approach might agree with Mayo that a happy worker is a productive worker, but they would disagree with the organizational behaviorists that management can manipulate organizational structures to improve workers' job satisfaction. The best managers can hope for, according to the dispositional theorists, is to use psychological tests to weed out those workers predisposed not to be happy (Staw and Ross 1985). In fact, the practice of pre-employment personality screening has "skyrocketed" over the last several years (Pepper et al. 2005). While much of this discussion has focused on the effects on job satisfaction, there is a clear assumption that job satisfaction is at the center of a wider constellation of

perceptions and attitudes that constitute worker dispositions. Further, such dispositions dominate workers' generalized subjective response to the workplace.[2]

A third perspective on workers' subjective states eventually evolved into the informal organization approach. This perspective started with Barnard's (1938) observations describing the informal organization of work as rooted in workers' "willingness to cooperate" and Roethlisberger and Dickson's (1939 [1967]) work linking worker "sentiments," independent of management interventions, to variations in productivity at the Hawthorne plant. Some proponents of this approach tried to steer research in the informal organization tradition into a direction that Mayo might have endorsed. For instance, Ouchi and Wilkens (1985:464) believed that the goal was "to find that large, complex organizations can be made orderly, responsive to top management, and 'rational' in serving the purposes of their owners." Similarly, Graham and Organ (1993:494) focused on conditions giving rise to "clan" or "covenantal" organizational forms that would elicit from workers "any form of contribution, any reasonable exertion of effort, and any tolerable sacrifice." This alignment of worker motivations with management interests, constructed within a spirit of cooperation, efficaciously supplied "an appropriate rule to govern any possible decision, thus producing a very elegant and complete form of control" (Ouchi 1980:139). From this logic, Kunda (1992:11) derived his labor control theory that

[2] Detractors of this perspective (see Gerhart 2005) point to the checkered history of personality tests in job selection. They further note that the personality literature has found that processes involved in keeping attitudes stable (disposition) and changing attitudes are often "orthogonal," suggesting that interventions in the workplace could be successful.

centered on "normative control," through which workers "are driven by internal commitment, strong identification with company goals, intrinsic satisfaction from work."

But other expressions of the informal organization perspective argued that worker subjectivity is dependent on deeper processes that lie beneath the formal and rational structures of organizations that management controls. This tradition focuses on worker consent as the dominant factor influencing workers' subjective experience in the workplace.[3] This variant of informal organization theory draws on early findings from researchers like Gouldner (1954:221) who noted that an important component of consent was the perception by workers that they had "some measure of control over the initiation and administration of the rules." Gouldner (1954:173) surmised that this "measure of control" was rooted in an informal arrangement with supervisors, and that workers recognized that "formal rules gave supervisors something with which they could 'bargain' in order to secure informal cooperation from workers."

In a variation of this perspective, Burawoy (1979:xii) acknowledged management's coercive power in the capitalist enterprise, but asserted nonetheless that the smooth and efficient production desired by management required of workers "an element of spontaneous consent." In *Manufacturing Consent*, he focused on the machine shop game of "making out" in which workers produced above quota levels to earn incentive pay and banked extra production into a kitty from which they would draw when their production lagged below quota levels. As a worker

[3] While these and other ethnographic accounts view consent as the central dynamic of the workplace, it should be remembered that this is but one aspect of informal organization of the workplace. One goal of a broader research agenda is to examine the interplay among these multiple features of informal organization and identify their separate influences on subjective experiences and material outcomes of workers.

in the machine shop, Burawoy found that proficiency in playing the game provided a basis for informal status among workers and served as a distraction from the routine and monotony of the job. However, Burawoy argued that by playing the game, workers were actively engaged in their own exploitation because consenting to the informal rules of the game amounted to acquiescing to the capitalist relations of production.

Burawoy further noted that the informal rules under which the game was constituted directly violated the formal procedures of the workplace and that upper management consistently admonished supervisors to prevent the banking of surplus production. But supervisors routinely ignored upper management's directives, believing that strict enforcement of formal rules would create tensions on the shop floor that would undermine the smoothness of the production process. As in Gouldner's (1954) study, Burawoy found that supervisors quietly acquiesced to the suspension of formal work rules in an effort to maintain acceptable levels of production. Ultimately, Burawoy contends that the game of making out pervades the entire process of production and creates the illusion that workers have real choices in their day-to-day activities under capitalism: "It is participation in choosing that generates consent" (Burawoy 1979:27).

This apparent disconnect between formal work rules and the informal arrangements which constitute the lifeblood of the workplace became the central point of Littler and Salaman's (1984) analysis of consent. They argue that "the subjectivity of the employee is – and must be – an inevitable ingredient in the organization of work, the achievement of production at work, in relations between managers and workers" (Littler and Salaman 1984:54). They echoed Barnard's point that formal structures cannot organize all of the necessary effort or realistically address all circumstances that might arise in production. Rather, the routinization of production requires some amount of give and take such as bending the rules to achieve extra effort. Workers

sometimes exploit this disconnect between formal and informal organization in a form of resistance called “working to rule” (see, for example, Garson 1988:102-103) in which they refuse to participate in this give and take, thereby disrupting production. Littler and Salaman characterize real work activities as the result of continual negotiations between workers and their supervisors over interpretations of formal work rules. When successful, this negotiation results in an exchange in which employers provide a flexible, humane work environment for workers in return for the work effort to achieve necessary levels of production (see also Baldamus 1961, for a discussion of the “effort bargain”). Ultimately, they conceptualize consent as the exchange of relaxed enforcement of formal work rules for alignment of workers’ motivations with the interests of management.

Laubach (2005) built on Littler and Salaman’s conception by defining consent in terms of an informal exchange. His ethnography of office workers suggested that the “the consent deal” consists of an informally negotiated exchange of *autonomy*, *schedule flexibility*, and *voice in decision-making* by managers for *organizational commitment* by workers. He noted that while the first three are generally conceived as objective, structural aspects of a worker’s position, when measured as self-reports in surveys of workers’ perceptions they evoke a subjective component that reflects the outcome of informal negotiations between workers and front-line managers. Thus, in surveys a secretary might express similar levels of autonomy as a middle manager, and two secretaries in similar formal positions might express vastly different levels of voice in decision-making. Laubach argued that while survey researchers might treat such discordant responses as “white noise,” in fact they might accurately convey genuine, deeper arrangements in the work culture. Laubach saw these informal arrangements as tacit, not articulated; that is, workers and managers did not formally negotiate bending the rules in

exchange for greater worker effort for to do so would breach formal legitimacy of their respective roles. Indeed, both workers and managers exerted more power when the arrangement was unspoken and subject to subtle recalibrations as circumstances change.

In essence, these arrangements constitute informal networks in the workplace that cut across the formal hierarchy and actually routinize and regulate the inherently conflictual nature of worker-manager relations. Laubach observed these negotiations result in managers informally applying different forms of control to workers at the same level within the same unit – similar to the "cadre" and "hired hand" continuum discussed in leader-member exchange literature (see Graen and Schiemann 1978; Lagace 1990). He found that this led to an informal structuring of the workforce – a tripartite stratification into what he called (a) the "administrative clan" – a network of workers that cut across function and hierarchical strata who exercised high levels of autonomy, flexibility and participation and were managed using normative control, (b) the "conventional core" – the majority of workers managed by bureaucratic control and offering moderate commitment, and (c) the "extended periphery" – workers laboring under the strictest personal or technical control and who return minimal commitment. Laubach's ethnographic observations indicated that this informal stratification translated into very real differences in status and power, and that it could be operationalized using the consent deal.

Laubach conceptualized the administrative clan as a privileged social network that extended beyond professional and managerial ranks which was present in one form or another in almost every work site he had either studied or participated in as a manager. Moreover, workers in almost every work setting intuitively recognize this network and can identify "insiders" and "outsiders" in their own workplaces. Members of this network are distinguishable by having high levels of all four of the consent deal characteristics—despite having sometimes quite different

job responsibilities and positions in the formal authority structure. The inclusion in the clan of members in lower formal positions—and the occasional exclusion of some members with high formal authority—argued that there was something going on beyond the conventionally understood relationship of structurally determined autonomy-producing commitment—i.e., something was producing both autonomy and commitment in structural positions where they would not be expected. This was especially evident when two clerical workers at the same formal structural level with the same formal job descriptions actually had very different responsibilities and would be treated very differently by coworkers, professionals, and managers. Furthermore, this differential treatment was for the most part accepted as legitimate by other workers and even something to be "earned."

Laubach concluded that that "something" that was producing both autonomy and commitment was the "consent deal," a tacit, informal understanding that the worker will give more if management bends certain work rules, specifically autonomy, scheduling, and participation. This tacit bending of the rules, negotiated on an ongoing basis between supervisors and workers, supersedes the formal structural characteristics of the job, and when measured by self-reports is often seen as statistical noise. Laubach's argument thus flies in the face of conventional wisdom that structurally-induced autonomy, schedule flexibility, and voice in decision-making create commitment. Rather, he claims that autonomy, commitment, flexibility, and voice are all simultaneously created by the consent deal.[4]

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[4] To further explicate this point, a manager whose director is replaced by someone who wants to bring in his or her own managerial staff will find quickly that formal structural position is no guarantor of autonomy, voice, and even schedule flexibility. Even in managerial and professional

Laubach's operationalization of the consent deal is thus a repackaging of familiar workplace elements that appear in studies of both formal (e.g. Edwards 1979; Ouchi 1980; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990; Graham and Organ 1993) and informal (e.g. Gouldner 1954; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) workplace stratification systems. Hodson's (2001) *Dignity at Work* reflects a similar orientation (see also Hodson 1996; Hodson and Roscigno 2004) and is of special interest to our study for several reasons. First, his analysis attempts to unify the experience of work under the overarching concept of worker dignity, an ambitious task to be sure, but one worthy of undertaking if we are to understand the complexities of the intersubjective world of work. Second, much of Hodson's discussion straddles the boundary between formal and informal aspects of the workplace and emphasizes the negotiated and contingent character of workplace outcomes. His approach emphasizes worker agency or "the active and creative performance of assigned roles in ways that give meaning and content to those roles beyond what is institutionally scripted" (Hodson 2001:16). Third, while the notion of consent is "buried" in Hodson's work, it is present nonetheless. His conceptualization of "citizenship behaviors" (see also Organ 1988) and "worker resistance" (Jermier, Knights and Nord 1995; Edwards and Scullion 1982) represent opposite poles on a continuum of worker consent (see Hodson 1999). For instance, Hodson's discussion of worker resistance centers on the "effort bargain" in which workers engage in a variety of behaviors to withhold cooperation from management (Hodson 2001:42, 62; see also Baldamus 1961; Edwards and Scullion

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positions, the level of components of the consent deal is more the outcome of ongoing supervisor-supervisee negotiation than formal position – even though the negotiations are expected to start with high levels.

1982:154). Finally, while Hodson acknowledges the importance of autonomy, participation, schedule flexibility, and organizational commitment[5] in various places in his theory of worker dignity, he does not conceptualize them, as we do, as components of the "consent deal" which we contend is the foundation for understanding the subjective world of the worker as well as the informal stratification of the workplace.

In this study, we follow Laubach's (2005) conceptualization of the consent deal as based on the informal exchange by employers of *perceived* autonomy, participation, and schedule flexibility, in return for organizational commitment (or "loyalty") by workers. This conceptualization permits that autonomy, participation, and schedule flexibility *measured as perceptions by workers* can diverge from the same characteristics measured as structural elements of the position. Using statistical models of workers' responses to a general survey of the workplace, we test the utility of the consent deal as an explanation for a range of subjective experiences of workers.

This analysis is conducted in two stages. In the first, we develop ten measures that tap diverse dimensions of workers' subjective experience. Then, controlling for variables tapping individual characteristics and structural and organizational features of the workplace, we

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[5] Hodson (1991) argues that autonomy (pp. 10-13) and participation (pp. 13-16) are key elements that are present in workplaces that support worker dignity. Schedule flexibility is related to overwork and excessive hours (pp. 75-76), which is viewed as an obstacle to dignity. And various aspects of organizational commitment such as commitment to organizational goals, pride in work, and extra effort (pp. 45-46) are cited as examples of worker citizenship behaviors that foster cohesion in the workplace and heightened productivity.

investigate how the consent deal, using Laubach's (2005) operationalization, impacts each of these subjective variables. If informal organization theory is supported, consent will have a strong positive effect on such outcomes as workers' perceptions of meaningful work, satisfaction with job security and technology, relations with supervisors and co-workers, and promotion and pay equity. It should have negative consequences on perceived discrimination, job stress, and self-estrangement. Moreover, these effects of consent should rival or exceed those of the structural variables. On the other hand if, as organizational behaviorists believe, management can tweak administrative procedures and work structures to improve worker perceptions and attitudes, then consent will have weaker or non-significant results compared to structural characteristics of organizations.

The second stage of our analysis articulates the assumption from the disposition research that there is a single latent factor underlying the measures of the worker's subjective world. Disposition theory would argue that this latent factor should be relatively uninfluenced by the situational factors specified in the model. We test this by specifying workers' subjective response using a second order measurement model, constructing it as a scalar variable, and estimating the relative effects of consent and the structural factors on it using the same model as for the ten original measures of subjective experience. For organizational behavior theory to be supported, structural factors must exert the strongest effect on workers' subjective response; however, if consent exerts the dominant effect on subjective experience, consent theory is supported. On the other hand, if none of the measures in the model exert a strong effect on the overall subjective response, both situational approaches – organizational behavior and informal organization – will be discredited as key factors influencing workers' subjective experiences, leaving disposition theory as the most viable explanation.

Our analysis follows the generalized workplace model portrayed in Figure 1. This model displays the key independent variables organized under individual characteristics, organizational characteristics, formal structural position and job characteristics, and informal position (i.e., the consent deal). The ten variables that measure different dimensions of the subjective experience of the workplace are shown as outcomes.

INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

METHODS AND DATA

In this analysis, we utilize the Indiana Quality of Employment Survey (IQES), which was conducted in the summer of 1996 using the facilities of the Center for Survey Research at the Indiana University Institute for Social Research Survey (see Wallace et al.1996). The IQES resulted in 705 respondents (84 percent response rate) from across Indiana selected randomly from working adults (defined as people over 18 working more than 20 hours per week) employed in non-agricultural jobs. In households where more than one member met the requirements of the sampling frame, a computer algorithm randomly selected the respondent who was interviewed. The survey instrument covered a broad spectrum of quality of employment issues and developed several scales with acceptable reliability levels (i.e., most scales used between three to five items). All measures used in the analysis (both individual items and scales) are shown in the Appendix.

The analysis for this paper was restricted to workers in organizations with 10 or more employees. Smaller organizations tend to be characterized by simpler management structures, higher face-to-face interaction, and bonds of loyalty that mitigate formal organization. We suspect that larger organizations, because of their size and complexity, are fertile ground for the intermingling of formal and informal organization. This restriction reduced the possible sample

from the IQES to 582 respondents, but this number was further reduced in individual models because of missing data on some of the variables.

Dependent Variables

We derived ten variables to measure diverse dimensions of the subjective experience of the workplace. These are meaningful work (the reverse of Blauner's [1964] concept of meaninglessness), satisfaction with job security, satisfaction with technology, relations with supervisors, relations with coworkers, promotion equity, pay equity, perceived discrimination, and self-estrangement (another dimension of alienation discussed by Blauner [1964]).

Measuring Consent

Following Laubach (2005), we model *consent* as a second order latent factor[6] comprised of four latent factors representing commonly discussed attributes of work: autonomy, voice in decision-making, schedule flexibility, and organizational commitment. We acknowledge that this formulation combines variables generally used at different levels of workplace models (i.e., three job characteristics that are often modeled as determinants of organizational commitment) but offer two arguments for this strategy beyond Laubach's ethnography. First, even some of the early proponents of structural analysis recognized the subjective nature of the job characteristics as outcomes of power struggles (Kalleberg et al. 1981). Second, we argue that the three job characteristics, *as measured in surveys of workers*, are in fact subjective interpretations, and could easily measure a secretary's level of autonomy as being as high as a manager's.

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[6] A second order latent factor model is derived from two or more first order latent factors instead of the distinctive items that comprise the first order factors.

Researchers have generally accepted these as objective measures since Hackman and Lawler (1971) demonstrated high correlations between worker and manager ratings of job characteristics, but Laubach argued that as subjective measures they are susceptible to consent and should therefore be modeled as indicators or measures of the underlying "consent deal" – a relationship expressed by the measurement model depicted with parameter estimates in Figure 2. We follow Laubach in arguing that this configuration resolves the problem of predicting subjective responses with a variable constructed using subjective responses—i.e., the real causal factor is the worker's position in the informal structure, which is measured by the elements of the consent deal.[7]

INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

We used maximum likelihood estimation (see Bollen 1989) but verified the results with asymptotically distribution free estimators to ensure that there were no distribution problems caused by using categorical variables. The fit statistics supported the assertion that the revised model fits the data (χ^2=30.6, *df*=24, p=0.17). We finally constructed an additive scale from these using the path values from the latent factor model. The Heise and Bohrnstedt (1970) invalidity statistic (Ψ=.01) verifies that there is only one factor, their validity statistic (ρ_{TS}=.85) shows a

[7] The survey we use for this study is the "Indiana Quality of Employment Survey" and almost all the questions we use are derived from the nationally-based Quality of Employment Survey in the 1970s and have been widely used in other surveys. Thus, the conceptual distinctiveness of most of the scales is well-established in previous research. In exploratory factor analyses, we confirmed that the subjective scales were distinctive from each other and distinctive from the consent deal scale.

high correlation between the scale and the underlying factor, supporting our use of the composite scale. Cronbach's coefficient (α=.75) indicates that this is a reliable measure for consent.

Other Independent Variables

The model controls for individual characteristics of the respondent, organizational characteristics, and formal structural position and job characteristics. Respondent characteristics consist of age, sex, race, education, and marital status. Organizational characteristics include employer size, organization scope (a four-point measure indexing local, statewide, national, or multinational operations), not-for-profit organization (dummy variable), government organization (dummy variable), and industry concentration based on sales[8] (see Pfeffer and Salancik [1978]). Job characteristics include the level of technological change, whether the job is part-time (dummy variable for working less than 35 hours per week), hours at other jobs (a measure of multiple job holding), hours worked at home, organization tenure, substantive complexity (a commonly-used measure of job-specific skill), occupational skill (a scale derived from eight occupational measures from the U.S. Labor Department's *Dictionary of Occupational Titles* and other sources), and union membership. We use a derivative of Wright's (1978) class scheme to approximate formal structural position, because it identifies broad structural categories

[8] Industry concentration was missing for non-profit organizations. For these organizations, we assigned the mean value for all for-profit organizations to non-profits. This allows non-profits to remain in the analysis but effectively exempts these organizations from the analysis of industry concentration. It also results in a conservative estimate of the effect of industry concentration in the overall analysis.

in the organization based on ownership, managerial authority, and job skill. Our measure yields five class dummy variables (large employers, large managers, small managers, first-line supervisors, and autonomous workers) that are contrasted with the excluded category of nonautonomous workers. We report standardized coefficients for each of the class dummy variables and use sheaf coefficients to measure the overall impact of structural position. The sheaf coefficient, which was originated by Heise (1972), allows the effects of multiple dummy variables to be summarized with a single coefficient that approximates a standardized regression coefficient. Thus, in each of our regression models we derive a sheaf coefficient to represent the overall effects of Wright's class structure dummy variables.

ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE VARIABLES

The results of the first part of our analysis are presented in Table 1. The first model shows that consent has a strong positive effect on whether the respondent considers his or her work to be meaningful ($\beta_{consent}$=.29). In fact, the effect of consent is the strongest in the model, nearly one-third larger than the next largest effect, substantive complexity ($\beta_{substantive\ complexity}$=.21). Individual characteristics such as being female and being older show positive effects on meaningful work. Working for a global operation, working full time, being new to the organization, and being in a unionized position are also determinants of perceiving work as meaningful. As for structural position, large employers respond as finding less meaning in their work than non-autonomous workers, but the sheaf coefficient for structural position as a whole is not significant.

INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

The second model shows only two key determinants of satisfaction with job security, consent ($\beta_{consent}$=.41) and age (β_{age}=-.13). No other factors are significant at the $p<.05$ level. In

the third model, consent is again the strongest determinant of satisfaction with technology with a positive effect ($\beta_{consent}$=.29), barely edging out the second strongest determinant, technological change ($\beta_{technological\ change}$=.27). Substantive complexity is also positively related to satisfaction with technology and tenure with the organization is negatively related.

In model four, consent ($\beta_{consent}$=.31) has a positive effect on relations with co-workers and again is the strongest predictor in the model, over twice the magnitude of the next strongest variable. Women and union membership are positively related to relations with coworkers, and hours worked at home is negatively related. Among the structural position variables, large managers display significantly lower levels of coworker relations than non-autonomous workers, but as in the previous models the sheaf coefficient for class as a whole is not significant.

In the fifth model, consent shows a very strong positive effect on relations with supervisors ($\beta_{consent}$=.48), almost three times the effect of the next strongest variable. Again, women and those who work fewer hours at home have better relations with supervisors, as do workers who have less tenure with the organization and workers whose jobs have higher levels of substantive complexity. Being a first-line supervisor has a very strong, negative effect on relations with their managers relative to the relationship that non-autonomous workers have with them, and structural position as a whole, measured through the sheaf coefficient, is significant.

In model six, consent ($\beta_{consent}$=.59) has a very large positive impact on the perception of promotion equity, more than five times the effect of age. In this model, first-line supervisors respond with a lower perception of promotion equity than non-autonomous workers, but structural position as a whole, measured through the sheaf coefficient, is not significant.

The seventh model shows that consent has a strong positive impact on pay equity ($\beta_{consent}$=.35), almost three times the magnitude of the next strongest predictor, working in

government ($\beta_{government}$=-.12), and almost four times as great as working for non-profit organizations ($\beta_{not\text{-}for\text{-}profit}$=-.09). These results suggest that workers in government and non-profit corporations have significantly lower perceptions of pay equity than workers in the private sector. Other significantly positive determinants of pay equity are being white, tenure with the organization, and union membership.

In model eight, consent has a strong *negative* effect on perceived discrimination ($\beta_{consent}$=-.28) suggesting that workers with high levels of consent are protected from discriminatory treatment in the workplace. Again, consent is the strongest variable in the model, substantially higher than the sheaf coefficient for structural position ($\beta_{structural\ position}$=.17), which is based largely on the fact that small managers and first-line supervisors perceive significantly larger levels of discrimination than non-autonomous workers. Workers who are racial minorities and workers who are unmarried report higher levels of perceived discrimination, as do workers in less competitive industries and respondents who work more hours on other jobs.

In the ninth model, consent has a strong negative effect on job stress ($\beta_{consent}$=-.19), equivalent in magnitude to the sheaf coefficient for structural position ($\beta_{structural\ position}$=.19), which is based on the fact that large managers, small managers, and first-line supervisors all have significantly higher levels of job stress than non-autonomous workers. Working in jobs with high levels of substantive complexity increases job stress, evidencing the highest effect of any variable in the model ($\beta_{substantive\ complexity}$=.24). The remaining significant predictor of job stress is hours worked at home.

Finally, in model ten, consent has a strong negative impact on self-estrangement ($\beta_{consent}$=-.46), easily dwarfing the effects of the next closest variable. Women have lower levels of self-estrangement, as do workers with higher education. However, workers whose jobs have

higher levels of substantive complexity – higher emphasis on training and change – tend to report higher levels of self-estrangement. Lower managers are significantly more self-estranged than non-autonomous workers, but the sheaf coefficient for class as a whole is not significant.

Summarizing the effects across the variables that tap the subjective world of the worker, consent has the strongest effect in nine of the ten models we examined, and shares second in the tenth (i.e., job stress). Its effects are in the expected direction, with positive effects on meaningful work, satisfaction with job security and technology, relations with supervisors and co-workers, promotion and pay equity; and negative effects on perceived discrimination, job stress, and self-estrangement. Moreover, while organizational, job, and structural position variables achieve statistical significance sporadically, their effects are not as consistently strong across the ten outcome variables. Substantive complexity (i.e., job skill) leads the way among these variables, achieving statistical significance in five of the ten models. It enhances the perception that the job is meaningful, satisfaction with technology, and relations with supervisors, but at the expense of making the job more stressful and inducing self-estrangement. Longer tenure with an organization has a largely negative effect, stifling the sense that the job is meaningful, reducing satisfaction with technology, and diminishing relations with supervisors, but with a positive effect on pay equity. Similarly, jobs with more hours worked at home tend to diminish relations with coworkers and managers, and increase job stress. On the other hand, union membership enhanced the perception that the job was meaningful, relations with coworkers, and the perception of pay equity. Factors such as technological change, occupational skill levels, and even working only on a single job had minor independent effects on the subjective measures across the board.

Organizational factors, often theorized to be important in promoting a hegemonic ideological influence over workers (see Vallas 1991), have relatively limited effects on the subjective experience of the workplace. Employer size did not affect any subjective measure. The organizational scope variable, consistent with expectations, showed that working in more localized settings enhanced the perception that work is meaningful. Working for government and non-profit corporations reduced the sense of pay equity. Similarly, industry concentration, a measure indicating a less competitive environment for the organization, only increased the perception of workplace discrimination.

Finally, while there are occasionally significant effects for some of the structural position variables (i.e., class), the sheaf coefficient for structural position as a whole achieves significance in only three of the ten models. Importantly, most of the significant effects of structural position emanate from lower managers and first-line supervisors, suggesting the importance of administrative personnel who have direct, day-to-day contact with rank-and-file workers. Hence, the analyses support our argument that consent has a pervasive effect on workers' subjective response that typically equals or exceeds the effect of formal structural variables.

ANALYSIS OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE LATENT FACTOR

In the next stage of the analysis, we ask whether there is a single latent factor underlying the subjective experience of work – that is, whether the subjective world of the worker can be expressed as a single constellation of measures that unifies diverse dimensions of workers' subjective experience. We first reversed the key for perceived discrimination, job stress, and self-estrangement to put them in the same direction as the other seven subjective experience variables in Table 1. Then, we conducted a factor analysis of all ten subjective experience variables (five scales and five single measures). This factor analysis yielded two factors, one on which all ten

subjective experience variables loaded and explained 25 percent of the variance, and the other which explained only three percent of the variance. The first factor had a Cronbach's alpha of .75, indicating a robust factor that included all ten subjective experience variables.

Next, we used structural equation modeling to specify *subjective response* as a second order latent factor model using the 19 individual items that comprised the 10 subjective experience variables (see Appendix 1). The first attempt at a second order specification including all 19 items yielded a model with poor fit statistics ($\chi^{2=}$369, *df*=147, p<.001) indicating that the model did not fit the data. While we agree with Bollen and Long (1993) that rejection of models should not be based exclusively on chi-squared, we nevertheless sought to identify a more parsimonious model that included theoretically justifiable improvements. Our first attempt at parsimony combined *work is meaningful* and the reversed *self-estrangement* into a first order factor of *integration with work*, dropped *job stress* as more of a physical outcome of work than an attitude, dropped *satisfaction with technology*, *satisfaction with pay compared to others at your workplace*, and *discrimination by race* because they seem more closely tied to situations than to the underlying factor. This dramatically improved the fit of the model (χ^2=202, *df*=84, p<.001), but was still beyond the chi-squared criteria for acceptance.[9] After a bit more experimentation, we found that removing two final items – *satisfaction with supervisor* and *finding coworkers helpful* – resulted in a satisfactory fit (χ^2=67, *df*=59, p=.214). The data-specific model which comprises seven variables and incorporates 13 of the original 19 items is shown in Figure 3.

[9] However, we note that the normed fit indices GFI, AGFI, NFI, IFI and CFI had all improved over the original model to greater than .9.

INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE

We next performed a factor analysis on this subset of variables and derived four factors which explained 27 percent, eight percent, five percent and four percent of the variance respectively. The first factor included all seven remaining subjective experience variables (six scales and one individual item) and yielded a Cronbach's alpha=.80, offering a substantial improvement over the alpha we derived for the original scale (α=.75) and supporting our assertion that the reduced factor more robustly measures the subjective experience concept. Using the path values as weights, we found that the Heise and Bohrnstedt (1970) statistics support the use of an additive scale with an invalidity statistic (Ψ<.01) verifying that there is only one second order factor, a validity statistic (ρ_{TS}=.93) showing a high correlation between the scale and the underlying factor, and a reliability statistic (Ω= .86) revealing a much higher reliability than Cronbach's alpha.

These results support a key expectation of the disposition approach that there is a single underlying latent factor that taps the subjective world of the worker. The next step is to determine whether this dispositional variable is determined by either structural variables or consent. To investigate this, we regressed the new latent factor portrayed in Figure 3 on the same set of variables as before. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 2. To isolate the effects of consent on subjective experience, we show two models, first excluding, then including consent.[10]

[10] One potential problem with this procedure is the possible reverse causality between one of the components of the subjective response scale—discrimination—and consent. We contend that one factor mitigating this argument is that discrimination fits the subjectivity scale so well

INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

In the first model of Table 2, which excludes consent, we find two significant determinants of subjective experience – industry concentration, which exerts a negative effect ($\beta_{\text{industrial concentration}}$=-.11) and substantive complexity, which shows a strong positive effect ($\beta_{\text{substantive complexity}}$=.24). This provides evidence in support of the organizational behavior argument that structural factors, specifically environmental (i.e., market competition) and technological (i.e., job-specific skills) dimensions, impact the subjective experience of work. However, numerous other structural variables in the model are non-significant and the R-squared is only .14, meaning that dispositional theorists could also claim support for their argument that the subjective experience of work is largely unaltered by structural variables.

In the second model in Table 2, we test support for the informal organization argument by adding consent to the model. Here we find that consent is the dominant predictor (β_{consent}=.64) of the latent factor of subjective experience, with a greater magnitude than for any of the ten

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indicating that it is part of the broader subjective response. We would acknowledge that this subjective response might be altered to exclude discrimination if, for example, there were a seismic shift in discriminatory behavior that affected workers on a broad scale (but not a single incident of discrimination in a single workplace). In a similar manner, other elements might enter or exit the subjective response scale if there were a dramatic shift in relations with supervisors, pay equity, or other dimensions that cut across all the workplaces in our sample. One lesson of this exercise is that we do not claim that the particular configuration of the subjective response scale in our analysis is fixed or static. Rather, the subjective response scale should be viewed as a fluid and dynamic concept subject to change over time.

original subjective experience variables. Industry concentration, which was significant in the previous model, is now non-significant, and substantive complexity has been greatly reduced ($\beta_{\text{substantive complexity}}$=.09), indicating that its effects are partly mediated through consent. New variables that achieve significance are education ($\beta_{\text{education}}$=.10) and the sheaf coefficient for class which indexes structural position ($\beta_{\text{structural position}}$=.16). The latter finding results primarily from negative effects of first-line supervisors and small managers relative to non-autonomous workers. Importantly, the R-squared for the model including consent jumps to 45 percent of the variance, a more than threefold increase over the model that excluded consent (R-squared=.14). On balance, these results suggest strong support for the informal organization argument and weak support for organizational behavior arguments, and the evidence for the disposition argument is mixed given the strong effect of consent on workers' subjective experience.[11]

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[11] Importantly, the results of the regression model shown in the second model in Table 2 are not much different from results when we regressed the scale constructed from the mean of the original items or from the theoretically justified reduced model. In both analyses, we found that consent was the dominant predictor with significant effects for education, hours worked at home, and the sheaf coefficient for structural position, all at approximately the same magnitudes. The R-squared showed that both model explained around 43 percent of the variance, similar to the model in Table 2. The bottom line is that whether the second order latent variable is derived from the looser criterion of the mean of all 10 original items or from the stricter criterion provided by the structural equation models, the results lead us to the same conclusion – that consent is the major determinant of the worker's subjective world.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The subjective world of the worker has been a topic of continuing interest in the study of the workplace. Workplace theorists have generally subscribed to one of three perspectives on how the subjective experience of work is determined: (1) as a response to structural characteristics of the organization or job, some of which can be manipulated by management; (2) as an outcome of the consent deal that arises in the ongoing social construction of informal relations at the point of production; or (3) as a direct reflection of the general disposition of the worker, a constellation of attitudes that is relatively impervious to change as a result of workplace variables. Our research largely rejects the first, provides qualified support for the third, and strongly endorses the second of these perspectives.

Our results point convincingly to the conclusion that there is a single latent factor underlying much of the subjective world of the worker and it is primarily determined by consent, rather than structural factors. Thus, the structural theory – that worker subjectivity is affected by how a job is structured – finds little support. Counterintuitive as it may be, workers' subjective response seems largely unaffected by occupational skills, tenure with the organization, the opportunity to work at home, or even whether the job is full or part time. The single latent factor which organizes a diverse range of subjective work experiences might be read as partial support for disposition theory. However, the central role played by the consent deal in structuring workers' subjective response undermines disposition theory and points to the importance of the informal relations perspective. Workers' subjective experiences – their underlying perceptions of fairness, job security, relations with supervisors and co-workers, perceptions of discrimination, and work integration – are primarily determined by the configuration of perceived autonomy,

schedule flexibility, voice in decision-making, and organizational commitment that constitutes the core components of the consent deal.

The centrality of consent follows closely from Burawoy's (1979) *Manufacturing Consent*. Burawoy's work represents a watershed moment for the sociological study of work in the contemporary era because, in the face of largely structural arguments about the organization of the workplace, it pointed instead to the importance of the culture of the shop floor or the office. Following Burawoy, a largely ethnographic tradition in the study of work has directed researchers to pay attention to the disconnect that often exists between formal structural arrangements in the workplace and the informal aspects of organizational life. Two recurring themes in this research are the wide gap between managerial rhetoric about administrative practices and organizational reality and the central role of consent in bridging the disconnect between these two realms of organizational life (cf., Juravich 1985; Grenier 1988; Finlay 1988; Graham 1995). For example, Vallas's recent research (2003a; 2003b) highlights the futile efforts of management to implement structural change in the workplace in the absence of consent, or what may be called worker resistance (cf., Fantasia 1988; Jermier et al.1994; Roscigno and Hodson 2004). Vallas concludes that managerial implementation of several "teamwork" initiatives in four paper processing plants occasionally resulted in worker integration and achieved limited success. But more typically these programs failed because they relied too heavily on scientific and technical rationality and neglected to address the underlying normative processes which might have provided a moral foundation for more progressive workplace change. In short, the workers recognized the top-down initiatives of management for what they were, schemes for more effective control of workers in the hopes of eliciting higher rates of

productivity, and largely withheld their consent or actively resisted them. Somewhere, Mayo's critics smiled.

Our research builds upon the lessons learned from previous ethnographic research. Using a representative sample of workers from a wide cross-section of occupations, industries, and organizations in Indiana, we derive a quantitative measure of consent and demonstrate its utility in explaining a wide array of subjective experiences in the generalized workplace. Our research thus provides strong evidence for the claim that the dynamics of informal organization and consent, so richly illustrated in previous ethnographic studies, are a central force in the structuring of workers' subjective experiences. So far as we know, our research is the first effort to explore quantitatively the importance of consent in shaping workers' subjective experiences using a broad, representative sample of workers. We encourage other researchers not only to replicate our analyses with other quantitative data sets but also to develop longitudinal studies of these phenomena to better identify the temporal processes involved.. In this way, we can better establish the generalizability of results about the workers' subjective world provided through ethnographic studies.

Our results should not be read as a claim that consent is the *only* salient feature of the informal organization. Other informal networks such as friendship or ethnic networks or even sport betting pools can certainly be consequential in the workplace and the interconnections among these various aspects of informal organization are worth exploring. Indeed, we view it as part of a broader research agenda to examine the interplay among consent and other features of informal organization, as well as to identify how these different aspects of informal organization affect both subjective experiences and objective work outcomes like income, job tenure, and mobility.

From a theoretical perspective, these results are far-reaching. The relative impotence of structural variables in explaining workers' subjective experiences was frankly surprising to us given the longstanding tradition of research pointing to the centrality of technology (e.g., Perrow 1967; Blauner 1964; Braverman 1974; Zuboff 1988) and other organizational factors (see Burns and Stalker 1961; Thompson 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990) in shaping worker attitudes. We are leery of drawing conclusions that summarily dismiss structural explanations and feel that a fuller array of structural variables than are available from the IQES might well have shown stronger results. Nevertheless, we believe our results give new urgency to the study of informal organization and its effects, particularly in broader empirical settings as represented by surveys and using quantitative analytical methods. Further, we have demonstrated that worker agency, that is, the capacity of workers to actively negotiate, manipulate, and change workplace rules, is at least as important as managers' capacity to promulgate workplace structures that elicit higher worker productivity.

From a practical perspective, our results should not be read to suggest that managers should stop structuring the workplace to improve conditions for workers. Instead, the strongest "recommendation" that flows from our research is that workers are most integrated when they are equal partners with management in the formulation of workplace policies and, as co-equals, consent to the enterprise. Managers should also recognize that the strongest influence on worker subjectivity comes from their relations with their immediate supervisors. However, management's strongest "tool" with which to influence workers – supervisors – are themselves conflicted in their relations with their supervisors, their sense of promotion equity, perceived discrimination, stress, and most importantly, the underlying subjective factor.

This study demonstrates the power of our measure of consent in statistical studies of the generalized workplace. Since it is constructed from fairly standard workplace measures, further studies should examine past data sets to explore how levels of consent and its effects have changed over time. More importantly, as a measure of worker subjectivity, analyses incorporating consent offer an opportunity to explore more fully how workplace subjectivity affects subjective responses to other arenas of modern social life.

Appendix A. Definitions of Variables

Standard responses are 1=strongly agree, 2=somewhat agree, 3=somewhat disagree, and 4=strongly disagree, with "neither agree nor disagree" not prompted. These are recoded to reflect higher levels of agreement, with "neither agree nor disagree" coded at 2.5. Means, standard deviations, alphas are computed for organizations with more than 10 employees and no missing values for consent scale.

Consent		Mean (stdev)
Autonomy	Agreement with statements (standard responses):	
	idecide: It is basically my own responsibility to decide how my job gets done.	3.38 (0.85)
	lotofsay: I have a lot of say about what happens on my job.	2.91 (0.91)
	freedom: My job gives me a lot of freedom about how I do my work [this was dropped from full consent model]	3.16 (0.93)
	Computed as mean score. Reliability α =.66	3.15 (0.69)
Schedule flexibility	*Please tell me how much say you have in the following areas* (1=a lot of say, 2=some say, 3=none at all; reflected for higher values to indicate greater say):	
	sayhours: The number of hours you work	1.91 (0.76)
	saydays: The days of the week you work.	1.80 (0.82)
	saytime: The time of day you work.	1.83 (0.76)
	Computed as mean score. (Each item was adjusted such that 1=1, 2=3, and 3=5) Reliability α=.79	1.85 (0.66)
Voice in decision-making	Agreement with statements (standard responses):	2.65 (1.03)
	partdecs: My job does not allow me to participate in important decisions that affect my organization. (Not reflected so higher values indicate greater participation)	
Organizational commitment	Agreement with statements (standard responses):	
	workhard: I am willing to work harder than I have to help my employer succeed	3.48 (0.70)
	myvalues: I find that my values and my employer's values are very similar	2.93 (0.99)
	iamproud: I am proud to be working for my employer	3.34 (0.80)
	Computed as mean score. Reliability α=.70	3.25 (0.66)

Individual Characteristics		
Gender	Dichotomous variable (Female=1)	0.47 (0.5)
Race	Computed as a dichotomous variable (white=1) from a question that offered a selection of racial groupings. The sample was 89.3% white.	0.88 (0.33)
Age	Computed from year of birth.	39.14 (11.8)
Education	Asked as highest grade of school or level of education and grouped by attainment (1=high school, 2=some college, 3=college degree and graduate work)	13.70 (2.27)
Marital status	Computed as a dichotomous variable (married=1) from a question that included living with a partner, widowed, divorced, separated, and never married.	0.60 (0.49)
Organizational Characteristics		
Employer size	*How many people work for your employer at all locations?* (1=1 through 9, 2=10 through 49, 3=50 through 99, 4=100 through 499, 5=500 through 999, 6=1000 through 1999, and 7=2000+) Note: Respondents were asked directly, but these categories were offered if respondents did not provide an estimate. This study recoded responses into categories. In 12% of the cases the survey staff obtained organization size through outside sources.	5.12 (1.94)
Organization scope	Computed into local, statewide, national, and multinational as the highest level using the following questions: *Does the company (organization) you work for have more than 1 location in Indiana?* *Does your company (organization) have locations in other states?* *Does your company (organization) have locations outside the United States?*	2.65 (1.10) .66 (.47) .63 (.48) .33 (.47)
Not-for-profit	Recoded as a dichotomous variable from: *In your present job do you work for the government, a private company, a not-for-profit organization, or are you self-employed?* (Not-for-profit=1)	0.09 (0.28)
Government	Recoded as a dichotomous variable from *In your present job do you work for the government, a private company, a not-for-profit organization, or are you self-employed?* (Government=1)	0.17 (0.38)
Industry concentration	Respondents were asked what kind of business or industry they worked for, with a follow up question asking what product or	50.66 (28.03)

by sales	service the company provided. These were coded to the 1990 Industrial Classification System using the *Alphabetical Index of Industries and Occupations,* published by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Industry environmental data such as the *concentration ratio in corporate sales* were appended by industry code based on data obtained from the IRS *Sourcebook: Statistics of Income, 1993. Corporate Income Tax Returns*. Missing values (i.e. from government organizations) were recoded to the sample mean to ensure that the cases are not excluded from the overall analysis but do not contribute to the analysis of this factor.	
Job Characteristics		
Technological change	*Since you began your present job, how much change has there been in the technology you use on your job?* (1=very much, 2=some, 3=not very much)	3.01 (0.89)
	An additional volunteered category of "none" was added and responses were reflected to increase with increasing change.	
Part-time work	Computed from *On average, how many hours per week do you work?* (1=less than 35 hours)	.10 (.29)
Hours at other jobs	*On average, about how many hours per week do you work in all other jobs outside of your main job?*	2.06 (6.93)
Hours worked at home	*On average, about how many hours per week, if any, do you work at home doing things for your job?*	2.51 (5.53)
Tenure with organization	*For about how long have you worked for your present employer?* Coded as years.	7.73 (9.09)
Substantive complexity	Computed from the following	
	learnjob: How long does it take to learn the key aspects of your job? (1=a few hours, 2=a day, 3=a few days to a week, 4=several weeks, 5=2 to 5 months, 6=6 months to a year, 7=a few years, 8=5 years or more)	4.95 (1.98)
	hiskill: My job requires a high level of skill. (Standard agreement responses)	3.20 (0.85)
	learning: I am constantly learning now things on my job. (Standard agreement responses)	3.18 (0.94)
	Computed as mean score (*learnjob*/2, *hiskill,* and *learning*). Reliability α=.66	2.95 (0.72)
Occupational skill	Respondents were asked their job title what they did on their job. These responses were coded using the 1990 *Dictionary of Occupational Titles* published by the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration. These titles are	-.02 (0.86)

	assigned ratings of various work functions based on studies conducted or funded by various branches of the government.	
	This measure captures occupational skill as the mean of Z-scores for 8 occupational measures from DOT and other sources.	
SEIM	Socioeconomic Index based upon males only	
Data score	Represents the degree to which the occupation requires functions with regards to data.	
People score	Represents the degree to which the occupation requires functions with regards to people.	
GED reasoning score	General Education Development Scale for Reasoning Development required for the occupation.	
GED math score	General Education Development Scale for Mathematical Development required by the occupation.	
SVP	Specific Vocational Preparation measure represents the amount of time required by a typical worker to learn what is necessary to adequately perform the job. The training may be acquired in school, work, military, institutional, or vocational settings.	
Average education	average number of years of education of workers in the 1990 Census occupation category in 1995. Based upon data extracted from the Current Population Survey, 1995.	
Percent college graduates	percentage of workers having college degrees in the 1990 Census occupation category in 1995. Based upon data extracted from the Current Population Survey, 1995.	
Union membership	Do you currently belong to a union? (Union=1)	0.18 (0.39)

Formal Organizational Position

Based on Erik Wright's (1978) model of social class including "contradictory locations" based in ownership, supervision, and skills.

Employer size	See above	5.09 (1.94)
Organization type	*In your present job do you work for the government, a private company, a not-for-profit organization, or are you self-employed?*	
	self-employed	2.3%
Is a supervisor	*In your job, do you supervise the work of other employees?* (Supervisor =1)	49.5%
Number	*How many people do you supervise directly or indirectly?*	

supervised	5 or fewer employees	24.9%
	6-20 employees	16.7%
	More than 20 employees	8.0%
Skilled occupation	Respondents were asked their job title and normal duties, which were then coded into DOT Occupational Codes. For distribution by occupational groups, see Table 4b. Occupational averages were obtained for eight skill related measures (SEI, DOT data and people scores, average GED reasoning and math scores, specific vocational preparation, average education for occupation, and percent of occupation with college degree). These were computed as z-scores and averaged into a skill scale, which was recoded into a dichotomous variable for high (scale > 0) and low (scale<0) skilled worker.	36.1%
Formal organization position	1. *Non-Autonomous Worker* – not self-employed, non-supervisory, does not work in a "skilled" occupation	37.2%
	2. First-Line Supervisor – not self-employed and supervises 5 or less workers	14.2%
	3. Semi-Autonomous Worker – not self-employed, non-supervisory or supervises 5 or fewer people, works in a "skilled" occupation	23.0%
	4. Lower Manager – not self-employed and supervises between 6 and 20 people	15.7%
	5. Upper/Middle Manager – not self-employed and supervises more than 20 people	7.6%
	6. Large Employer/Capitalist – self-employed and employs 10 or more workers	2.3%

Subjective Experience		
Job is meaningful	Agreement with statement (standard responses): *meaningl: I sometimes feel that the work I do is meaningless.* (Not reflected for higher values to indicate greater meaning)	3.98 (1.43)
Satisfaction with job security	Uses standard satisfaction responses (1=not at all satisfied, 2=not too satisfied, 3=somewhat satisfied, 4=very satisfied, and 5=completely satisfied): *satsecur: How satisfied are you with your level of job security?*	3.29 (.85)
Satisfaction with technology	Uses standard satisfaction responses: *sattech: How satisfied are you with the technology you use on your job?*	3.22 (.78)

Supervisor relations	Agreement with statements (standard responses):	
	suprhelp: My supervisor is helpful to me in getting my job done.	4.00 (1.28)
	suprcomp: My supervisor is competent in doing his or her job.	4.23 (1.17)
	satsuper: How satisfied are you with your supervisors? (Uses standard satisfaction responses)	4.14 (1.13)
	Computed as mean score. Reliability α=.82	3.26 (0.76)
Coworker relations	Agreement with statements (standard responses):	
	cowohelp: My coworker is helpful to me in getting my job done.	4.21 (1.03)
	cowocomp: My coworker is competent in doing his or her job.	4.26 (0.93)
	satcowor: How satisfied are you with your coworkers? (Uses standard satisfaction responses)	4.27 (0.95)
	Computed as mean score. Reliability α=.82	3.35 (0.56)
Promotion equity	Agreement with statements (standard responses):	
	getahead: My employer wants to give everyone a chance to get ahead.	3.61 (1.39)
	promfair: Promotions are handled fairly at my workplace.	3.42 (1.44)
	Reliability α=.78	2.84 (0.90)
Pay equity	Uses standard satisfaction responses:	
	fairpay: On the whole, how satisfied are you that you are fairly paid for the skills that you have to offer your employer?	3.67 (1.31)
	payyempl: How satisfied are you with your pay compared to others at your workplace?	4.00 (1.19)
	payoempl: How satisfied are you with your pay compared to people who do work similar to yours for other employers?	3.61 (1.41)
	Computed as mean score. Reliability α=.83	3.00 (0/81)
Discrimination at work	Uses the responses 1=never, 2=seldom, 3=sometimes, 4=often:	
	discsex: How often, if at all, do you feel discriminated against at your job because of your sex?	1.61 (1.13)
	discrace: How often, if at all, do you feel discriminated against at your job because of your race or national origin?	1.34 (0.93)
	discage: How often, if at all, do you feel discriminated against at	1.50 (1.08)

	your job because of your age?	
	Computed as mean score. Reliability α=.51	1.37 (0.55)
Job stress	*On a day-to-day basis, how stressful is your job?* (1=never stressful, 2=seldom stressful, 3=sometimes stressful, 4=often stressful, 5=always stressful)	3.48 (0/89)
Self-estrangement	Agreement with statement (standard responses): *judgment: Some of the things I have to do on my job go against my better judgment.*	1.97 (1.03)

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Figure 1. Generalized Workplace Model



Figure 2. Measurement Model for Consent



Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Chi-square = 30.556
Degrees of freedom = 24
Probability level = .167
N=560

Figure 3. Measurement Model for Subjective Response: The Subjective World of the Worker



Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Chi-square = 67.318
Degrees of freedom = 59
Probability level = .214
N=463

Table 1 Panel A. OLS Regressions of Job Attitudes, Perceptions, Behaviors, and Rewards on Individual, Organizational, and Formal and Informal Position Characteristics.

Full Models	Job is Meaningful Model 1	Satisfaction with Job Security Model 2	Satisfaction with Technology Model 3	Relations with Coworkers Model 4
individual characteristics				
Gender (female=1)	.10 *	.03	.03	.13 **
Race (white=1)	-.05	.05	.06	.00
Age (by category)	.14 **	-.13 **	.07	-.03
Education (by achievement)	.09	.01	-.02	.04
Marital status (married=1)	.00	-.05	.02	.02
Organizational characteristics				
Employer size (by category)	.07	-.06	.01	.04
Organization Scope	-.12 *	-.06	.02	-.02
Not-for-profit (=1)	-.03	-.02	-.01	-.06
Government (=1)	-.09	.08	.01	-.02
Industry concentration	-.02	-.08	-.03	-.01
Job characteristics				
Technological change	.05	-.02	.27 **	.03
Part-time work	-.09 *	-.05	-.03	.05
Hours at other jobs	.02	-.07	.02	.01
Hours worked at home	.02	-.01	-.02	-.13 **
Tenure with organization	-.14 **	.05	-.17 **	-.06
Substantive complexity	.21 **	.02	.15 **	.08
Occupational skill (a)	.00	-.12	-.11	.08
Union Membership	.09 *	-.02	.00	.14 **
Structural position: Wright's class				
Class: Large Employer (=1)	-.10 *	-.04	-.05	.00
Class: Large Manager (=1)	-.02	.04	-.08	-.10 *
Class: Small Manager (=1)	-.09	.03	.00	-.09
Class: First Line Supervisor (=1)	-.08	.06	-.03	-.07
Class: Autonomous Worker (=1)	-.07	.09	.03	-.03
Class Sheaf Coefficient	.10	.10	.10	.12
Informal position				
Consent	.29 **	.41 **	.29 **	.31 **
R-squared	.22	.20	.21	.15
N	537	536	532	534

Notes: coefficients are standardized

* p<.05 ** p<.01 two tailed test

(a) from Dictionary of Occupational Titles (US Department of Labor)

(b) the reference category for class is non-autonomous workers.

Table 1 Panel B. OLS Regressions of Job Attitudes, Perceptions, Behaviors, and Rewards on Individual, Organizational, and Formal and Informal Position Characteristics.

Full Models	Relations with Supervisors Model 5	Promotion Equity Model 6	Pay Equity Model 7	Perceived Discrim-ination Model 8
individual characteristics				
Gender (female=1)	.10 *	.03	-.02	.08
Race (white=1)	-.02	-.01	.10 *	-.13 **
Age (by category)	-.03	-.11 *	-.04	-.01
Education (by achievement)	.00	.04	.05	-.06
Marital status (married=1)	.01	-.02	-.02	-.10 *
Organizational characteristics				
Employer size (by category)	-.01	.01	.09	.00
Organization Scope	-.02	-.03	.02	.05
Not-for-profit (=1)	.01	.03	-.09 *	-.03
Government (=1)	.06	-.01	-.12 *	.02
Industry concentration	-.01	-.05	-.05	.10 *
Job characteristics				
Technological change	.00	-.04	.00	.03
Part-time work	-.06	-.03	-.03	.05
Hours at other jobs	-.07	.04	.03	.09 *
Hours worked at home	-.08 *	-.05	-.05	.03
Tenure with organization	-.15 **	-.04	.11 *	.04
Substantive complexity	.13 *	.07	.01	.03
Occupational skill (a)	-.06	-.04	-.08	.00
Union Membership	.04	-.02	.10 *	.07
Structural position: Wright's class				
Class: Large Employer (=1)	.00	-.07	.06	.03
Class: Large Manager (=1)	-.05	.02	.07	.03
Class: Small Manager (=1)	-.06	-.05	.02	.11 *
Class: First Line Supervisor (=1)	-.17 **	-.15 **	-.02	.18 **
Class: Autonomous Worker (=1)	-.10	-.01	.06	.04
Class Sheaf Coefficient	.16 *	.16	.11	.17 *
Informal position				
Consent	.48 **	.59 **	.35 **	-.28 **
R-squared	.28	.38	.20	.17
N	505	536	536	536

Notes: coefficients are standardized
* p<.05 ** p<.01 two tailed test
(a) from Dictionary of Occupational Titles (US Department of Labor)
(b) the reference category for class is non-autonomous workers.

Table 1 Panel C. OLS Regressions of Job Attitudes, Perceptions, Behaviors, and Rewards on Individual, Organizational, and Formal and Informal Position Characteristics.

Full Models	Job Stress Model 9	Self Estrange-ment Model 10
individual characteristics		
Gender (female=1)	.07	-.14 **
Race (white=1)	.01	.04
Age (by category)	.04	.04
Education (by achievement)	-.09	-.13 **
Marital status (married=1)	-.01	-.04
Organizational characteristics		
Employer size (by category)	.03	-.04
Organization Scope	-.02	.07
Not-for-profit (=1)	.07	-.02
Government (=1)	-.01	.01
Industry concentration	.01	-.04
Job characteristics		
Technological change	.06	-.03
Part-time work	.00	-.01
Hours at other jobs	.07	.03
Hours worked at home	.11 *	.07
Tenure with organization	-.04	-.05
Substantive complexity	.24 **	.12 *
Occupational skill (a)	.10	-.01
Union Membership	.01	.00
Structural position: Wright's class		
Class: Large Employer (=1)	.00	-.03
Class: Large Manager (=1)	.13 *	-.01
Class: Small Manager (=1)	.13 **	.10 *
Class: First Line Supervisor (=1)	.11 *	.05
Class: Autonomous Worker (=1)	-.04	.01
Class Sheaf Coefficient	.19 **	.10
Informal position		
Consent	-.19 **	-.46 **
R-squared	.16	.23
N	537	535

Notes: coefficients are standardized
* p<.05 ** p<.01 two tailed test
(a) from Dictionary of Occupational Titles (US Department of Labor)
(b) the reference category for class is non-autonomous workers.

Table 2. OLS Regressions of Subjective Response on Individual, Organizational, and Formal and Informal Position Characteristics.

	Subjective Response	
Full Models	Model 1	Model 2
Individual characteristics		
Gender (female=1)	-.01	.03
Race (white=1)	.00	.00
Age (by category)	-.07	-.07
Education (by achievement)	.10	.10 *
Marital status (married=1)	.01	.02
Organizational characteristics		
Employer size (by category)	.04	.03
Organization Scope	-.05	-.05
Not-for-profit (=1)	.05	.00
Government (=1)	-.08	-.05
Industry concentration	-.11 *	-.06
Job characteristics		
Technological change	.01	-.02
Part-time work	-.07	-.06
Hours at other jobs	-.06	-.04
Hours worked at home	-.07	-.08
Tenure with organization	-.06	-.05
Substantive complexity	.24 **	.09 *
Occupational skill (a)	.01	-.08
Union Membership	-.04	.04
Structural position: Wright's class		
Class: Large Employer (=1)	.00	-.03
Class: Large Manager (=1)	.06	-.02
Class: Small Manager (=1)	.00	-.09 *
Class: First Line Supervisor (=1)	-.10	-.17 **
Class: Autonomous Worker (=1)	-.09	-.03
Class Sheaf Coefficient	.14	.16 **
Informal position		
Consent		.64 **
R-squared	.14	.45
N	463	463

Notes: coefficients are standardized

* p<.05 ** p<.01 two tailed test

(a) from Dictionary of Occupational Titles (US Department of Labor)

(b) the reference category for class is non-autonomous workers.