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Oral History Interview: John Sherman Cooper

John Sherman Cooper

MARSHALL UNIVERSITY
HUNTINGTON, WEST VIRGINIA 25701
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ORAL HISTORY

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Date June 17, 1981

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MARSHALL UNIVERSITY

ORAL HISTORY OF APPALACHIA

HUNTINGTON, WEST VIRGINIA 25701

The Marshall University Oral History of Appalachia Program is an attempt to collect and preserve on tape the rich, yet rapidly disappearing oral and visual tradition of Appalachia by creating a central archive at the James E. Morrow Library on the Marshall campus. Valued as a source of original material for the scholarly community, the program also seeks to establish closer ties between the varied parts of the Appalachian region- West Virginia, Virginia, Ohio, and Kentucky.

In the Spring of 1972, members of the Cabell-Wayne Historical Society joined with Dr. O. Norman Simpkins, Chairman, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, and Dr. Michael J. Galgano of the Department of History in establishing the program. The Historical Society and other community organizations provided the first financial support and equipment. In April 1974, the Oral History program received a three year development grant from the Marshall University Foundation allowing for expansion and refinement. In 1976, the program became affiliated with New York Times Microfilm Corporation of America. To date, approximately 4,200 pages of transcribed tapes have been published as part of the New York Times Oral History Program. These materials represent one of the largest single collections of Appalachian oral materials in existence. Royalties earned from the sale of the transcripts are earmarked for the continuation of the program.

The first interviews were conducted by Marshall University History and Sociology students. Although students are currently involved in the program, many interviews are conducted by the Oral History staff. Graduate students are strongly encouraged to participate in the program by taking special topic courses in oral history under the supervision of Dr. Robert Maddox, program director since September 1978.

The program seeks to establish contacts with as broad a variety of regional persons as possible. Farmers, physicians, miners, teachers, both men and women all comprise a significant portion of the collection. Two major types of interviews have been compiled: the whole life and the specific work experience. In the whole life category, the interviewer attempts to guide subtly the interviewee through as much of his or her life as can be remembered. The second type isolates a specific work or life experience peculiar to the Appalachian region and examines it in detail. Although both types of interviews are currently being conducted, emphasis is now placed on the specific work experience. Recent projects are concerned primarily with health care, coal mining, and the growth of labor organizations.

Parts II and III of the Oral History of Appalachia collection were compiled by Dr. Robert F. Maddox, Director, and processed by Ms. Brenda Perego.

Dr. Robert F. Maddox, Director
Ms. Brenda Perego, Processor

Interview with Senator John Sherman Cooper by Richard C. Smoot, Washington, D.C., April 25, 1979.

RCS: Senator, do you feel that growing up in Somerset, in Southeastern Kentucky, helped your future political career? And if so, in what way?

JSC: Well, to look back and attempt to make a judgment as to what helped your political career is speculative. Nevertheless, I'm very happy that I was born and grew up in a small town. Somerset, Kentucky, at that time a small town of perhaps 6000. I believe when I was in high school we may have had 6000 people and until World War II, it did not exceed 7000 people. Now it's a great big town, about 18,000 people, and many of those people I don't know. I think the chief influence that interested me in politics grew out of my own family. While they had not participated largely in statewide politics at all, my father, my grandfather, my great grandfather, although the early were called differently; my uncle and a cousin had all been county judges, and an uncle who was a circuit judge. Numerous other cousins, that is, second cousins or cousins of my mother or in the family had served in the state legislature, either in the Senate or in the House. So, it looks like there were many in the family, also some had been sheriff of Pulaski County which is a large county and the sheriff is important. Also my father served for several years

as Chairman of the 11th Concession District - now the only district in Kentucky which has always voted Republican with one exception. As a young man about 30, he was appointed U.S. Collector of Revenues, covering one half of the state by President Theodore Roosevelt.

RCS: Yes sir.

JSC: All that had an influence. The second, it's hard to think about it today when it seems so far away. As I look back and think I was seeing people who had fought in the Civil War, both on the Union side and on the Confederate side, although my county, Pulaski was a Union county, and I could hear these older men, chiefly veterans, sit around and talk about the Civil War days. It had a political ring because they still felt pretty strongly about the Democratic and Republican parties. We were fortunate that Somerset was on a railroad, now the Southern Railroad, halfway between Cincinnati and Chattanooga. In those days, all steam driven engines had to stop after a certain number of miles and it happened that all had to stop in Somerset and change engines. We had a roundhouse there and a complete railroad shop. It enabled us to have many speakers that otherwise we would have never heard. Every train had to stop to change engines and politicians and others would come to the back car and make a speech. I heard Theodore Roosevelt speak there, when

he was a candidate on the Bull Moose ticket, the Progressive ticket in 1912. I heard William Jennings Bryan, Calvin Coolidge and there were many more. This also helped me to become interested quite early in politics.

RCS: Okay. Well what were your favorite pasttimes as a young man preparing for college?

JSC: What?

RCS: Your favorite pasttimes preparing for college, when you were a young man?

JSC: You mean in college or before I went to college?

RCS: Before you went to college.

JSC: Well, in a small town boys my age and different ages, were playing football or baseball. Sometimes they would rig up a hoop of some kind, on a barn and play basketball, but baseball and football were the usual games for us. My father was very good to our family of seven children, but he also was a disciplinarian and he believed in work. So every summer I had to work someplace, which was good. Now I didn't do that until I got older. Before I worked at home everyday. I had certain jobs to do at the house, I tended the family garden, I milked the cows. I had to go about a half mile out in the country, where my grandmother lived, where we kept the cows. I would go there and milk the cows and bring the milk home, before I went to school. As I got

older, at 15, I worked summers. I worked in 1916 in the railroad shops in Somerset, as a machinist helper on steam engines. I had a good Irish machinist from Dublin. He was awfully nice to me, but he was always scared to death I was going to hit his arm with a sledgehammer, I did once. But he helped me a lot. I worked 9 hours a day, 6 days a week, 19¢ an hour, but I thought it was a lot of money, and it was in those days. I worked one summer in 1918 at a coal mine in Harlan County. My father owned the mine, I did not work inside. I worked on the outside, laying track, dumping coal cars over the incline, and I drove a team. At other times I worked at saw mills and lumber mills, at times, as my father was in the timber business. I never did work very much on a farm. I couldn't plow very well but would cut out fence rows. But it was a mixture of work and play.

RCS: Do you think your educational background, including college, helped your future political career? If so, in what ways?

JSC: Yes, I'd hate to say that education doesn't help you if your study. I regret that I did not attach the same importance to it then that I now attach to it. I always passed all subjects, I didn't have any particular trouble that way. In high school, I was second in my class, but it was a small class, about 23. And while I was never second in college, I always passed.

RCS: You went to some very good schools, however.

JSC: Yes. And my father and mother both were readers, and they had encouraged reading in the family and I did like to read. So even when I was 12 or 13 years old I began to read seriously, history, literature. I kept that up pretty well until actually I went to college, and then unfortunately, just read what we were required to read. It seemed we were always engaged in something else. I kept up with my athletics in college. I've read all my life, but not systematically, and I wish I had, I still read. Without question, my college education was a great help to me. It made one think, it made one study. You try, and particularly if you have a law education, to be precise, be correct. Law arguments take away a little bit of the flavor of a public speech, and makes it less interesting perhaps, as it sounds more like a lawyers brief. But I liked that and tried to be accurate in what I had to say. Again, I'm very happy and grateful to my father and my mother about the education they made possible for ma. And I recognize that, while I did all right, I just could have done a lot better.

RCS: What do you feel you accomplished in your first elective office, the Kentucky House of Representatives, in 1928-30?

JSC: Well I ran for the lower House, actually the primary was the main race, and that was before my birthday and I was 25. But I had no opposition, curiously, in my first race. I

think it was due wholly to my father. If I may say so, I actually never knew him too well. I was a boy in school so much and I guess my being the oldest son, maybe there was some difficulty in talking to each other, but he was highly respected.

RCS: I understand that myself.

JSC: And, but I did what he told me to do, and you were supposed to in those days. But his position in the county there, a quiet man, but well liked and respected, and people just told me themselves that they wouldn't run against the son of Sherman Cooper. They called him Sherman, his name the same as John Sherman Cooper.

RCS: Yes sir.

JSC: I remember at least two men who came and told me that they wanted to run for the legislature but they couldn't beat me because of the name of my father and they wouldn't run against his son anyway. They liked him. You ask me what I did in the Kentucky House of Representatives, I don't think I accomplished much there. I was the next to the youngest in the House, as I recall. No, there were two younger than I - two men in the lower House that were younger than I. And, I don't know, I may have felt that I was raw and probably the older men there were more experienced. I wasn't a very good speaker, I didn't speak often. I can't say that I did

anything momentous except I'm glad that I did co-sponsor and spoke for the Free School Book Bill, the first ever introduced which passed. I don't know, maybe some had been introduced before but it was the first one that passed the legislature. I was glad to be a sponsor and I spoke for it. Curiously enough, it was opposed by the Louisville Courier-Journal, which we now consider a liberal paper.

RCS: Yes.

JSC: It opposed it on the ground, on one of the grounds that the books would be dirty. Oh, I introduced and there was passed what was called the Uniform Sales Act which I had studied in law school and many states had adopted it as the Uniform Law on Sales. It was adopted and I suppose has been amended many times since then. If I did anything that was worthwhile, of any great importance, I think it was chiefly on negative votes. Although it was a Republican Administration, with Governor Sampson, a man who was a friend of mine, and we got along fine. But, there was, at that time, a kind of schism in the medical fraternity. The State Board of Health had always been under the control of the Kentucky Medical Association. Governor Sampson and some opponents of the Kentucky Medical Association introduced a bill which would have put the State Board of Health under political control. The Governor would appoint the board. Only three Republicans

voted against it, and it only lost by one vote, so one of our votes defeated what was purely a political bill. I think it would have been bad for the medical profession and the State Board of Health. I recall some other bill, I think, but guess that's about it. I can't claim any great honor for my service there except that I voted as I wanted to. I did introduce a labor bill, which received no support but was later adopted in the Congress as the famous Norris Guardia Act.

RCS: Okay. What were some of the experiences you had as judge in Pulaski County during the years 1930-38, which you feel helped prepare you for your future positions in the United States Senate and as an Ambassador?

JSC: I think at that time the highest ambition I had, and it's a high ambition I think, was to serve in the House of Representatives as a Congressman from my district. It's been changed many times, at first it was the old 11th district, then the 9th, then the 7th, then the 5th. We had a Congressman then, Congressman John M. Robsion and no one could defeat him. I think my experience as county judge, joining that with my experience in the American Army in World War II were the two greatest experiences of my life. The Depression was beginning when I was elected and of course as it expanded, relief programs came into effect. While I didn't direct them, I was on a committee which had to give advice. I had to select

the projects in the county in certain fields, as roads and anything to do with the county jurisdiction. I visited these projects, saw these men working. Even women had a sewing project and it showed me something which I hope still persists and will persist in time of trouble; I saw these people working together and enjoying their work, although they weren't getting much in pay. I think but a dollar a day, maybe later a dollar and a half. It was a custom in rural counties for people in trouble to come to the county court house and see the county judge, although I took office at the age of 26. I found myself advising people twice my age about all kinds of things, even marital problems. But usually people came seeking aid. People who were sick, people without money. And they wanted to talk to somebody about it. I was young and strong and I could listen and I did and tried to help them. I found out that everybody has their troubles, I don't care whether they're rich, poor, white, black, whatever. I would travel through the county, see sick people. They couldn't get a doctor. But the old country doctors were good. They'd go night, day, anytime, they didn't seem to worry about their fee, they'd get it sometimes. And I saw people that everyone thought were rich for those days, but it turned out, because of the Depression their property, whatever they owned became

valueless if they owed money. I remember a man I thought was one of the richest men in the county, who one day told me, "John, I'm in worst shape than you are." I was in debt and was trying to dispose of my father's property, and it was very hard to dispose of. And it turned out it was true, he had financed a nephew who was a contractor who'd lost his money and he didn't have anything. He died almost bankrupt. The point I'm trying to say is I learned a good deal about people and I learned everyone has their troubles and their little triumphs at times.

RCS: Okay. What were your experiences as a circuit judge for the 28th Judicial District of Kentucky during 1946 through 1952 which, in your opinion, helped prepare you for your future national offices?

JSC: Well, it was really an accident that I was circuit judge. I was in the army and after the war ended in Europe, 1945, in May. I was in the occupation forces then in Germany, West Germany, stationed at Munich. I didn't know how long I'd be there, I knew I'd have to stay till I was discharged. Back in the 28th Judicial District which at that time embraced four counties, Pulaski, Wayne, Clinton, and Rockcastle, there was a looming conflict for the nomination for circuit judge. Somebody got the idea, well we will just throw up Cooper and maybe there will be no race. Well that's what happened.

They wrote me and asked me if I had any objections to filing and I said no and so I filed, I had no opposition. I came back. I had to have help to get out of the army, though. There was a Kentucky law at the time, I'm not sure if it's still in force, that you had to take the oath before the first of the year. I talked with the commanding officer in Munich, he said I haven't got anything to do with it, I don't know when you're going to be discharged. I had a rather important position at that time in Munich. They had given me the job, although I was only a captain, taking the place of a colonel, to reorganize the courts in Bavaria. There were over 200 courts and I had to start at the top with a Ministry of Justice and work on down, and I had got started on the work. Also, I was advising the officer who had charge of displaced persons--all those thousands of people from other countries whom the Germans had brought in to work, Russians, Yugoslavs, all eastern Europeans, and also some from France and Scandinavian countries, such as Norway. And I might have been there a good while. Well of course I knew both Senators Chandler and Barkley, and I asked them to help me. I had to ask for a political favor and they responded. They took it up with the army and just said, here is a man who has been elected to office, Circuit Judge, I suppose they termed it an important office and it is. It

was the highest trial court at the time. And so I got home just in time, I think about the last half of December, to take the oath before the first of the year. I only served as circuit judge until after I was elected to the Senate, and of course a good part of that time I was travelling and we had a special judge. But I enjoyed being a circuit judge. The only thing was, you could barely afford to be one. It paid $5000 and out of that you had to pay your transportation from town to town, and all expenses. I didn't have a secretary, but today they have. I did it all. But I enjoyed it. It had been quite a while since I had been in the law. I'd have to read every night, to study the cases that were coming up. I'd read at night to anticipate the issues that would be raised, evidence you would have to rule on. And I'd look up the cases. I knew that having been away almost four years the lawyers would appeal my decisions to the Court of Appeals. They'd think I didn't know anything, or if I had known something I'd have forgotten it. I didn't want to be reversed. And second, it's a great expense, you know, for a person to have a case tried and then have to appeal it to the Court of Appeals and then to come back and try it again. Not as expensive then as it is today, but it was a great expense in time and money. Well I was fortunate. In the short time I was circuit judge I had 17 cases appealed and I was affirmed

in 16 of them so I was very pleased with that. Of course if I had stayed on longer it probably would have in time run the other way although I like to work. Idid one other thing which I'm very proud of. They had always allowed black people to serve on grand juries, but they never put any of them on the petit jury, that is, the jury that actually tried the cases. I insisted that the law be followed. I never myself selected or promised to select any juror, but we began to turn up the black people on both the grand and petit jury in these counties. And that was the first time, at least in my district, and I think there weren't many in Kentucky, that let them serve on the petit jury.

RCS: Okay, what were the major causes for your defeat in the primary race for Governor of Kentucky in 1939?

JSC: Oh, I think a lot of people thought it was rather ridiculous for me to be running for the nomination for Governor when it was hard enough to be elected as a Republican, and the candidate that had announced was a very able man, Judge King Swope, who was circuit judge in the Lexington district and a very fine lawyer, fine judge. He had also served one term in the Congress. He made the race four years before and was defeated quite badly by Chandler. He was a tough campaigner. He was hard and a good speaker, but some people thought that he was too hard, that he was too vicious, talking about the Democratic

Party and Democratic candidates in a Democratic state. And he could be pretty rough individually to people. So a group of friends, and I don't know why they picked me out, perhaps because I'd been county judge, I was fairly well known and they suggested I run. It didn't cost me anything then. I just had a man who drove me around and as there wasn't any television, very little radio, lots of places you'd stay with friends. And really, I made the race and I did travel all over the state and I guess I went in every county. I would walk the streets and go in stores and into the court houses and stop at sawmills and everyplace I'd see a group of people. Of course, with all that work there weren't many, I saw probably 12,000 maybe 15,000. I spoke in all these places. Sometimes I'd have a pretty good crowd out of curiosity and sometimes there'd be a few. I went down in the southwestern part where there were hardly any Republicans and I'd go to see a fellow I'd served with in the legislature, although he might be a Democrat. He'd go and find a few Republicans for me. He'd introduce me around say, "this is Cooper, he's a pretty good fellow, for a Republican." But it laid the foundation for my later Senate victory. I wasn't so young, but I was 37. Today that wouldn't be considered young, but it was then. And so the people about that age and below, I found very sympathetic for me. At least I met many people

and I think made a good race. The papers, even though I was defeated, wrote that I made a clean race and with constructive opposition. And so it helped me later when I ran for the Senate. And King Swope, who defeated me, and I kept our friendship, and I campaigned for him. Now if I had been married and had children I couldn't have afforded to have done all that. I wasn't married and so I spent all the time just travelling.

RCS: Why did you enlist as a private in the army for World War II?

JSC: Well I had two reasons I can recall. One, at the beginning of WWII, the United States was drafting up to the age of 45, which is curious, you know, but they did. Again, I was not married and, and I felt that I would be drafted. I really decided that if I'm going to be drafted, I'd rather volunteer. Otherwise I would have had to apply for a commission except perhaps in the Judge Advocate's Department, the legal side. And I thought if I'm going in the army, and be a lawyer in the army, sitting in an office someplace in Washington, I'd just as soon stay out of the army and practice law and keep up the practice of law in my own home. Second, I felt that if I was going in, I wanted to really experience the training that every private soldier had to undertake. I was in good physical condition, I wanted to see how I could hold up, I guess there's some pride in that. But I just felt that that's

the way to do it as all were called to serve. And so I just went ahead and enlisted and am glad I did. I found out that I could do things that I, even at my age, would not have thought about doing before, like sleeping out on the ground, like a lot of heavy physical work in your basic training. I went through basic training about three times, after about a year, a little over a year, I applied for Officers Candidate School, and was admitted in the Military Police. The army put me in the Military Police because of my legal background, although I never did any police duty, except one time in France. When I got to Europe I was made a messenger. I ran messages from headquarters up to divisions, or smaller units. And that was my chief work, which was interesting and dangerous at times if you were trying to find divisions and smaller units running through woods where German troops were still hiding. I was in General Patton's army. He moved pretty fast and it was hard to find where the outfits were that I was carrying messages to. I kind of got around the question but I wanted really to be in the army. I don't derogate those who served in whatever capacity, as I think they did very important and patriotic work. But I just didn't want to sit in an office someplace.

RCS: Do you feel the Marshall Plan was well administered and successful?

JSC: Yes.

RCS: Why?

JSC: Well, I have to probably be prejudiced because it was enacted, you know, in those first two years I spent in the Senate. There was a very close working relationship on the Marshall Plan which was our plan, the United States, to provide aid, as you know, to Europe. And also the countries that we had defeated, Germany, Japan. But there was a working relationship between President Truman and Senator Vandenburg of Michigan. And Vandenburg made it a bipartisan effort. The Republicans were in control of the Congress in '47 and '48, both houses, so their vote was needed. And Senator Taft, who was the strongest man in the Senate, although he didn't take the lead, let Vandenburg take the lead because he was Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Taft backed Vandenburg with the Marshall Plan and of course that made a lot of difference with the more conservative members. It passed, I voted for it, I spoke for it, and I thought I'd had more experience than some had because of my service in the war. I was two years in Europe and I had seen what it looked like. Towns absolutely destroyed in parts of France and chiefly, of course, in Germany. If you go there today it's hard to realize what they looked like when I was there in the army. The Marshall Plan certainly restored Germany, restored parts

of France that were destroyed. And it did more than that. They were all broke, we had to loan money to Great Britain. Today it wouldn't seem much but 500 million was an awful lot of money in those days. Senator Taft said that he'd just rather give it to Great Britain. He said we probably will not be repaid so why not give it to them. He may have been right, I don't know if we will ever get it back, the Marshall Plan money in full. But, then to look into the future and for trade, the Marshall Plan was a great policy and very important. Russia was already beginning to act up, we had many who thought we could get along with Russia after the war. But in the first meetings, Stalin, Churchill, and President Truman, as President Roosevelt had died during the war, the Russians and Stalin made it clear that they were going to hold onto everything that they had overrun in eastern Europe and they were not going to have any free elections, as they had promised. They were posing a threat to Berlin and that threat did occur, you know, later with the blockade. I think that Russian threat too had something to do with the beginning of the Marshall Plan, followed by the formation of NATO. They have, at least until this time, I think, given a sense of security to Europe and to us, too, that we could have had and deterred the Russians.

RCS: What was your relationship, both personal and political, with

Alban Barkley?

JSC: With whom?

RCS: Alban Barkley.

JSC: I had known him when I was a county judge, when he'd come through, campaigning. He was a very strong man physically. He had a little two-seater Ford, about like a buggy. He drove it himself when he campaigned, although sometimes he'd have somebody going along with him, maybe a fellow to relieve him, but I've seen him drive alone or maybe he'd just drive into town. But he'd speak for an hour. I saw him eat before he'd speak, and he'd eat enough for two people. It didn't seem to bother him. He'd always come to see me in the court house. I liked him very much. He came to Somerset once for the State Bar Association in 1931 where he spoke and I saw him and talked to him then. He brought his daughter and actually I took her out to the dance. And in the Senate we got along fine, he had been, of course, the Majority Leader but in the Republican Administration he was the Minority Leader. But he called me "John" and as he was busy, sometimes I'd say "are you going to a certain committee meeting." I thought everything, you know, that affected Kentucky, both of us ought to be there. And I'd say are you going to this committee, he'd say, "now John, I can't go, you look after it for me and if there's any trouble you let me know."

People would come to see him, he'd be busy on the floor, and they'd call me out. And I'd go back and tell him. He would say, "John, I can't go out, I'm managing this bill, go back and tell them though, go to my office and I'll try to see them later." I told him once there was a beautiful girl out there that wants to see you, and says she's a strong Kentucky supporter of yours. He told me to tell her that he would be out in a few minutes. When I went down to tell him good-bye, before the election, he'd already been nominated to be Vice President. I knew that when he was nominated, my chances of being reelected fell right away because of his strength in Kentucky. But he laughed and he said that we've had a good time together, and, "John, I'd vote for you, except I'm a candidate myself for Vice President and I can't vote for you. I have to vote for the Democratic ticket." Of course, he was joking but he was friendly. Later when I run against him, you know, our relationship continued allright. I knew I was defeated in that campaign in '48, when he was a candidate for Vice President with President Truman. They carried the state. I didn't lose it much, I lost it enough though, I lost it by about 23 or 24,000 votes. That encouraged me to try it again.

RCS: What were your impressions of the Eightieth Congress?

JSC: Well, despite the fact that President Truman called it the

"do nothing" Congress, and I think that helped him get elected, as he really spread that all over the country. It was my first Congress. I was interested in everything that happened in it because it was something new to me. I think it was a good Congress. It handled some very difficult matters. You've mentioned one, of course, the Marshall Plan. Two, it passed the Taft-Hartley Act, which was bitterly opposed by President Truman and by organized labor. They called it "slave" labor act. Of course it wasn't. It brought about a balance. I voted for it and later even labor leaders admitted it. The budget for that year, after a war year, was about a hundred billion, ninety billion dollars. I remember Taft said we were going to bring it down to forty billion, which we did and balanced the budget for two years. A forty billion dollar budget, which of course is impossible today. A difficult bill I handled was to decide which controls should be maintained for a time and what should be taken off, that is, on all exports, imports, all controls. I was on the committee, the Judiciary, that made me chairman of the subcommittee and I handled that bill. It was the most intricate bill of that year in the Congress, and I heard all the hearings. It enabled me to meet every cabinet member. They all had to come and testify before the committee. I wrote the report myself. You couldn't let it get out

because people would have gambled on certain commodities. And it passed without any amendment. And, well, we'll talk more later on it, if you don't mind (break in tape).

RCS: Senator, what was your political and personal relationship with A.B. "Happy" Chandler?

JSC: You ask me this at a very good time. You may know that on May 17 they're having a "Happy" Chandler Day in Kentucky.

RCS: Yes.

JSC: Of course to raise funds for the Epilepsy Association. They call it a roast, but I think that many of "Happy's" friends are going to meet. I'm going down to the event. I met "Happy" Chandler in 1918 in front of the Phoenix, the old Phoenix Hotel in Lexington, and he was "happy" in the right way, he doesn't drink, you know, never. He was singing and of course he sang all through his political life and is still singing. He was going to Transylvania. I, at the time, was going to Centre College and I think, I think we played against each other, both in football and basketball. Got to know each other. I've known him ever since. I think that he was a good Governor. A lot of people forget that, in his first administration, that he actually changed the course of government in Kentucky. It had proceeded along the old lines for years. He brought in experts, some very conservative, as Governor Byrd of Virginia, later Senator Byrd, to send

people from Virginia to assist on the budget, working up a real budget system. He got from, I think, from Wisconsin, now it's bad, I can't remember every name, but this man became the director and ran TVA in its early stage, to look over, I think, the conservation measures and resources, Governor Chandler really began the modernization of the government of Kentucky, in my view. And that is what I remember from that time, not just by reading. He balanced the budget, he repealed the sales tax because that's what he'd run on, you know. He probably made a mistake in attempting to run against Senator Barkley for the Senate. In 1938, Barkley, the Majority Leader, and President Roosevelt was strong for him. Roosevelt came to Kentucky and rode around with Barkley. Happy Chandler met him, got right in the car with them. Then Senator Logan died and he came to the Senate on appointment and then later was elected and you'll recall, he resigned to become Baseball Commissioner and that's the reason I happened to have a chance to run for the Senate. I wasn't appointed. Robert Humphreys was appointed to fill out his term and then I was elected to fill out the rest, which was about two years. I'd say I always like Governor Chandler, we never had any agreement of any kind, political agreement, that he'd be for me or against me. But I think we both trusted each other and he liked me and I liked him, and he has made some statements

after we got out of politics that he helped me several times. And maybe he did. It is a disgrace that he has not been placed in the Baseball Hall of Fame, for it was his final and embattled decision that allowed black players into big league baseball.

RCS: Okay.

JSC: I consider him as one of our best Governors. I was very much interested in reading in The Miami Herald, which is a good paper, an article about him last week in which it said on its sporting page, that he should be put in the Baseball Hall of Fame, not only for being there when they took in the first black, but it was his fairness and strength, as a commoner who wasn't scared of the owners, a man who did justice, and insisted that Jackie Robinson should play.

RCS: How were your relations, both personal and political, with former Chief Justice Frederick Vinson?

JSC: With whom?

RCS: Frederick Vinson.

JSC: Well, looks like you are going to end up saying I got along with everybody, but we had a pleasant association. I had met him, of course, he had been from northeastern Kentucky, Ashland, that district. He was well known there. And he was well known and respected in the House and the entire Congress. He was an expert on fiscal matters, tax matters.

President Truman liked him very much, appointed him first to the Court of Appeals in Washington and then he became Secretary of the Treasury. It was always rumored that Truman really wanted him to run for President when there was doubt that Truman could be elected. He was nice to me and once in a while he would call me from the Supreme Court building. His secretary would ask, would it be possible for Senator Cooper to come up and see Chief Justice Vinson? I said "yes" unless I was down on the floor, "I'll be right up." And I'd go up and he would just say, we would just talk about Kentucky. He'd say I get lonely at times, and so we'd talk about some of our friends down there as we had some mutual friends in both Democratic and Republican parties. The last time I saw him, the same thing occurred and he said I'm very lonely, my wife is on vacation up in New York state in the Adirondacks and she won't be back for a week or so. She's not been very well and I'm worried about her. He was dead within two weeks. I went to his funeral. He was highly respected, he was a good man. I'm not sure he was the greatest Chief Justice, but he was highly respected and considered to have good judgment. He did hold very tightly with President Truman in several of his opinions which were pretty controversial. One on the power of the President to take over when Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company in Youngstown, Ohio couldn't reach an

agreement with the union. President Truman tried to take the company over but it went to court. The Supreme Court said he had no power, it's the power of the Congress. President Truman wouldn't use the Taft-Hartley Act unless he had to because he didn't like it. Chief Justice Vinson wrote a dissenting opinion saying he thought the President had the authority. He was a fine man. He wasn't for me, now, when I'd run, I know that, but were good friends and he was a man of the highest character.

RCS: Okay.

JSC: Because, even though he was on the court, I remember once he took a little political action when I ran in 1953. I remember he attended a meeting in Washington with some who were working for my opponent but that was his business, he was a Democrat.

RCS: What were your impressions of the administration of Harry Truman?

JSC: When he became President I was in Germany and I'll never forget when the word came through that President Roosevelt had died. The war was approaching a close then. We were, I remember just outside of Frankfurt, Germany. Well a lot of the soldiers, I was one of them, cried. And, of course, the story's well known that Truman worried about his own capacity. I served later with a lot of people who served

with him in the Senate and some of them told me that they doubted his capabilities when he took the office. But I think everybody recognized that he became an outstanding President. He was terribly political, the most political President I ever served under. But he was tough and he had determination. I talked to him a few times. I worked once, when I was out of the Senate, with Secretary Acheson, of State, on NATO. I went to Europe with Secretary Acheson three times and once he left me over there to visit with the NATO countries and talk to the officials about their willingness to really take part in NATO. And when I came back of course I reported to Acheson, but he asked me to go see President Truman, too, and I went to see Truman and reported what the European officials had told me. I'd seen prime ministers, defense ministers, people I never expected to see. Churchill was out of power, but I saw him in London, and Anthony Eden also out of power. Labor was in. Bevin was Foreign Minister, and he was a fine man. Atlee was the Prime Minister. They had so many officials in France I can barely remember who I saw there. DeGaulle wasn't in power then, he was out. But I saw the leading officials in every country in Europe. And I saw the grand old Chancellor Adenauer in Germany. I call him old but it's in a nice way. When I returned, I reported that, of course, depending upon

the willingness of the Congress to support and put troops in Europe, Europe would make an effort. President Truman was very nice. He thanked me for my work. I think now everybody regards him as having been a very determined and strong President. I think you have to take into account, though, in all of this and in what I may say later about other things, that at that time the United States was preeminent in the world. We had the credit, in large measure, for winning the war, that is, coming in with the final power to defeat Hitler, although the Russians were advancing rapidly from the east. Europe was broke, Japan was, Russia, although nobody ever knows just what situation Russia's in, their leaders run it like they want to. But everybody looked to the United States and believed in us. And, of course, all reacted in a way to help the President and the Congress and the country. On the other hand, if the man in that office hasn't got the capabilities, it can't help him much.

RCS: Do you feel you added significantly to the meetings of the Council of Ministers of NATO in 1950?

JSC: Did I what?

RCS: Do you feel that you added a significant part to the meetings of the Council of Ministers of NATO in 1950?

JSC: I think that's problematical, but that I did. I do not know just exactly how it happened that I attended as an

advisor, except that I think that Senator Vandenburg recommended me to Secretary Acheson. Senator Vandenburg was in the hospital, he was dying of cancer. He asked that Senator Acheson select me, a Republican, to go along as one of his advisors, a principal advisor, and he recommended me although I'd only been in the Congress two years with him. I believe that Chief Justice Vinson may have also given me a good name. Before I accepted, I knew some of the Republicans didn't like it in Kentucky, a lot of them. I was criticized because I accepted it. But I went for it for the United States - not a political party. I wasn't in the Senate at the time, I was in a law office here and backed by the Republican caucus and Senator Taft told me to go. He said go and come back and tell us your points, which I did. I came back and several of them who didn't like the idea of talking with Truman said well, you don't represent me. I said I don't expect to represent you. I'm just going over there to do what I can to find out the facts and I'll come back and tell you. I sat in all the meetings at the State Department where they made preparations. I sat in all the discussions that they had. First, we went to Paris and had a meeting with the French. The French wanted to be assured that they would not be left again, as they claimed they were left in World War II when the British

had to evacuate. And also, the French criticized the British for not using their air power. They didn't have it. The British had to save it to save their own country. There was mistrust and, of course, this was discussed. Then we went to London to talk to the English separately and then, finally we all met, all countries met in Brussels, in December '50. Curiously enough, one of the main purposes was to elect a Commander-in-Chief of NATO and that was Eisenhower. We had been agreed on when it came time to offer the resolution naming him as Commander-in-Chief of NATO (break in tape). Adrian Fisher from the State Department, a very able man, and I wrote the resolution appointing General Eisenhower to be Commander-in-Chief of NATO. That's more or less a clerical job, but anyway it was interesting. Acheson gave me credit for one thing, and he did it in his report to the Congress. He came, and spoke, not in the Senate Chamber, but in one of the private rooms in the Capital about his trip. The United States was very anxious to get West Germany into NATO. A lot of European countries didn't want them. They remembered close after the war the attack on their countries, but they also recognized that Germany had the strength against the Soviet-Eastern European countries and they knew eventually sometime they had to do it. I suggested that they admit West Germany to an organization which had been established

called OECD, Organization for Economic Development of Europe, which still exists. It was an economic organization of European countries and the United States. I said that could be a way to bring West Germany into NATO, and Mr. Acheson adopted my idea and the Council of Ministers agreed the next year. So he told the Senate I did propose it. It was a very interesting year. I owe a great deal to him and to whoever recommended me. I know Senator Vandenburg did because he told me. And I think that probably Chief Justice Vinson had something to do with it. But it was the opportunity of a lifetime. I met practically every official in Europe, prime ministers, foreign ministers, defense ministers, members of parliament. And I probably didn't realize then how, what an opportunity it was. But I did keep notes on my meeting and I sent regular reports to Secretary Acheson and of course they're someplace over in the files in the State Department. And I kept copies. I don't know where they are. I gave my papers to the University of Kentucky. They are probably stuck down among my papers they so kindly received.

RCS: What were your feelings and observations of Senator Joseph McCarthy, and the furor which surrounded the "Red Scare?" Joe McCarthy of Wisconsin. The "Red Scare." Your own feelings and observations.

JSC: I came to the Senate at the same time he did in '47, except

he was elected for a full six year term, I was just elected for a two year. When I returned to the Senate, of course, he had been reelected. I'm not sure whether he had yet been reelected, but anyway he was there. I served with him until he died. In those first two years I served, had not yet started his attack upon people in government, in the State Department particularly, other people throughout the United States as being communists, fascists, so forth. I never served on a committee with him so I didn't get to know him intimately. He was always very polite with me, except on two occasions. But in the two years I noticed two things happened. He was on the Commerce Committee. In the absense of a chairman, he just called a meeting, and not under the rules. He reported a bill, of course, it never was passed. I remember the chairman came back, Republican and he made a very strong speech on the floor against McCarthy for ignoring the rules and taking advantage of his absense. Second thing, the Eightieth Congress dealt very well with the veterans, pensions, and all their interests. McCarthy though, said that not enough had been done. And one night he filled the galleries with people from the various veterans hospitals around, Walter Reed, Navy Hospital, Veteran Hospital. Most of them wounded, some with arms off, legs off. He made a speech telling the Senate that they ought to be ashamed of

themselves. "Look up," he said, "In the galleries, look at those poor people, look at them." Taft was a very straight man and while I didn't agree with him on everything, that's nothing unusual, as one doesn't agree with anybody on everything. But Taft was straight as a string and he was honorable about these veterans. He responded and said the Senator from Wisconsin should be ashamed of himself. He said we honor these men, but you have brought them in here and, and put into their minds the fact that we are not trying to give them the best treatment and take care of them. He said, you tell us we should be ashamed, you should be ashamed. Senator George of Georgia, who was a great speaker and a wonderful man, got up and made the same statement, even tougher. He said it's a shame to treat these men like you have treated them tonight. Well those were two little things I remembered, when his later action came along I wasn't too surprised. He started down in West Virginia, made some speech, got some notice and he just went wild. He got help, two young fellows. Actually he had Bobby Kennedy as one of his attorneys, did you know that?

RCS: No, I didn't know that.

JSC: But he didn't stay long with him. McCarthy then began to denounce many people in speeches on the floor, many Senators would just get up and walk off the floor and just leave him

there to make these statements. And, of course, he went further and further when he began to attack the Army. He attacked a general, said he should be fired, intimated that he was protecting communists, and even attacking the Secretary of the Army. One day, I was sitting on the floor right behind him. He got up and made a speech and said that Winston Churchill appeared to be soft on communism. Well that was so senseless, that I got up and said I'm surprised that the Senator from Wisconsin would make such an outrageous statement when you remember his tremendous courage, effort, in the war to save England and Europe against Hitler. Also I said in the consideration of the Allies treaty, during the war, the Soviet Union being one, he stood up against the communists better than we did. Well he didn't say anything; he just gave me a hard look. But I remember the papers the next day. The New York Times and another paper said it was unusual that a back bencher, Cooper, just there a short time, had been the first to challenge McCarthy. Finally, Senator Flanders from Vermont offered a motion to censure him. This was before, months before the final vote. McCarthy said, "Go ahead and vote on it and censure me if you want to, if you feel like you can. You can't do it. The Senate won't do it," and they wouldn't at that time. But I supported and made a talk supporting the Senator from Vermont. McCarthy, turned around

and spoke something to me then and said, "I'll remember you," or something like that. The vote didn't take place because it was proper that he should have a hearing. The Senate appointed a committee, three Republicans and three Democrats, very fine men, to hold the hearing. It recommended that he be censured. And then with their backing, the Senate finally had enough courage to vote on censure. I spoke again because I knew he had a lot of supporters in the Senate and the country. He had a lot in my state. And there was some truth in some of the things he said. There were some communists in the government. I suspected a couple myself when I was in the UN. I knew that I'd be questioned, but I made a speech supporting censure, not a long one, and again he turned around and threatened me. He said, "I'll remember you, you'll hear from me." But I never heard from him. After the censure, he went to pieces. He may have been drinking before, but afterwards he appeared to drinking all the time. Then no one ever paid any attention to him. I don't know, but probably, as they say in the hills of Kentucky, he just died out.

RCS: What do you consider your major contribution to the United Nations?

JSC: It's pretty hard to make a contribution to the United Nations. I served there 4 years, '49, '50, '51, and '68. There were only 60 members in the early years. There was no one from

black Africa except Liberia. Liberia, you will remember was settled by slaves from the south, principally South Carolina, who went back to Africa. In these early days 1949, 1950, '51, practically anything the United States offered would automatically go through. All the South American countries would vote for us and all of Europe. And if it went to the Security Council, of course, it would be vetoed by Russia. There was one time they had a chance to veto and missed it. It was when Truman ordered US troops into Korea. The Russian delegation was absent that day, and missed its veto and so the troops really went in. The United Nations, and they passed the resolution to send troops into Korea to resist the aggression of North Korea, and later China. Of course after President Truman sent US troops in, the Congress approved. The first year I was on the Budget Committee in the U.N., which is a good committee to be on in the beginning, because you learn all about the operations of the U.N. I think at that time I made a contribution. The US was give about 40% of the budget. At the request of the State Department, I put in a resolution to reduce it. I think 36% or something like that. The other countries didn't like it much, but it went through. I think now our share is 33 or 32%. I was on some of the political committees. Until Afghanistan, there had been only 2 times that Russia had ever been censured by the U.N. I had

charge of the question both times. China, old China, under Chiang Kai-shek, China, and Yugoslavia.

RCS: The Nationalists?

JSC: Yes. They had been ousted from the mainland. They were on Taiwan. But they wanted a resolution from the U.N. condemning Russia for breaking its treaty with them. Russia went into the war in China at the last minute, you know, and made a treaty with Chiang Kai-shek that they would support him and his Nationalist forces. Of course they broke it immediately. It was hard to get anybody on the US delegation to take the resolution. I think they were afraid they couldn't get it through and then they'd be charged by Joe McCarthy with being soft on communism. I said I'll take charge of the resolution to condemn Russia, if the staff people won't tell me what to do. If I'm going to take it, I'm going to stay with it till there is a vote because I've seen it brought up and then taken down in the prior year. They said they wouldn't interfere with me. We did get a favorable vote and censured Russia. That was one time. The second time was in those first years - 1951. Yugoslavia had an item on, on the agenda condemning Russia for taking all the property out of the eastern European states; not only Germany, but Poland, all the other now communist states. The delegate who managed the resolution was a man named Djilas, a favored communist at

that time. He spoke for eight hours. I just spoke supporting him and the General Assembly did condemn the Soviet Union. I had a smaller association with that item, although I'd had the chief leadership in the Russian answer for breaking its treaty with the Chinese Nationalist. In '68 I went back to the U.N. It was the same year that Russia had invaded Czechoslavakia. Czechoslavakia had liberalized its government somewhat and suddenly the Russians invade Czechoslavakia and suppressed its new government. The Russians still have troops there. No one said a word about it in the U.N. I was on a committee, the legal committee, and the Russians were pushing what they called the "definition of aggression." They'd been arguing on it for years when they were aggressors themselves. The Russian delegate blamed the United States for holding it up, and called the United States a "world aggressor." Then I spoke extemporaneously. I said the last country in the world that ought to talk about the United States being an aggressor is the Soviet Union when it has just invaded Czechslavakia, aggressed against them, took over their government, put your own people in. I said you tried to find one person in, in Czechoslavakia that invited you to come in. You were never able to name one person. Well, he went up in smoke. I let him talk, finally said "just talk all you want to. The facts are there, your troops are in Czechoslavakia, aren't they?"

The Soviets protested to the US on my speech. Malik, who was the head of the Soviet delegation, protested. But I was glad to make the speech. You asked what contribution I made. It's pretty much a debating society and I guess more so today.

RCS: What did you think of the administration of Dwight Eisenhower?

JSC: Well you hear of people today say not much was done. But in my view it was a great administration. There was a small recession '57, '58, that was quickly turned around. Nothing like we have had since, or before. We were at peace all the time. There was a good feeling in the country. Even the Democrats in the Congress, never began to attack Eisenhower until about a year before '60 when the Presidential election was coming. Of course, he was, couldn't be a candidate. But then I remember the Democrats began, Senator Johnson, Senator Kennedy and others who were going to be candidates. They began to attack his administration. But never very hard. They had great respect for him. Of course there was great respect for him abroad. I'd have to say it was probably one of our best periods of good feeling, due in great measure to his own preeminence in the world as a war leader, but chiefly because he was a sensible man and a good man. And also he had enough sense, twice, to turn down requests to send troops into other countries. When the French, Israel and Britain tried to

take the Suez Canal back, they did not consult with President Eisenhower until later to send troops. They concealed it from him. But finally after they were in trouble they wanted his help. He wouldn't give them any. He did send some troops into Lebanon once. But most important he refused after the French were defeated in Indochina. There were some who wanted to send American troops into Vietnam in 1954, or at least to bomb the Indochinese. He refused. He said we'd had Korea and that was not yet settled, and it was not the proper course for us to get mixed up in Vietnam. We ought to always be thankful to him for his decision.

RCS: What was your relationship with John Foster Dulles, and do you feel he did a good job under President Eisenhower?

JSC: Yes. I didn't agree with all of his views. But John Foster Dulles was well known, he was a tremendously good lawyer, and well versed in international affairs. He'd studied it all his life. He always wanted to be Secretary of State, of course, he served in the U.N. and he served both Truman, in an unofficial way, and Eisenhower as Secretary of State. He was a devout Presbyterian, Calvinist. And he believed evil was evil and good was good. He believed the Soviets were evil and that countries that did not line up or be against them supported evil.

RCS: Sort of black and white situation.

JSC: Yes. He organized defense treaties against the Soviet Union

all around the world. I think they involved 40 countries. Some of them were bilateral, some of them multilateral. We had treaties with South America, treaties with Japan, bilateral. And, of course, the North Atlantic Treaty and the Southeast Asian Treaty. That would involve Vietnam and, of course, we had strong support on it from Australia and New Zealand. I was serving with him in the U.N., I forget whether one year or two years, and we always got along. Well he would talk to me because I had served in the Congress. I remember one time President Truman wanted him to go out to Japan and negotiate, finish negotiating a treaty and become one of its cosigners. Well he asked me to come in and said, "what do you think about this?" I said, you've helped negotiate it, haven't you? And he said, "yes." Well I knew what he was thinking about. Would it hurt the Republicans up on the hill, and I just beat him to the question. I said I thought it will do a lot of good. Japan is acting very well and you should go. He was pleased, he was going anyway. When I was in India, he helped me of course, he advised my appointment to, as an Ambassador of India. He advised Eisenhower. Eisenhower told me that John Foster Dulles had advised him to send me there because of our work together in the U.N. He thought I could get along allright with people and would in India. Mr. Dulles thought that they were not moral because they didn't join in the treaties

committing themselves to mutual defense against the Soviet Union and China. In India I talked to Nehru about the problem. Nehru just told me that he was not anti-American and, but he said unfortunately during all of our history we've been under somebody's domination, until just the last years I was there. I think 7 years after their independence. He said they'd been dominated by everybody for centuries. The Persians, the Portugal, the French had part of the country, the Portuguese were still holding part of it - Goa. The British who had practically all of India, but they left peacefully. Now we want to be free. We want to define our own policy. He said, I have doubts about China and Russia. They're big countries. Big countries are usually expansionist, he said. We have a disagreement with China over the boundary line. At this time we're getting along allright, but we don't know anything about the future. And he said we just have to get along the best we can with these countries because if they decide to make war against us they could defeat us. But the main thing is we want to make our own decision. When I came back on my first trip to the US, I told that to both Mr. Dulles and President Eisenhower. I think I convinced President Eisenhower, but I don't think I convinced Mr. Dulles. He was a man of strong will.

RCS: Did you enjoy your ambassadorship to India?

JSC: Yes. It's an interesting country, geographically and every way. Plains, mountains, tropical areas. Different people, different derivations from the North. Some of them are the same stock we are, Aryans. I think that's the proper pronunciation. I'm not quite sure. Some came from the islands from the south. They're black, but they're not of Negroid derivation. But then there are the great differences in wealth and poverty. The old maharajahs and rajahs and other titles. And the problem is still there with the Muslims, although they're divided, there are about 50 or 60 million people that are Muslims, in India. Nehru, though, was one of the most civilized men I ever met in my life. And for some reason, he would talk to me and usually asked me to his house. I think it was because he knew I wouldn't go out and give press conferences or make statements. I never did because I knew if I did he wouldn't talk to me anymore. He always told me more than I had been asked by the State Department to find out. Well that's something I ought to write about sometime. He told me what he thought about America, what he thought about England, what he thought about Russia, what he thought about China. And he said, "I'm an Indian. I'm from my own country." I have already told you of his concern about Russia and China. He said, "I like England, although they dominated us, because I went

to school there." But he said, "no country in the world has done as much for its own people as your country, the United States, for the working people, for the poor people, for the immigrants." But he did say, "it's too competitive for me. I've been there a few times, and it's too aggressive for me." I enjoyed my stay in India and I think I did some good there because at least they said they trusted me and my wife. They had an awful drought one time, needed grain and I helped them. The US aid program didn't want to help, didn't want to let them have any grain. I talked to Secretary Dulles and Dulles agreed to it. It shows he wasn't an anti-Indian. I told Nehru that Dulles and President Eisenhower have agreed to supply India grain.

RCS: Here's a good question on somebody who was important that you probably had a great deal to do with, you know, meeting and talking with him as, I'd like to know what your impressions were of Lyndon Johnson when he was a Senator.

JSC: How'd we get along?

RCS: Yes.

JSC: Well, I'll tell you the truth. Lyndon was a tremendous leader in the sense that he would run that Democratic side to get his way by any method he could use (break in tape). In his first year, he would twist arms. I've seen him take people back in the corner and argue with them. I remember one bill that came

up and he was very angry with an official in the cabinet. Johnson opposed a bill from his department, and as Lyndon was on the Appropriations Committee, well he just tore the bill to pieces. Some of us tried to put some of it back in on the floor, although we knew it finally, in conference, would come back pretty good. Several Democrats said they'd join with us. Well it ended up when Lyndon won and was back every Democratic Senator except one Senator Newberger of Oregon. He'd come up on the Republican side and talk to people on our side. It never bothered me much. Whenever I'd vote with him, he'd say, "John, you're a great American, a great American." And if I voted against him he probably wouldn't speak to me for 2 or 3 days. But he, he was a very human being. He'd talk to you. If he had some problem he thought you were wrong or, or he wanted to get your vote, he'd ask you down to the White House and talk to you about it. But he wouldn't, he never did try to put any squeeze on me. And I remember once he had an amendment up and I told him, "you are wrong." I opposed it. It was something to do about a book program. He wanted to cut it out every place. I opposed him because I had seen in India students read out books all the time. The Soviets were giving books away, they were giving them to them. And so I told Lyndon on the floor, people have been burning books a thousand years. You're not going to be one

of those book-burners, are you? Well that night, the bill hadn't been finished, he always went to the gym and I'd go to the gym. As I went in and I heard a voice, "Hello John, come here, come here." I said, "who is it?" He responded, "Lyndon, your leader." He said you seem to be very much convinced about opposing my amendment. I said yes. I called him Lyndon, we called each other by first names. You did an awful thing today and I'll explain it. Well, he said, come to my office tomorrow, half an hour before the Senate opens and tell me more about it. And I did. He was very, in his own way, just devious. He'd be wandering around on the floor before anybody came in. Nobody there but me, the presiding officer and two or three others and he'd just asked the amendment to be reconsidered and to pass. So he, he could be convinced. He was human. Of course, he being a southerner, being from Texas, Texas is not quite southern but they have a good deal of the same feeling there. There was fighting on the Civil Rights bill. And the efforts he made on poverty. Of course, they've grown so vast now, nobody knows how much waste is in, or whose, whether the people getting the help deserve it or not. But he started it and his idea was good, to help poor people. He went up into eastern Kentucky, and he asked me to go with him. I went up with him. And it was not long after, of course, that President Kennedy had been

assassinated. We had secret service men with us. We drove from, I think, Prestonsburg somewhere farther. He had a little helicopter. He'd just get out and shake hands with everybody. I remember the secret service man, whom I had known during the Kennedy hearings, he said you see, we can't protect the President, and except just the best you can. President Johnson made a mistake on Vietnam and we, of course, I did too in supporting him in those early days. But at that time, I don't think he had any mean purpose. There was still that idea abroad, that, that a lot of young people don't realize now, China and the Soviet Union, they considered Vietnam their vassel, they were just going to take by force South Vietnam. And so he got that resolution through. Then he began building up the forces, you see, I think between 450,000 half a million, or something like that. You couldn't argue with him very much about it. I voted for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. I knew what I was doing. I didn't believe he'd lead us into war. And I stood on the floor that day - it's in the record - and said I know what I'm doing. We're giving the President power to get us into war if he wants to. And Senator Fulbright agreed. Johnson got angry with Senator Fulbright because Fulbright said he'd been misled. And so in Johnson's book of memoirs he points that colorfully Senator Fulbright answer to my question . Well, I said we're giving

him this power, aren't we? Fulbright said yes. So President Johnson put it in the book. I made speeches beginning in 1968 that we should try to stop bombing in Vietnam and try negotiations. He wasn't negotiating, he said, unless the North Vietnamese withdrew. Well I said, you know they're not going to do that, it would be the same if they asked us to withdraw. I said just make an effort to negotiate with them. But he never would do that. He said they had to withdraw. But it was a tough period for him. I had great sympathy for him.

RCS: What were your feelings on the Administration of John F. Kennedy?

JSC: He had a short administration, you know. But, of course, he had an immediate failure, the Bay of Pigs, Cuba. But he was very honest about it. He took the full blame himself. He didn't make any excuses for it. And then he retrieved himself when the Russians started putting missiles in Cuba. He told them they had to stop and take them out. I don't know if they ever took the missiles out. They stopped bringing them in. They had ships in route to Cuba, you know. He told them that if they came, his planes were ready to destroy them. We were out of session then in 1962, I wasup in eastern Kentucky campaigning for Thruston Morton, and we got a telegram asking us to report to, several places we could go. We could go to Atlanta or Washington. I went to Washington. I went over to the State Department. Didn't learn too much over there

and I thought I'd go to the White House. I went over and I ran into Mac Bundy. He was worn out. President Kennedy heard I was there and he asked me to come up. I went up to his living, sitting room. He was calm, but he told me, I don't know what's going to happen. Their arms ships are still coming. But he said if they come, I'll do what I said I'd do. And he said, maybe it could be a nuclear war, of course. But he said I've got intelligence that they'll turn back. And they did. I have always considered myself very fortunate to have seen him. I, just by chance, lots of things happened to me just by chance. That I went to Washington instead of Atlanta and had that chance to see him. And to hear him say that. He always gave a lot of hope. He was young, good looking, had a good speaking voice. Of course, that first speech, which was praised then, today it might be considered too warlike, you know. But then we could go any place, do anything. But it, there was a slight recession while he was President in 1962. He ordered a public buildings program. I remember, they were building court houses, and repairing court houses, all around the country, several in Kentucky. It's hard to know what he would have done, but I did know him. I sat on the Labor Committee with him for six years and he was a good man. He was the most conservative Democrat on that whole committee. He told me (I'm telling a lot of

things), he said I, naturally, want to be sympathetic with labor and of course they supported him. But he said I just can't be for everything they want. And he said I get tired of being just asked to do everything they want. I don't believe in everything they want. He was the only one over there, on the Democrat side, that would just be independent now and then. And I think that's one reason we got to know each other, because I was independent on the Republican side. We also served on a subcommittee together on mining safety. John L. Lewis was trying to get something through against the small mines to protect them, and I offered amendments which Lewis fought. Senator Kennedy joined me. He said later when he was running for President maybe I was going to get him defeated - but in a joking way.

RCS: Okay. What role did you play on the President's Commission to Investigate the Assassination of President Kennedy?

JSC: Well I suppose the role we all played. Again it's rather curious, I was in Somerset. I got a call, telephone call, and the operator in Somerset said there's a man that says he's President Johnson calling you, says he's President Johnson. Well, it was. He didn't have some secretary call you, he'd call you. And he told me he was setting up this commission. He told me who was going to be on it and asked me if I'd serve. Well I said Mr. President, of course,

you know, you've appointed some awfully good men and if you think I'm capable of course I'll do it. I came back to Washington the next day and went down to talk to him. And then I talked to Senator Russell, who was a member. He was a friend of Johnson's, he didn't want much to serve as he didn't believe the Chief Justice ought to be engaged in anything but the courts work. But he agreed to accept. Johnson had a knack for pressing people. The hearings lasted for months. I guess we'd meet 3 times a week. Of course, we had a pretty large staff. We've been criticized lately, recently for using the FBI and the CIA, although at that time nobody had any questions about using the FBI and the CIA. It's all evolved recently. And where would we have gotten any investigators, you know. And actually, these fellows were there and they'd already made some investigations. We argued a good deal and debated. We went to Dallas, of course. Then there wasn't a doubt in our minds after several weeks and after hearings that Oswald was the sole killer. The question was if there had been any conspiracy. We could never find any. And we said in our final report, it was our unanimous decision. But if some proof turns up in the future, of course, let it come, let it come, let the truth be known. But we've done the best we can. We knew Oswald was trying to get to Cuba and back to Russia. There was one

suspicious factor before the assassination. Oswald had been to Mexico. He tried to get a visa there to go to Cuba. But they wouldn't give him one. And he came back and went to work in the school book depository. Sad thing was, the FBI did know he was working there because he had been in Russia. They had his record and should have kept him under close watch. One man down there, in the FBI, knew he was there and yet failed to watch his movements during the time of President Kennedy's visit. I've never changed my viewpoint that we came to the right conclusion and when they had the recent hearings last fall I had to testify along with former President Ford and a famous lawyer from New York, John McCloy. We're the only 3 left.

RCS: Do you feel that Barry Goldwater helped or hurt the Republican Party in the early '60's, and why?

JSC: I did not believe he could win for President in 1964. I was chairman for our delegation, I didn't ask to be. I didn't ask to be a delegate, because I'd already said I was not for Goldwater. At that time I was for Rockefeller. I wish he had run through. Unfortunately, he got out. And then they put in Scranton and he wasn't a strong candidate. But I had said I would support him as I wasn't for Goldwater. And I, Barry knew that. He told me and I told him. I thought that he was, I thought that he was about like me. I didn't think

he was qualified. And he had such dogmatic views on everything at that time. And he'd also let himself get into a position, although I don't think he meant it, that he'd do away with the Social Security System. Of course, that was an absolute disaster. Now I heard him make a speech on it once and he didn't say that, but it was close enough that they picked it up. And I remember in Kentucky I had a good many Republicans tell me, I never voted the Democratic ticket in my life, but I can't vote for him, I'm living on Social Security. Well out at the convention everybody in my delegation was for Goldwater except me. And they got pretty angry with me. But that last night, two of them didn't show up and so the two alternates, they joined me, and we voted against him and voted for Scranton. But after he was nominated, I supported him. He came to Kentucky. I met him, went with him, Louisville, and down to Corbin where he spoke. I went to Ohio and spoke for him and I was asked to come up there. I went to Michigan. I went up in Jerry Ford's district. I even spoke in New York City. Why in the world they wanted me in New York, where they'd never heard of me up there. Goldwater wrote me after that and said I know you were not for me, for the nomination, and you had your own reasons. I respect them. But he said many of my supposed supporters, when I visited their states or districts, they'd be absent, because the polls and everything

showed I was going to get defeated. They were running for Congress or something and they just wouldn't be there. But he said you were there in Kentucky. He spoke on the floor of the Senate. Before I left, they had one of those tribute days, you know. And I think it lasted from 9 to 11 or something like that, and when he came over, the time had elapsed. He asked permission if he could speak. And he got up and spoke and he told them that I was straight forward with him, that I told him I couldn't be for him. But he said, unlike many others, who fled when I approached their state. John Cooper was there to help me, and he said, he's my friend. He is very much respected in the Senate. They know he's honest, they know he's honorable, they know he believes in a strong defense. I do, too. I think a lot of people, more and more up there know he's straightforward, a good man. I hope he runs again for the Senate. He doesn't know whether he will or not.

RCS: Do you feel the Johnson Administration acted correctly?

JSC: What?

RCS: Do you feel the Johnson Administration acted correctly in its conduct of the war in Vietnam, and with the unrest which it caused in the United States?

JSC: Well he got himself in the position where he was just stuck. As I said, we, all of us there except two men, are partly

responsible for it. In 1954, when the French were defeated and there was talk that we might enter the war or send troops, Mike Mansfield and I spoke and urged that it not be done. Of course, Eisenhower didn't do it, but he didn't do so because we spoke. He just did it because he was a general and knew that it was guerilla country, and we had no real security interests there. I think Johnson's hero was Roosevelt. That's one reason he wanted his domestic program, as Roosevelt had a domestic program, you know, for unemployed and the poor. Also he had civil rights. I think he also wanted to win a war. Roosevelt won a war, or at least was supposed to have won it. I think President Johnson had those motivations. He wanted to be great. Go down in history. And he was advised by a good many people not to send troops there. There was a military expert who had followed Eisenhower in WWII, and, as the head of NATO, General Ridgeway. He was an experienced soldier, a general through World War II, under General Eisenhower, who sent him out to Vietnam. He came back and advised him not to intervene.

RCS: Was it General Westmoreland?

JSC: What?

RCS: General Westmoreland?

JSC: No. Before him. This man was Ridgeway, General Ridgeway. He's retired. President Eisenhower also sent General Collins,

who was a good soldier in World War II. They called him "Lightening Joe" Collins. I got a note from him a few days ago. I gave him a book the other day to read. It's about himself. Collins advised Eisenhower not to send troops. General Taylor told him it was allright. He had been Commanding General in Japan after MacArthur. He had been the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Eisenhower, but fell out with Eisenhower. But, of course, we had the chance up in the Senate. We'd supported the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. He wouldn't have actual authority to send troops. He could have sent them, but he was careful to get authority before he did do it. He could have sent them just like Truman sent troops to Korea. Truman sent more troops to NATO than he was authorized to send. I suppose President Johnson thought the advice he had from the generals out there, some of them at least, that if they just got more troops they could win. But then, then, of course, about the time when negotiations broke down, President Nixon sent troops into Cambodia. That was extending the war. That's when Church and I got into it.

RCS: The Cooper-Church Amendment?

JSC: Yes. Cooper-Church. We, and we used the only method we thought was constitutional and that was to deny the use of funds. That's what the Congress had the power to do. We could cut off funds. So we introduced a resolution that no

funds would be expended for the use of any of our forces in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand. We didn't attach Vietnam at that time. We were already in there. And after about 60 days of debate, it finally passed. But then Nixon had withdrawn them anyway. But then we offered other amendments to deal with Vietnam. But none was ever passed.

RCS: Did you work very closely with Senator Jacob Javits?

JSC: Yes. We were seat-mates for about 7 years. I sat next to him and George Aiken sat on the other side of me. There couldn't have been two men more unlike. George Aiken, a good old maple syrup farmer from Vermont was about 80. He never spent more than $15 in a campaign. He'd always report $15 or something like that, which was the cost of going down and filing. He had great judgment. He'd make a short speech, about a 10 minute speech. But sometimes he had more to say than anybody else. Just like he said once, "why don't we just pull our troops out of Vietnam and say we've won the war." He had common sense. Jack Javits, another seat-mate, was a brilliant fellow, but just was in everything nearly. And I think dissipated a lot of his energy, although I have great admiration for him. And after a while, many of the Southern Senators, who didn't like him at first, began to have a great respect for him because of his ability and his honesty.

RCS: Did you consider Richard Nixon a good President?

JSC: Yes. But not Watergate. I've at times spoken on this subject. I mean, they've asked me at times to speak usually extemporaneously, and analyze my viewpoints of the different Presidents I've served under. I always said this about him. I think he was the hardest student of any of them. He was not an intellectual in the sense that people talk about intellectuals, you know, and some of them may be and some of them may not be. But he had a great mind. He was strong-willed, and courageous, and determined, and he studied. On foreign policy he had a good advisor, Henry Kissinger, and former Secretary of State William Rogers was a good man. Nixon had imagination. He was the one who really thought of opening up relation with Russia and China, and see if we couldn't at least, reduce these confrontations. I know this to be in the campaign in 1968. After his election, I was in New York at the U.N. He asked me to come and see him at the hotel where his headquarters was located. Kissinger was there and myself. Nixon wanted to appoint somebody to be ambassador to the U.N. and they asked me to give them some names. But then they began to talk about Russia and China, and better relations, for they knew I wouldn't tell. President Nixon said he was considering then that better relations with Russia and China should be made. I found

while in East Germany, he's highly respected by their people and the people in all those eastern European countries, because they're scared to death of a nuclear war. They thought that if we could get along better with Russia that would reduce that possibility. And, of course, President Nixon thought so too. And also I think they were all a little bit scared of him. They didn't know what he'd do. Just like he dropped bombs once in Vietnam when he thought Vietnam failed to live up to its agreement on negotiations. He was smart. He was rather in-drawn. When he was vice president his office, they weren't so fancy then, was a little office over in the old Senate office building. Curiously enough, Jack Kennedy was right across the aisle from him. I'd pass, and at times Rosemary Wood would say, the vice president is in, want to drop in and talk to him? So I would. He was always friendly. He didn't have a great deal of humor. He would not say much about himself, about his ambitions, his desires. I think that was one of his problems, he held himself in very close. Naturally, he was very ambitious. He had thought about being President all those years and, and it was rather remarkable after being defeated in '60 and then being defeated for governor, that yet he kept up and was elected. I thought at the beginning that the Watergate Investigation, as I was out of the Congress, that the breakin made no sense. Everybody

knew that he was going to beat Senator McGovern. And what could be learned by sending in a group of Cubans and others, and breaking into that Democratic headquarters? And I couldn't believe that he knew about it. I thought he was being condemned wrongly by newspaper articles saying that from certain confidential sources, unnamed persons, they had built their stories involving him. I was out of Congress, I did a couple of speeches usually saying that I felt he deserved the same rights as any other American had. He had a right to be heard and not to be found guilty unless proven guilty under the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. But, of course, nobody would pay any attention to it. I was interviewed elsewhere several times. I spoke in Kentucky one afternoon with the Lexington Leader, and they never would print what I'd said. But, of course, when the tapes came out, then he was ruined. It's difficult for me to understand how he got in that awful position. Of course, everybody says his advisors were bad and I have no doubt they were. He didn't have an outstanding group of White House advisors. Of course, he had a good man in Kissinger, Bill Rogers, General Snowcraft, and finally General Haig. Bill Rogers quit when the tapes came out, you know. He didn't know anything about them. He and Nixon had been good friends, but he quit his job as Secretary of State. Of course, probably, too,

because Kissinger was taking it over. But I know the man. Bill Rogers is a very honorable man. And, but it's still inexplicable.

RCS: What was the motivating force behind the Cooper-Church Amendment?

JSC: Well the first one, as I said, was that we felt that, that Nixon by sending troops into Cambodia, was going to widen the war. It would spread to Cambodia, Laos, and perhaps Thailand, because we had those big bases in Thailand from which we were bombing North Vietnam, and fearful they would end up in trouble unless it was curbed. In Thailand even now, the Communist Vietnamese are fighting right up on their border, as you know. And so we put in the amendment calling for that withdrawal of U.S. forces from Cambodia, and denying any funds for the use, for any payment of any troops of any kind or supplier to be used in Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand. That was the first step. And we had a hard fight on it because many felt that the President had the right to do whatever was necessary as Commander-in-Chief. But we finally won it in the Senate. But in the Senate House conference they changed it just to apply only to ground troops, so the U.S. kept using the air force in those countries. Without question, North Vietnam is, and always has been, the aggressor and however, they now talk about and blame Johnson and Nixon

North Vietnam was always the aggressor. I was just reading an old document the other day on the report of a United Nations delegate on Vietnam. That covered the early '60's, '62, and '63. The head of it was a very able and well-known Canadian. His name was Lester Pearson. He'd been Prime Minister of Canada and the head of the U.N., one of the most respected men in the world. He headed and signed the report that charged North Vietnam with breaking the '60, '54 U.N. agreements. North Vietnam was sending troops infiltrating South Vietnam, and breaking all their promises. And, of course, you can see what they've done since the close of the war. They've taken over Cambodia and with all the arms they took, that we'd left out there. Of course they control Laos and I'm sure Thailand is afraid of them. China, too.

RCS: Do you now, or did you ever, consider yourself a "liberal" Republican?

JSC: Well I think most people did, looked at me that way, or more liberal than most, it's safe to put it that way. It's hard to define what a liberal is, you know, because there are all types. I always voted and as I have noted, twice led the censure of the Soviet Union for strong defense. And I voted against a lot of increases in spending, which I don't believe the business community in my own state ever gave me credit for. I never would take any money from labor unions,

with the exception of the railway workers, who were having a hard time, and they never gave me a large contribution. They didn't bother about any problems except to maintain their trust fund, you know for their pensions, which was a good thing to do. I was on that committee, and Kennedy was on it. And we, we worked up the bill for them. And they never asked us for anything. But I didn't want the labor people, or any group to think I was under their control. And I wasn't. And they were sometimes for me, sometimes they were against me.

RCS: So, so.

JSC: John L. Lewis would denounce me, yet I'd carry eastern Kentucky, at times, and sometimes be defeated. George Meany, head of the AFL-CIO, was a good friend of mine. He invited me to speak to one of their conventions. I know I may have been just a token Republican. But I thought if a Republican's got a chance to speak, he ought to do it. So he introduced me. He called me John, and said he voted against us at times when he thinks we're wrong, but he votes with us when he thinks we're right, and John's a pretty good fellow, he said and allright to vote for. And we correspond now. I got a letter from him the other day. And I got to see him once in a while. He's a very patriotic man. And, of course, he fights hard for his union, I can't blame him for that. But, but he's a great patriot. And, of course, when I voted for

civil rights and got thousands of letters against that. But I took positions on a good many things that were questions which were so obviously national I felt that even though it might not be liked very much in Kentucky, that I had the duty to vote for what I thought was best for the nation. Although I made a lot of mistakes just like others, in the end I think that's why I probably got elected. People finally said well at least he's honest with us. I have to think why I got elected in a Democratic state. I hope this doesn't sound like self praise, but some would tell me at least you tell us what you're going to do. Yes, I think with most conservatives, considered me too liberal. I wasn't as liberal as George McGovern, or Jack Javits or others. But some considered me too liberal.

RCS: What was, and is your relationship, both personal and political, with former Kentucky Senator Thruston Morton?

JSC: Well we had a good relationship. I've known him for many years. His brother-in-law and I were classmates. Senator Morton has one sister living, but her husband's dead. His name was Morton, my class mate. And so I met Thruston. I guess he's about 8 or 9 years younger than I am. I met him when he was about 18 or 19 years old. And I've known him ever since. And we never had any trouble. We happened to run together in 1956, because Senator Barkley had died, and

I ran to fill out his four years. And Thruston was running for the full six year term of Senator Clements. We ran together. He being from Louisville, a big city, and I being from up in the hills, we kind of made a good team, I think. He had never made a statewide race. I did go with him and help him then. And he had a tough opponent, he had a harder race than I did. And also, he hadn't made, he didn't know the state very well. Although he was different, the people began to respect his ability and to accept the fact that he didn't talk so much. He had honesty, integrity, good business sense, he was very much respected. He was reelected and could have been elected again. Fact is, I think if he'd been nominated for vice president with Nixon in '60, Nixon might have won. He'd been National Chairman. He was much liked. We didn't vote together, alike, all the time. At the beginning I thought he was more liberal than I was. But he became Republican National Chairman and was a good one. And, and, of course, he had to keep the home troops happy. And he changed some of his views, but he was very strong about, well he was strong about civil rights. He really jumped on Johnson very hard for some of the things he did during the Vietnam War, you know. And we still are friends. I see him. We campaigned together again two years for President Ford. We didn't have much luck, but we campaigned together in Kentucky.

And I'll guess we'll be campaigning together this fall for the Republican ticket in Kentucky. He's a very find man with a wonderful wife and family. The man is outstanding because of his integrity and ability.

RCS: What people worked most closely with you during your Senate terms?

JSC: Senate what?

RCS: Your terms in the Senate.

JSC: Well naturally it was on different issues. I, naturally on the Vietnam war, it was Church, Aiken and Mansfield. Now Aiken and Mansfield were on the Cooper-Church Amendment. But they never mention their names because Church and I were doing most of the speaking and debating. But Mansfield was highly respected and so was Aiken. And, and I'm sure they helped us a great deal. So on those war issues I'd say Aiken and Mansfield and Church and myself, and, of course, a lot of others. But then on Kentucky things, we had a pretty good situation up there. Our whole congressional delegation, Democrats and Republicans voted together on practically everything, we voted together that affected Kentucky. The House people and Senator Morton and myself and Senator Clements. I served with Clements and Barkley and lately with Marlow Cook. Somehow on Kentucky issues, except for civil rights, why, and Medicare. We, we all stuck together pretty well. We disagreed

on some water projects. But I was for most of them, but I didn't want them to destroy some of the national fresh water streams in a place like Red River Gorge. I fought the dam at the Tennessee-Kentucky line or the Smith Fork River. It's a river that's clear and clean and they wanted to build a power plant down there. I supported it at first, but then fought it. I had the same experience with the Red River Gorge, first supporting the dam, then leading the fight against it. But I would think, I usually found myself in the corner with Aiken and Mansfield more than any other Senators there. Except when Mansfield wanted to withdraw troops from NATO and I didn't. I was against that. But he's an outstanding man.

RCS: Do you feel that your fellow Republicans in the Senate considered you a "renegade" from the usual party line?

JSC: No, I don't think so. I know that's been suggested but I never had any trouble with any of them. I'm sure that some of them disliked some of my votes. But our leader, Dirksen, never tried to twist anybody's arms. He didn't get angry with you if you didn't vote with him. Once in a while he'd drop by and say John, if you think you could help me and it's allright, I'd appreciate it. We never lost our friendship for each other. No, they did not, I,

that's been said now in some of the articles written about what some people have said. But I wouldn't want to say that I didn't have people who didn't like me. People don't like everybody, you know. And just like I didn't like some of their votes, some of the rest of them did, but it was their own business. And, well they said they respected me, my independence and honesty. I remember several times I was the only one to vote against a bill or for it. Some would be surprised and tell your votes may beat you. I'd answer, well I don't think it will, but it's the way I feel. There were two bills when I was the only one to vote against them. And, and I remember once a bill up which I thought let too many immigrants in. So many were coming in, you know, and it was a pretty difficult subject because it involved the Middle East, South America and others. But I thought as we are not in very good times, I'm going to vote against this bill. Well all the liberals were voting for it. But they came down the line and I voted against it. Some came in later and asked how'd you vote? I said I voted against it. Then 2 or 3 of them changed their votes. They thought if I voted against it, they wouldn't be condemned too much. I laughed at one of the very

conservative members. Norris Cotton of New Hampshire on that vote. I knew that he wouldn't be for it so, but for some reason, he voted for it. When he heard I voted against it he came over and said, did you vote against the bill? I said yes. He said, what for? Well I said, I just think we're in hard times right now. We're taking in a lot of people anyway, refugees. And why just increase the quotas all over the world. I'll change my vote, he said. And I knew it's what he believed. Also he got back in favor of the voters. But I decided I was lucky to be a Senator from Kentucky, a Democratic state. And I couldn't, I knew it wasn't going to last forever. And I thought I owed, it was my duty to listen and for Kentucky's interest and do all I could to support it. But if I felt there was something that was maybe of more of national, international interest which overweighed the interest of any particular group, I felt I had a duty to support it or otherwise I thought there's no point in my being here. I just would get beat if they didn't want me. And, and I felt better about it.

RCS: What was your favorite moment in the United States Senate?

JSC: Being sworn in, I guess.

RCS: That seems natural.

JSC: I know I'll never forget going up and I just thought my goodness, here I am. Who'd ever imagine I'd ever be in the United States Senate, you know. And it was only, I guess, an accident. I think, there was several, I don't know. I may, I regret my vote on the Tonkin Gulf Treaty because I knew better. But I know, of course, that four or five years ago I tried to correct it with the Church Cooper Amendment. I use a system with Aiken and Mike Mansfield to find some way, if we could, to get out, either by negotiation or by finally just stopping the war by stopping appropriations. Stopping the killing. And as I look back and think of anything I believed some good. I, as I told you, at the beginning, consider my years as county judge the most valuable in my life because in a rural community I got to know people. I learned there are good and bad people. I learned that everybody has their troubles, whatever their condition in life, and I learned about human nature, I think. Second, I think the war in which I served in Europe, was a great experience for me because I saw war and, while I wasn't in the front line, being too old, but being a messenger I was traveling all the time and in a

jeep with a driver and a corporal. I was in dangerous country. We were fired on a number of times from the woods and bombed. We even took some prisoners once. Of course the Germans just came out of the woods and gave up. I got to see these boys going up everyday to the front, you know, up to what might be their last day. I had a young cousin, second cousin, killed the first day he was in battle. He was just 18 years old. And seeing all that destruction, I felt that anything honorable that we can do that, to keep out of war we ought to do it. That doesn't mean shouldn't keep up our defense. We should, that's one way of keeping out of war. So the Russians will know they can't just take us for granted. After the war, when I was in Munich, I was made, among other things, an advisor on the repatriation of what they called displaced persons. The forced labor that the Germans brought in, chiefly from Russia and from eastern Europe, but also from France and other countries. The Russians sent a team to Munich to negotiate the return of the Russians to Russia. It was my first experience negotiating with the Russians. They claimed under the Yalta Treaty that they had the right to take every Russian back. Well it's in the treaty. But they

said we'll only take the Russians. Now a lot of Russians had married people from other countries. They had children. And the Russians said we won't take them. And for some reason, some order came down from higher headquarters approving the agreement and saying we will have to stand by it. I was just a captain. I went to our commanding officer and I told him that I had people representing the world's churches to see me. A Papal emissary had been to see me from the Pope. And I told him this ought to be stopped. And we had already sent some Russians back. They sent a few carloads back and a lot of them had jumped out. And I said when this gets back to America it's going to raise the storm it ought to. It is wrong he said to me, who are you, a captain, to question an order. And I said I'm sure there's something wrong with this order. And I was older, older than he was. And he was always pretty nice to me. And so I said I believe General Patton hated the Russians, you know. If he knows about this he'd stop it. Well he said if you want to go see him, if you can get to see him. Well I went and I took with me another officer who was a lieutenant colonel, because I felt with him I'd have a better chance. I didn't actually see Patton, but I saw

his executive, his chief executive, General Gay, (spells) G-A-Y. And we told him the story and he said to us, Patton will stop this right now. He did. And so I think if I ever did anything worthwhile, I probably kept thousands of families from being broken up.

RCS: How do you account for the support you received from the leading Democratic newspaper in Kentucky, the Courier-Journal?

JSC: Well, there's some error on that. They didn't always support me. A lot of people think that, you know. They didn't always support me. In the first race I ran against John Y. Brown, they did support me. And it came as a surprise to me. It was probably a week before the election. And everybody said then that I was going to win. John Y's an able fellow, but he has the capacity of somehow making some mistake to beat himself. And he did then. And it kind of scared me when they came out for me. I thought, well I hope all the Republicans don't vote against me. But it did help me, of course, and although some Democrats and Republicans didn't like the Courier-Journal. And I don't think they liked John Y. Brown. I wouldn't want to put this one on a purely personal basis because I think he's a fine man. While

we're not close friends, we've always been able to talk and I believe he's truthful and he knows I'm so. We believe and respect each other. But when Judge Brangham was ambassador to Great Britain, John Brown Sr., critized him, saying he wore knee breeches at a ceremony. That was the old custom. Now maybe that's too small a reason, if the story is true, but I suppose if somebody got up and made fun of my father for something like that, I wouldn't like it too much. The Courier Journal who supported me said I made a better campaign and I had a more constructive approach. They believed I had the better viewpoint towards world affairs. They knew that I had been in the army. They approved statements I'd made during the campaign and efforts for the U.N.. So I think that was the reason they supported me in '48, although I lost. In '52 I was running against Tom Underwood, and they supported Underwood. In 1954 they supported vice president Barkley and they naturally should. He'd been vice president, he'd been the leader of the Democratic party. But in the last two elections, in '60 and in '66, they did support me. I ran in seven races, they did support me in five of them and twice they were against me. I appreciate their support.

RCS: What were your accomplishments while serving as Ambassador to East Germany?

JSC: It is pretty hard to have any accomplishments as ambassador to East Germany, particularly the first one. I was the first ambassador and I suppose the biggest accomplishment was to create a position of respect for the United States. I believe I did that. I'm talking about the government, as you don't know anything about what the people think. You can't talk to them, you know, or they won't talk. They were scared to talk, I believe. I did talk to them once in a while by chance, in a restaurant or in rural parts of the country. Some of them told me that they wished they could come and talk to you, but they thought I'd lose my job. We had a limited agenda of things that are normally considered when countries establish relations. One is to get a consular's treaty. Well they wanted it loaded in a way which would offend West Germany and differ from our regular consular treaty. And we wouldn't agree to it. And we just wanted a straight agreement, one like we had with any other country, without any political considerations in it. They finally made some agreement on that. Then claims we had against them for property destruction of our embassy and private property during World War II. But those things go on for years.

And we were just starting to negotiate when I left. The United States had had claims against Russia since World War II that have never been settled. The U.S. has settled with a few eastern European countries, Hungary and Romania, Yugoslavia, and Poland. But that East Germany - U.S. negotiations go on for years. They'll claim against us. They haven't got much money and you never get the full amount anyway. Then the agreement has to be approved by the Congress. Cultural relationships. Well they're willing to send art exhibits over here and they did send the Dresden picture from the Dresden gallery which is a great gallery. The exchange was negotiated while I was there, although it was only shown in '77 or '78, I've forgotten. But they don't want too many of our people to come over there except business people because they're so afraid their people will be influenced by Western customs. I recall the Lerpzig trade fair, an ancient fair. We had an exhibition of more sophistocated machinery than they have. Of course the Russians had a big building about as big as the capital for their exhibition. And the U.S. wanted to put up a booth showing the progress of industry in America. At first East Germany refused. I told them if you refuse this exhibit we just won't have any exhibition.

They finally consented. The U.S. had a very honest pictorial history. Showed slavery and everything. But I, I noticed, for the first day or two they had more men who looked like undercover men, walking through looking at it. It attracted thousands of people. Their chief interest is trade. They have the ninth largest producing country in the world with only 17 million inhabitants. But the trouble is they haven't, unless they can make some kind of trading, in kind agreemtns, they haven't got the money that, the currency to buy our products. They want us to give them the same rights, you know, we give some other countries and that are mutual. That would give them the currency so they can buy through the world. But we haven't agreed to that and with the wall, and the separated family problem, it seems to me very doubtful. But I had no problems talking to the officials. And, of course, we each knew where the other stood. We had different systems, different allies, and neither intends to change. But they treated me correctly. When I had to see them, they'd see me. And so you asked me what, as far as any tangible accomplishments, there wasn't much because it's difficult. But I think that they know that I told them the truth and held up the United States in full respect.

RCS: You have been known as a supporter of a bipartisam foreign policy for the United States. Why do you feel it necessary to be bipartisan in its foreign policy, and do you think America has proved to be bipartisan in its foreign policy during your years in public service?

JSC: Not all the time, no. I would say that the years where you would say there was a true foreign policy was those immediate post-war years. Then, as I told you, the United States was preeminent, where everybody in the world looked toward us, with the exception of the communist countries, who were scared of us. We had the power then, we had the money, we were in good economic shape. And it was very natural too, that we were looking to the future for our security and for trade. That we helped restore Europe and Japan and it had to be a bipartisan effort to do that. But later, disagreements arose on, there were all kinds of things. There wasn't much trouble about defense until the Vietnam war. And then some people almost wanted to disarm unilaterally and I think there is still a division in this country about that, that will come out in any SALT talks. And there's been disagreement about a number of things, some recently about the establishment of relations with China. But then you make a different agreement,

different position with Taiwan. And some people who feel we ought to lift the sanctions against Rhodesia. President Carter says no, even though they had elections over there. And it seems to me that you had it pretty much during Truman's time, you had it pretty much in Eisenhower's time, till the last couple of years. Of course, you had it with Kennedy when he was holding back on the Cuban crisis, not the Bay of Pigs, but the Cuban crisis. Great divisions under Johnson, under Nixon and under President Carter.

RCS: Okay. Who do you feel has done the most for American foreign policy in the last 30 years, and why?

JSC: That's a question I'd have great difficulty in answering. I have, as I said, the conditions have been so different. It's hard to compare Truman, for example, to the time he worked in and Eisenhower or with President Carter or President Johnson or in the time we are today, where we haven't got the strength we had. We're having economic problems; where other countries do not look at us the same way. Some confidence has been lost in us. President Kennedy came in kind of in the middle. Because of his assassination, it's hard to tell what his future would have been. He made a good impression throughout the

world with his youth and his courage. And he got, I think, the support throughout the world. But you've asked me a question where it is almost impossible for me to answer. Eisenhower, in my opinion, despite the difficulty in answering, was the calmest, most successful president. President Ford was a fine president in difficulty times. Different times, different ones that, that had great influence. But I can't pick one out.

RCS: What are your observations of America's foreign policy today?

JSC: I think it's a very difficult time. Again, I have to repeat this, it is difficult to have a coherent foreign policy when you're dealing with so many different types of countries. We have a certain relationship, which is the most stable, with Europe even though NATO's in some trouble with Italy and communist officials, and Europe is having economic troubles. I think we have a good relationship with Japan, although we're always fighting about trade, about their imports coming into this country. I have never been in Africa except in the northern part, I've never been in black Africa. I've been in Morocco and Egypt and Tunisia. But it, it will be a long time before we ever know what exactly will happen in Africa. The tribal divisions and revolutions and coups and all

that are uncertain. I must say I think President Carter's made a little progress in Africa. At least he's made them, the blacks, think that we are not meddling in their affairs. I'm sure there will be a big battle over our attitude toward Rhodesia. I think you have to give him some credit for his work in the Middle East, Israel, Egypt, although we'll have to wait and see how successful it's going to be. But at least I do give him the credit for having the persistence to keep at it. And to make this first step. We're in a worse position with Russia than, well I don't know whether you can ever be in worse position with Russia. Russia is never going to change its views, as long as they can control in their own country, which they do. They'll continue to use these war adventures, as Afghanistan, Angola, which make it difficult for us. I have the idea for our foreign policy that we should keep strong friends with Europe and Japan. And keep our defenses, at least powerful enough that the Russians will perceive it equal to theirs and a deterrent, that they will not sneak any attack upon us. I think they will keep on meddling in, in different countries. But they don't get along very well in these countries. They get in there, as in Africa, they take them for awhile

and then the African countries throw them out. They don't like them. I had African ambassadors in East Germany tell me they didn't like the Russians. They said they would like their help so we could become free, but we don't want them. I don't want to be pessimistic. I believe in this country. But I think it's got to arouse itself and to be sure our defenses are all right. We have to work more on our economy to be more productive. We got to really do something about this energy and we haven't done anything to amount to anything. A real failure. And I don't want to begin to talk like a president, but perhaps we're going to have to realize we have to do a little bit better ourselves. I don't mind, I thought his speech was perfectly all right. Because that's what we're supposed to believe in. But the idea of human rights in a communist country is absolutely contrary to their form of government. If they gave human rights in Russia, there wouldn't be any communist country there, or East Germany, or eastern Europe, or China. And I don't know where President Carter understood that or not when he had Secretary Vance go over to Moscow on the first visit, tell them they had to give human rights. What he's actually asking the Russians to do is to demolish communism. Because if you had human rights there and I wish they did

have, why there wouldn't be any communistic system. And I don't know, don't believe President Carter is uneducated about Russia. But I don't know whether he ever thought that he was asking Russia to demolish its system. Of course, Vance knows. Vance ought to have told him. But the United States can't just tell other countries what they have to do. And we also, we can't be even-handed with it, because we deal with friendly, with a good many countries that don't have any human rights. I think that if, if this administration and those that follow are absolutely honest with the people and tell them what our beliefs and system are and what's necessary to be done, if they can to cure theirs. We must give an example of a good country and people. We must build our economy to get it into better shape, energy, defense, and realize the dangers of not doing these things. The American people are strong. But they've got to feel that everybody's got to make some sacrifices. Most of us want somebody else to make the sacrifice. But I don't worry, I have confidence in this country and we're one of the few democratic countries in the world and the best. It's surprising, 10 or 15 countries, something like that. And the others, some of them are communist, some of them don't know what

they are. But we're the best hope of the world. But we have to live up to it.

RCS: Last question. You have known many of America's greatest leaders. In your own personal opinion, who was the greatest of these leaders, and why do you think so?

JSC: Greatest leader? Again, that's like asking me who's done the most for foreign policy. I, I wouldn't want to dodge the question because, again, they were all under different circumstances. As I said, Eisenhower had a "period of good feeling" and I think he was a good leader perhaps the best. Truman showed great courage and was a good leader. Johnson was a very human being. I think one of the most human Presidents I've known, the way he talked, the way he acted. And he had real interest in the average person, the poor person. But he made a lot of mistakes. And did, I think have a good heart. I think Nixon's one of the smartest and ought to have been, and for a time gave a show of initiative as a great lerder. But it's wiped out. But he still did things, which Kissinger can't take away from him, you know. Like the initiative to China and Russia. President Ford restored confidence in our country and will be remembered for doing so. And, well I don't know, I just know it takes, people have got to

believe a man's got courage, integrity and they've got the qualities of leadership. And you never know whether a man's got the qualities of leadership until he's in the place where he can demonstrate it. I'm afraid I've been very general on a lot of these things, but I'd rather be that way than dogmatic, and I really don't know the complete answer. If I, I think everyone of these men under whom I've served tried to do the best for their country. I, I hate to say it, I, Nixon did some great things for this country, but he hurt this country too. And it was in the globe, which cost, it made a lot of people lose confidence in government. And it hurt us abroad. Well we've pulled through all these years. We're the oldest republic in the world. So I, I think we're still going to be the oldest and the best.

RCS: Well, thank you very much, Senator.

JSC: I thank you for your interview. You have shown great knowledge of the United States and world affairs and fairness.

MARSHALL UNIVERSITY

HUNTINGTON, WEST VIRGINIA 25701

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The only transcript which I authorize to be used by Dr. Maddox, his agent, or Marshall University, is the one which I have corrected and which is dated February 17, 1981.

Morrow copy of corrected transcript.

John Sherman Cooper

John Sherman Cooper

ORAL HISTORY

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MARSHALL UNIVERSITY

ORAL HISTORY OF APPALACHIA

HUNTINGTON, WEST VIRGINIA 25701

The Marshall University Oral History of Appalachia Program is an attempt to collect and preserve on tape the rich, yet rapidly disappearing oral and visual tradition of Appalachia by creating a central archive at the James E. Morrow Library on the Marshall campus. Valued as a source of original material for the scholarly community, the program also seeks to establish closer ties between the varied parts of the Appalachian region- West Virginia, Virginia, Ohio, and Kentucky.

In the Spring of 1972, members of the Cabell-Wayne Historical Society joined with Dr. O. Norman Simpkins, Chairman, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, and Dr. Michael J. Galgano of the Department of History in establishing the program. The Historical Society and other community organizations provided the first financial support and equipment. In April 1974, the Oral History program received a three year development grant from the Marshall University Foundation allowing for expansion and refinement. In 1976, the program became affiliated with New York Times Microfilm Corporation of America. To date, approximately 4,200 pages of transcribed tapes have been published as part of the New York Times Oral History Program. These materials represent one of the largest single collections of Appalachian oral materials in existence. Royalties earned from the sale of the transcripts are earmarked for the continuation of the program.

The first interviews were conducted by Marshall University History and Sociology students. Although students are currently involved in the program, many interviews are conducted by the Oral History staff. Graduate students are strongly encouraged to participate in the program by taking special topic courses in oral history under the supervision of Dr. Robert Maddox, program director since September 1978.

The program seeks to establish contacts with as broad a variety of regional persons as possible. Farmers, physicians, miners, teachers, both men and women all comprise a significant portion of the collection. Two major types of interviews have been compiled: the whole life and the specific work experience. In the whole life category, the interviewer attempts to guide subtly the interviewee through as much of his or her life as can be remembered. The second type isolates a specific work or life experience peculiar to the Appalachian region and examines it in detail. Although both types of interviews are currently being conducted, emphasis is now placed on the specific work experience. Recent projects are concerned primarily with health care, coal mining, and the growth of labor organizations.

Parts II and III of the Oral History of Appalachia collection were compiled by Dr. Robert F. Maddox, Director, and processed by Ms. Brenda Perego.

Dr. Robert F. Maddox, Director
Ms. Brenda Perego, Processor

Dated: February 17, 1981 John Sherman Cooper

RFM: An interview with John Sherman Cooper, August 28, 1980 in his office in the Covington and Burling Law Office, 888 Sixteenth Street, Northwest, Washington, D.C. 20006. The interview is conducted by Robert Franklin Maddox, Director of the Oral History of Appalachia Project, Marshall University. The interview was conducted as part of the background research for an art-, for a chapter in a book dealing with John Sherman Cooper's opposition to the Vietnam War. The interview deals primarily with the question of Vietnam and Cooper's positions in the United States Senate on Vietnam.

This has got about forty-five minutes on that side. Now what in your background and experience, uh, caused you to oppose the American intervention in Southeast Asia?

JSC: Well, to be honest I did not oppose it at first, although I doubted its wisdom. In one of the articles from the Congressional Record, which I'll give you today, from a debate on the Senate floor, I outlined in general the history of the war as I had studied it. It won't take long. I have always thought that the French were primarily responsible for the Vietnam War. The Japanese humiliated the French in World War II, who controlled Vietnam, North and South, Laos, and drove them out. After the close of

World War II, there was some talk the United States and Great Britain propose a trust territory. But the French with all of that great pride /‾RFM: (Laughs).‾/ immediately, without consultation with Great Britain or the United States, sent the puppet Emperor Bao Dai back to North Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh, the popular leader, did not wish to oppose the French at that time. But later the French fired upon a meeting of a North Vietnamese group under Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi and the war between the French and the Vietnamese began. Vietnam then was united as a whole, North and South Vietnam, and at the battle of Dien, Dien Phu or Bien Dien Phu, I don't always (laughs) get the correct name, the French forces were disastrously defeated and had to evacuate Vietnam. At that time President Eisenhower was President. There were some who thought that the United States should intervene by land forces or by air. President Eisenhower refused to do so. He sent one of his trusted military advisors, I believe General Ridgeway, who had served under him in Europe and who reported back, as Eisenhower believed, that there was no possible chance to win in guerrilla warfare. At least it wasn't important to our security. Eisenhower refused to send in troops, and this should always be remembered. It will be recalled, negotiations went on and in the Geneva Accords it was agreed that North

Vietnam and South Vietnam would be divided on the thirty-eighth parallel, that there would be a neutral zone, three to five miles wide, on which troops would not be stationed. But it was agreed, as the French and British insisted, that there would be elections to eventually unite Vietnam. Mr. John Foster Dulles was our Secretary of State. He refused to sign the Accords, but said that he supported them in substance, on the condition there would be free elections.

RFM: Do you think President Eisenhower, uh, did this because he was a military man and really understood the implications of an American intervention?

JSC: What?

RFM: Do you think that President Eisenhower was able to, uh, you know, kind of prevent an American intervention because he, he did have a military background [JSC: Absolutely.] and was not as impressed with the military staff?

JSC: Yes, he knew that. I knew him well when he became President. Before, I knew him well when he was Commander of NATO Forces and had talked to him in 1951 in Paris. He had seen the awful World War II. You will remember he refused to send troops when Great Britain, France and Israel tried to take over the Suez Canal from Egypt. They didn't consult him but he said he was strongly opposed to American participation. I don't want to say condemn, he wasn't that kind of man, but

he said they were wrong. He wouldn't send troops. He did send troops into Lebanon once. When there was a threat to Lebanon, then a very free and neutral country. He sent some troops there and the threat disappeared. He did leave six hundred military personnel in South Vietnam as civilian and military advisors to help ambassadors to the South Vietnam Government and the South Vietnamese Army. It wasn't long until war broke out between North and South Vietnam. I think one must remember in all fairness that the aggressors came from the North, from North Vietnam. With one exception, the later bombing of North Vietnam and Haiphong harbor under President Johnson and some minor retaliatory raids; all the aggression, the attacking troops, the North Vietnamese moving into South Vietnam either directly through the demilitarized zone or down through Laos and Cambodia on what was called the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In retrospect, I believe that was aggression by North Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh always had determined that he was going to take over South Vietnam. I don't know what he thought about Cambodia, but the North Vietnamese have now taken over Cambodia and Laos and reestablished the old Siamese Empire as a Communist state.

I will only say this about my feeling at the time of the French return to Vietnam in 1954. The British Broadcasting Company, BBC, asked Senator Mansfield of Montana, a Democrat,

and me to appear on a program about Vietnam. At the time of the defeat of the, the French in 1954. I think they probably thought because we were of different parties we'd take (laughs) opposite stances. But both of us said under no circumstances should the United States ever intervene in South Vietnam, nor in North Vietnam. (Laughs) I think it ruined their program but that's what we said in 1954.

RFM: Now what, why did you believe that in 1954?

JSC: Well I was pretty old, 53 years, but I went through World War II. I spent almost two years in the Third Army under General Patton. I wasn't in the first line troops but I was a messenger, taking messages up to different divisions and different units in combat. I saw an awful lot and I saw what happened. Cities destroyed, people killed. I saw dead men. I saw the newly buried graves. I saw prisoners penned into stockades. I saw the concentration camp, the first one captured by the Americans in East Germany at Buchenwald. I happened to be taking a message to US troops occupying Buchenwald the day of its capture [RFM: Is that right?]. I was there one half an hour [RFM: Oh my God.] after it was taken by the American soldiers. The Hitler SS ran off and there really wasn't any fight. But before they left they killed forty or fifty of those poor immates who were lying around. Twenty thousand starved immates were

lying on shelves in barracks and nearby were three crematoriums where they burned the dead bodies. I saw the violence of war, / RFM: Okay. / I came to believe that war solves nothing, unless we actually have to protect our country and people's security. And it didn't seem to me, and it doesn't now, that Vietnam involved our security.

RFM: Course that, that's actually the traditional, that's the traditional American position.

JSC: Yes.

RFM: Up into, uh, the twentieth century.

JSC: Yes.

RFM: Is, is, uh, exactly the way you expressed it for defense, period. Home and hearth and, and that kind of thing.

JSC: You will remember that George Kennan, a famous scholar, a State Department expert on Russia, Ambassador to Russia, had first proposed what was called the Containment Theory, to hold Russia in, to prevent then aggression. John Foster Dulles accepted the theory that we should protect, if possible, all free countries where there was aggression against them. President Truman accepted the position in Korea. He sent US troops in without Congressional authority when Korea was attacked. Dulles and Eisenhower were very close. I'm sure that Dulles influenced Eisenhower on general principles of foreign policy but he couldn't budge him on military action.

RFM: Okay. Now under President Kennedy, /JSC: Yes./ we see a, you know, a step up in activity in 1961 and particularly in 1962 and you opposed, uh, uh, any potential sending of troops into Southeast Asia /JSC: Yes./ in 1962. For the same reasons of 1954 would you say, /JSC: Yes./ or was the situation a little different?

JSC: It is hardly known and never hardly mentioned but, and I say this in deep respect for President Kennedy. In the short time he lived we know what he did to protect our security when the Soviets were bringing nuclear weapons into Cuba. It took great courage to do that. I happened to be in Washington. It was in the fall. We were all out campaigning when we were asked to report, at least Senator Morton and myself, either to Atlanta or Washington. Well, I came to Washington. I went to the State Department, got some briefing, then I went over to the White House. President Kennedy, with whom I had served for six years, heard I was in the White House and asked me to come up to private quarters where he was sitting in his rocking chair. He told me what he'd done, that our ships were moving out and they were going to stop the blockade. They were going to blockade the Russians and he said they will turn back. He said, "I know it's a critical time but thank God, they will turn back," /RFM: Yeah./. But he did send, I can't give you the exact

number, someplace between twelve and fifteen thousand troops to South Vietnam to assist Vietnam, Vietnamese forces. They were not supposed to enter into active combat. I know all this because I talked to the group of Senators who went to Vietnam to find out the situation regarding our troops. They stated our planes and forces were asked to ferry South Vietnamese troops up to the thirty-eighth parallel which had been breached by the North Vietnam and had carried out a terrible massacre at the city of Hue in North Vietnam. But of course our planes were fired on and our men had to fire back to protect themselves and we were in the war. It illustrated the danger of sending troops abroad when we are not in war.

I have the view that President Kennedy would never have engaged in the war we finally found ourself in. I believe that he would have found a way to withdraw our troops with honor through acceptance of the Geneva Accords before we had so many killed and got in so deeply. You may ask me why I say that. I have no substantial facts for it except my own knowledge of President Kennedy. We served together for several years on the Committee on Labor. I think because we were so different in ages and I was a Republican and he was a Democrat he would talk to me when he might not talk to, to others. He also sent me on a mission once, which

I'll have to write about sometime, it was to Moscow before he was inaugurated, to talk to the Russian leaders, which showed he had some trust in me. But sadly, when he was assassinated in 1964 I would say then that's when the beginning of the real American involvement opened up in Vietnam.

RFM: Okay, now since you, uh, we're moving from Kennedy into Johnson [JSC: Um, mmm.] and you've indicated that you didn't think that Kennedy would have expanded the war in quite that way. Uh, and then we find Lyndon Johnson, uh, who, you know, obviously, uh, expanded American involvement there [JSC: Yes.]. Uh, again do you think it was because, as in the case of Eisenhower, Eisenhower wasn't as impressed with the military? Uh, do you think Kennedy was not as impressed with some of his advisors in the military as was Lyndon Johnson?

JSC: Well, about that, I think they were of different natures. I knew both of them, served in the Senate with then. I talked to Kennedy a great deal because of our Committee on Labor. I think he confided in me because he knew I wasn't talking to anybody about what he said. Also, [RFM: Yeah.] you know, [RFM: Sure.] we had no conflicting ambitions, I wasn't running for President [RFM: Yeah, sure.]. Then President Johnson, in 1964 President Johnson presented to the Senate the Tonkin Gulf Revolution [RFM: Okay.]. Now I must say right here that (papers shuffling) I was one that voted for it.

There were two votes against it, Senator Gruening, of Alaska and Senator Morse of Oregon. I have to confess that I knew what I was doing. The resolution had two parts. The first was constitutional. It gave to the President the authority to protect our troops, an authority which he already possessed. Second, it gave him the authority to take such measures as he thought necessary to carry out the provisions of the SEATO Treaty countries to the South, Eastern Asia Treaty, which included as sponsors Great Britain, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, France, and others. The second provision was designed to take measures to defend the protocol states, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos according to our constitutional process. But the resolution did not define constitutional process /~ RFM: Yeah._~/. I had studied all the treaties the US entered into since World War II. They involved forty-two countries, not that many treaties because some of them were multi-lateral, with a number of parties, and some bi-lateral like Japan and the United States. But the same wording appeared in all, "according to the parties constitutional processes." The Foreign Relations Committee, in every case, refused to interpret the language as requiring approval by the full Congress to commit US forces. I knew that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution would give the President the power if he wanted it. On the day the amendment came up in the Senate,

I entered into what they call a colluquy, /‾RFM: Yeah.‾/ a fancy word, a question and answer period, with Senator Fulbright, who was managing the bill. I wasn't on the Foreign Relations Committee at that time. I asked his view of the authority given to the President. I asked him if we were not giving the President the authority to send troops and to enter into war in protection of these countries if he so decided. Senator Fulbright said, "yes." Later, and I don't say this in criticism, he said he'd been fooled by Johnson during the hearings who had not told all the circumstances about the attack on our ships. I don't know what went on in the hearings. I would say that Secretary Rusk of State was one of the most honest men I ever knew. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution grew out of the firing on an American vessel off the coast of North Vietnam /‾RFM: Yeah, the USS Maddox.‾/. I believe it was fired on, I have no doubt about it. The question is, would retaliation have been enough - fired back at it and attack against North Vietnam shore buttresses? The hearings required more investigation before asking for the broad Tonkin Gulf Resolution. I have to say I knew what I was doing when I voted. It appears in the Congressional Record and when President Johnson wrote his memoires he included my question and answer debate with Senator Fulbright in his book. He did that I'm sure because he got awful angry

with Senator Fulbright /‾ RFM: (Laughs.) ‾/. He wanted to show that Senator Fulbright agreed with me, that we were giving him this authority if he decided to use it. But I, like the rest, had the general feeling that I didn't believe really that he would engage the US in the war that followed. Later, I recall that President Johnson came up to the Capitol one day and called a number, curiously enough, not into Mike Mansfield's office, who was then the Democratic Leader of the Senate, who had succeeded Johnson as the leader (laughs). But he asked us to meet in Senator Dirkson's office /‾ RFM: Is that right? ‾/ who, who was the Republican leader. I remember there were about thirty there. People from the Foreign Relations Committee, people from the Armed Services Committee and, and others. He told us he was going to send thirty-five thousand troops to Vietnam. That was the largest number at that time and it was a shock. I can remember Senator Saltonstall, who was a very quiet man who usually went along with any administration. A very honorable man from Massachusettes, who was the ranking Republican on the Armed Services Committee. He spoke up vigorously and said, "I think it's wrong, Lyndon." That's the first time I think I had heard him /‾ RFM: Is that right? ‾/ oppose a President. Oh, but Johnson said, "We'll just clean it up." Well you know what followed. More and more raids from the North into South Vietnam. They came in

Laos and Cambodia through the demilitarized zone, agreed on in the Geneva Accords and they were all through the northern part. They got into the southern part, south of what's now called Ho Chi Minh City but was then Saigon, the capitol of South Vietnam. Then in 1965 we began to bomb North Vietnam about '66. I began to speak against the bombing of North Vietnam on the premise that cessation of bombing, it might bring about the possibility of negotiations. I remember President Johnson called me down to his office several times. He was always courteous but he would say we have stopped bombing several times. I told him, "yes, but you've done it on their holidays, religious holidays, for a few days, and as soon as their religious holidays are over you've started again." "My judgement is they don't consider you've stopped at all /RFM: (Laughs.)/." I told him, I'm not saying forever, but for a month or two and it's not doing any damage. You haven't bombed anything up there that would really damage North Vietnam. Such as their chief sources of water supply which produce very good. If they were bombed it would flood one of their great rivers and sources of supplies. But always underneath there was the question whether China or Russia would intervene. They were both in competition supplying North Korea and I think, as I spoke in 1966, one would have intervened. I don't know what else the President would have

done unless he'd invaded North Korea, and without China or Russia intervening, he might have very well invaded North Korea. If he'd had done that in the flat part of the war, he probably would have to defeat North Vietnam, but again with Congressional authorization. But when the casuality list came in the real furor in our country begun and opposition began to develop throughout the United States.

RFM: Do you think, uh, General Westmoreland's policy of using search and destroy missions, war of attrition /¯JSC: Huh?¯/. Do you think General Westmoreland's actions in using the search and destroy missions, do you think this was the proper kind of activity?

JSC: Well I'm not a military expert, I visited with Vietnam twice. Curiously enough, it was in '65 and '66. I went to his headquarters. I knew him as he formerly was in command of Fort Campbell in Kentucky, and as a fine military field commander. It's on the line between Kentucky and Tennessee. They're still fighting about the name of the post office /¯RFM: (Laughs.)¯/. But I visited and of course I, in those briefings him and his staff (break in conversation, noise in background).

RFM: Here, let me get you one.

JSC: The books say, I was looking for the cigarettes.

RFM: There you go. Be in your coat over here?

JSC: Yes. Oh, they would say that we are gradually winning by our Vietnamesation program in the villages where they had a security force there and by our search and destroy program sending out patrols, and we just need more men. That was in '65. By chance I went back in '66, and I went with Dean Rusk, he asked me to go and course I didn't sit in on the conferences with the leader. They had a different leader first time I was out there (coughs). I can't remember his name, the second time was Ky, (spells) K-Y, and I remember we all had dinner one night up in his private place. He had a little place in the airport; he had his own helicopter in his garden and guards everywhere. Then again General Westmoreland was very confident they would eventually win but always there was the request to send more troop, more troops. The second time I was in Saigon I noticed one official from the State Department who was pretty quiet when the rest talked more confidently and I asked him if he would see me later. I asked him if he would have a talk with me. We talked for about an hour and he told me of course he supported policies, support by the government, our ambassador, State Department, the commander's policy. But he said, "I can see no light at the end of the tunnel. I don't think we're going to get out of it."

RFM: And this, you were saying this in '65 and '66?

JSC: '66 - not without negotiations or an even greater war.

RFM: '66, okay.

JSC: One thing our leaders in South Vietnam complained about and I think correctly, the two times I was there, was that the US media was very unfair painting the worst picture of US military actions. They had played up in contrast the killing of Vietnamese civilians by the American captain at . . .

RFM: My Lai.

JSC: What?

RFM: At My Lai.

JSC: Yes, yea. Our forces spoke of Hue in the North of South Vietnam. Vietnamese had overrun and murdered South Vietnamese citizens. The American military leaders said, and I think truthfully that the North Vietnamese had invaded Hue and slaughtered people by the hundreds, private citizens. They told me, General Westmoreland did, and our civilian officials had without success begged the American photographers and television people and media to go there and record the slaughter, as they did about My Lai later. They felt that the American media did not report fairly on even what limited successes they had.

RFM: Okay, I tell you, let's stop a second and let me flip this tape.

JSC: Allright.

RFM: Okay, now, uh, in 1966 you began to, uh, speak out more and

more that Congress should take a more active role /JSC: Yes./ in a, /JSC: I was on the Foreign Relations Committee./. You began to feel, I think, from looking at some of the things you said, that the President was exceeding his authority. So we came into a constitutional question and a constitutional crisis and even though at that point you seem to feel that Congress should focus its attention on the escalation of the war and not policy itself. Now why did you take the position that it should be escalation and not policy?

JSC: What?

RFM: Escalation of the war and not the policy which the Johnson Administration was, was evolving in Vietnam.

JSC: Well it was policy. I actually became a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. Let's see, I served six years on it, beginning in 1966. In 1967 I studied the authority of the President and Congressional war making power. Senator Fulbright and others began to talk about the relative powers of the Executive and the Congress toward committing troops abroad without the consent of the Congress. Senator Fulbright introduced a resolution which he called the Commitments Resolution and which appears in the text of this speech that I will give to you. I did not think his wording of the Resolution was precise enough although he's a finely educated

man /RFM: Yeah./ and had been on the Foreign Relations Committee for many years and a fine chairman. But I, I thought it was redundant. It ended up in a circle. I offered a substitute which was defeated by the committee and his version was reported by the Committee to the Senate. When it got on the floor a good many objections were raised along the lines I had suggested. He came over to me and asked me if he could offer my version as a substitute for his, the one which was before the Senate. I said of course. So he then presented mine and it was accepted by the Senate and it became the Fulbright Resolution, as amended by Senator Cooper. Its wording and substance was that the President had no authority to engage the United States in war or to send troops into a situation which might involve us in war without the consent of the Congress. Practically everybody voted for it. I think many of the people on the Armed Services Committee voted for it. Senator Stennis, its Chairman, who's a wonderful man, and who always supported the President in military matters, joined in voting for it. And so while it is the initiative of Senator Fulbright, the actual wording is mine. Well then in '69 the Armed Services Committee voted out a bill authorizing aid in different fashions to Thailand, Laos as well as Vietnam. The language was the same. It didn't say troops, it did mention material,

equipment, and all that, but it offered aid and it was not defined exactly. Remembering the Fulbright-Cooper Commitments Resolution, I questioned Senator Stennis, who had charge of the bill, if this would mean we could give, put forces, American forces in Laos or Thailand. Curiously, we already had forces there /- RFM: (Laughs.) -/ so I wasn't really, wasn't questioning that so much. There were 36,000 or 40,000 American troops in Thailand then at air bases and Senator Stennis was very fair. He said he, he was not intending to authorize troops, only in his view, supplies. But he recognized that it was a question which had to be considered. It was debated one evening and several Senators attacked me pretty vigorously. Senator Tower of Texas thought I was endangering American troops in South Vietnam if my amendment were adopted. I said then you speak to the Department of Defense about it and we will bring it up another day. It was brought up another day and the Senate accepted my amendment or, or moved it in such a way that it would, it would not allow troops to be used in Laos. The US already had troops in Thailand. Cambodia wasn't much considered at the time because it was considered to be a neutral country. But the truth of the matter is we were actually, which we found out later, in Cambodia. Senator Fulbright sent two messengers to Laos and Cambodia. Our Ambassador to Laos was a practical

general there in charge of our troops. There was some authority for this position because the Ho Chi Minh Trail ran through Laos and Cambodia and of course we had a right to attack the trail. The law in war is that you have the right to attack to protect your troops. But the US was extending our air forces through other areas of Laos.

RFM: Okay. One thing I want to get back a little bit, uh, did you at some point come to the conclusion that despite all the American aid that the South Vietnamese were unable to defend themselves or come up with a stable form of government, did you [JSC: Yes.] ultimately come to that conclusion?

JSC: That always changes. I, I said I remember in '65 they had a man in charge who was President. There were changes, he had been pushed out and with the assent of the US. The next President was Ky, to whom I have referred. He was an air force marshall, very vain and wanted to be the head man, even above the American Commander. He didn't last long. At the dinner I attended at Ky's, we ate outdoors. There was a man named Thieu there, (spells) T-H-I-E-U, and everybody said he's the best man in the cabinet, both US and TW personnel. He later became President and he held the office till the end of the war, and was condemned as ineffective by opponents of the war. It was the North Vietnamese fighting a hard war to win (it is said the people from the north are

stronger and harder fighters than people from the south.). I wouldn't say that's true, when we think of our Civil War [RFM: (Laughs.)]. But it was true. South Vietnam couldn't have survived without American help. The next matter of Senate interest came up by way of rumor or leak. There always are leaks, [RFM: Yeah.] sometimes the press finds them out. Somebody leaks and sometimes the government leaks. I don't think the government leaked in this case, but there were rumors that United States troops with the South Vietnamese were going to invade Cambodia. They were to attack (coughs) a large communication center in Cambodia and ammunition dumps used by the North Vietnamese. But curiously enough, we called Secretary of State Rogers before the committee, (that was before Mr. Kissinger took over). Secretary Rogers is a very honest man and he just said flatly, "I cannot respond to you." Considering what has passed since then I can't tell you whether he knew or didn't know (laughter). Perhaps the National Security Council under President Nixon's Administration and President Ford's and now President Carter, had taken over the authority of the Secretary of State.

RFM: The whole thing, right?

JSC: Secretary Rogers was a very honest man, straight man, and as you know, he resigned as Secretary after a while. I don't know whether he knew or not about the projected invasion of

Cambodia. But if he did know he, he was not going to tell us. Well within a day or two, I proposed to Senator Aiken of Vermont, a wise man, and to Senator Mansfield, Democratic Leader, we offer an amendment prohibiting in a constitutional way the use of any funds to send American troops into Cambodia. It is a power of the Congress under the constitution. Senator Frank Church joined me in its introduction. He was on the Foreign Relations Committee, as were Mansfield and Aiken. Senators Mansfield and Aiken were very influential men in the Senate. Everyone, the press, always call the amendment the Cooper-Church Amendment, but Senators Mansfield and Aiken were also on it and their influence was very helpful. Again, curiously, the day we were going to introduce our amendment (laughs) the, the President sent troops into Cambodia, /RFM: (Laughs.)/ but we introduced our amendment any way. It was followed by a debate which lasted two or three months. The President had a meeting at the White House with us and other members of the Congress, both opposing and supporting the US invasion. He agreed that he would withdraw troops on a date certain. As I recall it was June the first or July first, about sixty days in the future. The debate continued all that time. We wanted our amendment passed not only to assure that they withdraw but to prevent a future invasion and also to establish the principle that the President could

not expand the war into another country without the authority of the Congress.

RFM: Now didn't Congress also bout the same time repeal the Gulf of Tonkin interest?

JSC: Yes, they repealed it. I do not think it helped as a matter of fact, as our troops were already in Cambodia and under the President's power of protection. Finally after the date the President had set (Senator Cooper's secretary enters the room). Thank you /~Secretary: Sure.~/. Our amendment passed. But in the Senate-House conference it was reduced. Ours prohibited the use of any American forces, ground, air, whatever. In conference the House insisted that it could only cover ground troops and the Senate accepted the compromise as the best we could do. The amendment was passed and the President signed it, and it was the first legislation in history passed inhibiting the war powers of the President. And the amendment was also extended to Laos. But in both cases, as reduced by the House, it only referred to ground troops. We found out later that US air forces were used in both Cambodia and Laos.

RFM: How do you react to the critics, uh, of that amendment who say that this was an encroachment on Presidential authority, course you're really in a gray area /~JSC: Yes.~/ to a certain degree. But how do you react to critics, uh, you know?

JSC: Well I have had many critics on that point. We had lots of

youngsters then - students who were coming / RFM: Yeah. / from all over the country to Washington, coming into our office to talk. I left the door open. I talked to all of them, everybody I saw. I also got thousands of letters, and I think I answered a great many of them. But they came, such a volume, I don't believe a lot of them were ever answered, thousands from the entire country. I did get up a printed letter expressing my position and that of my colleagues, which I sent to those who were for or against the amendment, explaining. The same letter went to all. Those against it were very vicious at times, mostly very critical, some vicious. Some without signing their name would call me obscene names (laughter). Some signed their name too. But I just sent them the same letter, of course the anonomous I couldn't answer any way. But I was convinced we had adopted the right course, that it was the constitutional authority of the Congress to provide funds for the war or to cut the funds off if it chose to do so, that was the proper course. Now there were amendments offered by Senator Hatfield just to set a date when we should withdraw from all of Vietnam. I voted against that and I was criticised very strongly, but I felt that the Congress only constituted authority through the power of the purse. But we didn't have the authority to tell the President, withdraw our troops on a certain day where they might be in mutual danger.

That was going too far and these amendments lost by large votes. Finally when the President announced, I think it was in 1972 that he was going to withdraw the troops on a day certain, then I did introduce an amendment that they should be withdrawn on that day that he had fixed.

RFM: Do you think the precedent which, /JSC: But it was never voted on./ do you think the precedent which was set by the Cooper-Church Amendment will, uh, in effect prevent some kind of way, you know, that they did in Vietnam?

JSC: Oh, that depends on the circumstances. Later Senator Javits and Senator Eagleton and curiously enough Senator Stennis introduced what they call the War Power Bill /RFM: Yeah./. I voted for it but I wrote an individual view saying I voted for it because I thought it was a necessary guideline and proper in its objectives, but I thought it was unconstitutional. For this reason. It provides that in the event of an attack on the US, its forces or people, if the circumstances weren't such which affected our immediate security, the President had to convene the Congress. If, if there were circumstances such as we were being attacked, of course, he'd have the constitional right on his own initiative to defend the country, troops, and people. The bill stated that within thirty days the Congress should meet and then decide whether or not our troops would be withdrawn, and the war stopped. Well my thought was if

the same circumstances prevailed sixty days later that had prevailed when he had the constitutional right to commit our troops, that constitutional right continued to protect our security and forces and it was doubtful whether Congress could order him to withdraw troops unless the Congress cut off funds.

RFM: Okay. Now, President Nixon, uh, of course ran in 1968, uh, implying that he would end the war.

JSC: Yes.

RFM: Now do you think that he was honestly committed to that course of action, uh, which ultimately became the Vietnamesation policy, uh, or do you think this was political rhetoric or do you think he gave us a little more of the same or, uh, . . .

JSC: Well I think that he was committed, but after he entered office, 400,000 US troops were in Vietnam that was enough. I knew him since he came to Congress. He was in the House and I was in the Senate and I was out of the Senate at times, defeated several times. I wasn't in the Senate when he was there, I was out then. But I knew him better when he was Vice-President. The Vice-Presidents didn't have all the fancy offices they have now; he just had an office over in the Senate Office Building, bout three doors from mine. Curiously enough Jack Kennedy was right across the hall from him.

RFM: Is that right, huh.

JSC: I'd invite him over to my office and sometimes he'd call me

in and we'd talk. He was always very nice to me. He never got angry and he always, although he didn't like my position. But he once told me, "John, you oppose on several things that are important to me but you never hit me personally." And I didn't and so, and he called me down to the White House once in a while and he'd talk to me about some things. When Eisenhower was President and the question was whether we should send troops to Vietnam when the French were defeated, there was talk around that Nixon favored sending at least air forces in, I don't know whether that's true or not. But he was always a strong man for protecting the security of the United States and for that I applaude him, I believe we should maintain defenses and sufficient forces and power at least to assure our security and to let the Soviets know they just can't run over us. Their abiding doctrine is to conquer the world eventually - the Marxist-Leninist teaching. President Nixon was very anti-communist and I think he had the idea that perhaps, thought Vietnamesation or strengthening our forces he could bring the North Vietnamese to a position where they would be willing to reach some agreement. And he placed two eminent men in Paris, Averell Harriman and the former Secretary Cyrus Vance /-- RFM: Yeah. --/ to negotiate with the Vietnamese. Saw them several times in Paris. They told me that the North Vietnamese talked alot about negotiations with unofficial US

visitors but, with them, there were no negotiations at all about quitting. We had US people go over there and talk to the North Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese would say, "Oh we're ready to negotiate any time." I remember several of those people who came back and just jumped all over me. They would say we've seen the North Vietnamese, they say they're ready to negotiate, settle all this. Well, and Harriman, Vance told me that their talks were just nothing, no willingness to negotiate. Finally, the war dragged out and a kind of agreement was reached under which the South Vietnamese weren't able to protect themselves. The North Vietnamese broke their agreement, just took over Vietnam and of course now you see what they've done in Cambodia, which is in a terrible situation.

RFM: Yes, it's an awful situation, yeah. Do you think, uh, Nixon's Vietnamese, Vietnamesation policy moved fast or . . . he did move to withdraw troops and, and so forth.

JSC: He withdrew some troops, you know.

RFM: Yeah. But do you think that he was moving quickly enough for Senator Cooper?

JSC: Oh, it's hard to say, I have said, looking back I, I think there never was any questions in the mind of Ho Chi Minh, North Vietnamese leader. After his death, his successor, particularly General Giap, (spells) G-I-A-P, who said from

the beginning that the North Vietnamese were communist revolutionaries, we speak out of the barrel of a rifle, and that they were going to take North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Whether China or Russia would intervene, I think was always in the minds of Johnson and Nixon, and I don't see how they could have ever thought we could of won that war.

RFM: I know in, in '72 if I remember correctly, you called for a pullout of American troops in four months.

JSC: What?

RFM: In 1972 you pulled, you called for a pullout of American troops in a, in a four month period.

JSC: Yes, after, after Nixon announced he would / RFM: Yeah._/ have them out by that time. But I put a section in my amendment which was very much criticized. I thought it was one which would, which would probably come closer to ending the war. Every amendment which had been offered about a pullout particularly that offered by Senator McGovernon and Brook and Hatfield, just said pullout by a certain date, but prescribing that our prisoners had to be released before the US pulled out. Well I felt that they were not going to release our prisoners until there'd been an actual pullout on our part. That was one of the ways they held us up. So my amendment left it out. I just said we would withdraw in four months. I was attacked on the floor rightfully they said it was inhuman.

I said in response, "do you think they're going to release our prisoners as long as we are there and continue fighting. Prisoners have always been released after a war and course after everything was settled prisoners were released." It is still claimed that 700 or more are unaccounted for. But that was in '72. I assume there will always be a number whose fate will not be known.

RFM: Do you think there was every possibility or did you hear rumors that there might be tactical nuclear weapons used, uh, in Vietnam? Do you think there was ever any danger of that?

JSC: Of what?

RFM: Tactical nuclear weapons.

JSC: No, I don't think so. For example, if we'd actually started a pullout and our troops were moving towards ports or air fields, would be large accumulations of jammed groups. They'd be in a very vulnerable position. The North Vietnamese could have brought their troops in force and firing on our groups which were withdrawing. Our troops would have been in a dangerous position. There might be in that case, the use of tactical nuclear weapons to protect the withdrawal of Americans.

RFM: Okay, what about the use of chemical agents in Vietnam?

JSC: Well they were used all up and down the Ho Chi Minh Trail to defoliate the trees so US planes could see the North Vietnam troops coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. I don't feel so bad

about that. Some people do but after all we were in the war, our troops were being attacked and I don't know that these chemicals were toxic on individuals.

RFM: I think, I think its been proven out that they have been in some cases.

JSC: Yes, we know these chemicals do affect human beings.

RFM: Okay, I'm going to stop the tape here for just a second. Now what, uh, this is giving you a chance to evaluate yourself.

JSC: What?

RFM: What, what mistakes do you think you made as a Senator in relationship to the question of Vietnam?

JSC: The biggest mistake I ever made was on the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. My vote didn't affect its passing one iota /~RFM: Yeah.~/. But I should have been a Senator against it, because I knew and said at the time, that we were giving President Johnson the power to take us into war. There were three or four others who spoke against it. On the day that it came up, the Senator from Wisconsin, Gaylord Nelson, who's still a member of the Senate raised some questions directed to Senator Fulbright and even talk about offering an amendment but did not do so. A Senator from Maryland who was later defeated after serving one term, Daniel Brewster, actually tried to offer an amendment and he was persuaded not to do so. If I had voted against it, I think they would have voted

against it. I believe Senator Mansfield would have voted against it. I believe George Aiken would've voted against it. Church would have. So I think that's all the effect my, there might have been some others, but there wouldn't been, would not have been many. Johnson was a tremendous man on pressure. I used to see him in the Senate when he was leader take these Senators who were up and over in the corner and change their, their votes (laughs). He'd even come over on the Republican side a time. He never did talk to me to change my vote but he, I know two or three he did. But he, he would, I can remember an occasion when he thought there'd be ten or fifteen voting against his proposals and then I remember one particularly and then nearly all, he got hold of them. I could see him talking to them and ended up with only one Democrat opposing him. I let loyalty to our President and our troops in Vietnam influence my vote. Morse, although he was an able man and did a lot of good things, did not have much influence in the Senate because they considered him a kind of maverick. Gruening was a good man, an older man, and was right but did not carry great political influence. He was greatly respected. I always have believed that his great hero, not unexpected, was Franklin D. Roosevelt. He wanted to do something great on the domestic side like Franklin D. Roosevelt. That's the reason he had for his health poverty programs. That's the

reason he made the fight on civil rights. He believed in these domestic programs, but I think he wanted to win a war like Franklin Roosevelt.

RFM: What do you consider to be your great success concerning, /JSC: Hum?/ what do you consider to be your greatest success as far as the issue of Vietnam is concerned?

JSC: Well, I was the first one that raised the question of its constituting, and particularly lack of authority, to extend the war into countries other than Vietnam. It didn't draw much attention at first, but it gradually did. I was the first one along with Senator Nelson who protested the bombing of North Vietnam because we thought its cessation might offer an opening for negotiations. We spoke against bombing in 1965 and 1966. I was the first one who asserted that the Congress had the power through denying funds, to prevent and then stop the expansion of the war into Cambodia and Laos. Finally, that you can prevent a war if it is not necessary for our country's security.

RFM: Okay. One other question and I haven't, you know, we haven't said anything really about the politics of Vietnam and John Sherman Cooper, but what impact did this have on you in the State of Kentucky in a political sense, the stands you were taking?

JSC: Well you see some might say that I took my positions because

I wasn't a candidate in '72. But I'd taken stands before, from 1954 to 1964, in favor of civil rights in 1960 and 1966. Yet, I got a larger majority than I ever had after voting for civil rights. I won in '56 to fill out Senator Barkley's four year term by about sixty-five thousand and in 1960 I won my first six year term by 199,000 and in 1966 after the 1964 civil rights battle. Although I got 30,000 letters opposing me, I won by a larger majority of 217,000. I hope this doesn't sound egotistical, but I'm rather proud of it and use it to illustrate my Vietnam position wasn't political /RFM: (Laughs) I'm sure./. I carried every district in the state, even the first district and all but five or six counties. It was the largest majority that anyone had ever received for a state office. I mean, elected by the state. President Johnson carried the state by a larger plurality and Nixon carried larger in 1972. I had decided in 1966 I wouldn't run again because I knew if I lived I'd be 71 at the time, and I wasn't going home and ask the people to keep me in until I was 77. Although now I'm 79. I knew it took every bit of your mental and physical strength to do the job and I wasn't certain that I would have it. The people have been good to me. Republicans and Democrats and I just felt it wrong to go down there and say will you keep me in the Senate until I'm 77 years old. People have told me, "yes you could

President Carter after it's done. You have to be patriotic /RFM: Yeah, sure./. I have been criticizing the Vietnam situation where we backed into a war involving a half a million Americans and thousands of dead and wounded. As to the rescue effort in Iran, although now it appears very poorly organized, but I assume President Carter believed he had to make the effort. There is no reason why the President should not come to Congress except in those cases where we know our security is threatened. An example would be action by the Soviets, the only ones with power to challenge us. Another example, China has got the power now. An attack on this continent, Canada or perhaps Mexico, and certainly, our western European NATO allies. If the Soviets attacked Europe, I would not say that the President does have the authority to move without the express authority of the Congress, and of course in the case of a nuclear disaster there would be no other course. In these cases the security of the United States and its people would be under threat, and I believe the President should act.

RFM: Yeah, sure.

JSC: I hope with all my heart that a Soviet-United States war will never occur. Our people, as well as the Soviets, must realize a nuclear war would kill most of our population and most of the population of Russia and the European countries

as well. Even though the Russians with superior power might prolong it, the end result would be the same - the destruction of the world as we know it today. When I was in East Germany, I found that even in those communist Warsaw Pact countries, they're very fearful of a nuclear war. They know they'd be the first to go down in total destruction.

RFM: Be the first to go.

JSC: Be wiped out.

RFM: Yeah, yeah.

JSC: That's the reason they shout Detente so much.

RFM: Well Senator, thank you so much for the interview. It'll be very helpful, [JSC: What?] I said thank you so much for the interview.

JSC: Well, you've helped me and I appreciate your interest. I'll just be glad when the election is over and whoever is elected, we can resume efforts to build up a strong economy and to build up our defenses so that we have a stronger deterrent against war, and move toward a reduction of nuclear arms by treaty, both the United States and Russia.