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Abstract

Arguments in the rhetorical literature against the sufficiency of formal logic show the need for a foundation of both the rhetorically oriented disciplines and formal logic in truth. As the rhetorical disciplines have argued, formal logic cannot offer this foundation. But the rhetorical disciplines also cannot provide it: they are structurally too much like formal logic to achieve their distinctive aims. The combined rhetorical and logical nature of this foundation, as conceptual truth, is sketched. Implications are drawn for the foundational importance of ornamental rhetoric, and for the study and teaching of rhetoric as aimed, precisely, not at persuasion.

The Foundation in Truth of Rhetoric and Formal Logic

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The Foundation in Truth of Rhetoric and Formal Logic

Over the last fifty years many rhetoricians have tried to establish the importance of argumentative or justificatory rhetoric as against formal logic. A number of closely related bodies of work have developed, for example in informal logic, argumentation theory and sociology of knowledge. I discuss issues common to all of these areas of research, and I shall therefore refer to them all, for convenience, as the rhetorical disciplines.

The rhetorical disciplines have argued their importance against that of formal logic by showing that both kinds of discipline need a grounding in truth which formal logic cannot supply. But I shall argue that, despite work like that of the contributors to Cherwitz' Rhetoric and Philosophy (1990), both the rhetorical disciplines and formal logic need a foundation in conceptual truth, truth embodied in meanings, which neither can provide on its own. I shall try to sketch the nature of this foundation as combining what is treated by both kinds of discipline, and to draw some implications for the evaluation, study and teaching of rhetoric.

In the first section I argue that the rhetorical disciplines are still structurally too much like formal logic to achieve their ultimate aims on their own. In the second section I discuss specific arguments in the rhetorical literature against the sufficiency of both formal logic and, similarly, the basis of metaphysics in self-evident logical truths. I try to show that these arguments, together with some I add, demonstrate the need for a foundation of both disciplines in truth. In the third section I argue that this foundation is both informally rhetorical and formally logical, and I offer one possible sketch of its nature. In the fourth and final section I draw some implications of this grounding for the foundational importance of ornamental rhetoric and for the

study and teaching of rhetoric in general as aimed precisely not at persuasion.

1

The rhetorical disciplines claim to offer an indispensable supplement (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 2f.), or even an alternative to formal logic (Willard 1989, 14ff., but see 245f.). In this section I shall argue that the rhetorical disciplines need a foundation in truth but cannot provide it, partly because in an important respect they remain too much like formal logic, which also needs and cannot provide this foundation.

As is well known, formal logic studies arguments, but "cannot tell anything about the truth of the premises" of those arguments (Gottlieb 1968, 17). It only studies the validity of links between premises and conclusions from those premises, whether the premises are true or false. That is, it studies the validity of arguments, and not their soundness, the bearing of valid arguments on the world they refer to. The rhetorical disciplines claim, by contrast, to acknowledge not only the bearing of the claims of argument on its context, for example on the truths its audiences in fact hold, but the bearing of its context, for example these audience-held truths, on the validity of argumentation itself (Dearin, New Rhetoric, 1989, 217; Perelman 1979, 50; Perelman 1989, 97-8; Willard). As Willard puts it, "arguments are happenings whose nature is altered by abstraction from context" (1989, 15). This relevance of the audience allows, among other things, reasonable and productive discussion of values (Perelman 1989, 92f.).

But these claims are inconsistently carried through in rhetorical work, so that the relevant contrast between formal logic and rhetoric is not properly achieved. As a glance through any rhetorical manual or rhetorical analysis shows, the rhetorical disciplines in practice divorce

argumentation from particular truths, including the truths of particular audiences, just as formal logic does. They explore the structures of arguments as identifiable as the same structure in different contexts. For example, a rhetorician might examine ad hominem arguments in general, or discuss the ad hominem character of a particular argument in the light of the general characteristics of ad hominem arguments. That is, the rhetorical disciplines explore arguments as the same in the context of any particular audiences and any particular truth claims (see, for example, Aristotle 1984; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 9 and passim; Wuthnow 1992). Particular audiences and truth claims, then, are not really given a role in constituting the structure of arguments.

The rhetorical disciplines are therefore purely formal disciplines. They are distinguished from formal logic only in having a wide variety of general "symbols" (like the character of being "ad hominem") which reduce different particular arguments to formal identity irrespective of particular audiences, instead of using a few, more general symbols (like "p" for any proposition) for a wide variety of the particular statements which make up arguments.

In contradiction to their aims, then, the rhetorical disciplines, like formal logic, in fact allow their argumentative structures no internal or necessary relations to their contexts of, for example, particular audiences. These contexts are really given no role in constituting the structure of the arguments. But the rhetorical disciplines are also distinguished from formal logic precisely by aiming to analyse the validity of arguments as dependent on these contexts. That is, they refuse to consider formal, or internal relations as giving the coherence of argumentative structures. They aim to analyse this coherence as given by factors external to the relations of the statements making up the arguments: factors such as the assent of audiences, for whatever motives, that the statements composing these structures support each other. That is, they treat

each of these structures as having no internal or necessary relations even between its own parts. Rhetoric studies argumentative effects which happen to have been produced, or which can be produced, rather than studying what it is in the nature of statements themselves which makes one statement in the arguments support another. Rhetoric, then, retains the formalism of formal logic, but eliminates the kind of formal considerations which might allow that formalism to succeed or even make sense.

One result of this incoherence is that while the audiences' beliefs are indeed taken into account, they are not taken into account as anything like supports of truth. They are rather taken into account as motives or causes which need not have any relevance to considerations stemming from the issues themselves. If an audience is motivated purely by whimsy or fear, there is no reason here to deny truth to the claims they support. If one introduces the requirement of honesty, in a way which would make it in some sense independent of and so able to regulate the same audience-dependent difficulties (Mailloux 1989, 167; Scult 1989, 160), one is no longer relying on audience-dependence (or any equivalent context) to establish the support of one statement by another. The same applies, for example, to Perelman's "universal audience": what this is needs to be established somehow independently of any particular empirical audience's adhesion. Accordingly, again, particular audiences in fact play no role in constituting the validity of arguments.

Similarly, if other contextual factors like social norms are taken as the basis for justification, but are treated as having no internal, logical relations to the issues under discussion, they can be entirely irrelevant to the considerations stemming from the issues themselves. The norms happen to be there, and the issues happen to be there, and no mutual relevance is required to establish a relation between them which bears on truth.

The rhetorical disciplines make truth claims, then, without reference to any internal mutual relevance of statements, including their own. Consequently they base truth on statements which are as likely as not entirely mutually irrelevant by any standards which take sense or meaning into account.

But sense and meaning are not themselves "selected" or "agreed upon" by audiences or norms. As Wittgenstein argued, they are rather presupposed by any such selection (1958, secc. 28, 30, 124, 482). This is the one of the thrusts of his argument against the idea of a "private language." Selection requires pre-given meaningful alternatives from which the selection occurs, and agreement requires pre-existing shared meanings. It follows that without sense and meaning there can be no such thing as "selection" or "agreement." That is, the pure opposition of the rhetorical disciplines to formal connections of sense and meaning does not only make these disciplines incoherent. Beyond that, they do not and cannot offer any account of truth-oriented argumentation as such, at all. And they similarly eliminate, in principle, the means of justifying the truth of their own accounts of any rhetoric, justificatory or not.

In trying to restore recognition of the importance of audiences and their values, and of the rhetorician's "invention" of locally appropriate arguments, but doing so without the internal relations of meaning studied by formal logic, the rhetorical disciplines present an understanding of both audiences and rhetoricians purely as products of arational determining factors. This is a not a way to recognise the importance of audiences, the importance and possibility of reasonable discussion of human values, and of rhetoric itself as a discipline or art.

The rhetorical disciplines, then, need instruments central to formal logic to achieve their own distinctive aims. But it is still true that formal logic cannot achieve these aims. If these instruments are meant to link arguments and non-formal or particular extra-discursive contexts,

they can only be used for non-formal rhetorical purposes. As I have argued, however, the rhetorical disciplines do not in fact deal with particular contexts. And as I shall argue, the rhetorical disciplines are right to recognise the value for truth of particular, extra-discursive contexts. I shall argue that a proper recognition of particular contexts involves seeing the formality or generality inherent in them. This formality only emerges after one has taken particular contexts into account in a properly non-formal way.

2

The rhetorical disciplines differentiate themselves not only from formal logic, but also from metaphysics, since the latter bases itself on what it takes to be self-evident logical truths (eg., Perelman 1979, 1f.). In this section I shall present and elaborate some of the rhetorical disciplines' own arguments that formal logic and metaphysics need a foundation in truth which they cannot supply. I shall also try to show in some more detail, partly on the basis of these arguments, that the alternatives offered by rhetoricians do not allow this foundation either.

The main rhetorical line of argument against the sufficiency of formal logic and of metaphysics, and so in favour of the rhetorical supplement or alternative, is that truth is not given independently of particular, contextualised efforts to establish it. The evidence for this claim is both practical and theoretical. First, practically, disagreement exists about what is self-evident and about what self-evidently follows from what (Perelman 1979, 49). And people live and act in accordance with their beliefs whether or not others think they are self-evidently wrong. For practical purposes, then, what one finds self-evident is not so. Second, theoretically, a reliance on self-evident truths which precede justification is untenable, because, for example, these truths are expressed in words or ideas, the meanings of which are culture- and sub-culture-specific

(Attridge 1988; Mailloux 1989, 15 and passim). Further, in the use of self-evident truths, the steps of reasoning from self-evident truths to other truths are themselves often far from self-evident.

Logicians have developed artificial symbolic languages which are unambiguous and in which the validity of the steps of inference is unmistakably clear. But for these languages to have any application at all a translation from "natural" language is required. Further, the symbolic languages are themselves developed, explained, justified and used with the unavoidable help of natural languages (Ryle 1960, 123-4). As Wittgenstein puts it, since all meaning depends on the actual use of language, "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it" (1958, sec. 124).

For both theoretical and practical reasons, then, the rhetorical disciplines hold that the foundation of intellectual rigour consists in the contextualised justification of truth claims, rather than in given or axiomatic truths and necessary links between premises and conclusions.

Justification does not depend on given or axiomatic truths and necessary inferences; the latter rather depend on justification (Perelman 1989, 97-8).

Rhetoric, the art of justification, is therefore the primary discipline of intellectual rigour.

Much of the literature on the rhetorical disciplines maintains, with Perelman, that truth is the aim of argumentation (Cherwitz and Hikins 1986; Eubanks 1989, 233; Hikins 1990; Scult 1989, 156). But, as I have argued, this claim is based on ideas involving the context of argument to the exclusion (at the base) of logical links, ideas like "audience adhesion" (Dearin 1989, 217), cultural or sub-cultural norms or commitments (Fish 1980), and, more subtly, dialogical process (Cherwitz and Hikins 1986, 104 and passim). That is, as I have argued, these ideas do not give an account of truth-oriented argumentation at all.¹

In addition, many of the same authors acknowledge that audiences are not infallible, or are not always qualified to give a reasonable agreement (Cherwitz and Hikins 1986, 97; Perelman 1979, 57), that different audiences will give incompatible agreements on the same issue (Perelman 1979, 49), and that the responsible rhetorician cannot simply pander to audience agreement but must work to evoke responsible agreement (Eubanks 1989, 233; Scult 1989, 154; Willard 1989, 121). These acknowledgements apply also to an audience which is in "dialogical process" with another audience, and to an audience which consists in an entire culture. And they imply that audience adhesion (for example) is not the ultimate criterion for truth.

As Cherwitz and Hikins point out (1986, 2), an appeal to the pluralistic nature of truth is often made by rhetoricians (eg., Perelman 1979, 49). But this appeal does not help decide what is responsible agreement to any one of the differing "truths." Further, what is meant by "pluralistic truth" is very unclear. If we grant truth to the belief that matter is alive, and also to the incompatible belief that it is not, what exactly is meant by "truth" here?

Some students of rhetoric have therefore argued that truth is not the aim of argumentation (Attridge 1988, 122; Mailloux 1989, 17). Rather, argumentation is simply a matter of manipulation of one kind or another. Where this is understood to allow responsibility, however, it is still necessary to explain how we decide which manipulation is "better"; and this requires criteria other than manipulation. And if responsibility is abandoned, then the concept of justification loses all meaning. Any justification would be merely another manipulation, and both rhetoric and logic are simply forms of arbitrary force. One might argue that the successful manipulation is the justified one; but this comes to the same as saying that the successful manipulation is the one which succeeds. The idea of justification here adds nothing. Further, accordingly, there is no reason to take this view seriously, except as an attempted manipulation.

I have argued, however, that meanings are crucial to argumentation, and in the next section I shall argue that meanings carry in themselves various kinds of internal relations, internal relevance, to each other. That is, they involve formal logical relations. As Wallace notes, communicators "intend to make sense rather than nonsense; hence meaning dominates the searching" (1989, 119).

Nonetheless, the arguments that truth is not given independently of the efforts to establish it by justification are not invalidated by the reasoning of this section. It seems that subjective, situational, cultural or sub-cultural contexts, for example, do and must affect which truths are understood to be self-evident and which steps of reasoning are understood to make sense. In the next section I shall try to show that the relevance of these subjective and situational contexts does not abolish truth. Rather, these contexts themselves already involve conceptual truth. And I shall argue that conceptual truth is inaccessible both to formal logic and the rhetorical disciplines if each operates on its own.

3

I shall argue in this section that the foundation for rhetoric and formal logic must consist in conceptual truth. By "conceptual truth" I mean the truth embodied in meanings. I shall argue that meanings are not simply abstract ideas, but are abstract ideas already embedded and partly consisting in particular concrete contexts. The truth of meanings, like metaphysical bases, involves logical self-evidence. Accordingly, while truth constituted in diverse concrete contexts is subject to rhetorical considerations, a foundation which is self-evident and formally logical also belongs to metaphysics and formal logic. This paradoxical state of affairs is the main positive point I argue in this paper, together with its corollary that the necessary foundation is

both absolute and relative.

Winch argues that to study human subjectivity, situations, culture and social organisation -- the contexts of argumentation focused on by the rhetorical disciplines -- is partly to study meanings, because these human phenomena exist partly as meanings (Winch 1958, 23, 50-3, 88-9). I have already offered an argument that meanings are presupposed in considering human phenomena. And, as Winch argues on explicitly Wittgensteinian lines, meanings already involve internal or logical relations to other meanings (121ff.), both compatible and incompatible. For example, understanding "tree" is also understanding "wood," and also the difference between "tree" and "animal." What it is to be a meaning is to be associated with and differentiated from diverse other meanings. Some statements, then, can support or be irrelevant to each other because of characteristics of the meanings of these statements themselves. These internal or logical relations between meanings are what is articulated by conceptual analysis.

Since human subjectivity and culture exist partly as meaningful occurrences, the precise delineations of meaning which are concepts do not simply describe human and institutional actions, but are part of the very being and structure of consciousness, of meaningful human dispositions, of human situations, of subjectivity in general, and of human institutions and practices (Lyne 1990, 164). As Winch points out, concepts are given their meaning partly as the experiences, practices and institutions they constitute (29ff., 88-89, 121ff.). Concepts, the instrument of analysis, are here also the concrete subject matter which they analyse. Concepts, then, exist as a union of empirical facts of behaviour, experience and immediate and wider human situation, and meanings with their internal, logical relations with other meanings. As Gottlieb puts it in connection with the analogous issue of rules, "When I say that there is a contract . . . I assert the existence both of a legal rule and of the facts contemplated in the rule. . .

. It is a statement of mixed law and fact . . ." (1968, 36). And, conversely, human phenomena and situations exist as a union of meanings with their internal logical relations to other meanings, and empirical particularity.

Rhetoric and formal logic, then, must work with meanings in dealing with human phenomena. And insofar as they work with or in relation to meanings, they need to be understood as working with the very connections which form part of their human subject matter, their audiences, and their practitioners. That is, these disciplines do not simply argue about truth, but their arguments are already an engagement and working of human truth. Properly understood, the very texture of these disciplines is already partly a tissue of connections which are logical in and by being concretely contextualised, and concretely contextualised in and by being logical.

The formalism of the connections between concepts understood in this way is not divorced from particular contexts in the way formal logic and the rhetorical disciplines are. This formalism arises from concrete contexts, whether argumentative situations or wider cultural contexts, because it constitutes those contexts and is constituted by them. It recognises internal, logical relations between meanings which simultaneously are, and so engage with, concrete situations.

On the other hand, since subjectivities, situations and cultures differ empirically in important ways, and since concepts are concepts in being partly empirically contextualised in subjectivities, situations and cultures, one can say that concepts, and their internal relations, differ in important respects from subjectivity, situation and culture to subjectivity, situation and culture. But one cannot meaningfully say that incompatible concepts are therefore relative or plural truths in the sense that the truth of one negates the incompatible truth of another. This kind

of comparison relates meanings which, being incompatible, are by definition absent from each other. It is like trying to compare apples and five past two on Thursday. That is, it tries impossibly to relate meanings which have no meaning for each other, and therefore no meaningful relation to each other. Putting this the other way round, if we think about the concepts consistently with what they mean, we are unable to compare them, since the meaning of each does not exist for the other. We cannot compare meanings belonging to different concepts in a way which treats one meaning as relevant to another. (If we could, they would have related meanings, and consequently would not be incompatible.) Where we deal consistently with incompatible concepts, there is no comparison between them at all, so that the questions of relativism cannot begin to be meaningfully asked. (For related arguments in the different context of the issue of conceptual schemes, and to very different effect, see Davidson 1984, 183ff.)

What we have, then, is not relative truths, but something like absolute truths with conflicting theoretical and practical consequences, however troubling this may appear to be to both the rhetorical disciplines and formal logic.² In this light, values are accorded the truth-related significance the rhetorical disciplines often aim to recognise in them. For reasons I shall give shortly, this conception also recognises the place of reasonable discussion in connection with values.

On the other hand, while incompatible concepts cannot be related in terms of logical or internal connections, such concepts are nonetheless necessarily brought into logical relation. This is true of both incompatible contextualisations of the "same" concept, and different concepts which are logically incompatible within a single context. One does not understand a new usage of a familiar term without contrasting it with one's accustomed usage, nor does one understand "green" if one cannot tell it from "red." In fact, grasping any concept in the first place

presupposes grasping its difference from incompatible concepts. Consequently, concepts are the concepts they are only in relation to some incompatible concepts. Their relations to some incompatible concepts are therefore internal.

On the one hand, then, the relations of incompatible concepts are external, since they bring together incompatible concepts. On the other hand, as I have just argued, they are also internal. The relations between incompatible concepts must therefore be understood as simultaneously both external and internal. That is, these relations are conceptually confused, consisting in logically incompatible types of relation. This kind of conceptual confusion is not an error of analysis, but rather a paradox which, I have argued, is true of this state of affairs. Consequently this kind of confusion should not and cannot be undone. Rather, we can only try to understand the mechanisms of the confusion in different cases, and take them as guides in analysing the relations of incompatible concepts and in working with such concepts in practice.

These relations, then, must be investigated and practically negotiated partly by means of conceptually confused, alogical terms and discourses. Many theoretical and practical instruments for this work are available in the less directly argumentative devices studied specifically by rhetoric and also by poetics.³ For example, metaphor brings together logically incompatible meanings in a way which maintains and uses the incompatibility; and anacoluthia describes a full sentence whose last part is syntactically incompatible with its first.

One of the roles of rhetoric here is to allow the mutual explanation of incompatible concepts relevant to the "same" issue, or the discovery of new concepts given a starting point in old ones. That is, it allows, for example, the discussion of differing values. But it does not necessarily allow legitimate persuasion from one concept to another. Instead, in many cases, since the criteria for deciding the applicability of one concept are irrelevant to those for an

incompatible concept, it allows only a grasp of the difference of the concepts and of what each has to offer in its own terms. For example, a view of the family as intended for perpetuation of the species need not find the criteria given by love meaningful in deciding whom to marry, while a view of the family as a harbour for love need not find the criteria given by reproduction (like fertility) meaningful for the same purpose. And understanding both views, without "refuting" either, requires understanding "family" as referring to the "same" thing in two mutually exclusive senses at once. This is the mechanism articulated, for example, by metaphor.

Further, thoughtful commitment to one incompatible concept versus another is possible only via something like an existential experience (whether decision or discovery) of where one's commitments lie between absolute truths. One's own truth comes to be at stake; one has to allow oneself to find out where one leans without deciding in advance. This is not a matter simply of giving reasons, but also of establishing who one is. Scult, for example, notes that argumentation has the requirement: "risk yourself" (1989, 160). And this risk is an establishing of truth.

Oneself, and one's situation, are parts of one's relevant reality; one's existence is partly conceptual; and one's characteristics accordingly function as a kind of reason justifying what one believes. One could as accurately call the existential experience a conceptual one. Karon insists that in deliberation, "the mind is engaged in the real, because paradoxically the real lies in search of itself." Recognition that conceptual truth is the foundation of logic and rhetoric requires and allows both disciplines to be governed, in theory and practice, by the aim of respecting and facilitating this necessary existential dimension of truth-seeking.

and study of rhetoric. First, Aristotle maintained that the aim of rhetoric was to persuade (1984, 1355b26), while Burke argued that it is most importantly "a symbolic means of inducing cooperation" by establishing identifications (1969, 43f, emphasis in original). Rhetoric is also often handled as a study and practice of communication (Burke 1969; Perelman 1979; Wallace 1989; Willard 1989). But these are serious mistakes. I have argued that rhetoric deals with and is grounded in the very substance of human truth, and consequently calls the most fundamental truth of a person's being into play (Hyde 1990, 243). Consequently it has the most profound responsibility (Lyne 1990, 164). And I have also argued that properly considered human truth is something like absolute. It follows that the most fundamental responsibility of the rhetorical disciplines is precisely not to persuade, however judiciously. Persuasion and induced cooperation would deny the something-like-absolute claims on both or more sides. Rhetoric's most fundamental responsibility is to allow and develop a balancing of views with full plausibility on both or more coherent sides, which in turn allows uninterfered existential or conceptual experience. And this not as an academic exercise, but in recognition of the engagement of each other's truths, and of the selfishly vital need to test one's own (Hyde 1990, 229-230). And rather than being a study of communication, it is more fundamentally a study and practice of respect for and engagement with truth and constitutive being, on which successful communication and responsible persuasion in any event depend.

Accordingly, rhetoric needs to focus on conceptual analysis of purely circumstantial consideration and discussion, since existential, and conceptual truth generally, involve purely circumstantial issues. "Because I was brought up that way" need not always be a fallacy. As I have argued, the truth-relevance and absoluteness of concepts inheres in circumstantial truth. And this focus involves attention to conceptually confused rhetorical and poetic figures.

On the other hand, it is not always clear when one is dealing with incompatible concepts and when not. Accordingly, rhetorical skill needs to operate in such a way as to keep both options open. Rhetoric's formalised structures of argument, for example, which allow generalised thought and training, are still necessary. Further, in thinking through the consistency of each relevant incompatible concept on its own, the standard elements of argumentation apply. That is, precisely in order to give full weight to more than one incompatible concept or position, so as not to persuade, one has to argue each separately in the fullest relevant way, just as one does when arguing for the sake of persuasion.

The existent methods and texts, then, need to be kept exactly as they are, but supplemented, and guided by a broader and different attitudinal and practical context from that in which the discipline, perhaps as opposed to individual teachers, so far presents itself and operates.

The second main implication is that epideictic, or display, rhetoric, including ornamental rhetoric, are fundamental to truth-oriented rhetoric. Rhetoricians have tended to regard ornamental and expressive rhetoric as irrelevant to truth. Perelman, for example, writes, "there is nothing of philosophical interest in a rhetoric that has turned into an art of expression, whether literary or verbal" (1979, 5).⁴ But, as I have argued, it is the less directly argumentative rhetorical and poetic devices which allow the understanding and negotiation of incompatible concepts and truths which are simultaneously relevant and ineliminable. These ornamental devices are therefore at least as fundamental to the issue of truth as argumentation. (For a related argument, see Lyne 1990, 165). Further, a position or concept justifies itself fully only in relation to an incompatible one, against which it can stand out as a whole.⁵ The ultimate justification of a concept or position, then, occurs only in the negotiation of incompatible concepts or truths.

Accordingly, this kind of negotiation is more fundamental with respect to truth than argumentation which occurs simply on the basis of a single concept or position. That is, ornamental and expressive rhetoric, which allow this negotiation, are more fundamental specifically with respect to truth than argumentative rhetoric. This kind of rhetoric should therefore be the foundation of the study and teaching of rhetoric.

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1. Hikins concludes: "because rhetoric is . . . anchored in reality, humans are assured at least minimally objective criteria with which to compose discourse, evaluate rhetorical praxis, and generate theory" (1990, 67). But he does not offer an account of how the discipline of rhetoric itself engages with truth, only a philosophical argument that there is a true world for rhetoric to engage with. How that is relevant to the constitution of the rhetorical discipline as such is beside his point.

2. "'Put it here' -- indicating the place with one's finger -- that is giving an absolute spatial position" (Wittgenstein 1967, no. 713).

3. Wittgenstein suggested, I think partly for this reason, that "philosophy ought really to be written only as a poetic composition" (1980, 24e).

4. Lang, however, gives a very sensitive extended discussion of the relation of style to truth. He suggests, for example, that "the very structure of an idea, its status as an idea, is linked to the

form of its articulation" (1990, 77).

5. I should note that a concept or position can stand out as a whole specifically with respect to the particular concept or position it is contrasted with. It would stand out as a whole in different ways when contrasted with different concepts or positions.