The Politics of War: The Abrams Doctrine, the War Powers Resolution, and Neoconservatism in the Post-Vietnam Era

Andrew Chase Lore
andrewchaselore@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: http://mds.marshall.edu/etd
Part of the Political History Commons, and the United States History Commons

Recommended Citation

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Marshall Digital Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses, Dissertations and Capstones by an authorized administrator of Marshall Digital Scholar. For more information, please contact zhangj@marshall.edu.

A thesis submitted to
the Graduate College of
Marshall University
In partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in
History
by
Andrew Chase Lore
Approved by
Dr. Christopher White, Chairperson
Dr. Daniel Holbrook
Dr. Michael Woods

Marshall University
May 2015
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter One</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Two</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Three</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

1. Americans’ Views on Defense Spending 56
2. Reservists in First Gulf War 102
3. Percentage of Contractors in Total DoD Force in Recent Conflicts 108
4. Total Contract Spending by Department of Defense in Constant 2010 dollars 113
5. Pentagon’s Personnel Composition Chart, 2012 115
This thesis examines three reactions to the Vietnam War—Neoconservatism, the Abrams Doctrine, and the War Powers Resolution—and argues that those reactions have shaped America’s foreign policy agenda in the last fifty years. Beginning with the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, exploring the Reagan era and its interventions in Grenada and Latin America, and ending in the mid-1990s, this thesis traces the politics of war in the United States since Vietnam and argues that the culmination of these three reactions during the George H.W. Bush presidency has resulted in the subsequent direction of the country’s objectives abroad.
INTRODUCTION

In February 2015, President Barack Obama sent a letter to Congress asking for an authorization to use military force to fight the extremist group ISIS. The letter’s language was very clear that there would be no “enduring ground assaults” and that there was a time limit to the war: three years. The request from President Obama received mixed reception among Congressional officials. Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), a member of the Armed Services Committee, said that he had “great reservations.” West Virginia Senator Joe Manchin (D-WV) argued, “If money or military might would change that part of the world, we’d be done a long time ago.” Not all, however, criticized the President’s approach. Senator Jeff Flake (R-AZ), member of the Foreign Relations Committee, noted that although he hardly ever agreed with President Obama, “. . . [I]n this instance, we need an Authorization to Use Military Force.”

Besides signaling that the United States was, once again, seeking to intervene significantly in the Middle East, the letter was also a sign that the powers of war as outlined by the U.S. Constitution were being followed. Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, which vests the power of war with the Legislature, was invoked when President Obama asked the Congress to make a decision about a reengagement in the Persian Gulf. It was the first time since George W. Bush’s Global War on Terror initiative in 2001, and subsequent War in Iraq, that Congress had been asked for an authorization to use military force. What is important about President Obama’s letter and George W. Bush’s authorization in 2001, however, is that seeking Congressional authority in order to wage war had been virtually ignored in the previous four decades of American foreign policy. This thesis outlines and adds historical context to the


politics surrounding the previous fifty years of U.S. military engagements, while arguing that three reactions to the Vietnam War—the Neoconservative Movement, the Abrams Doctrine, and the War Powers Resolution—culminated in the post-Vietnam era and permanently affected U.S. foreign policy directives. Tracing each of these reactions from their inception in the 1970s through the George H.W. Bush Administration, this thesis maintains that while two reactions to Vietnam (the Abrams Doctrine and the War Powers Resolution) lost their potency, the third remained a strong, influential force in the politics of war.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

When President Johnson decided to increase military presence in Vietnam in 1965, he sought to do so in a way that would cause as little disruption to the American people as possible. One of the results of this plan was that Johnson resolved not to activate the National Guard and Reserves. Many of Johnson’s constituents in Washington had sons who served in the Guard and Reserves, and Johnson became nervous about the political ramifications a call-up might entail. ³ Arguing that the activation would be too dramatic, Johnson, instead, filled the fighting force with draftees, most of whom came from lower-socioeconomic backgrounds and less affluent parents.⁴

Johnson’s decision not to activate the Reserves had one consequence that directly shaped the way the American people were involved in the war—it disrupted the lives of those not serving minimally. Johnson’s logic on this was sound: when Reservists are not called to active duty, they are often influential, integral parts of their communities. Johnson, believing that a

---


call-up of the Reserves would be politically detrimental, decided to reduce the war’s effects within the general population by augmenting active forces with draftees. Johnson’s decision, made out of political necessity, soon had unintended consequences.

Those serving in the war felt as if the American people had abandoned them, that the war was not affecting the general population, and that the government had burdened them, not the country, with war. The morale of the military was shattered as a result of this feeling. And because of that sense of abandonment among soldiers, General Creighton Abrams, commander of the forces in Vietnam from 1968 to 1972, proposed a restructuring of the U.S. Army to ensure that the military would never again go to war, while the civilian population remained virtually unaffected. His antidote was the Abrams Doctrine.

As Chief of Staff of the Army in 1972, Abrams restructured the Army’s divisions in order to interweave Reservists into primary support functions. What Abrams’s restructuring effectively did was ensure that when the U.S. military went to war, the Reserves had to come along, and by extension so did the American people. Forcing Presidents to disrupt the lives of Reservists and their families—pulling them out of their jobs, ripping influential community members from their communities, asking the sons of powerful constituents to serve—Abrams made the decision to go to war more precarious, more intimidating, and more debate-invoking.


The Abrams Doctrine remained largely moot in the Reagan era, simply because the military engagements Reagan oversaw did not entail the Vietnam-era call-ups the Abrams Doctrine sought to prevent. In the George H.W. Bush Administration, the Abrams Doctrine was adhered to during the First Gulf War, with 180,000 Reservists serving in the conflict. With that conflict, however, the counter to Abrams Doctrine was formulated: military privatization. Then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney proposed augmenting U.S. forces with contractors.\(^8\) In effect, the Reservists, who had served in key support functions, would no longer be needed. The idea of private contracts gained momentum in the Clinton Administration, and by the 2000s, accounted for over half of the Pentagon’s budget.\(^9\) It was out of the same Abrams Doctrine sentiment of “never again will there be an ill-conceived, poorly executed war like Vietnam” that Congress sought to reestablish itself as the war-making branch of government.

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, passed in August 1964, had been the impetus for Presidents Johnson and Nixon to wage war in Southeast Asia. After the disastrous results of Vietnam and presidents waging war on their own accord for nearly a decade, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution Act of 1973. In it, Congress reasserted its preeminence on issues of war, and attempted to sharply curtail a president’s ability to wage war without its approval.\(^10\) Though replete with built-in loopholes, the War Powers Resolution was Congress’s first step in trying to reign in presidential prerogative on foreign policy directives.

During the Reagan Administration, the War Powers Resolution would see its greatest challenges as Reagan engaged in military operations in Grenada, Latin America, and Lebanon.


\(^9\) See Figure 3-3.

The George H.W. Bush Administration was bound to the War Powers Resolution by the sheer size of the First Gulf War; in short, the number of troops requested by the military commanders for the intervention in the Persian Gulf inarguably needed Congressional approval. While the War Powers Resolution and the Abrams Doctrine attempted to impede on a president’s ability to wage war, the third reaction to Vietnam outlined in this thesis, Neoconservatism, would spend the next decades arguing against its contemporaries.

The Neoconservative Movement arose in direct opposition to the anti-war movement surrounding Vietnam. Disgusted by what they saw as the unpatriotic peace movement, Neoconservatives advocated for the United States to stay the course in Vietnam and implement American democracy in the region.\(^\text{11}\) By the end of the war, Neoconservatives gained the reputation for being pro-military intervention during a time in which that sentiment was no longer accepted by the mainstream. After the fall of Saigon in 1975, Neoconservatives continued to promote the idea of American exceptionalism, and eventually found a niche in the Reagan Administration’s anti-Communist fervor.

Gaining prominent positions within the Reagan Administration, Neoconservatives championed Reagan’s increased military spending, anti-Communist position, and the reassertion of America’s military superiority. It was during the Reagan Administration’s interventions in Grenada, Latin America, and Lebanon, and its development of the arms-for-hostages tradeoff known as the Iran-Contra Scandal, that Neoconservatives began to realize their goals of reshaping the world through military force. As Reagan’s shirking of Congressional approval during his military excursions saw success, Neoconservatives continued to advocate presidential prerogative in the next administration, while serving in more prominent roles.

George H.W. Bush, Reagan’s Vice President, filled his administration with many familiar Neoconservative faces, like Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz. Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was the first true test for Neoconservative ideas, which argued that Bush needed Congress’s support, not its approval. The War Powers Resolution was adhered to and the Abrams Doctrine was employed, but the overwhelming success of the U.S. military in the First Gulf War added credence to Neoconservative ideal that America could implement change through military might. The Regional Defense Strategy, which accompanied the First Gulf War, authored by Neoconservatives Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz, set the precedent for America’s next decade of foreign policy. For all intents and purposes, the George H.W. Bush Administration saw the culmination of the three reactions to Vietnam, all of which were as prevalent in the 1990s as they had been in the 1970s at their inception.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

The scope of this thesis is directly related to political pundit Rachel Maddow’s book, *Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power*. In her book, Maddow argues that the United States has lived in a perpetual state of warfare in the past fifty years, the result of presidents progressively gaining more power since the Johnson Administration. While Maddow’s work was an invaluable source for this thesis, she ignores an important aspect to the argument: Neoconservatism. Maddow’s assertion that the evolution of presidential powers is a natural process, passed on by each successive administration, misses a larger element in American politics. Neoconservatives, who have arguably held more prominent, powerful foreign policy positions during war time than any other political persuasion in the last fifty years, have permanently shaped America’s international objectives, alongside its Vietnam counterparts.

While agreeing with Maddow’s conclusions, this thesis utilizes more primary sources than Maddow’s work, gives historical context to the overall argument, refines her major arguments to be more explicit, and adds a deeply needed facet to fully understand the politics of the post-Vietnam era.

The *New York Times* archive provided most of the articles and quotes regarding politicians’ views on the events outlined in the chapters. Historian Sean Wilentz’s book, *The Age of Reagan*, provided insight to the political atmosphere in the 1980s, while helping to contextualize why the Age of Reagan is an integral part American politics and the overall politics of war.\(^\text{13}\) Wilentz’s assertion that Ronald Reagan truly ushered in a new era in American politics is substantiated in what follows. Historian Lewis Sorley’s works on General Creighton Abrams, culminating in his book, *Thunderbolt*, provided the relevant information about what General Abrams sought to accomplish with his restructuring of the Army.\(^\text{14}\) Agreeing with Sorley’s argument on the reasons behind Abrams’s restructuring, this thesis adds the differing, yet related sentiments within the American consciousness during the 1970s.

Neoconservatism is a hotly contested topic within the academic community, with two schools of thought on its inception, one claiming it comes from domestic disagreements, while others maintain it is a foreign policy-driven ideology. Examining works on both theses was essential to understand which argument is more credible. Social ethicist Gary Dorrien’s *The Neoconservative Mind* was especially helpful in wading through the differing points of view on the topic, while helping to shape the argument of this thesis.\(^\text{15}\) In addition to Dorrien, other

---


secondary sources on the topic were consulted, like political scientist James Kurth’s “The Neoconservatives are History,” and historian David Noon’s “Cold War Revival: Neoconservatives and Historical Memory in the War on Terror.” The Father of Neoconservatism, Irving Kristol’s memoir *Reflections of a Neoconservative* helped to substantiate the claims made in secondary sources about the ideology’s views and goals.

Sources surrounding the War Powers Resolution are generally primary sources, such as legislative bills, resolutions, interviews, and newspaper articles. Biographies were consulted, like Colin Powell *My American Journey*, George H.W. Bush’s *All the Best*, and Dick Cheney’s *In My Time*. The papers of public figures and congressional hearings helped to build the primary source material of the thesis.

Examining the intersection of three reactions to the Vietnam War—Neoconservatism, the Abrams Doctrine, and the War Powers Resolution—and how they have affected U.S. foreign policy for the last few decades is the question this thesis seeks to answer, and an important question to answer in overall U.S. political history. Arguing that the Abrams Doctrine and War Powers Resolution have lost their viability in the post-Vietnam era because of the political constraints of war, this thesis maintains that of the three reactions, Neoconservatism has made the most lasting impact on the United States’ foreign policy agenda since Vietnam.


CHAPTER ONE

NEOCONSERVATISM, THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE AND PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVE

INTRODUCTION

. . . [I]t is a fact that if you have the kind of power we now have, either you will find opportunities to use it, or the world will discover them for you. 19

--Irving Kristol, Father of Neoconservatism, *The Weekly Standard*

The Vietnam era in the United States was filled with uncertainty: uncertainty regarding America’s global status, military strategies, and politics. It had become clear that the United States had spent over a decade in Southeast Asia fighting an unwinnable war. While many Americans were calling for an end to the war, Neoconservatives, who opposed that idea, called for the United States to remain steadfast in its cause. Arguing that the U.S. withdrawing from Vietnam would harm America’s reputation as the world’s leading democracy and superpower, Neoconservatives distinguished themselves from the traditional conservative movement by advocating combative foreign policies, while not criticizing the government’s domestic interventions.

The Neoconservative Movement was not the only response to the Vietnam War that would become a significant factor in America’s war-making policies. The Total Force Policy, colloquially known as the Abrams Doctrine, named after General Creighton Abrams, who had led U.S. forces in Vietnam from 1968-1972, changed the composition of American combat forces or at least how they were discussed. Abrams, who had become Army Chief of Staff by 1972, restructured the U.S. Army to guarantee that the United States would not be able to go to war without activating the Guard and Reserves. Viewing Johnson’s unwillingness to activate the Guard and Reserves in the Vietnam as one of the main reasons for the war’s loss, Abrams sought

to ensure that the U.S. military would never again bear the brunt of foreign policy directives while the civilian population remained comparably unaffected. This strategic restructuring of the military would directly contrast with the Neoconservatives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, which sought to crush opponents militarily without the Reserves and with as little domestic backlash as possible. With Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney’s privatization of the military in the early 1990s, the Abrams Doctrine was undercut by the politically-driven imperative to execute an aggressive foreign policy agenda with a minimum number of U.S. troops.

As Abrams had done with his restructuring of the Army, Congress also attempted to prevent another disastrous, Vietnam-like war. With the War Powers Resolution of 1973, Congress asserted itself as the preeminent branch of government on the issue of war. Recognizing that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution had effectively given Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon free reign in Vietnam, Congress wanted to ensure that presidential prerogative did not persist in the post-Vietnam era. And, though the legislation did see limited successes, its ultimate demise would come during the Reagan Administration’s Iran-Contra defense, in which notable Neoconservatives, such as Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, and Jeanne Kirkpatrick, advocated that President Reagan had been well within his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to execute certain facets of foreign policy without Congressional approval.

The only substantial work that looks at the intersection of the Abrams Doctrine and the War Powers Resolution is political commentator Rachel Maddow’s *Drift: The Unmooring of*
Maddow concludes that America’s foreign policy initiatives since Vietnam have simply been an extension of presidential prerogative, first exercised by President Johnson during the Vietnam War; more specifically, she argues that presidents, once bestowed with powers beyond the office of the presidency, have not given up that power. Maddow’s work offers political commentary on this issue, with suggestions of how to correct this political deficiency, and is certainly the template for the scope of this thesis. With full respect to her scholarship, there is an element from Maddow’s book that is missing, which this thesis attempts to correct.

While the Abrams Doctrine and the War Powers Resolution were explicit, definitive reactions to Vietnam, the third reaction—Neoconservatism—should be framed in equally important terms when discussing United States foreign policy of the past three decades. Refining and expanding Maddow’s work with an increased number of sources, information, and historical context, this thesis adds the Neoconservative element to her work, while agreeing with many of her conclusions. Without adding Neoconservatism to the argument, an important facet of the story is lost. Arguably neither of the other reactions to Vietnam has had such a tangible effect on U.S. foreign policy as Neoconservatism. And with the more recent wars in the Middle East, understanding the progression of this ideology, and how it has been able to successfully circumvent its contemporaries, is crucial to the understanding of current U.S. foreign policies.

This chapter provides the background of these three reactions, whose interaction with one form the basis in the succeeding chapters. Simply put, the Neoconservative agenda ran in direct contrast to the Abrams Doctrine and the War Powers Resolution. All three of these reactions to

Vietnam attempted to correct the perceived mistakes made in that conflict, but one—Neoconservatism—took an approach that was fundamentally different than the other two. Outlining the history of the Neoconservative Movement and establishing its tenets, and its relationships to the American political system, providing the reasoning of and the arguments regarding the Abrams Doctrine, and delving into Congress’s attempts to reestablish itself as the war-making branch, this chapter details how all three of these topics began to shape American foreign policy ideas in the post-Vietnam era.

NEOCONSERVATISM

As American involvement in Vietnam dwindled in the early 1970s, one of the reactions to the war evolved into a political ideology that has become a prominent power broker in America’s foreign policy agenda: Neoconservatism. Adherents of Neoconservatism, a political school of thought arising in the late 1960s and early 1970s, argued that America needed to continue its campaign in Vietnam and that a withdrawal would hurt the United States’ ability to lead globally. Distressed by what they saw as the “unpatriotic” antiwar movement, Neoconservatives were adamant that America was still the world’s leading democracy and could maintain its superiority through military might and an eventual victory in Vietnam.

In the fifty years following the Vietnam War, Neoconservatives have continued to argue for American interventions in countries all over the world. Neoconservatives found their political niche in the Reagan Administration in the 1980s, which strongly opposed the spread of Communism and was willing to confront that challenge with force. It was during the George H.W. Bush Administration, however, that the Neoconservatives and their ideas were catapulted into the national spotlight, as the First Gulf War became the first major military engagement since Vietnam, and leading Neoconservatives, such as Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, and I.
Lewis “Scooter” Libby, were spearheading that campaign. With a history of advocating for presidential prerogative and doctrines that supplant Legislative will, Neoconservatives have heavily influenced the foreign policy agendas of both Republican and Democratic administrations. Every administration since the Reagan era has either been filled with Neoconservatives or has benefitted from Neoconservatives’ practices, as is the case with Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama. But the gains of the Neoconservatives were not instantaneous; the political movement struggled to gain legitimacy in the 1960s and 1970s, and only found success during a time in which administrations were supportive of American diplomacy through military excursions.

**HISTORY OF THE NEOCONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT**

Political pundits, historians, and journalists frequently referred to “Neoconservatism” when describing the George W. Bush Administration’s political ideology, but few actually defined the term. Since Neoconservatism has become a “hot button” topic in the past decade, it is crucial to understand exactly what is meant by it.

Neoconservatism has its roots in the 1960s and 1970s. The founders of Neoconservatism self-identified as liberals and ardent supporters of the Democratic Party. The founding philosophies of Neoconservatism have led to the creation of a political ideology that denounces liberalism, yet is denounced by traditional conservatives. Although the founders of the ideology were self-labeled Democrats in the 1960s, Neoconservatism has become closely aligned

---

22. Justin Vaisse refers to Neoconservatives as former “Scoop Jackson Democrats,” named for Henry Jackson, who was a Washington State Democrat known for his traditional liberal views, yet was a strong opponent of Communism. The notion that Neoconservatives bemoan domestic intervention is historically false; it is one of their distinguishable traits from traditional, or paleoconservatism. Justin Vaisse, *Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).

23. “Traditional conservatives,” are also referred to as “Paleoconservatives.” Because Neoconservatives have criticized Paleoconservatives for not properly governing a modern democracy, this has led to a schism in the conservative wing of American politics. Kristol, “The Neoconservative Persuasion.”
and associated with the Republican Party. The domestic agenda of the Neoconservative Movement appears very different than the mainstream conservative movement; they do not bemoan government intervention in economics (in contrast to the laissez faire economics most conservatives advocate), but they do believe that liberal social movements have created a litany of domestic problems rather than solved them. More so than the domestic differences, the foreign policy agenda of the Neoconservative Movement has distinguished it from both liberals and conservatives.24

There are generally two theories among historians and political scientists on the origins of Neoconservatism: 1) a disillusionment with liberalism directly resulting from Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society and War on Poverty and 2) a reaction to the Vietnam War and the anti-war movement. Although this thesis argues that the latter has had a greater impact on the Neoconservative Movement, scholarship from both sides of the debate is needed to fully appreciate that assertion.

DEFINITIONS OF NEOCONSERVATISM

In American Conservatism: An Encyclopedia, Neoconservatism is defined as “a right-wing branch of American liberalism that emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s, largely as a reaction to liberal utopianism and the irrationality of the new Left.”25 It is clear that the editors of the encyclopedia are addressing both the domestic and foreign policies that angered many Neoconservatives, highlighting their differences with the 1960s Democrats. Though the encyclopedia gives a brief description of the topic, it clearly outlines why the Neoconservative


Movement began. The historiography tends to expand this definition, while maintaining that foreign policy is the most important factor in the movement’s development.

As Irving Kristol, the Father of Neoconservatism, argues in his book, *Reflections of a Neoconservative*, “Neoconservatism is a current of thought emerging out of the academic-intellectual world and provoked by disillusionment with contemporary liberalism.”26 Kristol argues that the Neoconservative Movement was created in response to the “extreme” tenets adopted by the 1960s Democrats. Though he does not specify whether or not he is referring to domestic or foreign policies, it can be assumed that both play a role in his definition, as he further outlines each in his book.

The disillusionment theory of Neoconservatism’s creation is a consistent theme of the writings on the topic. In his book, *The Neoconservative Mind*, American social ethicist Gary Dorrien dissects the origins of the modern Neoconservative Movement on the first page and argues:

Most of these new conservatives were former radicals; all of them had supported the early civil rights movement. Some were opposed to America’s war in Vietnam; all were repulsed by America’s antiwar movement. Most were Democrats who supported a limited welfare state; all had turned against the politics and culture of American liberalism.27 Neoconservatives began to see the “utopianism” of the American Left as unrealistic. Policies, like Johnson’s Great Society, came under scrutiny because it created dependency on the state, which, Neoconservatives argued, hindered America’s chances at becoming a more powerful

---


Although mentioning the disillusionment with liberalism’s domestic agenda, Dorrien argues that foreign policy and American hegemony played a more crucial role in the development of the Neoconservative Movement than the domestic policies of Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon.

TENETS OF NEOCONSERVATISM

Although Kristol states, “there is no set of neoconservative beliefs concerning foreign policy, only a set of attitudes derived from historical experience,” the Neoconservatives have guided and/or created American foreign policy significantly during and since the Reagan era.\(^2^9\) Neoconservatism is a nationalist ideology, and the antiwar movement of the 1960s caused its adherents to become more entrenched in the idea of American superiority.\(^3^0\) As historian David Noon argues, “As one of the primary ideological artifacts of the cold war, neoconservatism emerged from arguments over . . . foreign policies that came to crisis during and after the American war in Vietnam.”\(^3^1\)

It was because of the perceived “anti-American” fervor personified in the antiwar movement of the Left that Neoconservatives found their ideology more closely aligning with traditional conservatives, which is why they remain identified with the Right in American politics today. The foreign policy agenda promoted by the Neoconservatives since the Vietnam War has been simple: the United States should promote American democracy throughout the rest

---


of the world, often through military force. Quoting Kristol, Dorrien states, “We [the US] are a
strong nation, and they will respect our strength as well as our loyalty to our own political and
social ideals.” Instead of highlighting their opposition to domestic policies of both the Left and
the Right, Dorrien maintains that foreign policy ideals are what separate Neoconservatives from
the Left and traditional conservatives. Several authors have agreed with Dorrien’s assertion.

In his article entitled, “The Neoconservatives Are History,” political scientist James
Kurth echoes Dorrien’s sentiments in how foreign policy played a direct role in the formation of
Neoconservatism:

Their concentrated and uncompromising focus upon communist ideology and the
Soviet threat made them very different from the traditional conservatives or
realists. There thus opened up a great divide among conservatives in regard to
U.S. foreign policy, a split that has now persisted for more than thirty years—
through successive eras of Cold War, rogue-state, and Islamist threats. Kurth suggests that in order for Neoconservatives to have political capital, they must have
something to oppose, usually militarily. During the formative years of the Neoconservative
ideology, Communism was the major foe. Since the fall of the U.S.S.R., America has no great
enemy left to challenge its superiority on that scale; however, as seen by the string of
interventions beginning in Reagan era, Neoconservatives seek to answer challenges presented by
other opponents of American democracy.

Examining the Neoconservative foreign policy agenda in the post-Cold War era, Noon
asserts that “for contemporary neoconservatives, the conclusions are self-evident: an aggressive
foreign policy that promotes the spread of America’s central values represents the only

legitimate path to winning the war on terror and preserving American identity.” The role of U.S. interventionism within the Neoconservative ideology is not a new concept, wholly created by scholars studying the movement. Kristol wrote about this idea, calling it a “new conservative nationalism” in the Cold War era. In essence, it was not enough for the U.S. to contain Communists; it had to actively combat them. This more aggressive foreign policy agenda finding political allies in the Reagan Administration and its numerous interventions in Latin America, fueled by the Administration’s anti-Communist fervor, carried over to the War on Terror.

Citing the tenets of the Neoconservative ideology, Kurth explains that the interventionism undertaken by the U.S. in the Iraq War emphasized a direct contradiction in the movement’s domestic and foreign policies:

[T]he neoconservatives were very critical or skeptical about the efficacy and value of social reforms implemented by a strong state. There thus opened up a great contradiction within the neoconservative ideology between its foreign-policy and domestic-policy elements. . . . This contradiction reached its highest, and most absurd, point with the Iraq War, when the neoconservatives urged that a strong U.S. state, an American hegemony, could and should impose not only regime change but fundamental political, economic, and social reforms on another society, one which was totally different from America.

Kurth’s analysis reflects the more contemporary views of the Neoconservative ideology. The contemporary, fundamental critique of Neoconservatism is that it bemoans the domestic, social reforms implemented by a strong state, much like its opposition to the Great Society; however, the strong state, through military force, can implement any type of reform, in any country in the world, because of its position of power. As political commentator and former Neoconservative

35. Noon. "Cold War Revival," 95. This point is also echoed in Cheney’s “Defense Strategy.”


Murray Polner writes, “. . . [T]he Iraq War was an integral part of their unshakeable faith that [Neoconservatives] knew how to reshape and inject democratic rule into the autocratic, complex and chaotic Middle East.”\(^{38}\) Journalist George Packer focuses on the Neoconservative influence in the Iraq War writing that reputable Neoconservatives such Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith advocated the removal of Saddam Hussein to guarantee U.S. interests and were “supremely confident” in their ideas.\(^{39}\) The Neoconservative idea of American democracy is unique in its belief of democracy’s universality; that is to say, the countries and cultures on which Neoconservatives have advocated an implementation of American democracy are not often fully understood by them. The irony in this is simple: for an ideology so focused on geopolitics, it lacks an understanding of other countries and its issues.\(^{40}\)

With the U.S. government’s emphasis on foreign policy beginning in the Reagan era and exponentially growing since the fall of the Soviet Union, Neoconservative ideals have reached their apex of influence. Advocating that America’s interests abroad should be protected, even preemptively, Neoconservatives have found a niche in American politics. And because of that reason, as this thesis argues, Neoconservatives were formed and have risen to prominence because of their insistence on American superiority facilitated by military interventions.

The time in which Neoconservatism was conceptualized is crucial in understanding its path to power. In the post-Vietnam era, the “ghost of Vietnam” was ever-present in American foreign policy decisions. A majority of foreign policy decisions were prefaced with “Will this


become another Vietnam?” or “How will the American people rally behind this policy?” And as a philosophy that promoted American interventions in the period that followed Vietnam, Neoconservatism initially struggled to persuade large audiences to their point of view. One of the main detriments to the Neoconservative cause was that other groups, more powerful than them at the time, were promoting ideas that were critical of their objectives.

Trying to correct some of the deficiencies in America’s war-making powers, the military and Congress brought their own, post-Vietnam ideas to foreign policy. At the same time the Neoconservatives were promoting “staying the course” in Southeast Asia, the military, Congress, and American people were advocating the exact opposite approach. One of these approaches—a direct response to President Johnson’s refusal to call-up the Guard and Reserves—the Abrams Doctrine sought to make interventions (like Neoconservatives advocated) more difficult. 41

LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE “RESERVES QUESTION”

When President Johnson escalated the war in Southeast Asia, he was determined to do so in a way that would cause as little consternation with the American people as possible. In 1964, Johnson had campaigned against Arizona Republican Senator Barry Goldwater on the platform that an escalation in Vietnam was irresponsible and reckless, a contrast to Goldwater’s approach. Goldwater, in an interview on the ABC program, “Issues and Answers,” stated that low-yield nuclear bombs should be used to “defoliate” the jungles of Vietnam, exposing the supply lines of the Viet Cong. 42 Conversely, while speaking at Akron University, Johnson expressed his stance: “We are not about to send American boys 9 or 10,000 miles away from home to do what Asian

41. For the remainder of the thesis, the term “Reserves” will be used inclusively to mean both the Guard and Reserves.

boys ought to be doing for themselves.”

After Goldwater’s pro-nuclear interview (and the iconic Johnson campaign commercial of a little girl picking daisies, while a nuclear explosion erupted in the background), Johnson easily took the presidency in a landslide victory, winning sixty-eight percent of the vote.

An important fact is missing from Johnson’s speech at Akron University, however: the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which had been passed overwhelmingly two months earlier. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was the first—and only—congressional authorization for military intervention during the entire U.S. campaign in Southeast Asia. Passed on August 7, 1964, with an 88-2 vote in the Senate and a unanimous vote in the House of Representatives, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution became the legal basis on which Presidents Johnson and Nixon waged war in Vietnam. Stating, “The Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression,” the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave the President Congressional approval to use military force in Vietnam.

Highlighting that fact during his reelection campaign, however, was not in Johnson’s best interest, considering he had worked very hard to distance himself from Goldwater’s aggressive foreign policy agenda. It was after the 1964 election and his inauguration in 1965 that Johnson’s intent to escalate in Vietnam became evident.


45. A Joint Resolution to Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia. P.L. 88-408, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., August 7, 1964. It should also be noted that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was repealed in 1971. After its repeal, Nixon claimed that his prerogative as Commander-in-Chief allowed continued intervention in the region for the purpose of protecting American lives.
In his book, *America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975*, historian George Herring discusses the battle between the supporters and dissenters of Johnson’s strategy in Vietnam.\(^{46}\) In the early stages of the escalation, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was a staunch advocate of increasing troop levels in Southeast Asia. In his memoir, President Johnson noted McNamara’s insistence on raising the troop levels, stating that McNamara requested an additional 100,000 troops.\(^{47}\) Not all within the administration were as convinced that a troop increase was an effective strategy for the war. In a memorandum to President Johnson on July 1, 1965, Undersecretary of State George Ball wrote, “No one can assure you that we can beat the Viet Cong or even force them to the conference table on our terms, no matter how many hundred thousand white, foreign (U.S.) troops we deploy.”\(^{48}\) In the end, despite these concerns, Johnson sided with McNamara and troop deployments increased throughout 1965, with an open-ended commitment to employ American military forces as the situation demanded.\(^{49}\) Under the terms of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, this open-ended agreement was legal and acceptable. But, as Johnson knew, increasing the U.S. military presence in Vietnam would cause a greater disruption at home. Determined to minimize the effects, Johnson sought to take the nation to war with as little domestic backlash as possible.

Believing that he could not convince the American people that an intervention in Vietnam was necessary, Johnson sought to avoid making that plea. After all, he had defeated

---


Goldwater by depicting him as a warmonger; Johnson saw a flip-flop on the issue as politically unviable. So, the question for the Johnson Administration became how to wage a war without the American public feeling its full effects. One of the ways in which Johnson was able to accomplish this feat was by increasing the number of draftees to fill the holes left by active duty servicemen. Concerned with hearing from powerful constituents, whose sons served in the Reserves, Johnson decided that conscription was a better course of action. He believed that instating a draft, which disproportionately drafted Americans from lower socioeconomic status and less affluent parents, would minimize the number of political enemies he would make.\textsuperscript{50}

In a press conference on July 28, 1965, Johnson announced his plans for increased military intervention in Vietnam, supported by an increase in draftees. Johnson stated, “This [action in Vietnam] will make it necessary to increase our active fighting forces by raising the monthly draft call from 17,000 over a period of time to 35,000 per month, and for us to step up our campaign for voluntary enlistments.”\textsuperscript{51} According to the Selective Service System, between August 1964 and February 1973 about 1.8 million Americans were drafted into the U.S. military.\textsuperscript{52} Some have argued, as does this thesis, that the number of draftees was highly inflated because of Johnson’s decision not to enlist the Reserves. The decision of whether or not to call-up the Reserves is where the Johnson war strategy became contested within his administration. The Reserves have a long, storied past in American military history, and their contributions, or

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
lack thereof, since Vietnam has created a culture of misunderstanding, disdain, and controversy within and surrounding the Reserves.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE RESERVES

The idea of the Reserves began with the Founding Fathers. Thomas Jefferson, during the framing of the U.S. Constitution, adamantly denounced the idea of standing army, stating that it was inconsistent with freedom. Believing that a standing army makes a country more prone to react to any “speck of war on the horizon,” this idea of the citizen-soldier became the basis for Jefferson’s military doctrine. Under this philosophy, Americans (in Jefferson’s time, white males) should be soldiers in time of war; however, when in peacetime, large armies were not needed and citizens should carry on with daily life. The sentiment of military campaigns being supported by citizen-soldiers was still advocated over one hundred years later: “It is the traditional policy of the United States that the military establishment in time of peace is to be a small, regular Army and that the ultimate war force of the Nation is to be a great Army of citizen-soldiers. This fundamental theory of military organization is sound economically and politically.” This Jeffersonian idea of the citizen-soldier defines the modern Reserves.

When Reservists are not called to duty, they are often fixtures in their local communities and their role as local fixtures makes a call-up more politically challenging. President Johnson knew activating the Reserves would lead to an increased public awareness that America was fighting a war. Echoing this same idea, military historian Lewis Sorley states:

55. This idea can be seen by military drawdowns after every U.S. war prior to the mid-20th century.
Johnson’s refusal was apparently motivated in part by reluctance to spread the effects of the war through the population—certainly many more families and virtually every town and city would be affected by a call-up of any proportions, with a much different class cross-section and much greater political impact than draft calls affecting only those who could not engineer a deferment. Another reason for Lyndon Johnson’s unwillingness to call up the reserves was the hope that he could prosecute the war on a low-key basis not really having to go to war big time.\(^{57}\)

In another attempt to wage war quietly, Johnson asked Congress for as little money as necessary. George A. Carver, Jr., a CIA official, later recalled that Johnson “tried to fight a war on the cheap, and tried to fight a war without acknowledging that he was fighting a war.”\(^{58}\) In a telephone conversation with Senator Richard Russell (D-GA), Johnson stated, “We don’t think we’ll ask for much money [from Congress] because we don’t want to blow this thing up.”\(^{59}\) In that same telephone conversation with Russell, Johnson discussed the issue of activating the Reserves:

Johnson: But I don’t think I’ll call [the Reserves] up now. I think it’s too dramatic. I think it commits me where I can’t get out. And it puts me out there further than I want to get right at the moment. Now does that make sense to you?

Russell: Yes. Except it adds to old Ho Chi Minh’s argument that we ain’t going to stay in there. That we’re going to pull out. It may ease the pressure that we . . . hoped Russia would put on to get him out.

Johnson: What do you think?

Russell: Call up the Reserves. They understand that language.

Johnson: If I extended the enlistment, if I put a hundred thousand out there, they’ll understand it. I’m afraid they’ll understand it too much. I

\(^{57}\) Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and the Active-Reserve,” 37.

\(^{58}\) Dr. George A. Carver, Jr., interview with Lewis Sorley, July 20, 1988.

Johnson acknowledged that activating the Reserves meant the American public would notice the war, because it meant that those often influential community members were going to be ripped from their daily lives, in cities all over the country.

Recognizing what Johnson was trying to do, many within the administration tried to persuade him to active the Reserves. As Herring states, “The JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] pressed for mobilization of the reserves and calling up the National Guard to make clear, as [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] Wheeler later put it, that the United States was not becoming engaged in ‘some two-penny military adventure.’”

Having the support of the American people became the paramount concern of Johnson’s foreign policy advisors. Secretary McNamara, an early supporter of the increased intervention in Vietnam, became concerned about the implications that it may have for the administration’s political capital. Many urged Johnson to seek another Congressional resolution to bolster public support. Former Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. later asked, “How do you send young men there in great numbers without telling why?”

But the concern with public support did not dissuade Johnson from conducting the war, as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution permitted him to do. Assured by Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach that he did not need additional Congressional approval, Johnson continued his plan “to avoid undue concern and excitement in Congress and in domestic public opinion.”

---

63. Herring, *America’s Longest War*, 166.
The United States found itself in quite a predicament: it was fighting a domestically “quiet” war, with an active duty force, consisting mainly of draftees. It was the antithesis of Thomas Jefferson’s vision. The lives of the American people were disrupted minimally, but the U.S. military was not as fortunate. The military command in Vietnam believed that changes needed to be made, that American lives needed to be disrupted, that the Reserves needed to be a part of war. And so, by the time General Creighton Abrams arrived in Washington, D.C. as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army in 1972, the ability to wage a major war without calling up the Reserves and “exciting” the Congress and the American public was the first item on his agenda.

**CREIGHTON ABRAMS AND THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE**

In his article, “Creighton Abrams and Active Reserve Integration in Wartime,” and subsequent book, *Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times*, historian Lewis Sorley investigates Abrams’s preoccupation with restructuring the Army during his tenure as Chief of Staff. At the conclusion of his research, Sorley argues that Abrams’s intention was “to so organize the forces that it would never again be possible to take the Army to war without its reserves.”

Outlining Abrams’s love for the military, Sorley states that the restructuring for Abrams was personal; he wanted to ensure that another Vietnam could not decimate his beloved institution. And Abrams’s admiration for the military was obvious.

While discussing the Army, Abrams said, “[the Army] represents a constancy of those essential virtues of mankind—humility, courage, devotion, sacrifice. The world has changed a lot. I choose to feel that this is part of the cement and the steel that holds our great country

---


In a speech given to the American Ordinance Association in Philadelphia prior to his departure for Vietnam in 1967, Abrams said of the Army’s accomplishments in the early years of the Vietnam War:

Without the declaration of a national emergency, without calling up the reserves, without extending terms of service, and without requiring the nation’s business and industry to shift to wartime footing, the Army has successfully discharged an assortment of missions in about one hundred foreign lands. . . . Instead of being weary or out of breath, this Army is bigger, wiser, and better conditioned than it was at the beginning.67

Although boastful of the Army’s ability to adapt to Johnson’s refusal to acknowledge that the United States was fighting a war, Abrams would make sure it would never have to make those adaptations again.

One of the consequences of not calling up the Reserves was that the Army had to compensate for having inexperienced leadership in Vietnam. Because of the rapid and enormous expansion of the Army during this time, coupled with the increased casualty rates depleting the pool of viable leadership candidates, the number of inexperienced officers prematurely promoted to leadership positions skyrocketed.68 Many within the Army complained bitterly that the inexperienced officers were harming the mission and that activating the Reserves would place better trained, more experienced leaders in the field. Accompanying the smaller pool of soldiers came successive tours, longer deployments, drug abuse, and other behaviors that became synonymous with the Army in Vietnam era.69


But, Johnson’s decision not to mobilize the Reserves did more than just harm the active duty soldiers; it also crushed the morale of the Reserves. Those who were career Reservists had been preparing to be called-up when conflicts such as Vietnam arose. The war in Vietnam was what Reservists trained for; however, they were not going to participate because of political considerations. As Sorley explains, “The Army was mobilizing for war. There was just one big problem: the reserve components, which had been maintained at such expense and effort over the years in anticipation of exactly such a need, were not going to be allowed to take part.”

Not only did many Reservists feel as if their careers had been wasted, but the influx of those seeking to avoid service enhanced the Reserves’ reputation for being a refuge to those too cowardly to serve on active duty. As Sorley denotes, “It was all perfectly legal [enlistment in the Reserves to avoid active duty], even (perhaps) legitimate, but the proud reservists . . . were horrified and disgusted as their ranks became progressively infested by those whose motivation was exactly the opposite, a devout desire to avoid going to war.”

A consequence of the Reserves not being mobilized was that their portion of the defense budget got smaller. In 1965, the Reserves received 5.2% of the Defense Department budget. In 1968, it received 4.4%. Although the 0.8% decrease is not a glaringly disproportionate figure, it must be noted that the Defense Department budget increased by 49.6% during that same time ($46,752,051,000 in 1965 to $69,936,620,000 in 1968). The total dollar amount of the Reserves’ budget increased; however, with more soldiers enlisting in the Reserves, the money had to be stretched further, leading to less being spent on infrastructure and upkeep. With the

72. These figures come from the Defense Department Appropriations for FY 1965 (H.R. 10939) and FY 1968 (H.R. 10738).
active duty forces shouldering the burden of fighting in Vietnam, the Reserves’ equipment, training, and support saw few upgrades, leading to an increased self-image problem. The self-image problem caused by a lack of respect from the Department of Defense, active duty soldiers, and the nation was fundamentally challenged by the Abrams Doctrine, because it was no longer possible for the Reserves not to be deployed in times of conflict.

THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE ARMY

After leading in Vietnam from 1968 to 1972, General Abrams returned to the United States to assume the position of Chief of Staff of the Army. Often basing his objectives for the military’s organization on historical trends, Abrams stated, “We have paid, and paid, and paid again in blood and sacrifice for our unpreparedness. I don’t want war, but I am appalled at the human cost that we’ve paid because we wouldn’t prepare to fight.” And Abrams was quite adamant about solving the Army’s proclivity for unpreparedness; the Abrams Doctrine was the first step.

Seeing the strain that Vietnam had put on his beloved army, Abrams restructured the Army to ensure that calling up the Reserves was not optional for the President; it was mandatory. Into the 16-division structure, the Reserves were woven into necessary functions so that the Army could not be deployed without them. Abrams outlined the goal of the restructuring thus: “We are committed firmly to the essential task of bolstering the readiness and responsiveness of the Reserve Components, integrating them fully into the total force.” What is most important about the Abrams Doctrine, however, is not the restructuring itself, but its implications.

Although some argue, like Sorley, that Abrams simply was trying to reinvigorate the Army after the defeat in Vietnam, the inability to wage war without a call-up of Reservists is the Abrams Doctrine’s lasting legacy. General William Rosson said of Abrams’ intentions that sending the Reserves to Vietnam “would have forced a debate on the whole issue of support for the war. Instead, what resulted was simply a ‘gutting’ of the regular establishment as the reserves remained out of reach and the larger issue of involvement in the war remained unresolved.”\(^75\) Changing that, Abrams ensured that the Reserves were the “initial and primary source of augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces.”\(^76\) By requiring the Reserves to serve as the primary augmentation source, the debate that General Rosson argued had been ignored in Vietnam was now forced.

Many military officials championed Abrams’s restructuring. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Vessey said of Abrams: “[Abrams thought] let’s not build an Army off here in the corner someplace. . . . That was his lesson from Vietnam. . . . And part and parcel of that was that you couldn’t go to war without calling up the reserves.”\(^77\) Further confirmation comes from Colonel Harry Summers, who stated, “General Abrams hoped this . . . would correct one of the major deficiencies of the American involvement in the Vietnam War—the commitment of the army to sustained combat without the explicit support of the American people as expressed by their representatives in Congress.”\(^78\) And this explicit support from the

---


American Congress and public is the lasting political implication of General Abrams’s restructuring of the Army. As Rachel Maddow writes in *Drift*, Abrams was attempting to right a wrong that had been committed in Vietnam. Because as the Jeffersonian idea of the citizen-soldiers promoted, requiring a country to send Reservists to war would ensure that “when the United States went to war, the entire United States went to war.” The issue of taking the military out of the national spotlight during Vietnam was not just something military commanders and political commentators bemoaned; it was a theme also explored in literary works.

In his novel, *Fields of Fire*, Vietnam veteran, former Secretary of the Navy and former Senator of Virginia Jim Webb describes a conversation between a new-to-the-war soldier and a battle-hardened officer. Deftly explaining the war’s perception in the United States, the officer states:

> We all knew it would get bigger, though, and we figured Johnson would call up the Reserves. We kept telling all the Weekend Warriors that they’d better get their shit in one bag, because they were going to war. Like Korea. And it got bigger, but Johnson didn’t have the balls to call up the Reserves. Reserves can vote. And they drive planes for United. And they run businesses. Instead Johnson just made a bigger draft, filled it with loopholes, and went after certain groups of kids. . . . Airplane drivers still drive their airplanes. Businessmen still run their businesses. College kids still go to college. It’s like nothing really happened, except to other people. It isn’t touching anybody except us. It makes me sick, Lieutenant. . . . We been abandoned, Lieutenant.  

Explained in powerful, succinct prose, Webb describes exactly what Abrams sought to prevent with his restructuring: to make sure that the institution he loved, and all of those young soldiers he cared for, would never again feel as if they had been abandoned back home. Without the

---


disruption to the lives of regular, voting, flying-the-airplanes-for-United Americans, war could not be waged.

Some have argued, however, that these interpretations of the Abrams Doctrine have been applied after its advent. Naval historian Patrick Cronin argues that the Abrams Doctrine was not an attempt to garner public support or to disrupt American lives, but it was a natural extension of fiscal policies of the 1970s. Because Reservists do not have to be compensated to the extent that full-time, active duty soldiers do, relying on the Reserves made economic sense. As Cronin argues, “The Total Force concept [the Abrams Doctrine], in essence, meant that the fiscal stringency being applied to strategic systems was also being applied to the fastest growing portion of the defense budget: manpower.”

Cronin is not alone in his criticisms of popular interpretations of the Abrams Doctrine. Lt. Colonel Brian Jones, historian at the U.S. Army War College, also makes the economic argument that “General Abrams’ actual intention in advocating this policy was an attempt both to save force structure and to resource the Reserve Component forces appropriately.” Further explaining that the interpretations most associated with the Abrams Doctrine are “fallacies,” Jones argues that “limiting prolonged combat is the desired outcome.” Although Jones states that limiting prolonged conflict is the intent of the Abrams Doctrine, he essentially argues the same notion as previous scholars, but on economic grounds.


83. Jones, “The Abrams Doctrine: Total Force Foundation or Enduring Fallacy,” iii. A recent book, Why We Lost, examines this aspect through the lens of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. Claiming that the United States should not have started on a path to nation building or counterinsurgency, General Daniel Bolger states that the U.S. should have left the region as quickly as possible, rather than “slogging onward, taking on two unlimited irregular conflicts.” Daniel Bolger, Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (New York: Eamon Dolan/Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014).
The Abrams Doctrine itself is not without critics. As Cronin reasons, the Abrams Doctrine affects “the ability of the United States to respond swiftly and with sufficient military force to crises and wars . . . or whether the United States can count on having sufficient time to mobilize its Reserves for general war.”84 The Secretary of Defense under George W. Bush and notable Neoconservative, Donald Rumsfeld said in 2002 that the Abrams Doctrine was “hampering his ability to deploy forces.”85 But despite these criticisms, the Abrams Doctrine is an integral part of U.S. military strategy and the military’s growing dependence on the reserves increased throughout the last thirty years, until the theory of military privatization was pioneered in the early 1990s by then Secretary of Defense and Neoconservative Dick Cheney.86

When Creighton Abrams died from complications from lung surgery in 1974, he was still serving as Chief of Staff for the Army. Although only serving in that position for two years, Abrams’ ideas had a tangible effect. In a memorandum dated August 23, 1973, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger stated, “Total Force is no longer a ‘concept.’ It is now the Total Force Policy which integrates the Active, Guard and Reserve forces into a homogenous whole.” He went on to add, “It must be clearly understood that implicit in the Total Force Policy . . . is the fact that the Guard and Reserve forces will be used as the initial and primary augmentation of the active forces.”87 And it is because of Abrams’s love for the military and disgust for how it was treated by administrations during Vietnam that the Abrams Doctrine has become an integral part of American military theory.

It was not only Abrams and other military leadership trying to prevent another disastrous war. Congress, too, was in the midst of drafting an unprecedented check on presidential power, which, like the Abrams Doctrine, would face direct opposition from the Neoconservative Movement. As Cronin states, “Among Congressional concerns of the time, the notion of preventing future ‘Vietnams,’ may have been preeminent. One means to effect that kind of constraint was to harness the President’s ability to mobilize forces for war.”

Public Law 93-148, “A Joint Resolution Concerning the War Powers of Congress and the President,” better known as the War Powers Resolution Act of 1973, was the result.

A REASSERTION OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY

When the framers of the U.S. Constitution were debating what branch should make the decision to go to war, they were quick to remember one of their main complaints about King George III: maintaining a massive, globe-trotting army. Crafting the Constitution to make going to war difficult, they decided to vest the decision with the cumbersome, slow-moving, and debate-driven Congress. As James Madison wrote, “The Constitution supposes what the History of all Governments demonstrates: that the Executive is the branch of power most interested in war, and most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care vested the question of war in the Legislature.”

That idea persisted for at least the first fifty years of the Republic. In a letter to lawyer and his future biographer William Herndon, then Illinois Senator Abraham Lincoln wrote regarding war-making responsibilities:

The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making power to Congress was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons. Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not


always, that the good of the people was the object. This, our Convention understood to be the most oppressive of all Kingly oppressions; and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us.  

But America’s involvement in Vietnam had seemingly changed these ideas. Neither Johnson nor Nixon sought a Congressional declaration of war (Johnson had the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, as Attorney General Katzenbach reminded him and Nixon stated that as Commander-in-Chief he had a duty to protect soldiers already in the region). And so, after years of an unwinnable war in Vietnam, with presidents sending troops to the region without seeking Congressional approval, and no open, public debate by elected officials about the merits of the war, Congress decided to reclaim its authority in the single most important foreign policy decision—war. President Nixon was the target of this initiative. As Herring notes, “By the early summer of 1973, Nixon’s ability to dangle carrots or brandish sticks had been sharply curtailed by an increasingly rebellious Congress.”

**WAR POWERS RESOLUTION ACT OF 1973**

Introduced in May of 1973, the bill does not mention Vietnam specifically, but its language directly addresses a president’s ability to wage war without congressional approval: “It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.” Quite simply, the military of the United States could not be brought into a situation like Vietnam without explicit support of the American people through their elected representatives.

---


91. Herring, *America’s Longest War*, 327.

The War Powers Resolution may have been popular with Congress (it passed in the House 245-130 and in the Senate 76-21), but it infuriated President Nixon. When the War Powers Resolution reached Nixon’s desk for signature, he unsurprisingly vetoed it. In his response to Congress’s attempt to check presidential authority, Nixon wrote:

While I am in accord with the desire of the Congress to assert its proper role in the conduct of our foreign affairs, the restrictions which this resolution would impose upon the authority of the President are both unconstitutional and dangerous to the best interests of our Nation. . . . While I firmly believe that a veto of House Joint Resolution 542 is warranted solely on constitutional grounds, I am also deeply disturbed by the practical consequences of this resolution. For it would seriously undermine this Nation's ability to act decisively and convincingly in times of international crisis.  

It was Nixon’s belief that the War Powers Resolution hindered the President’s potency as Commander-in-Chief. And the Nixon Administration’s argument regarding the War Powers Act is an argument every administration has made since. What Nixon failed to mention in his response, however, was that the President could make quick decisions in times of emergency.

The War Powers Resolution contains three main provisions that are still highly contested: one, the President must notify Congress within forty-eight hours when U.S. troops are deployed; two, all troops must be removed from combat within sixty days unless Congress approves otherwise; and three, reports must be submitted to Congress of all missions in which U.S. troops are being used. The language of the bill does not state that a president cannot respond accordingly to a national emergency without congressional approval, say an invasion or attack. What the law does clearly hinder is a President’s ability to wage a sustained war. Even with questions of the act’s constitutionality, Congress overrode Nixon’s veto and passed the War Powers Resolution Act on November 7, 1973.

PRESIDENT GERALD FORD AND THE WAR POWERS ACT

After Nixon’s resignation following the Watergate scandal, his successor Gerald Ford struggled to reconcile his foreign policy prerogatives and those of Congress. In 1975, when the fall of Saigon was imminent, Ford requested a billion dollars in aid for South Vietnam. In that request, Ford had earmarked $722 million dollars for military aid. Fearing that the inflated proposal was a thinly veiled attempt to reengage U.S. militarily in Vietnam, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee went to the White House to meet with Ford to express its concerns.

The declassified minutes of Ford’s meeting with the Senate Committee outline their apprehensions:

Ford: The $722 million is designed to meet the current situation and is totally different from the $300 million. . . . If there isn’t some indication of aid, the situation could disintegrate rapidly.

Senator Jacob Javits (NY-R): I will give you large sums for evacuation, but not one nickel for military aid for Thieu [President of South Vietnam].

Ford: We are not wanting to put troops in, but we have to have enough funds to make it look like we plan to hold for some time.

Senator John Glenn (OH-D): The idea here is very different from what I envisioned. . . . I can see North Vietnam deciding not to let us get these people out and attacking our bridgehead. Then we would have to send forces to protect our security force. That fills me with fear.

Ford found himself in a predicament: he wanted to get evacuees out of South Vietnam and give assistance to the Thieu regime to stave off the Communist forces; however, Congress was not budging on its no-reengagement policy in Vietnam. Later, Ford would point out that although he did not agree with the War Powers Resolution, he fulfilled his duty by informing Congress of his intentions.


plans. In a speech in 1977, he said, “I did not concede that the resolution itself was legally binding on the President. . . . Nevertheless, in each instance, I took note of its consultation and reporting provisions, and provided certain information on operations and strategies to key members of Congress.”

Ford’s billion-dollar proposal—including the roughly $300 million for evacuations—died in the House, the final vote of 162-246. Later, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (Ford’s Chief of Staff at the time) wrote in his 2011 memoir that the War Powers Resolution “despite its questionable and still untested constitutionality undercut the President’s ability to convince troublemakers of America’s staying power.” Rumsfeld would make the same argument during his tenure as Secretary of Defense under George W. Bush, in addition to his argument against the Abrams Doctrine.

PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER AND THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

When Jimmy Carter assumed the presidency, the War Powers Resolution had been a law for nearly four years. Given the public and Congressional backlash following Vietnam, Carter was sympathetic to the War Powers Act as a presidential candidate. During his presidency, Carter’s Office of Legal Counsel upheld the War Powers Resolution’s central provisions as Congress exercising its constitutional authority—the ruling was never reversed. But this acceptance of the War Powers Resolution has to be contextualized within Carter’s presidency.


During Carter’s tenure as president, the United States military did not engage in any interventions abroad. The major objective of the Carter Administration differed from its predecessors. The only war Carter wanted to wage was on foreign oil.

In his “Crisis of Confidence” speech, known as the “Malaise Speech,” speaking to a national audience, Carter vowed that the United States would “never use more foreign oil than we did in 1977—never.” So, Carter’s support for the War Powers Resolution was easier to obtain than Ford’s. He was not seeking to intervene in foreign countries, America’s national security was not threatened, and the American people were still reeling from Vietnam. While his speech outlined America’s initiative to shirk its reliance on foreign oil, as Rachel Maddow argues in *Drift*, Carter buried the lead: “Lost in President Carter’s ten-car pileup of war metaphors was a line that probably should have been his headline that night: that America was ‘a nation that is at peace tonight everywhere in the world.’” Ending the nearly two decades of military interventions, Carter chose to focus on domestic policies. Four months after his speech, however, Carter joined his predecessors in weighing the costs and benefits of a military intervention.

After the U.S.-backed Shah of Iran was deposed, and hostages were taken at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Carter was faced with the difficult decision of how to extricate the hostages from Iran. In his 1980 State of the Union Address, Carter vowed that the United States would not rest until every hostage was released. While planning the rescue mission, Carter was confronted with the War Powers Resolution for the first time. As one of the provisions stated,


102. Maddow, *Drift*, 42.

the president was required to report any military missions to Congress. Concerned with keeping the rescue mission a secret, however, Carter viewed informing Congress as an unnecessary risk. Knowing that rescuing the hostages was the top priority, Carter found a loophole in the War Powers Resolution.

Under the War Powers Resolution, a president must inform Congress any time U.S. troops are sent into “hostilities.” The question became: how could the administration conduct secret operations (no matter the justness) if it had to inform Congress every time? Like every president has done since, Carter did not acknowledge the Iranian rescue mission as a “hostile” operation. Despite its use of U.S. troops, entering a foreign country, supplied by the Department of Defense, the Carter Administration argued that it was a “humanitarian mission.”

After the overwhelming failure of Operation Eagle Claw (the attempt to rescue the hostages in Tehran), Carter carefully crafted his address to the nation to make clear that the intentions were peaceful:

There was no fighting; there was no combat. . . . The mission on which they embarked was a humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran; it was not directed against the people of Iran. It was not undertaken with any feeling of hostility toward Iran or its people. It has caused no Iranian causalities.104

And the explanation of Operation Eagle Claw as a humanitarian mission was how Carter was able to avoid alerting Congress. The War Powers Resolution required congressional approval for preplanned military engagements, not humanitarian efforts.

After Congress was made aware of Operation Eagle Claw, many condemned Carter for his avoidance of the War Powers Resolution. Senator Frank Church (D-ID) stated, “I think he disregarded this provision of the War Powers Act.” Senator Charles Mathias (R-MD) agreed, “It would seem to me that it would be appropriate that at least a limited few members of the

Congressional leadership would be consulted.” Congressman Henry Reuss (D-WI) was far less reserved: “I’m very disturbed by it. I think the President would be doing a useful thing for the country if he promptly announced that he is not a candidate for re-election.”

It was after a midday meeting with Carter that Congressional leaders began to ease the rhetoric. Senator Edmund Muskie (D-ME) said, “I would have been disappointed if plans of this kind had not been under preparation.” Senator Howard Baker (R-TN) championed the decision: “My only criticism of the President is they didn’t do it before now.” Although the hostages were not rescued, and their release was not achieved under Carter (a fact which torpedoed his re-election campaign), Carter succeeded in finding a workaround to the War Powers Act, setting a precedent that has persisted until today, and which Neoconservatives have exploited during their times in power. It should be noted that in 1995, when Congressman Henry Hyde (R-IL) sought to repeal the War Powers Resolution, Carter wrote him a letter stating, “I fully support your effort to repeal the War Powers Resolution. Best wishes in this good work.”

So while the Army, under the direction of General Abrams was undergoing a transformation between 1972 and 1974, the United States Congress was also trying to ensure that a president could not send the country into another Vietnam. Whether it was by activating the Reserves and disrupting American lives to the fullest extent, or having to seek authorization from Congress under the War Powers Resolution, a president’s ability to wage war on his own accord was under direct attack; the decision would have to be made as a country. Neoconservatism, however, would spend the next thirty years successfully finding loopholes in both of its contemporaries. It would advocate military interventions around the world, without the Reserves


and without Congressional approval. Starting on its path to prominence during the Reagan era, Neoconservatism championed the hard-line approach Reagan took in Grenada, Lebanon, and Central America, while advocating strongly against Communism.

CONCLUSION

Three reactions to the Vietnam War converged in the mid-1970s. Neoconservatism honed its political acumen in the post-Vietnam era, trying to reconcile its foreign policy ideas with a country sharply opposed to war. The Abrams Doctrine sought to permanently link the American public to war and ensure that the entire country participated in war, not just the military. The War Powers Resolution, despite its flaws, reasserted Congress’s interest in conducting major foreign policy decisions. All three of these reactions were direct responses to Vietnam, but in many instances, the Abrams Doctrine and the War Powers Resolution attempted to curtail the same thing—presidential prerogative—but the Neoconservative Movement, starting in the Reagan Administration, argued against its counterparts. Each of these reactions brings a unique perspective the U.S. foreign policy, and in the subsequent chapters, their interaction with one another is explored in depth.
CHAPTER TWO
RONALD REAGAN, GRENADA, IRAN-CONTRA, AND THE NEOCONSERVATIVES

“For many of the ideas that animated our administration can trace their ancestry to . . . all of you.” 107

--President Ronald Reagan, Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute, 1988

INTRODUCTION

As historian Sean Wilentz states in his book *The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008*, Ronald Reagan shares with FDR and Lyndon Johnson the distinction of transforming and defining an era in American politics. Wilentz writes, “Just as the period of American history from 1933 to the late 1960s—between the rise of the New Deal and the fall of Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society—was chiefly one of liberal reform, so the past thirty-five years have been an era of conservatism.” 108 The thirty-five years referenced by Wilentz directly reflect the legacy of Ronald Reagan and his post-presidency popularity. Reagan’s presidency marked a turning point in American politics and certainly altered the discussion about America’s global standing.

During the contentious Republican primaries in 1976 Reagan was catapulted into and remained in the national spotlight until his ascension to the presidency in 1980. But what made Reagan a true tour-de-force in American politics were his strongly held convictions regarding the superiority of American democracy—a belief shared with Neoconservatives—and his ability to persuade a vast swath of the public to share those beliefs. Reagan tapped into the national desire to reclaim America’s pride after the loss in Vietnam, taking a hardline stance on issues such as the Panama Canal and Communism, while advocating for increased military spending to meet


those objectives. Agreeing with Wilentz’s analysis, there is an “Age of Reagan,” but for reasons in addition to it ushering in an era of conservatism.

Reagan’s interpretation of presidential power during his tenure, which supplanted the War Powers Resolution of 1973, set the precedent for every president since to argue that the office of the president holds certain, unilateral powers. Unlike Jimmy Carter’s “humanitarian” efforts to save the hostages from Tehran, Reagan did not attempt to veil his missions by using the same logic, though he would begin his campaign in Grenada on similar footing. With the help of his Administration, filled with adherents to the recently formed Neoconservative Movement such as Paul Wolfowitz, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Richard Perle, and Congressional allies like Dick Cheney, one of the major contributions Reagan made to American politics was an expanded view of Executive authority.

While the Neoconservative Movement and the War Powers Resolution clashed with one another consistently throughout the 1980s, the Abrams Doctrine, the third reaction to Vietnam mentioned in Chapter One, will remain, in this chapter, largely in the background. The expansion of presidential power, facilitated by relatively small military excursions, rendered the Abrams Doctrine moot during the Reagan Administration. Simply put, campaigns such as Grenada, Latin America, and Lebanon required a small contingent of U.S. forces, not the Vietnam-like call-ups the Abrams Doctrine was designed to prevent.

Detailed in the chapter that follows is the lineage of the Age of Reagan, starting with Reagan’s failed run for the Republican presidential nomination in 1976 and ending when his presidency does in 1989. Arguing that the combination of anti-Communism and increased presidential powers led to a U.S. foreign policy agenda that promoted interventions abroad, this chapter argues that the Reagan Administration, with the help of Neoconservative ideas, set the
stage for how the Legislative and Executive branches interacted on issues of foreign policy and is the nadir for the War Powers Resolution Act of 1973.

**RONALD REAGAN AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE “REAGAN DOCTRINE”**

During the 1976 Presidential campaign, Republican Gerald Ford’s incumbency was being threatened by the former governor of California, Ronald Reagan. Reagan, who had served as California Governor from 1967 to 1975, was gaining national political capital. Ford’s presidency was still reeling from the Watergate scandal and his subsequent pardons of those involved. Reagan’s sudden rise to the upper echelons of the Republican Party did nothing to help Ford’s reelection campaign; in fact, Reagan’s run favored Democratic challenger Jimmy Carter by splitting Republican voters. Reagan eventually accepted that he was unable to overcome Ford’s incumbent status for the Party’s nomination and conceded at the Republican National Convention. But, during a speech which was intended to show his support for President Ford, Reagan used the national platform to highlight the issue most important to him: foreign policy.

Referencing a letter he wrote to be placed in a time capsule for California’s tricentennial, Reagan announced what he believed was at stake in the ‘76 election: “We live in a world in which the great powers have aimed and poised at each other horrible missiles of destruction, nuclear weapons that can in a matter of minutes arrive at each other’s country and destroy virtually the civilized world we live in.” The threat of nuclear war, to Reagan and many Americans, was the most pressing issue of the time. The discussion of this topic at the

---

109. As many Republicans were drawn to Reagan, support for Ford slipped. This schism within the voting bloc strengthened Carter’s bid for the presidency, because Republicans were split. As Wilentz argues in *Age of Reagan*, Ford’s attempt to appear more moderate resulted in “helping to push many ex-Democrats as well as longtime conservative Republicans into the political camp of the pro-Reagan right.”

Republican National Convention was not an anomaly for Reagan; he had built his entire ‘76 campaign on the issue of foreign policy. The issue of American foreign policy, the threat of nuclear war, and the perceived superiority of the Soviets merged to become Reagan’s political platform. His speech regarding the “terrible missiles of destruction” marked a shift in topics for Reagan. During the early stages of the campaign, Reagan took a stance on an issue much smaller than nuclear war: the ownership of the Panama Canal.

**REAGAN AND THE PANAMA CANAL**

During the election cycle, there was talk about the U.S. relinquishing possession of the Panama Canal. Reagan’s view on the ownership of the Canal was absolute. He had even developed a signature tagline for it: “We bought it, we paid for it, we built it, and we intend to keep it.”

The tagline became the trademark Reagan quote for 1976. He would often repeat it in interviews, press conferences, speeches, and any other form of media through which he could reach an audience. In Reagan’s view, it was not the Canal itself that was at stake; it was American superiority and pride, a view shared by the Neoconservatives who later filled his administration.

The country was still recovering from the war in Vietnam, and many Americans felt as though America’s world standing had taken a beating in the loss. For Reagan, the thought that the Panama Canal was going to be turned over to the Panamanian government was another loss—a loss of pride in post-Vietnam America that could not stand. *Time* magazine succinctly summarized Reagan’s views on the Canal and how they were being received by the American people: “Reagan’s jingoism on the canal has apparently struck a nerve among parts of the


112. See Chapter One’s section on the history of Neoconservatism and this sentiment’s role in its formation.
electorate, arousing post-Vietnam sentiments that the U.S. should not be pushed around in its own hemisphere . . .”

According to Reagan, the Panama Canal, if handed over to the Panamanian government, would only add to a feeling of failure the American people had harbored since the loss in Vietnam. To Reagan, that kind of failure was not acceptable, especially to a country that was number one in the world and should be seen as such.

As Reagan’s message of “we intend to keep it” reached a wider audience, many of his constituents were aghast by what Reagan projected to the American people. Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), the Republican nominee for president in 1964, bought some television airtime to counter Reagan’s canal message.

Even Hollywood icon and avid Republican John Wayne weighed in on the Reagan-Canal debate, sending Reagan a scathing letter condemning his position: "Now I have taken your letter, and I'll show you point by goddamn point in the treaty where you are misinforming people. If you continue these erroneous remarks, someone will publicize your letter to prove that you are not as thorough in your reviewing of this treaty as you say or are damned obtuse when it comes to reading the English language."

In a televised debate regarding the Canal with conservative pundit William F. Buckley, Reagan reiterated the sound-bite of “We bought it, we paid for it, we built it, and we intend to keep it.” During the nearly two-hour debate, Reagan maintained it was American pride that would suffer if the U.S. relinquished the Canal. As Reagan argued, “We would become a laughingstock by surrendering to unreasonable demands, and by doing so, I think we cloak

---


weakness in the suit of virtue.”\textsuperscript{116} Reagan’s political strategy and how he attempted to garner votes was by invoking the resounding sense of disappointment, embarrassment, and anger that a large portion of the American public still harbored about Vietnam.

Yet what Reagan ignored in his Panama Canal rhetoric was that the negotiations had begun long before 1976. In 1964, there was a riot in Panama between Panamanian citizens and U.S. residents over the Canal Zone, culminating in a brief diplomatic standstill between the two nations. The understanding that there would be a treaty turning ownership of the Canal over to Panama had its roots in 1967; however, turmoil in the Panama, leading to the coup which put General Torrijos in power, stalled the negotiations. In 1973, President Nixon appointed former U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker to head-up the U.S. delegation in the Canal talks. The objective of the Nixon Administration, and the subsequent goal of the Ford Administration, was to ensure continual U.S. use of the Canal, not maintain ownership. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told President Ford in 1975 that if the Canal negotiations failed, “We will be beaten to death in every international forum and there will be riots all over Latin America.”\textsuperscript{117}

While Ford vowed to maintain U.S. use of the Canal during the 1976 campaign, it was not just Reagan who criticized his approach. In a foreign policy debate against Ford, Democratic nominee Jimmy Carter took a much more conservative stance than anticipated, stating that he would not give up “practical control of the Canal,” while seeking to share sovereignty.\textsuperscript{118} Weeks


after his election, Carter did, however, change his views on the Canal on the advice of many pro-treaty advisors. The treaties, which became colloquially known as the Carter-Torrijos Treaties, were ratified in October 1977 despite protests from the American Right.119

The debate over the Canal dated back to the early 1960s, which meant that talks about ownership and use of the Canal had been present in American politics for over a decade. What differed, however, in the 1976 election season was the way in which the debate was framed. Traditionally, the Canal rhetoric focused on economic consequences of relinquishment. Many opposed to the treaties cited the threat to U.S. economic interests. The threat of encirclement by pro-Communist regimes also became a natural Cold War-era argument. Changing those traditional, static arguments, Reagan made the Canal an issue of pride. And by equating the loss of the Canal to a loss of American pride, the argument became more emotional, more visceral.120

Reagan’s and his Neoconservative constituents’ calls of patriotism, American military might, and nationalism were not enough to stop the transfer of the Canal, though buried in that defeat was a victory: Reagan had tapped into a national sentiment that would carry him to the presidency in 1980. Reagan had been able to gain mass support in the electorate by capitalizing on the national feeling of embarrassment surrounding the loss in Vietnam through the issue of relinquishing the Panama Canal. In his book The Reagan I Knew, Reagan’s one-time Canal debate opponent Buckley wrote, “I think that Governor Reagan put his finger on it when he said

119. The Carter Administration introduced two separate bills regarding the Canal. The first, the “Neutrality Treaty,” stated that the U.S. could use its military to defend the Canal, ensuring its continued use. The second, “The Panama Canal Treaty,” stated that the Panama Canal Zone would no longer exist on October 1, 1979, and that the ownership of the Canal would change hands on December 31, 1999.

120. Journalist Adam Clymer writes in his book about the role the Panama Canal played in the rise of Ronald Reagan. By highlighting the unpopularity of the Carter’s “weak” approach, Clymer also denotes several instances in which Senators lost their seats as a result of their support of the treaty. Adam Clymer, Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch: The Panama Canal Treaties and the Rise of the Right (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008).
the reason this treaty is unpopular is because we’re tired of being pushed around. We were pushed out of Vietnam because we didn’t have the guts to go in there and do it right.”121 It was clear that Reagan had tapped into something much larger than the Canal itself. He had publically professed the same, stifled sentiments many Americans had regarding the failures in Southeast Asia. Reagan’s promise and determination to restore American pride was an incredibly successful political strategy. With his continued assertions regarding the United States’ military inferiority compared to the U.S.S.R., Reagan further cemented his political niche.

**REAGAN AND HIS PRE-PRESIDENTIAL VIEWS OF THE U.S.S.R.**

In the same televised address in which he criticized the Ford Administration’s stance on the Panama Canal during the 1976 election, Reagan also addressed the issue of Soviet superiority:

> The Soviet Army outnumbers ours more than two-to-one and in reserves four-to-one. They out-spend us on weapons by 50 percent. Their Navy outnumbers ours in surface ships and submarines two-to-one. We’re outgunned in artillery three-to-one and their tanks outnumber ours four-to-one. Their strategic nuclear missiles are larger, more powerful and more numerous than ours. The evidence mounts that we are Number Two in a world where it's dangerous, if not fatal, to be second best. . . . But peace does not come from weakness or from retreat. It comes from the restoration of American military superiority.”122

In retrospect, Reagan’s statements were, at best, factually shaky. There was no hard evidence at the time—especially none accessible to a former governor of California running for President—that could substantiate his claims. Factual inaccuracies aside, what Reagan had done was paint a stark, terrifying picture for the American people. In a world where the threat of a nuclear apocalypse was a paramount concern, being confronted with the “fact” that the U.S. was outmanned and outgunned struck a nerve. Reagan’s determination to restore American pride,


through the use of military might, resonated with voters and the Neoconservative Movement, and in 1980, Reagan unseated Jimmy Carter to become the 40th President of the United States.\textsuperscript{123}


Shortly after Reagan was sworn in as President, he focused his attention on the federal budget. One of his objectives was to ensure that someone could no longer make $150,000 a year on welfare, as he had claimed was possible.\textsuperscript{124} Instead, the nation needed to direct its energies elsewhere—national defense, which he argued had been neglected.

Between the 1976 campaign and the 1980 campaign, Reagan was adamant about the dangers the country faced as the U.S.S.R. grew “stronger.” In his first inaugural address, Reagan focused on the economy and the inflation Gerald Ford had sought to “whip.”\textsuperscript{125} Lost in the extensive, strong economic rhetoric, however, was an allusion to his plans to build-up America’s military, thus restoring American pride post-Vietnam. Reagan stated:

> When action is required to preserve our national security, we will act. We will maintain sufficient strength to prevail if need be, knowing that if we do so we have the best chance of never having to use that strength. Above all, we must realize that no arsenal or no weapon in the arsenals of the world is so formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women. It is a weapon our adversaries in today's world do not have. It is a weapon that we as Americans do have.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{124} During his 1976 Presidential campaign, Reagan on many of his campaign stops spoke of a “Welfare Queen.” Reported on by the Washington Star (a now out-of-business newspaper in Chicago), Reagan claimed that there was a woman who had “80 names, 30 addresses, 12 Social Security cards. . . . She’s got Medicaid, getting food stamps and she is collecting welfare under each of her names. Her tax-free cash income alone is over $150,000." The story, as it turns out was a wild exaggeration, but it gained popular support and was retold numerous times. A full story on the background of the “Welfare Queen” can be read on the CNN website. John Blake, “Return of the ‘Welfare Queen,’” CNN, January 23, 2012, accessed February 22, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/23/politics/welfare-queen/.

\textsuperscript{125} As his platform in the 1976 election, incumbent President Gerald Ford’s motto was to “whip inflation now,” as a reference to the high cost of living at the time.

In the last minutes of the speech, Reagan referenced a soldier buried in Arlington National Cemetery, who had given his life for the nation’s fight against tyranny. As it turned out, the soldier who Reagan mentioned—Martin Treptow—was not even buried in Arlington National Cemetery; he had been buried in Wisconsin. That error notwithstanding, Reagan had a purpose in telling Treptow’s story. He was telling the American people, through the journey of a fallen soldier, that American military superiority had to be restored. The federal budgets reflected that desire. Below is a table which outlines the Reagan Administration’s budgets, as well as Carter’s for comparison.

Table 2-1: Budgets of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan (in constant 2009, billions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Federal Budget</th>
<th>Defense Spending</th>
<th>Percentage of Budget</th>
<th>Deficit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1,320.5</td>
<td>335.6</td>
<td>25.41</td>
<td>173.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1,392.7</td>
<td>337.4</td>
<td>24.23</td>
<td>179.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1,408.7</td>
<td>348.1</td>
<td>24.71</td>
<td>113.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,494.9</td>
<td>363.0</td>
<td>24.28</td>
<td>186.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,543.9</td>
<td>382.2</td>
<td>24.66</td>
<td>179.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1,579.3</td>
<td>414.0</td>
<td>26.21</td>
<td>271.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1,630.4</td>
<td>444.6</td>
<td>27.27</td>
<td>419.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,642.8</td>
<td>461.3</td>
<td>28.08</td>
<td>357.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1,761.3</td>
<td>493.6</td>
<td>28.02</td>
<td>395.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1,805.0</td>
<td>522.4</td>
<td>29.94</td>
<td>403.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1,778.9</td>
<td>530.5</td>
<td>29.82</td>
<td>265.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1,824.2</td>
<td>533.3</td>
<td>29.23</td>
<td>265.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1,887.7</td>
<td>538.3</td>
<td>28.52</td>
<td>251.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Table 1.3 and Table 8.2

The numbers show the Reagan Administration increased the federal budget and Department of Defense spending every year, which coincided with higher deficits that peaked in 1983. Reagan’s Budget Director David Stockman rang the alarm quite early in the

127. There were several factual inaccuracies surrounding Reagan’s invocation of Martin Treptow’s sacrifice, but the extent to which Ronald Reagan was aware of these discrepancies is unknown. A full article on the snafu can be found here. Richard Halloran, “The Pledge of Private Treptow,” The New York Times, January 21, 1981.
Administration’s budget talks. Stockman warned Reagan about the problems of increased deficits, while Reagan continuously reminded those opposed to his budget of what was at stake, especially where national security was concerned.

In his book, *The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed*, Stockman describes a conversation with Reagan concerning the budget. Quoting Reagan, Stockman wrote, “There must be no perception by anyone in the world that we’re backing down an inch on defense buildup. When I was asked during the campaign about what I would do if it came down to a choice between defense and deficits . . . I always said national security has to come first, and the people applauded every time.”128 Stockman would resign in 1985 in protest of the growing deficits.129

The budget deficits of today skew our interpretations of the Reagan-era budget shortfalls. In a decade where a trillion-dollar deficit is not uncommon, the idea that Reagan’s deficits were a couple of hundred billion dollars does not sound as alarming to a modern audience; however, at the time, it was the largest peacetime deficit in the nation’s history. The Reagan Administration had to make a convincing case to the American people why such deficits were necessary.

As the Administration argued, the Soviet Union’s military build-up had forced their hand; the United States had to match the Soviets tank-for-tank. The Administration reminded Americans what was at stake: the Soviets were focused on world domination and the enslavement of all free people. Neoconservatives, becoming integral in the Reagan White House, argued that the United States needed to portray strength to avoid enemies becoming more self-assured. In a 1981 interview with Walter Cronkite, in which Cronkite suggested that Reagan


might have been exaggerating Soviet intentions in order to gain support for his budget, Reagan stated:

    . . . [N]othing is immoral if it furthers their cause, which means they can resort to
    lying or stealing or cheating or even murder if it furthers their cause, and that is
    not immoral. Now, if we’re going to deal with them, then we have to keep that in
    mind when we deal with them.130

Invoking morality in times of war was nothing new in American politics, but Reagan’s use of
morality to justify military spending in a time of peace added a new facet to the discussion. The
same year, the U.S. Department of Defense released a booklet entitled Soviet Military Power.131
In it, the DoD outlined the Soviets’ advancements and warned of the consequences if the United
States did not keep pace. Questioning the timing of its release, Time magazine noted, “Its
purpose [is to] send a red alert to Americans and their allies that the U.S.S.R. is gaining a
military edge over the West. Naturally, there was suspicion that the timing was designed to help
the Pentagon justify the vast sums needed for the new strategic defense systems.”132

    Shortly after Reagan’s Defense Department had released the provocative booklet, Soviet
Premier Leonid Brezhnev called for Reagan to join him in “rejecting the very idea of nuclear
attack as criminal.” Brezhnev went on to state, “It is dangerous madness to try to defeat each
other in the arms race and to count on victory in nuclear war. I shall add that only he who has
decided to commit suicide can start a nuclear war in the hope of emerging a victor.”133

131. Reagan was the first to include the booklet in the budget.
132. Quoted in Maddow, Drift, 63.
    October 21, 1981.
could not be believed; Reagan was confident that the Soviets thought nuclear war was winnable.\textsuperscript{134}

Despite the amount of money spent on the nation’s defense and the deficits it was creating, a majority of the American people supported Reagan’s efforts to out-spend the Soviets on military necessities. The Gallup poll below shows the public sentiments towards defense spending:

}\textit{Americans' Views of Defense Spending}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart2-1}
\caption{The graph shows that in 1981, while the Reagan Administration was adamant that the Soviets were outspending the United States, an overwhelming majority of Americans believed that the U.S. was spending too little on defense. In other words, the Reagan Administration’s argument had a tangible effect on the way Americans viewed the Soviets’ military superiority and supported increased defense spending to keep pace.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{134} Schmemann, “Brezhnev Bids Reagan Help Ban a Nuclear Attack.”
As has been seen in the 2000s, what are usually lost in the talks about defense spending are the consequences it had on the United States domestically. As political scientist Anne Hessing Cahn wrote in 1993:

For more than a third of a century, assertions of Soviet superiority created calls for the United States to ‘re-arm.’ In the 1980s, the call was heeded so thoroughly that the United States embarked on a trillion dollar defense buildup. As a result, the country neglected its schools, cities, roads and bridges and health care system. From the world’s greatest creditor nation, the United States became the world’s greatest debtor—in order to pay for the arms to counter the threat of a nation that was collapsing.  

Perhaps Cahn unfairly blames the Reagan Administration for not knowing about the Soviet Union’s impending collapse, but her point is well made. It is troublesome that the deficits were not a result of increased spending on education, healthcare, or infrastructure, but it is important to realize that the threat of the Soviet Union was real to millions of people. And because of that fear, defense spending that created deficits was more palatable. In October 1983, after all of the debate about spending, deficits, and the like, the Reagan Administration got to prove the benefits of having America’s improved and costly military.

THE UNITED STATES INVASION OF GRENADA

In October 1983, the United States launched a full-scale invasion of the tiny island-nation of Grenada. Codenamed “Operation Urgent Fury,” it was the first opportunity for the Reagan Administration to confront Communism, or what they deemed Communism, militarily, with the world watching. After the government of Grenada was overthrown in a Marxist coup, Reagan became increasingly concerned about the Cuban influence—and by extension, the Soviet influence—in the hemisphere. Promoted as a rescue mission of the American students studying medicine at the American owned and operated St. George’s University (like Jimmy Carter’s

---

secret mission to save hostages in Iran), Operation Urgent Fury was not without its blunders. More so than its shortcomings, what is most historically important about the mission is the secrecy with which it was undertaken. Under the War Powers Resolution Act of 1973 as discussed in Chapter One, an invasion of a sovereign country could not be Reagan’s decision alone; Congress had to approve. Instead of asking Congress for the go-ahead, however, Reagan facilitated the invasion on his own accord (largely from the Augusta National Golf Course), ignoring the checks to presidential power Congress had attempted to instill in a post-Vietnam America.

**PLANNING AND SECRECY**

During the planning of the operation, the Reagan Administration was adamant about keeping the invasion of Grenada a secret. There could be no hint that the United States was coming. As a result of the secrecy, many of prerequisites for invasion were ignored. In fact, even as the invasion was underway, U.S. troops were using tourist maps to navigate the island, instead of the tactical maps the Defense Department could have supplied with its ever-growing budget. Reagan was concerned that the more people were aware of the impending invasion (like map makers in the Pentagon), the more likely it was that information about the invasion would surface. President Reagan did not even warn his closest ally British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the invasion, despite the compelling fact that Grenada was a member of the British Commonwealth. After the operation was underway, Thatcher was understandably furious. Reagan called the Prime Minister to apologize:

---

Reagan: We regret very much the embarrassment caused you . . . We have had a nagging problem of a loose source, a leak here. . . . Incidentally, let me tell you that we were being so careful here that we did not even give a firm answer to the Caribbean States. We told them we were planning, but we were so afraid of this source and what it would do; it could almost abort the mission, with the lives that could have endangered.

Thatcher: I know about sensitivity, because of the Falklands. . . . The action is underway now and we just hope it will be successful.137

Thatcher may not have been thrilled that she was left out of the loop regarding the invasion, but she understood the importance of secrecy. As Reagan saw it, if the operation was going to succeed, information had to be on a need-to-know basis. For that reason, the Administration also made the decision to not inform the press corps about the invasion.

In 1987, former White House spokesman Larry Speakes told the New York Times that Vice Admiral and Deputy National Security Advisor John Poindexter was told to lie about the impending invasion. Citing direct instructions from White House Chief of Staff James Baker, III, Speakes recalled that he and Poindexter told reporters that the rumors of an invasion were “preposterous.” Baker later responded to Speakes’ accusations in an interview with the New York Times: “I never told John Poindexter to tell Larry Speakes that it was preposterous. I might well have told John Poindexter and others that they might not talk about this and the press office should not be briefed because American lives were at stake, as they indeed were.”138 It was not just the press that could not know about the Grenada invasion. Congress, too, could not be informed of the Reagan Administration’s plans, because as a natural extension of the adopted plan, a 535-member legislative body was not conducive to secrecy.


CONGRESS’ OBJECTIONS TO REAGAN’S MILITARY ADVENTURISM

Even before the invasion of Grenada, Congress and Reagan, in 1982, had a showdown over the funds the Reagan Administration was diverting to help efforts overthrow the leftist government, or Sandinistas, in Nicaragua, though the Reagan Administration and its allies would label the government “Marxist” or “Communist” in order to emphasize the need for its overthrow. The disagreement culminated in the passage of the Boland Amendment. Under this law, “No funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement or individual.”

Congress was adamant that the Reagan Administration’s diversion of funds to subvert leftist efforts in Latin America had to stop. In his autobiography, Reagan wrote about a conversation with Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill regarding Congress’ efforts to keep aid from Nicaragua: “The Sandinistas have openly proclaimed Communism in their country and their support of Marxist revolutions throughout Central America. . . . They’re killing and torturing people! Now what does Congress expect me to do about that?”

To Reagan, secrecy regarding the invasion of Grenada was a preventative measure, ensuring another Boland Amendment would not end the plan before its inception. In order to guarantee minimal interference from Congress in, Reagan understandably did not tell them.

139. “A Joint Resolution Making Continuing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 1985, and for Other Purposes,” H.J. Res. 648, 98th Congress, 2nd sess., October 12, 1984. There was a Boland Amendment passed in 1982, which stated that funds should not be used to facilitate an overthrow of the Nicaraguan government, which is not the one I am quoting here. After Congress began to rethink the loopholes in the first Boland Amendment, it passed the second, which is what is quoted above.

Known for his persuasive oratory, Reagan addressed the nation to talk about the budget, the Department of Defense, and the looming threat of the militarization of Grenada. During the speech, Reagan addressed the concerns of Congress and the American people about the increased budget and deficit. Arguing in defense of his spending, Reagan stated: “In 1955 defense took up more than half of the Federal budget. By 1980 this spending had fallen to a low of 23 percent. Even with the increase that I am requesting this year, defense will still amount to only 28 percent of the budget.”

The public could not argue with numbers. After all, President Eisenhower let the Department of Defense budget claim 50 percent of the budget, nearly double what Reagan was asking for. To further illustrate his point, Reagan reminded the nation of the Soviet and Cuban threat, especially pertaining to Grenada:

On the small island of Grenada, at the southern end of the Caribbean chain, the Cubans, with Soviet financing and backing, are in the process of building an airfield with a 10,000-foot runway. Grenada doesn't even have an air force. Who is it intended for? The Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada, in short, can only be seen as power projection into the region.

The airstrip was an issue of particular importance. Reagan’s ominous, rhetorical question was meant to leave the American people with the impression that it was a devious plot by the Communists. Scholarship on the subject suggests that the airstrip was simply meant for commercial use. In her book, Masters of War: Latin America and the U.S. Aggression from the Cuban Revolution to the Clinton Years, historian Clara Nieto states that the United States was the first country Grenada approached for assistance in building the airstrip, but the Reagan


Administration declined.\textsuperscript{143} Former official at the State Department and critic of U.S. foreign policy William Blum explains other omissions in Reagan’s speech:

At least five other Caribbean islands, including Barbados, had similar-sized or larger airfields yet did not possess air forces. The building of the airfield was encouraged by the World Bank, which also discussed with Grenada the erection of new tourist hotels. The excavation work was being done by the Layne Dredging Co. of Florida and the communications system installed by Plessey, a British multinational, the Cubans donating labor and machinery. Plessey rejected the US claim: ‘the airport . . . was being built to purely civilian specifications,’ it said, and listed a number of technical characteristics of a military airport/base which the new airport would not have.\textsuperscript{144}

It was not just Blum’s retrospective analysis that declared the airstrip as a non-threat. In 1982, testifying before the House’s Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Congressman Ron Dellums (CA-D) said after a fact-finding trip to Grenada, “. . . [I]t is my conclusion that this project is specifically now and has always been for the purpose of economic development and is not for military use.”\textsuperscript{145} The airstrip may have been Reagan’s “smoking gun,” proving Communist actions in the country, but he would later be criticized for inaccuracies and secrecy regarding the invasion. In a \textit{New York Times} article, Reagan was chastised by Congressional leaders for his lack of transparency on the issue.\textsuperscript{146} Exasperated from not being informed of the invasion and Reagan’s proclivity for war, Senator Lawton Chiles (D-FL), said, “Are we looking for a war we

\textsuperscript{143} Clara Nieto, \textit{Masters of War: Latin America and U.S. Aggression from the Cuban Revolution to the Clinton Years} (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005), 392.


can win?”

It was not just Congress that was angered by the invasion; the United Nations Security Council issued a resolution “deeply deploring” the United States’ action in Grenada. In an article appearing in the *New York Times*, journalist William Safire wrote about the Reagan Administration’s secrecy during the weeks prior to the invasion of Grenada. Safire wrote, “The fuss was about telling the truth to the people. The United States Government may on rare occasion fall silent for a time, but it must not deliberately lie; only the presence of reporters pledged to temporary secrecy can help justify a news blackout.”

When planes with the American “hostages” from Grenada landed in the United States, one of the rescued U.S. citizens famously kissed the tarmac. After that scene was replayed over and over again on all media outlets, condemnation of the invasion receded. In an effort to capitalize on the public relations victory the kiss provided, Reagan spoke to the American people about the successful mission in Grenada:

The events in Lebanon and Grenada, though oceans apart, are closely related. Not only has Moscow assisted and encouraged the violence in both countries, but it provides direct support through a network of surrogates and terrorists. It is no coincidence that when the thugs tried to wrest control over Grenada, there were 30 Soviet advisers and hundreds of Cuban military and paramilitary forces on the island.

After Reagan’s speech, a poll showed that a majority of Americans believed that the Americans on Grenada were in danger, and that Reagan made the right decision by extricating them by

147. Francis Clines, “White House Tactics Could Be Costly Next Year,” *New York Times*, October 30, 1983. Some context should be added to Chiles’s statement. On October 23, 1983, U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon were bombed, killing 241 Marines. The country was still reeling from that tragedy, as well as Vietnam and Latin America, when the invasion of Grenada was announced. Chiles’s rhetorical question implies that the Reagan Administration was looking for “a win,” in order to promote America’s military staying power.


To Americans, Lebanon, Grenada, and the Soviet Union were now all interconnected. The merits of that can be debated, but the precedent of secrecy in Reagan’s invasion of Grenada is the most lasting legacy of the short-lived conflict. Reagan’s press blackout, no warning to U.S.’ allies, not asking Congress for permission all culminated in a war undertaken by a single man; a direct violation of the War Powers Resolution and the founding idea of the Republic.

**BACKLASH AND PRAISE OF THE INVASION**

It was hard for anyone in the Reagan Administration to make the case that the tiny island nation of Grenada qualified as a direct and imminent threat to national security as would have to be the excuse for Reagan’s invasion of Grenada without Congressional approval. Congress did take measures to ensure that the Reagan Administration would follow the provisions of the War Powers Act that were still left after the invasion was already in effect. The House passed a resolution mandating that the clause of the War Powers Act which stated that U.S. forces could not be deployed to another country for more than sixty days without permission from Congress was followed. This was Congress’s attempt to re-establish itself as the war-making branch following the secrecy of the initial invasion.

In an interview with the *New York Times*, Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill condemned Reagan:

---

151. David Sharibman, “Poll Shows Support for Presence of U.S. Troops in Lebanon and Grenada,” *New York Times*, October 29, 1983. The exact figures of the poll are as follows: 62% of men agreed with the military force decision, while 29% did not. 41% of women agreed, while 43% did not. Pre-speech 51% of Americans believed that Americans in Grenada were in danger. After the speech, 65% believed that danger was real.

152. The War Powers Act gave the President authority to engage in military conflict in times of emergency.

153. On October 26, 1983, the House introduced H.J. 402 stating that section 4 (a)(1) of the War Powers Act was effective when U.S. forces entered Grenada.

154. The Senate did not pass the resolution, though it was taken up for debate.
I don't like where we're going one bit. I'm frightened, not because our nation isn't big enough, but because the President of the United States, in my opinion, is absolutely going down the wrong road. . . . You can't justify any government whether it's Russia or the United States, trampling on another nation. I'm worried about the effects of this. . . . He (the President) is wrong in his policy. He's caused us continuous harm. . . . He has no knowledge or no talent of the things that are happening out there. 155

Given the barrage of personal insults O'Neill later made towards President Reagan (and even Nancy Reagan) in the interview, it was clear that he was livid about what had transpired. Dick Cheney, then a Congressman from Wyoming, third ranking Republican in the House, and leading Neoconservative, praised Reagan’s Grenada campaign saying, “A lot of folks around the world feel we are more steady and reliable than heretofore.” 156

Aided by the constant replay of the American from Grenada kissing the tarmac and the resounding success of the operation, Reagan’s ignoring of the law fell through the cracks; it was a massive victory for the Administration, especially in terms of public opinion. The number of U.S. casualties was low—19 deaths, 17 from friendly-fire, and 116 wounded—and the U.S. accomplished its goals in a week. 157 It was not just the Soviet-centric mentality that the United States had addressed with the success of Grenada. The ghost of Vietnam was partly exorcised.

In his book The Long Gray Line: The American Journey of West Point’s Class of 1966, journalist Rick Atkinson noted the effect Grenada had in the minds of Americans from the Vietnam era:

For all of its shortcomings . . . the invasion of Grenada was a victory. . . . After Grenada, soldiers walked a little taller, not because of their battlefield exploits but because of the huzzahs from the rescued students and an appreciative citizenry at home. The United States Army, its self-esteem battered in Southeast Asia,


needed to win a war, any war. That slender campaign from Grenada buried beneath it the seventeen preceding ribbons from Vietnam.\textsuperscript{158}

With the ghost of Vietnam being silenced for a short time, the Reagan Administration’s publicly-known military adventures came to a close. The DoD budget continued to go up, but Americans were not being sent abroad, which critics questioned. Following Grenada, the Administration did engage in military adventures abroad, however, of which the public and Congress remained unaware.

In 1987, the scandal which almost prematurely ended the Reagan presidency with impeachment came to light. It involved the counterrevolutionaries in Nicaragua that Congress said (via the 1982 and 1984 Boland Amendments) Reagan could no longer fund. According to Reagan, Congress, as was the case with Grenada, did not understand the severity of the situation, thus the reason for secrecy—in addition to the overwhelming fact that the Administration was on shaky legal ground. In what became known as the Iran-Contra Scandal, Reagan’s refusal to acknowledge Congressional authority marred the last two years of his presidency with investigations and hearings. Though Reagan avoided impeachment, the precedent that the President could lead on issues of foreign policy pertaining to war was only strengthened.

**REAGAN AND THE IRAN-CONTRA SCANDAL**

The Iran-Contra Scandal stemmed from Reagan’s dissatisfaction with the Legislative Branch’s insistence on checking his presidential prerogatives and curtailing his foreign policy agenda. As Reagan argued, there were certain matters of national security that the President “knew” that were impossible for Congress to know. He met with military officials, CIA officials, National Security Advisors, foreign dignitaries, and a vast network of informants every

single day. Because he was privy to that information, he understood the dangers the United States faced better than anyone; he had the most information to make the best decisions. Based on that understanding, Reagan made a logical, coherent argument. So when Congress passed the second Boland Amendment in 1984 stating that the CIA or any other intelligence agency could not divert their allocated funds to support the anti-leftist Contras in Nicaragua, the Administration sought to circumvent that piece of legislation. In the rationale of the Reagan White House, the Executive Branch understood more about what was at stake in Latin America than did the 535 members of Congress, because those members of Congress were not privy to daily intelligence briefings.\textsuperscript{159}

To contextualize the implications of the Scandal, some background information is needed. In the mid-1980s, four American hostages were being held in Lebanon. Using Israel as a middle-man the U.S. supplied Iranian moderates (by way of shady businessman Manucher Ghorbanifar) with arms in order to secure the hostages’ release. The money made from the arms sales would be sent to Nicaragua to help the Contras’ efforts against the leftist Sandinistas.\textsuperscript{160}

The Reagan Administration successfully found a loophole in the Boland Amendment, effectively continuing its monetary support of the Contras. The ad-hoc reason the Reagan Administration gave for the transactions continued to establish a precedent in American war-making politics, while maintaining that the Executive was the preeminent authority on issues of foreign policy.

\textbf{THE REASONS AND SECRECY OF THE IRAN-CONTRA SCANDAL}

\textsuperscript{159} This section will focus on the politics and political ramifications of the Iran-Contra Scandal; it does not explore the ins-and-outs of the Scandal as a whole. For a complete report on the Iran-Contra, see historian Theodore Draper’s book, \textit{A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs} (New York: Touchstone, 1992).

\textsuperscript{160} After some private companies skimmed from profits off of the top. It should also be noted that many of the weapons were captured by the Revolutionary Guard of the Ayatollah, who was considered a terrorist by the United States. The Reagan Administration’s no negotiations with terrorists mandate took a hit in the scandal.
The first Boland Amendment was passed in 1982 (which said no interference by the U.S. in Latin America), and since its passage, Reagan continued to rationalize with the American people the reasons interventions in Latin America were necessary. In an address to the nation on May 9, 1984, Reagan was adamant about the threat of Communism in region: “If the Soviet Union can aid and abet subversion in our hemisphere, then the United States has a legal right and moral duty to help resist it.”\textsuperscript{161} The American people, however, were not to be swayed on this issue. Perplexed by his unusual inability to persuade the public and calling for better “education” on the topic, Reagan wrote in his diary, “Our communications on Nicaragua have been a failure, 90\% of the people know it is a communist country but almost as many do not want us to give the $14 million for weapons. I have to believe it is the old Vietnam syndrome.”\textsuperscript{162} After a meeting with Congressional leaders regarding the situation, Reagan wrote, “The meetings went well & I think I answered some of their worries. It’s apparent though that the lack of support on the part of the people due to the drum beat of propaganda ‘a la Vietnam’ is influencing some of them.”\textsuperscript{163} Although he was hopeful that he could persuade Congress, it was later clear that it, too, would not budge on this issue. Members of Congress felt as though they had not been asked about the invasion of Grenada; they had instead just been informed. They were attempting to ensure that did not happen again in Latin America.

Reagan bemoaned what he saw as Congress’s power play:

In the last ten years, the Congress has imposed about 150 restrictions on the President’s power in international diplomacy, and I think that the Constitution made it pretty plain way back in the beginning as to how diplomacy was to be conducted. And I just don’t think that a committee of 535 individuals, no matter


\textsuperscript{163} Brinkley, Reagan Diaries, 308.
how well intentioned, can offer what is needed in actions of this kind or where there’s a necessity. Do you know that prior to the Vietnamese War, while this country had four declared wars Presidents of this country had found it necessary to use military forces 125 times in our history?\footnote{Ronald Reagan, “The President’s News Conference,” \textit{Public Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1984}, (April 4, 1984): 464.}

It was a rhetorical question, but Reagan was making a sound, coherent point based on historical evidence. The United States’ diplomacy, according to him, could not function properly if Congress got involved in every little detail of foreign relations. It was simply impossible to consult the 535 members of Congress on everything that a nation such as the United States dealt with internationally. But, what President Reagan failed to comprehend was that Congress was doing exactly what the Founding Fathers had envisioned and what the Republic had attempted to achieve as a result of independence. War is costly (both in materiel and lives), time-consuming, and too large of a decision for one man to make; its effects, in some sense, had cost King George III the American colonies. By ensuring that hundreds of individuals’ opinions would have to be heard, the Founding Fathers made war the least likely form of diplomacy to succeed. Congress’s assertion of power on Nicaragua worked exactly as the system was designed.

When intelligence leaked that the CIA had been meddling in Nicaraguan harbors, the Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) wrote to CIA Director William Casey, “I am pissed off! . . . This is an act violating international law. It is an act of war. For the life of me, I don’t see how we are going to explain it.”\footnote{“Text of Goldwater’s Letter to the Head of C.I.A” \textit{New York Times}, April 11, 1984. The \textit{NYT} deleted the “pissed off” portion in their reporting, but the quote was verified in other media outlets.} In the appropriations of the Defense budget, Congress had been explicit about the Reagan Administration not helping the Contras.\footnote{“Making Continuing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 1985, and for Other Purposes,” H. Res. 648, 98th Congress, 2nd sess., October 12, 1984. Following the provisions on Nicaraguan funds, there is a section in
permission, and in effect, make his case as to why the intervention directly benefitted the United States. Reagan’s resolve was only strengthened, insisting that Congress was just making a power-play in attempts to stave off another Vietnam. Invoking the debate surrounding American troops in Lebanon following the bombing of the Marine barracks, Reagan stated, “A debate as public as was conducted here, raging, with the Congress demanding, ‘Oh, bring our men home, take them away.’ . . . It should be understood by everyone in government that once this is committed, you have rendered [our military] ineffective when you conduct that kind of debate in public.”

Public debate about the use of the military, according to Reagan, was unnecessary, even detrimental. This rationale was the antithesis to the ideas of warring at the country’s inception.

The Iranian Hostage Crisis, just a few years removed, was still fresh in the minds of the Reagan Administration when hostages were taken in Lebanon. The Administration had seen what Carter’s inability to free the hostages did to his public opinion numbers and his presidency; they were determined to handle this hostage crisis more effectively. So, when an opportunity presented itself to free the hostages (albeit under illegal terms), the Administration seized on the opportunity. The convoluted plot broke several laws Congress passed to impugn presidential authority, and it was clear that Reagan knew this. During the planning stages of the arms-for-hostage plan, Reagan wrote in his diary: “I would not even write it up in this diary what we are up to.”


which Congress says that the provisions will be negated by February 28, 1985 if Reagan presents them with a report of why the U.S. should fund the Contras’ efforts. In effect, Congress was giving Reagan the opportunity to make his case in an open, public debate. Ask Congress for assistance rather than inform them after the fact. Reagan did not take this offer.
DISCOVERY AND DENIABILITY

Congress eventually caught on that the Reagan Administration was somehow getting money to the Contras; the plot was so ill-conceived that it was only a matter of time. When asked, the Administration flat-out lied. National Security Advisor Bud McFarlane said, “None of us has solicited funds, facilitated contacts for prospective potential donors, or otherwise organized or coordinated the military or paramilitary efforts of the resistance.”\textsuperscript{169} After the Tower Commission concluded that the Reagan Administration had in fact traded arms for hostages, \textit{Time} published a scathing article criticizing Reagan:

\ldots [T]he President has consistently and vehemently denied that the U.S. was swapping arms for hostages, though the voluminous record assembled by the Tower commission leaves no question that that is what happened. \ldots The President who did not understand that arms-for-hostages swaps, in the commission’s words, ‘ran directly counter to the Administration’s own policies on terrorism’ is the same Reagan who had never admitted, probably even to himself, that his tax and spending programs were bound to result in gargantuan budget deficits.\textsuperscript{170}

Attorney General Ed Meese was the most successful in making sure that Reagan avoided impeachment. Meese stated that because the arms-for-hostages negotiations were facilitated by members of the National Security Council (not the CIA, DoD, or other agencies historically considered to be intelligence agencies), the law was not broken. According to Meese, the language of the Boland Amendment left a big loophole for the Reagan Administration.\textsuperscript{171}

\begin{flushright}

170. George J. Church, “Can He Recover?” \textit{Time}, March 9, 1987. What is meant by the Administration’s policy on terrorism is that Iran was on the United States’ list of known sponsors of terrorism. Reagan was a fierce advocate for not negotiating with terrorists.

171. There was no work-around for the violation of the Arms Export Control Act. An Act to Amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign Military Sales Act, and for Other Purposes. H. Res. 13680, 94th Congress. Under this act, the United States could not sell weapons to countries considered terrorists states; Iran was added to that list after the revolution in 1979. Israel was also required to report the transfer of U.S.-supplied arms to other countries; more specifically, the Legislative Branch. It did not.
\end{flushright}
Because the NSC had never been considered an intelligence agency, and the Boland Amendment only prohibited intelligence agencies from assisting the Contras, no one had violated the law.\textsuperscript{172}

Reagan may have been spared impeachment, but he certainly took a beating in the press and from his constituents. Future Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, at the time a Republican congressman from Georgia, would say, “He will never again be the Reagan that he was before he blew it. He is not going to regain our trust and our faith easily.”\textsuperscript{173} But, not everyone condemned Reagan for the scandal. In the minority report signed by four Republican Congressmen and two Republican Senators, author Dick Cheney wrote:

This history speaks volumes about the Constitution’s allocation of powers between the branches. It leaves little, if any, doubt that the President was expected to have the primary role of conduction of the foreign policy of the United States. Congressional actions to limit the President in this area therefore should be reviewed with a considerable degree of skepticism. If they interfere with core presidential foreign policy functions, they should be struck down. Moreover, the lesson of our constitutional history is that doubtful cases should be decided in favor of the President.\textsuperscript{174}

And it was not just Dick Cheney who supported the President and presidential prerogatives. The newly influential political faction, Neoconservatism, had cut its teeth in the Reagan White House. The Reagan Administration, with its anti-Communist fervor, assertions of presidential prerogative, and insistence on military build-ups, helped the Neoconservative Movement, which would influence American foreign policy for the next two decades, hone its ideas.

\section*{REAGAN AND THE NEOCONSERVATIVES}

\textsuperscript{172} Lee H. Hamilton and Daniel K. Inouye, “Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran/Contra Affair”, 496. Meese would later compare the NSC to the Department of Agriculture in his analogy.


\textsuperscript{174} Hamilton and Inouye, \textit{Iran Contra}, 469
As mentioned in Chapter One, the Neoconservative Movement has been defined by a myopic foreign policy agenda; in short, the expansion of American democracy. During the Cold War, the threat of Communism was the basis for their ideas, and in the Reagan White House, the basis for their influence. Writing for *Commentary Magazine* and published by American Enterprise Institute, the leading Neoconservative think-tank, columnist Jeane Kirkpatrick wrote in 1979 of the Carter Administration’s failures in diplomacy:

The U.S. has never tried so hard and failed so utterly to make and keep friends in the Third World. . . . Where once upon a time an American President might have sent Marines to assure the protection of American strategic interests, there is no room for force in this world of progress and self-determination. Force, the President told us at Notre Dame, does not work; that is the lesson he extracted from Vietnam. It offers only “superficial” solutions.\(^{175}\)

Kirkpatrick lamented the United States’ passivity in foreign affairs. She highlighted many of the key positions associated with the Neoconservative Movement: use of military force, dealing with the threat of an enemy, America’s role in the world, and the influence of Vietnam in America’s consciousness. Kirkpatrick obviously disagreed with Carter’s foreign policy platform, but her usage of those Neoconservative ideals gives some context for the movement as a whole. In an article entitled, “Strategic Parallels . . . And Perplexities,” she wrote, “Our world cannot resolve moral issues by submitting them to the judgment of dictators. The legitimacy of a military action must be judged by the morality of the situation, not by the Security Council.”\(^{176}\)

Advocating the use of the military to answer the world’s problems is one of the critiques many have of the Neoconservative Movement. The assumption that a strong military force can solve any problem does not hold up under stronger inspection, but that did not deter the Neoconservatives from pontificating that idea as an acceptable course of action. Reagan

---

seemingly approved of the Neoconservatives’ notions, highlighted by Kirkpatrick. Jeane Kirkpatrick served on his National Security Council, as well as his Ambassador to the United Nations. Those combative, direct foreign policy ideas were understood in the Reagan Administration’s fight against Communism.

It was not just the idea of military interventionism around the world or American superiority that Neoconservatives championed in the Reagan years. Reagan’s constant reliance on the military, coupled with Congressional backlash, also gave the Neoconservative Movement a cause around which they build a coalition: presidential prerogative. The Neoconservatives argued, like Reagan, that they understood what was at stake. Communism had to be stopped and America had to lead, not shirk from its global responsibilities. Congress was too weak, clunky, and knotty to address the issues with the ferocity they deserved.

At the annual American Enterprise Institute Dinner, former Deputy Secretary of Defense and co-founder of Hewlett-Packard David Packard spoke about the intersection of the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch in American politics, “There is no rational system whereby the executive branch and the Congress reach coherent and enduring agreement on national military strategy. . . . The absence of such a system contributes substantially to the instability and uncertainty that plague our defense program.” Effectively, Packard argued that the Executive and the Congress cannot both make decisions regarding use of the military. Instead of urging the branches to work together, he maintained that it was impossible. In 1986, while Reagan was insistent on keeping Congress uninformed about his dealings involving Iran and Nicaragua, this sentiment only added to the argument that the President was endowed with certain authorities. Logically, it is easier for one man to make the decision than it is for 535 people to agree; it was

The notion that Packard dismisses, however, is exactly the way the country was designed to
handle matters of war. Many people with differing, strong opinions should make the decision to
go to war to ensure all other alternatives have been considered.

Political scientist and professor emeritus at Georgetown University Walter Berns wrote at
the height of the Iran-Contra Scandal, “Congress often defines any action taken without their
approval as an abuse.”178 Berns’s analysis certainly glosses over the illegality of the Iran-Contra
Scandal, but his point of view was shared by numerous people. Just like Reagan was bemoaning
Congressional interference, Berns saw Congressional attempts to check presidential power as
petty. What Berns failed to realize is that Congress’s attempts to check Reagan in the late 1980s
was not pettiness or retribution; it was their job. A president, no matter how well-intentioned he
might have been, could not authorize illegal activities to circumvent Congressional will.

The number of writings done by the Neoconservatives during this time is striking. Using
the American Enterprise Institute as a database, some quick searches determined the kinds of
things written about during the Reagan years.179 What the numbers show is that the
Neoconservative Movement overwhelmingly wrote on the virtues of Reagan’s defense plans, but
when it came to controversial or misguided adventures, they were not apt to write about those.
More strikingly, adding to the arguments that Reagan’s popularity exploded in his post-


179. The AEI compiles articles from all sorts of publications. If one of their “scholars” is published in the
WSJ, it appears on their website, as was the case with Walter Berns. Setting the parameters of the search from
January 1, 1986 to January 1, 1990, there were only two results returned for the phrase “Iran-Contra.” For the entire
decade of the 1980s, the search term “Grenada” applied to only two articles. The same parameters of the decade
were set for the terms “Reagan Defense” and “Reagan,” which found 24 and 81 results respectively. These numbers
were found by using the advanced search option on the AEI’s website. Just to see how the “myth of Ronald
Reagan” theory held up, I also searched for the term “Reagan” with the parameters set to 01/01/1990 to 01/01/2014.
The search returned 2,625 results. It appears Reagan’s nostalgic popularity holds true in this instance.
presidency years, the Neoconservatives wrote significantly less about Reagan during his actual tenure; in fact, the writings on Reagan after he left office grew an astonishing 3,200 percent.

Neoconservatives were not just writing about Reagan’s policies; they helped shape them. As mentioned above, Jeane Kirkpatrick served in the Administration, but so did a number of notable Neoconservatives. Richard Pipes, Russian historian at Harvard, who wrote a hugely exaggerated article entitled “Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War,” served as Reagan’s Director of East European and Soviet Affairs on his National Security Council. Richard Perle, who had served with Pipes on the Team B Committee, was Reagan’s Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs. Paul Wolfowitz served as Director of Policy Planning, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, and Ambassador to Indonesia all under Reagan. Neoconservatives were not just idly watching the Reagan Administration. The tough-on-Communism restoration of American military superiority mentality of Reagan was further strengthened by his decision to fill his administration with those who shared those convictions. While speaking at the annual American Enterprise Institute dinner in 1988, Reagan joked—though it is telling—“Of course, it would be a massive understatement to say I see a lot of familiar faces in this room. In fact, for a minute I thought I had stumbled into the White House mess.” The Neoconservative influence would carry over into the next administration, and thus into America’s next conflict: the First Gulf War.

CONCLUSION

180. Team B refers to the committee the CIA commissioned to examine the Soviet Union’s capabilities. Their findings led to an increase in weapons production under Reagan. Anne Hessing Cahn’s, “Team B: The Trillion Dollar Experiment” should be consulted for more information about the specifics of the committee and their findings.

When Ronald Reagan first ran for President in 1976, he was determined to restore American pride in the post-Vietnam era. Taking hard-line stances on the ownership of the Panama Canal, the necessity of military build-up, Communism, and American global superiority, Reagan was a stark contrast to most politicians in the country, who had decided that Vietnam was the end of America’s military adventurism for an indefinite period of time. With his excellent oratory, likeability, and patriotic ideas, Reagan earned the presidency twice, creating the “Age of Reagan.”

What is more important about the Age of Reagan, however, is the tangible effect it had on America’s foreign policy directives. Reagan’s insistence on increasing military spending, lone decision to invade Grenada, and his Iran-Contra initiative set the precedent for the next two decades of foreign policy. Presidents were now more confident than ever before about their leadership role in matters of war. Congressional approval was no longer seen as necessary, but as an advantage. An official in the George H.W. Bush White House would later say during the First Gulf War that the administration would seek “support” from Congress, not permission. The decade of the 1980s gave administrations more power in war-making than any previous decade, and the fall of the U.S.S.R. only reinforced the idea that global military adventurism, which had been largely approved by the President, was a successful diplomatic strategy.

The successes of the Reagan Administration, arguably skewed by the fall of the Soviet Union, also led to an increase of power in the Neoconservative Movement. As the driving ideology of the Reagan Administration—the administration that had successfully defeated the Soviets—Neoconservative ideas gained more political capital and viability. Soon, as will be seen in the next chapter, more Neoconservatives gained prominent positions in administrations, especially in foreign policy circles. With the First Gulf War and the strategies for the post-Cold
War promoted by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, the Neoconservative Movement fundamentally changed the way America viewed its world standing and effectively changed the way the United States went to war.

The interventions in Latin America, which had been wholly supported by Neoconservatives, were not the only instances that would greatly affect the U.S.’ foreign policy objectives for the next two decades. The Latin American interventions did lead to an increase in presidential authority, while the simultaneous support for the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan to combat the Soviets and support for Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War would directly affect the country’s diplomacy for the next twenty years. In those cases, Neoconservatives supported the Mujahedeen’s fight against the U.S.’ Cold War rival and remained steadfast in their opposition to Iran, advocating for aid to be sent to Iraq. In an ironic twist, Neoconservatives would spearhead campaigns to invade both countries—Iraq twice—in the following years.

The Neoconservative Movement in the George H.W. Bush Administration did have its setbacks. There were critics and controversies as the Administration sought to engage in the first major land war since Vietnam and comparable in terms of the number of troops it would require. Requiring that type of military build-up did not come cheaply, and the attempts to dissuade the country from going to war were evident. The Abrams Doctrine, which had remained unaffected by the small skirmishes of the Reagan era, reached a new level of importance, while the War Powers Resolution continued to lose its viability. And it was in the George H.W. Bush White House that all three of the post-Vietnam reactions, detailed at the outset of this thesis, converged to permanently alter America’s foreign policy.
CHAPTER THREE

GEORGE H.W. BUSH, THE FIRST GULF WAR, AND MILITARY PRIVATIZATION

“If we sought congressional involvement [for the First Gulf War], it would not be authority we were after, but support.”

--Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor to President George H.W. Bush

INTRODUCTION

National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, in the quote above, is articulating the George H.W. Bush Administration’s thoughts regarding the powers of war after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. His sentiments reflect the culmination of the attitudes and policies discussed in the first two chapters of this thesis. The Neoconservative influence reached its strongest point during the H.W. Bush presidency. Though the political ideology has become more associated with the George W. Bush Administration, many of the ideas first proposed by Neoconservatives, such as military privatization, increased interventions abroad, and the expansion of American democracy have their roots in the 1990s, but their consequences extend beyond that decade.

The Abrams Doctrine, which was created to make decisions about going to war more difficult, saw its first practical applications during the First Gulf War between 1990 and 1991, as the Bush Administration, under the advice of General Colin Powell, was authorizing a contingent U.S. force of 500,000 troops to forcibly remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The Abrams Doctrine’s interweaving of Reservists into military forces made the Bush Administration consider all alternative routes before making the decision to take the country to war.

Not only did the Abrams Doctrine have its first uses in the Bush Administration, but it also saw its demise during the same time. With the idea of privatization of the military,

pioneered by then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, the Abrams Doctrine lost its potency because Reservists—as well as a large portion of active duty troops required for military action—were replaced by private contractors. In essence, the government could hire contractors to facilitate certain support functions that had been previously undertaken by soldiers, thus minimizing the number of U.S. forces being sent abroad in times of conflict.

The War Powers Resolution, which had begun to lose its viability in the Reagan White House, continued to be a hotly contested issue in the H.W. Bush Administration. Worried about the precedent that it might set if he asked for Congress’s permission to wage war against Saddam, President Bush attempted to find every escapable route in order to avoid the ask. Congressional officials were adamant that the President needed their permission, while Bush thought he needed their support. The power of the resolution was ultimately, in a roundabout way, adhered to, as explained below. In the end, the country did decide to go to war, and the debate surrounding the merits of that war was sound. But, the continued criticisms of the War Powers Resolution and its constitutionality only enhanced presidents’ disdain for it and their desire to circumvent it.

While the George H.W. Bush Administration engaged in the first major, post-Vietnam military operation, the three reactions to Vietnam—the topic of this thesis—were just as prevalent as they were at their inception in the 1970s. The Neoconservative Movement, the Abrams Doctrine, and the War Powers Resolution’s collision course with one another came, as it turned out, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990. As two of those ideas (the Abrams Doctrine and the War Powers Resolution) seemingly lost their effectiveness, Neoconservatism withstood the First Gulf War and made a resurgence in the early 2000s. But
those three separate, sometimes conflicting ideas, which arose from the loss in Vietnam, interacted with one another most explicitly in the 1990s.

GEORGE H.W. BUSH

When George Herbert Walker Bush was sworn in as the forty-first president of the United States in 1989, he had a lot to celebrate. Reagan’s Vice President’s bid for the White House was tainted by the Iran-Contra Scandal and Reagan’s near impeachment, but Bush won nonetheless. For all the criticisms of Reagan’s military adventurism around the world, and the legalities thereof, Bush won an impressive fifty-three percent of the popular vote and seventy-nine percent of the electoral vote.\(^{183}\) In his inaugural address, Bush highlighted the need for fiscal responsibility, a stronger dialogue between the Executive and Legislative branches, the virtues of American democracy, and even condemned cocaine.\(^{184}\) Claiming, “The day of the dictator is over,” Bush extolled the virtues of American democracy and how people all over the world were thirsting for freedom.\(^{185}\) Though he did not mention it directly, Bush was clearly referencing the internal problems of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The Soviets were fighting a losing war in Afghanistan, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany closed out 1989, Soviet satellites were revolting, and Mikhail Gorbachev was determined to finish his missions of glasnost (“openness”) and perestroika (“restructuring”). By the time Bush had been sworn in, it was clear to many in the international

---


\(^{184}\) Bush called for the American people to help eradicate drug usage in the country. He compared the first shipment of cocaine into the United States to a deadly bacteria. All of these points were exactly the same as his predecessors, and coupled with Bush’s demeanor, led \textit{Newsweek} to publish a story entitled “The Wimp Factor.” The Wimp Factor becomes important in the First Gulf War because Bush is viewed as too weak to lead the country into war.

\(^{185}\) George H.W. Bush, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1989, \textit{Public Papers of the President of the United States}. 

81
community that the Soviet Union’s days were numbered, and that America would emerge as the lone superpower of the Cold War. But, despite Bush’s invocation of peace, freedom, and the day of the dictator being over, a new threat to America arose in the guise of a former ally: Saddam Hussein. Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait marked the defining moment of the H.W. Bush presidency and started what became fourteen years of United States involvement with Iraq.

**IRAQI-KUWAITI RELATIONS AND THE BUILD-UP TO THE FIRST GULF WAR**

Following World War I, Great Britain dismantled the Ottoman Empire, a loser in the Great War. Iraq, which had been under the control of the Ottoman Empire, was turned into a colony of Great Britain; however, in 1921, Britain made the decision to carve Kuwait out of the Iraqi borders. The British had hoped to defeat the growing sense of Arab nationalism by restricting Iraq’s access to the Persian Gulf and its Arab neighbors. After Iraqi attempts to establish connections between Iraq and Kuwait failed (mainly as a result of British authorities vetoing any plans), the country of Kuwait became a symbol of humiliation for the Iraqi people. Shortly after the Second World War, the monarchy of Iraq was overthrown in a coup, and talks of returning Kuwait to Iraq were murmuring within the government. Despite those notions, in 1961, Britain declared Kuwait a free and sovereign nation.186

The inability for Iraq to access the Persian Gulf, coupled with humiliation and Kuwait’s oil fields, which could potentially add billions to Iraq’s economy, led Iraqis to seek alternate routes to the Gulf, without entering Kuwait. When Saddam Hussein became president of Iraq in 1979, gaining access to the Gulf was a top priority, but Kuwait, supported by the U.S. and Britain, would not allow him access because of its own oil interests. In 1980, the ambition of reaching the Gulf culminated in the Iran-Iraq War, which was also fueled by the longstanding

feud between the two nations. The United States, which had declared Iran an enemy after the U.S.-backed Shah was overthrown in 1979, supported Saddam in the conflict (though Reagan was selling arms to the Iranians in the Iran-Contra plot). The Iran-Iraq War lasted eight years and decimated the region. Saddam did not conquer Iran or reach the Gulf as he had hoped, and so he turned his attention to the tiny nation that used to be a part of his: Kuwait.  

Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. He had reiterated the claim that Kuwait had been a part of Iraq all along, so it was not an invasion, but a retaking of what was rightfully Iraq’s. Hussein later furthered his cause by saying that the Kuwaitis were stealing oil from Iraq, which he deemed economic warfare; therefore, the invasion was actually self-defense. Whatever his reasons were, the United States could not let this type of aggression stand, especially in the Middle East where its oil interests were vital to the national economy. In his address to the nation on August 8, 1990, President Bush remained steadfast in his support for Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and peace in the Middle East. Bush laid out his demands for Saddam, told the American people that he had directed troops to be stationed in Saudi Arabia, and that the world’s oil suppliers needed to increase production under the circumstances. This speech would also be the first time Bush leveled a comparison of Saddam to Hitler, stating that appeasement would not be a negotiating tactic. But Bush did not emphasize two important points as much as he might have: 1) he had a clear objective and strategy for Iraq, two things that had not always been established in the previous three decades of American foreign policy and 2)
Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait and subsequent acquisition of its oilfields did pose a significant threat to the western world and could potentially endanger the United States.

When Saddam’s Iraqi Army trounced the Kuwaitis in early August, Saddam gained control of twenty percent of the world’s oil supply.\(^{190}\) In a time in which the United States was not only using, but importing, more oil than ever before, one country controlling that much of the oil supply was a dangerous thing. There were not only concerns for the oil already under Saddam’s control, but some analysts thought that he might capture the Saudis’ oil next, which would have given him fifty percent of the world’s oil supply.\(^{191}\) In response to the invasion of Kuwait, President Bush was firm: “We will not let this aggression stand.”\(^ {192}\) Having dispatched parts of the 82\(^{nd}\) Airborne Division to Saudi Arabia, at the request of the Saudis, Bush and his cabinet began weighing their options.\(^{193}\)

The United Nations Security Council leveled economic sanctions against Iraq, but Saddam showed no signs of vacating Kuwait unless forcibly removed.\(^{194}\) Bush felt so strongly about the coalition he had built that he boasted, “Recent events have surely proven that there is no substitute for American leadership.”\(^{195}\) Saddam Hussein, on the other hand, was not


\(^{193}\) It should be noted that the Saudi King asked for American troops to be sent to the region, he was approached by Osama bin Laden and his “freedom fighters,” who said that they could defend the kingdom against Saddam Hussein, but King Fahd declined recognizing the ferocity of Hussein’s army. This rejection, coupled with foreigners in the Holy Land, added to bin Laden’s anti-American sentiments.


impressed by the West’s tactics. In an interview with CNN, Hussein said he was unmoved by the economic sanctions and made it clear that he had no intentions of leaving Kuwait. Hussein was also adamant that he was trying to avoid a military confrontation, but Israel, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and President Bush seemed to favor that path. Saddam then stated provocatively, “Whoever commits aggression against Iraq will be the party that shall turn out to be the loser.”

It was obvious that Saddam, despite his confessed intentions of trying to avoid war, was provoking the West. At the time, Iraq possessed the fourth-largest Army in the world and had proven to be quite efficient in its invasion of Kuwait; however, in a confrontation with the United States (which had been quite literally building-up and investing in its military for the last decade in preparation for something like this), Saddam was outmatched, whether he acknowledged it or not. And, so President Bush, equipped with the world’s greatest military machine, had to weigh the options and decide if forcibly removing Saddam from Kuwait was necessary. What accompanied that decision, though, was that he had to seek Congressional approval—a task virtually ignored since Vietnam, and a move with which many Neoconservatives within his administration disagreed.

**BUSH VERSUS CONGRESS IN THE FIRST GULF WAR**

While weighing the options of a full-scale military operation in the Persian Gulf, President Bush often complained of his stomach hurting. On several occasions, he would write in his diary that the pain in his lower gut was immense, and he would often need to take breaks throughout the day to lie down after taking a Mylanta. Bush’s sickness was surely a physical

196. Eric Schmitt, “Mideast Tensions: Hussein, in U.S. T.V. Interview, Rejects Kuwait Withdrawal,” *New York Times*, October 30, 1990. Hussein also stated in the interview that if economic sanctions were enough to make the U.S. leave Hawaii, then they would be enough for him to leave Kuwait.

manifestation of the pressures he felt as commander-in-chief on the eve of war. But what was more striking was the degree to which Bush felt the Persian Gulf was a personal undertaking. In his diary on January 13, 1991, Bush wrote, “It is my decision. My decision to send these kids into battle, my decision that may affect the lives of innocence [sic].”¹⁹⁸ Bush felt as though the military campaign against Saddam was his responsibility alone, not a decision for the country to make. And while those sentiments are understandable, the system of government implemented in the U.S., and how it decided on matters of war, made the decision a shared responsibility, not just Bush’s. Bush wrote this entry in his diary the day before signing a war authorization against Saddam and two days before the U.N. deadline for Saddam to leave Kuwait. Public Law 102-1 gave Bush Congress’s permission to aid the U.N. Resolution in using “all necessary means” to remove Saddam from Kuwait, but getting that permission did not come easily.

**AUGUST 1990 TO JANUARY 1991**

At a press conference on August 30, 1990, President Bush had set the goals high for what a war in the Persian Gulf could mean. “. . . I’d like to think that out of this dreary performance by Saddam Hussein there could be now an opportunity for peace all through the Middle East,” he said, fielding questions from reporters.¹⁹⁹ As the months went on and Saddam’s occupation of Kuwait showed no signs of ending unless military action was taken, Bush, a World War II veteran, charged Saddam with being “worse than Hitler.”²⁰⁰ “I mean, people on a dialysis machine cut off, the machine sent to Baghdad; babies in incubators heaved out of the incubators

---


and the incubators sent to Baghdad,” Bush claimed, citing news reports of the atrocities committed by Saddam’s army. Bush’s rhetoric was persuading the American public to his view. By the end of August, his approval ratings received a fourteen point boost.

The increased favor did not last long. A few months later, in October, the Bush Administration took quite a beating, both in Washington and in the public. The budget showdown with Congress during the week of October 6th caused Bush to write in his diary that “I think this week has been the most unpleasant, or tension filled of the Presidency.” Attempting to correct the budget deficits caused by the Reagan Administration’s increased military spending, Congress forced Bush to renege on his promise of “no new taxes.” The economic woes of the country, coupled with the public announcement of tax increases, decimated Bush’s approval ratings. The New York Times called his twenty-one point decline “one of the worst slides in public approval of any modern President.”

October continued to be a trying month for the President. As the situation in the Persian Gulf intensified, Congress adjourned for recess on October 28th and was not scheduled to reconvene until January; this put the Bush Administration in a precarious situation. Under the War Powers Resolution, it was required that Bush ask Congress for an authorization to use military force against Saddam; however, he could not ask if they were not in session. Sensing that the situation in the Middle East may deteriorate in their recess, Congress appointed a special, eighteen-member committee to consult with the President on Middle East matters. On the

---


203. Bush, All the Best, 480.

morning of October 30th, the Congressional team met with the President and presented him with a letter signed by eighty-one constituents, calling it an “expression of concern.” The text of the letter, however, unequivocally outlines its true intentions:

Recent reports and briefings indicate that the United States has shifted from a defensive to an offensive posture and that war may be imminent. We believe that the consequences would be catastrophic—resulting in the massive loss of lives, including 10,000 to 50,000 Americans. This could only be described as war. Under the U.S. Constitution, only the Congress can declare war.205

The Congressional leaders wanted to make certain that Bush, unlike his recent predecessors, could not keep them in the dark about his plans in the Persian Gulf. Unlike Vietnam, Grenada, and the dealings in Latin America, Congress was asserting its authority before a military operation, not playing catch-up afterwards. Bush rejected Congress’s attempt to stifle presidential prerogative, as did many of the Neoconservatives serving by his side. Arguing the troops he had dispatched to the Persian Gulf were in no imminent danger—which was a built-in loophole of the War Powers Resolution—Bush stated that he was well within his Constitutional right as Commander-in-Chief to shift forces.

Later that evening, Bush met with his advisors in the Situation Room of the White House to discuss strategies to expel Saddam. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell painted a stark picture for Bush: “Nearly double. About another 200,000 troops.”206 That, according to Powell and General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf, was how many additional U.S. troops would be needed to forcibly remove Saddam from Kuwait, bringing the total number of troops in the region to 500,000. It was certainly an


206. Marvin Kalb and Deborah Kalb, Haunting Legacy: Vietnam and the American Presidency from Ford to Obama (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2011), 141. Powell also made it clear that this was the number of troops needed to expel Saddam from Kuwait. If the President desired an invasion of Iraq and to depose Saddam, the number would increase.
inflated number, but that was Powell’s military philosophy. The Powell Doctrine had four parts: an overwhelming, disproportionate force, clear objectives, an exit strategy, and public support. As a Vietnam veteran, Powell experienced what happened when an Administration neglects these prerequisites; Powell was determined to present President Bush with the harsh realities of war.

In addition to the increase in ground troops, Powell asked for an additional five or six aircraft carriers to be shifted into the Gulf to show that the United States was serious. Powell later stated in an interview, “If this is important enough to go to war for, we’re going to do it in a way that there will be no question what the outcome will be.”

Bush, recalling that meeting, stated, “I did not want to repeat the problems of the Vietnam War, where political leadership meddled with military operations.” Powell also asserted that a military operation of this magnitude would depend on a call-up of the Reserves. Just as General Creighton Abrams had sought to accomplish with his restructuring of the Army after Vietnam, Powell conceded that the Reservists were an integral component for this incursion.

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, who was also Powell’s boss, was not in agreement with Powell’s suggestions. In his memoir, In My Time, Cheney wrote that “Listening to him made me think about how Vietnam had shaped the views of America’s top generals.” It was clear that Cheney and Powell were clearly not on the same “team,” as Cheney sometimes put

---


208. Kalb and Kalb, Haunting Legacy, 142.


it. In Cheney’s estimation, Powell was purposefully inflating the numbers to try to dissuade Bush from action. As adamant as Powell was that his estimates were not an effort to sway Bush’s thinking, he did address the issue in his memoir. While discussing his position on the political ramifications of his disproportionate troop call-ups and his reluctance for war, Powell wrote, “War is a deadly game; and I do not believe in spending the lives of Americans lightly.”

Often highlighting the mistakes made in Vietnam, Powell later said that he was perhaps “the ghost of Vietnam,” for the Administration, serving as a reminder what could happen if there were not careful consideration.

Cheney was not the only cabinet member to accuse Powell of having ulterior motives. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, surprised by the force size Powell was requesting, believed, “The military . . . had moved from reluctance to undertake an offensive operation at all to a deliberately inflated plan designed to make the president think twice about the effort.”

Though he has since publicly maintained that his call for an endgame of 500,000 troops in the Persian Gulf was not politically motivated, Powell’s plan certainly made President Bush reconsider military action.

RESERVISTS

The number of troops Powell requested put the United States in a position it had not been in since Vietnam. There had been plenty of military interventions undertaken by the United States since the 1970s—especially in Latin American countries—but 500,000 troops was an


214. DeYoung, Soldier, 200.
unheard of figure in the post-Vietnam era. More strikingly, Powell was not only asking for active duty troops; he was asking for Reservists, too. It was the Abrams Doctrine’s failsafe working. The restructuring of the Army in the 1970s made the decision to call-up 500,000 more difficult because it would involve the call-up of Reservists. As Powell told President Bush: “Sir, a call-up means pulling people out of their jobs. It affects businesses. It means disrupting thousands of families. It’s a major political decision.”

After the October 30th meeting and Powell’s 500,000 troop request, the decision of when to activate the Reserves became the paramount concern for the Administration. The congressional elections were held on November 6th, and many thought it was prudent to announce the mobilization afterwards. On November 8th, 1990, President Bush made the announcement: “I have today directed the secretary of defense to increase the size of the U.S. forces committed to Desert Shield . . ..” It was not a declaration of war; only Congress could do that. But it was an overt sign to Saddam that the United States was committed to his removal from Kuwait.

The announcement also signaled to the American people that the United States was preparing for war and in a big way. It was after Bush’s announcement that debate over the merits of the war began. As the New York Times argued, “After 14 weeks of proceeding virtually unchallenged at home, the United States policy in the Persian Gulf had become the focus of a national debate.”


THE DEBATE RAGES

Bush’s announcement of troop mobilization two days after the midterm elections had another pitfall in the war-making process, but a saving grace for the Administration. Besides its signal that war was imminent, it also meant that Congress was not going to reconvene until January, over two months after the call-up. What this effectively meant is that President Bush was solely in charge of the U.S. forces, waiting for Saddam to make a move in the Gulf. In the interim, however, politicians (Republicans and Democrats alike) and the American people were weighing in on the possibility of war. The debate quickly became intense, and several senators were calling for a special session of Congress to debate the merits of American involvement in Kuwait. Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), who served on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told the press that President Bush had “set the United States on a collision course in which Iraq will either withdraw from Kuwait or be forced to do so by military means.” Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) was more candid about Congressional responsibility: “Silence by Congress is an abdication of our constitutional responsibility and an acquiescence in war.” The Senator Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-ME) was unequivocal in his response to Bush’s plans stating that the President “has no legal authority, none whatever” to take the country to war and that “the Constitution clearly invests that great responsibility in the Congress and the Congress alone.”

As the debate raged on, it was clear, as Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Congressman Les Aspin (D-WI) stated, there was a “lack of consensus in the country


220. Rosenthal, “Senators Asking President to Call.”
about this policy.”221 In a meeting with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, the House Armed Services Committee grilled the Secretary about Congressional involvement in the decision-making process, to which Cheney reportedly replied, “How many of you really want to take a vote in advance on the use of force?”222 After no one on the committee raised his/her hand, they were satisfied with Bush’s promise that there would be no war without first consulting them.

It was not just the House Armed Services Committee that did not want to take a firm stance too early. Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole (R-KS) was concerned that all of the public debate surrounding how best to remove Saddam was detrimental to the cause: “How do we have open debate without sending the wrong signal to Saddam?”223 Congressman Henry Hyde (R-IL) was more pacifying to the President with his stance: “Congress are supposed to be leaders. We should be carrying the [President’s] message to the people.”224

President Bush and his Neoconservative-filled Administration were steadfast in their position: the President did not need Congressional authority to shift troops into the Persian Gulf. They were in no imminent danger, so the sixty days cap set by the War Powers Resolution, which had become a main point of contention, did not apply. And, Bush had announced the call-up on national television, effectively informing Congress of U.S. troops being deployed, albeit at the same time the entire country was informed. As National Security Advisor Scowcroft later recounted, “We were confident that the Constitution was on our side when it came to the


222. Zaldivar and Thompson, “Congress Unsure.”

223. Zaldivar and Thompson, “Congress Unsure.”

president’s discretion to use force if necessary. If we sought congressional involvement, it
would not be authority we were after, but support.”\textsuperscript{225}

Republicans and Democrats had differing opinions on what should be done in the Middle
East. It was the level of debate the Founding Fathers had hoped for when they framed the
Constitution to bestow the power of war with the Legislative Branch. Continuing throughout
November, the debate culminated in several members from the House of Representatives filing a
lawsuit against President Bush to try to prevent the country from going to war without
Congressional approval.

**DELLUMS VERSUS BUSH**

Forty-five members of the House, led by Congressman Ron Dellums (D-CA), the same
Congressman who testified that Grenada was not building a military airbase in 1983, filed a
lawsuit against President Bush asking that an injunction be placed on any military operations
against Saddam Hussein until Bush received Congressional approval. As Dellums’ fellow
Californian Congressman Don Edwards (D-CA) argued, “There is no necessity for quick action
here. We are not being invaded. There is no reason at all why the Constitution in this case
should not be honored. And that’s what this lawsuit is about.”\textsuperscript{226} Dellums reiterated Edwards’s
point, “War is a very solemn and sobering and extraordinary act and it should not be granted to
one person. . . . To do anything other than what we’re suggesting here is to undermine the
Constitution of the United States.”\textsuperscript{227}

\textsuperscript{225} Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 398.

\textsuperscript{226} Martin Tolchin, “Mideast Tensions: 45 in House Sue to Bar Bush from Acting Alone,” *New York
Times*, November 21, 1990.

\textsuperscript{227} Tolchin, “45 in House Sue.”
There was reaction from within the Administration, especially from Dick Cheney, who, like most Neoconservatives, had been advocating for presidential prerogative for two decades. Future Secretary of Defense and notable Neoconservative Donald Rumsfeld, Cheney’s mentor in the Ford White House, wrote in his 2011 memoir that in 1975, on the advice of an advisor, he had resolved not to “contribute to the erosion of presidential power on [his] watch,” later saying those words “left an impression on me, and, I suspect, on Cheney.” Cheney went on Meet the Press on November 18th, 1990 to defend the Administration’s position and tactics. Cheney told Garrick Utley, “I loved the Congress. I had served there for ten years. But I also had a sense of its limitations. . . . Putting a matter of the nation’s security in the hands of the 535 members of the U.S. Congress was a risky proposition.” Like President Bush had done previously, Cheney then compared what was happening in the Persian Gulf to the Second World War:

I take you back to September 1941 when World War II had been under way for two years. Hitler had taken Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and was halfway to Moscow. And the Congress, in that setting, two months before Pearl Harbor, agreed to extend . . . the draft for twelve more months, by just one vote.

The comparison of Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait and Hitler’s blitzkrieg through Europe is a debatable one; however, Secretary Cheney was quite adamant about the dangers of letting Congress decide on whether or not the United States should confront Saddam militarily. In a Congressional hearing prior to the war, Cheney was called to testify to make his case explicitly as to why President Bush did not need to seek Congressional approval. In a heated exchange with Senator Ted Kennedy, Cheney took a firm stance on the issue stating, “Senator, I do not believe the president requires any additional authorization from the Congress before committing

229. Cheney, In My Time, 204-205.
US forces to achieve our objectives in the Gulf.”

Cheney’s views left the Congressional committee stunned. Several times during the exchange, Senator Kennedy asked clarifying questions to make sure that there would be no doubts as to what Cheney was suggesting. Cheney later went on to argue that the United States had been engaged in military confrontations over 200 times in its history, and war authorizations were only passed for five of those instances.

In short, Cheney argued that the President had historically led on foreign policy and should continue to do so.

Soon after the Congressional hearings, Federal District Judge Harold H. Greene ruled on *Dellums v. Bush*. In his decision, Greene stated that he agreed with the petitioners that an invasion of Kuwait by several hundred thousand troops constituted a war. He acknowledged that the Constitution of the United States was unequivocal in this matter, citing Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 as a guiding statute for war-making. His judgment, however, stopped there. Though the Congressional leaders were seeking an injunction against President Bush to effectively tie his hands from invading Kuwait, Greene did not issue the injunction. He argued that the majority of Congress “is the only one competent to declare war, and therefore also the one with the ability to seek an order from the courts. . . . [U]nless the Congress as a whole, or by a majority, is heard from, the controversy here cannot be deemed ripe.”

What Judge Greene argued was two-fold: first, Dellums’s forty-five member caucus was not a majority of Congress, which would be required to obtain the injunction, and second, Congress needed to act as a majority in order to

---

231. Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region : U.S. Policy Options and Implications : Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., September 11, 13; November 27, 28, 29, 30; December 3, 1990, 701.


start or stop the invasion of Kuwait. What Judge Greene was effectively signaling to Congress was that it had the legal argument to stop the Bush Administration, but it needed to act together in order fulfill its Constitutional responsibility; the courts could not supplant Congressional authority.

THE 102ND UNITED STATES CONGRESS

Judge Greene’s ruling in December 1990 clearly defined what the 102nd Congress’s docket would look like when it convened in January 1991. U.N. Resolution 678, passed on November 29, 1990, gave Saddam Hussein a deadline to leave Kuwait: January 15, 1991. If Saddam had not vacated Kuwait by that time, the United Nations Security Council supported “all necessary means” to forcibly remove him.234 After the U.N. Resolution was passed, the Administration began to contemplate the need to seek similar authorization from Congress. National Security Advisor Scowcroft later wrote, “Once again we were faced with weighing the president’s inherent power to use force against the political benefits of explicit support from Congress.”235 Not only did the Administration contemplate Congressional approval, but so did Congress. Many agreed that since the U.N. had passed the resolution, it gave Congress what Congressman Henry Hyde (R-IL) called “desirable condition precedent” to debate the issue.236

Shortly before the Congress reconvened, President Bush still sought advice from his team on how the War Powers Resolution could be avoided if the 500,000 troops in the Gulf were sent into battle. In a memorandum addressed to White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray, President Bush wrote, “Without recognizing the constitutional validity of the War Powers Resolution, is

236. Zaldivar and Thompson, “Congress Unsure.”
there a way for the President to fulfill all his responsibilities to Congress . . . yet doesn’t tie the
President’s hands?”

Time was running out for Bush. Some Congressional members, such as Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA), were calling for a war authorization to be the first piece of legislation on the agenda for the new Congress. “The best time to debate this issue is before this country commits itself to war and not after. Our constitutional obligations are here and now,” Harkin said on the first day of the new Congress.

In early January, Congressional leaders met with President Bush to discuss a possible authorization. In the meeting, Senate leaders George Mitchell (D-ME) and Bob Dole (R-KS) both agreed that they would not put the resolution on the floor until January 23rd. The announcement of that decision was celebrated by the Bush Administration, but condemned by members of Congress. The outrage was understandable; Congressional leaders were proposing to discuss the possibility of a Congressional authorization eight days after the U.N. Resolution’s deadline to Saddam.

The American public was just as torn about going to war as Congress. Only 53 percent of Americans supported the United States expelling Saddam from Kuwait, according to a Gallup poll. New York Times journalist and Pulitzer Prize-winner Anthony Lewis was more direct about what was at stake if Congress kept avoiding the debate: “Congress in recent decades has

---

237. Bush, All the Best, 491-492.


239. Clymer, “102nd Congress Opens.”

240. David W. Moore, “Americans Believe U.S. Participation in Gulf War a Decade Ago Worthwhile,” February 26, 2001, Gallup, accessed March 12, 2015, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1963/amer...orthwhile.aspx. The 53 percent approval rating was only after the UN Resolution was passed. Prior to that, the approval rating for military action was 37 percent.
avoided its responsibility. We have come very far toward the monarchical Presidency that [the Founding Fathers] feared.”

**AUTHORIZATION TO REMOVE SADDAM**

In the end, Congress debated the merits of war a few days before the January 15th deadline to Saddam. On January 8th, 1991, President Bush sent a letter to Speaker Tom Foley (D-WA) asking both the House and the Senate to pass a resolution supporting U.N. Resolution 678. Arguing that this would send the clearest message to Saddam, Bush was not technically asking for a declaration of war. Instead, he was asking for Congressional support for the U.N.’s position. Nevertheless, this was the closest thing to a consensus that would be achieved. And, it did cause an open and public debate in Congress over the virtues of the intervention in the Gulf, just as the Founding Fathers intended. The debates were equally zealous from parties on both sides of the issue. When the votes were tallied, however, both the House and the Senate voted in support of the U.N. Resolution by votes of 250-183 and 52-47, respectively. The United States was going to war.

**THE FINANCIAL COSTS OF THE FIRST GULF WAR**

The Reagan era military budget had grown to an all-time peacetime high, while preparing for a fight that never came. When the dissipation of the Soviet Union was only a matter of time, there were constituents asking for that money to be invested into other domestic programs. In 1990, there were numerous opinions on how to limit the Pentagon’s share of the budget: Senator Ted Kennedy proposed a $210 billion cut in the defense budget over the next seven years;

---


Democrats proposed a five percent reduction in order to fund a tax cut for middle-class families; Republicans sought to use any extra money taken from the DoD to pay-down the deficit.  

Secretary of Defense Cheney, however, was not as willing to concede that there were cuts that could be made. In a speech to Princeton University students, Cheney argued that anyone who thought that significant Pentagon budget cuts were prudent was irresponsible, stating that critics “never supported a strong national defense,” going on to say, “[they think] there is some kind of big peace dividend here to be cashed in and to buy all the goodies everybody on Capitol Hill can think about buying.” In the end, Cheney’s objections were overridden. Between 1989 and 1991, the Department of Defense budget fell roughly eleven percent. Yet, there was a peace dividend.

“We could be so lavish with resources because the world had changed. We could now afford to pull divisions out of Germany that had been there for the past forty years,” Powell wrote in his memoir. That was the peace dividend that so many mayors, senators, and congressmen were scrambling to collect. Now that the Soviet Union no longer threatened America’s global objectives, the United States was able to move more freely in the world. There were cuts to the Pentagon’s budget—cuts the DoD more than regained in the following years—but those cuts only were the monetary portion of the peace dividend. The real peace dividend


244. John M. Broder and Melissa Healey, “Cheney Labels as ‘Hogwash’ Complaints about His Defense Budget Cuts Strategy,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 16, 1989. Many urban city mayors were seeking extra assistance from the federal government in the early 1990s. Many supported defense cuts in order to fund inner-city programs. The Chairman of the House Way and Means Committee Dan Rostenkowski told them, “There’s no money to pay for such programs. The peace dividend is already going to be swallowed.” Full *L.A. Times* article can be found here: “‘Peace Dividend’ Already Spent, U.S. Mayors Told,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 18, 1990.

245. Office of Management and Budget, “Historical Tables, Table 4.1, Outlays by Agency, 1962-2020.” It should also be noted that the 1992 budget increased by $25 billion.

was that the United States could unleash its military might without the same fears it had had in the previous four decades. Without the threat of the Soviet Union, the United States could undertake huge missions, sparing no expense; the First Gulf War was the first example of this.

The United States’ military dazzled in the First Gulf War. The ground assaults were over in less than 100 hours, and it had routed Saddam out of Kuwait within five weeks. It was the kind of military showing for which many within the Administration were hoping and one that Neoconservatives championed. Some argued that the spending undertaken by President Reagan might have really been worth it. If the United States could defeat Saddam’s Iraqi Army (fourth largest in the world at the time) with such ferocity and ease, the military ends did justify the spending means.²⁴⁷ But there was one expense in the First Gulf War that did take many within the Pentagon by surprise: the Reservists.

In the First Gulf War, around 180,000 Reservists were called to active duty. On the following page is a chart explaining each branch of military’s contributions more fully²⁴⁸:

²⁴⁷ It should be noted here, as previously stated, that the Pentagon’s budget did go up by $20 billion in the year following the Gulf War.

²⁴⁸ The level of detail contained within the charts is important when later discussing the privatization of the military.
Figure 3-1: Reservists in First Gulf War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>USAGE</th>
<th>PERSONNEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat (field artillery)</td>
<td>979</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>13,708</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Police</td>
<td>8,242</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply and Service</td>
<td>13,716</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>6,548</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>1,074</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>2,554</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>18,036</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS (augmentation)</td>
<td>25,138</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS (in preparation/CS, CSS)</td>
<td>20,181</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS (in preparation/combat)</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>123,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAVY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>7,731</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare</td>
<td>197</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Sweepers</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Sealift Command (MSC)</td>
<td>373</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Control of Shipping (NCS)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>245</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Support</td>
<td>2,173</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat SAR (HCS)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo Handling Battalions/Staff</td>
<td>644</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seabees</td>
<td>2,314</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ship Augment</strong></td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/Misc</td>
<td>635</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>15,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supply &amp; Service</strong></td>
<td>94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Refueling</strong></td>
<td>2,948</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Command &amp; Control</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intelligence</strong></td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Search and Rescue</strong> (SAR)</td>
<td>124</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS Augmentation/Training</td>
<td>10,467</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>25,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COAST GUARD</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Security (USA)</td>
<td>462</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Security (Middle East)</td>
<td>281</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS Augmentation/Training</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MARINE CORPS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS (augmentation/training)</td>
<td>5,189</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEF (augmenting/reinforcing)</td>
<td>16,840</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command &amp; Control</td>
<td>674</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>22,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIR FORCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Airlift</td>
<td>3,149</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Airlift</td>
<td>1,359</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>5,226</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Communications</td>
<td>169</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>1,582</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Police</td>
<td>606</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figure 3-1, Source: Table 1: Use of Selected Reservists in Operation Desert Shield, Stephen Duncan, “War Confirms Total Force Policy”
The Reservists contributed to Desert Storm in a big way, as General Colin Powell had intended them to do. The Abrams Doctrine ensured that the major war effort undertaken by the United States would disrupt civilian life as much as possible. Requiring the President to call-up 180,000 Reservists from their everyday lives, from communities all over the country guaranteed that the war could not be a burden to a small portion of the American people, as had been the case with Vietnam.

One of the consequences of such a large call-up, however, was that the United States had to pay for all of these Reservists to now be full-time, active duty servicemen. This meant that the government had to pay for health care, housing, salaries, day care for children, employer reimbursements, and a myriad of other expenses. The United States defense budget had been downsized since the Reagan era, and Congress was threatening to make further cuts. The Pentagon was faced with the decision of how to maintain American military superiority, but on a budget.

**PRIVATIZATION OF THE U.S. MILITARY**

In 1996, the Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Outsourcing and Privatization stated that “Department of Defense support infrastructure has remained largely impervious to downsizing” and that the United States should “implement an aggressive outsourcing strategy.” The Task Force had a grim prediction for what would happen if the United States did not find some way to cut certain parts of the defense budget: “Without such an initiative, DoD may not be able to procure the new weapons systems and technological edge

---

needed to ensure the continuing military preeminence of the United States in the coming century.\textsuperscript{250}

The Task Force made the argument that many conservatives with disinclination to bigger government had been making for decades: the private sector was simply more efficient. So confident was the Task Force in their predications that they said privatizing certain portions of the military could save the government seven to twelve billion dollars a year by 2002.\textsuperscript{251} What the Task Force emphasized in its report was that the United States’ military could hire private contractors to do certain non-combat jobs and pay a fraction of what it paid to active-duty servicemen. As Figure 3-1 illustrated on page 108, several of the Reservists functioned in key support roles—supply/service, medical, logistics—totaling tens of thousands of personnel. What the Task Force theorized was that instead of having Reservists serve in those inherently non-combat positions, the government could hire contractors, thus saving billions. There were several consequences to this privatization, albeit, some unintended, that became evident in the mid-to-late 1990s and beyond. This idea of privatization championed by the Task Force in 1996, however, had already gained traction in the Department of Defense in the early 1990s, under Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. But prior to this idea, Cheney was attempting to reduce the Pentagon’s budget through bureaucratic restructuring, not privatization.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DICK CHENEY, BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, AND REGIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY**

After the fall of the Soviet Union, there was a general consensus in Washington that there would be military downsizing, just as the United States had done after every major war. The defense budget did get trimmed in the first years of the Bush presidency, but these were strategic

\begin{enumerate}
\item[250.] DoD, “Outsourcing and Privatization,” 1A.
\item[251.] DoD, “Outsourcing and Privatization,” 1A.
\end{enumerate}
cuts. Dick Cheney, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz, and Colin Powell were determined to present programs that could be cut without severely affecting national security. As Powell later wrote, “I wanted to offer something our allies could rally around and give our critics something to shoot at rather than having military reorganization schemes shoved down our throats.”

The Defense Department’s new, post-Cold War strategy for America’s national security was presented to members of Congress on the same day that Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. In the meeting where the new plans and drawdowns were supposed to be discussed, Powell wrote, “But all we heard was, yeah, sure, right. But what’s going on in Kuwait.”

In the Defense Department’s official report entitled, “Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy,” it was clear that the collapse of the Soviet Union did not affect the way the Bush Administration, or its Neoconservative allies, viewed the world. As Cheney and the DoD saw it, “... [W]e can draw down out military force at a responsible rate that will not end up endangering our security,” something, he argued that had been done poorly in the past. The threat of the Soviet Union had ended, but there were other regimes in the world that sought that take its place that must be precluded.

The first concept Cheney introduced was restructuring the military’s “four pillars of capability” (readiness, sustainability, modernization, and force structure) into six pillars. The traditional modernization pillar was broken into two pillars: science and technology and systems

---

252. Powell, My American Journey, 424.

253. Powell, My American Journey, 463.


acquisition, both having areas of overlap. What was more important in Cheney’s restructuring, however, was the development of a new “infrastructure and overhead” pillar. Each of the existing pillars had overhead costs already built into their budgets, but now there was an entire section of the budget filled with overhead, a kind of rainy-day fund for the Pentagon. As Cheney argued, the restructuring was going to help “to reduce our cost of doing business and direct our shrinking resources to ensuring very high quality, ready forces and rigorous technical and doctrinal innovation.” What Secretary Cheney had done with his advent of the infrastructure and overhead pillar was give critics of the Pentagon’s budget a target at which to aim. Instead of cutting the funding to important, actual military-related programs, Congress could slash the overhead budget—without really affecting the budget or downsizing in a big way. The idea, on Cheney’s part, was politically genius. Congress could get their budget cuts in, while the Pentagon could continue to spend on its desired materials; it was a win-win for all parties involved. The restructuring of the military’s budget was not the only revolutionary idea during Cheney’s tenure. The outsourcing and privatization celebrated in the 1996 Task Force report was also pioneered by H.W. Bush’s Secretary of Defense.

LOGCAP

LOGCAP, or the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program, is one of the few government programs with a straightforward name; it quite literally means augmenting the number of military personnel with civilian contractors. The first LOGCAP contract, known as

256. This translated into cuts that could be made to the budget without really cutting the budget.

LOGCAP, as a program, had been created in 1985 and was used to a minimal degree in the late 1980s. The most prominent example is the military hiring contractors to work on petroleum pipelines in Southwest Asia. The first actual LOGCAP contract, and thus the military’s first widespread use of civilian augmentation, started in 1992.

259. Washington Post, quoted in Homer Duncan, *Bush and Cheney’s War: A War without Justification* (Bloomington: Traddford Publishing, 2006), 5. For the sake of full disclosure, Secretary Cheney became the CEO of Brown and Root’s parent company, Halliburton, which has been the subject of many conspiracy theories.


As the report concluded, the use of privatization has been fairly consistent in recent operations, accounting for half or more than half of the total forces. In the Balkans, about fifty percent of personnel were contractors. In the war in Afghanistan, the number of contractors increased to roughly fifty-five percent of the total force, and in Iraq, they accounted for a Balkans-like half.

The military’s reliance on private contractors in the Balkans did not go unnoticed by the American press. *Bloomberg Business* magazine wrote in 2003 that “… [I]t wasn’t until U.S. led NATO forces into Bosnia in 1995 that the entire private military industry came of age.”262 As the article goes on to state, the Army was limited by President Clinton’s decision to only call-up 4,300 Reservists, so hiring contractors was the only logical option. Political scientist P.W. Singer described the relationship between the U.S. military and Brown and Root Services as, “It is no exaggeration to say that where the U.S. military goes, so goes Brown and Root.”263

---


reliance on contractors, presented as a cost-saving measure, did have three significant, unintended consequences: misconduct of contractors, the financial costs of privatization not actually being cheaper, and the political implications of outsourcing military operations, leading to the ultimate demise of the Abrams Doctrine. Though each of these affected the United States’ foreign policy agenda respectively, the culmination of these three has called into question whether or not privatization of the military is the best way for the United States to execute its objectives abroad.

**MISCONDUCT OF CONTRACTORS**

Ben Johnston worked as an airlift mechanic in Bosnia, as an employee of DynCorp (a major beneficiary of government military contracts). After returning to the United States, Johnston became a whistleblower, speaking out against the conduct of government contractors in the Balkans. A lawsuit was filed on his behalf against his former employer claiming, “Johnston learned that employees and supervisors from DynCorp were engaging in perverse, illegal and inhumane behavior [and] were purchasing illegal weapons, women, forged passports and participating in other immoral acts.”

Johnston had several ethical concerns about DynCorp’s contractors, but none were more disturbing than the alleged misconduct with children. Johnston recounted a story of a middle-aged man, weighing 400 pounds, who had purchased a “sex slave.” The girl, as Johnston stated, could not have been more than fourteen years old. The prostitution was no secret on the base where the DynCorp employees were stationed. Johnston later claimed that the contractors were

264. Kelly Patricia O’Meara, “U.S. DynCorp Disgrace,” *Insight*, January 14, 2002. The article has since been removed from the *Insight* Internet archive. The article in its entirety can be found here on CorpWatch: http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11119. Johnston brought this issue to the attention of his supervisors, but was fired and later placed into protective custody by the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division until he could leave the Balkans.
in business with the Serbian mafia, who had been helping transport fresh girls into the base, and dispose of the girls when the contractors got tired of them.\footnote{265}{O’Merea, “US: DynCorp Disgrace.”}

The prostitution, sex trafficking, and other illegal activities did not go unnoticed, but they did go unpunished. According to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate in Bosnia, “Under the Dayton Peace Accord, the contractors were protected from Bosnian law which did not apply to them,” and that they knew of “. . . [N]o [U.S.] federal laws that would apply to these individuals at this time.”\footnote{266}{O’Merea, “US: DynCorp Disgrace.”} The statute of the Dayton Peace Accord stating that U.S. citizens were not subjected to Bosnian law, which extended to the DynCorp contract, made it nearly impossible for the perpetrators to be held accountable for their crimes. Bosnia could not prosecute them, and they had not broken any U.S. laws. Unlike U.S. active-duty servicemen who would have been court martialed for this conduct, the DynCorp employees were able to avoid punishment for their alleged misconduct.

As seen in Figure 3-2, an equal number of U.S. military personnel and government contractors served in Bosnia. Both the personnel and the contractors represented the United States in its efforts in the region. The U.N. had declared the war in the Balkans a human rights violation. Yet, despite the best intentions of the United States, the illegal acts of contractors only added to the human rights violations in the region, and the fact that no one could be prosecuted for their crimes only added to the disdain for the U.S. military in the region. A U.N. peacekeeper in the region, Kathy Bolkovac, reiterated Johnston’s claims of misconduct in the region, stating that peacekeepers—U.S. and U.N. alike—were trafficking young girls displaced by the war; she

\footnote{265}{O’Merea, “US: DynCorp Disgrace.”}

\footnote{266}{O’Merea, “US: DynCorp Disgrace.”} That judgment was later reversed, but after DynCorp had already conducted its own investigation and fired the employees they deemed to be involved. The Huffington Post wrote an article about the continued use of DynCorp by the US military and outlined the concerns raised in the Balkans about misconduct: David Isenberg, “The DynCorp ‘See No Evil’ Monkey,” \textit{Huffington Post}, February 10, 2012, accessed March 20, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/the-dyncorp-see-no-evil-m_b_1267479.html.
was later fired for her claims.\textsuperscript{267} It was not only the sex trafficking facilitated by contractors that became evident in the Balkans, but the financial costs of privatization also became clear.

**IS PRIVATIZATION REALLY CHEAPER?**

One of the main thrusts for privatizing certain portions of the U.S. military was that it would be a cheaper, more cost-effective approach. Many conservatives argued that the private sector had always been better at innovating at a lower cost. While reporting on the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, reputable sources like the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and even Congressional reports cited volumes of articles, lawsuits, and audits pertaining to private companies overcharging the Department of Defense. Headlines like “U.S. Sees Evidence of Overcharging in Iraq Contract,” or “Halliburton Overcharged $108 Million, Report Says,” ran in the *New York Times*.\textsuperscript{268} The *Washington Post* published articles entitled, “Audit Finds That Iraq Contractor Overcharged for Repair Parts,” and “Army Contracting Criticized.”\textsuperscript{269} And, Ben Johnston, who had been deeply disturbed by the sexual forays of DynCorp’s employees, was just as disturbed by the way the contractors worked.

“There was this one guy who would hide parts. . . . They’d have us replace windows in helicopters that weren’t bad just to get paid,” Johnston told the reporter. Moreover, Johnston claimed that DynCorp would hire teenagers, fresh out of high school, who knew nothing about basic mechanics in order to ensure the process would take longer, costing the government more.

The same 400 pound man who was accused of having sex with the fourteen year old girl,

\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}
Johnston said would often fall asleep; one time “with a blowtorch in his hand and burned a hole through the plastic on the aircraft.”

Despite the growing concerns of fraudulent charges to the government, privatization of military tasks still continued to increase. Figure 3-2 demonstrates that the number of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan constituted more than half of the total U.S. force. And the renewal of LOGCAP contracts in the past decade increased, both in service providers and in dollar value. LOGCAP II, valued at $102 million and lasting from 1997 to 2001, was awarded solely to DynCorp, even after the allegations of misconduct and overcharging in the Balkans. When the Global War on Terror began in 2001, Kellogg, Brown, and Root Services was awarded LOGCAP III, valued at $35.7 billion. LOGCAP IV, signed in 2007 and in effect until 2017, was awarded to KBR, DynCorp, and Fluor International at a value of $2.4 billion. The billions of dollars spent on private contractors steadily increased—peaking with LOGCAP III—since the introduction of privatization of the military in the early 1990s, with 2002 being the first year in which more than half of the Pentagon’s budget was earmarked for contracts. Below is a graph representing this shift:


Figure 3-3: Total Contract Spending by Department of Defense in Constant 2010 Dollars

The bottom portion of each bar graph represents the total dollar amount the DoD spent on contractors. Since 1990, which saw $158 billion spent on contractors, the amount has more than doubled and has accounted for more than half of the overall DoD budget ($368 billion in 2010). It is impossible to determine how much money has been saved by using these defense contracts, because that would be trying to analyze something that did not happen; however, there have been reports that the privatization of the military has cost the taxpayers billions of dollars without returns.

In the Senate Appropriations Committee’s report on “Examining the Effectiveness of U.S. Efforts to Combat Waste, Fraud, Abuse, and Corruption in Iraq,” it was determined that the government awarded DynCorp a $1.4 billion contract and had paid $1.2 billion of it. In the report, it was reported that the government agencies “did not know specifically” what had been
received for the billion-dollar investment.\textsuperscript{272} The \textit{Washington Post} reported that a special congressional auditor had found that DynCorp had overbilled the U.S. government $50 million more than they had proposed in their contract.\textsuperscript{273} Countless stories have been written discussing the financial misconduct of companies dealing with the Department of Defense. What is most telling, however, was what the Defense Department itself determined in 2012.

Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta presented a plan in 2012 that would cut costs in the Pentagon’s budget over the next ten years, saving $450 billion (even a trillion dollars, if the cuts increased).\textsuperscript{274} Included in his presentation was the chart below showing defense expenditures:

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
The Department of Defense determined, as seen by the text in the top portion, that the cost of defense contractors is where the Pentagon could save the most money: “The savings are here.” The chart also says, “Its growth has been unchallenged and often we don’t even know what is in the base.” When realizing that over half of the Pentagon’s budget (52% in 2010) cannot be fully accounted for, the logic of the cost-effectiveness of military privatization is questionable; however, the Pentagon’s recognition that this section of the budget is becoming “increasingly unaffordable” lends credence to the argument that the privatization is not as fiscally sound as it had once been proposed to be. Despite the disturbing accusations of sexual misconduct by contractors and the doubts of its financial soundness, privatization of the military presented its most profound consequence: its ability to make the decision to go to war easier, and its inherent ability to circumvent the Abrams Doctrine.
THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF PRIVATIZATION

Under the Abrams Doctrine, which had been employed during the First Gulf War, it was impossible for the United States to go to war without a call-up of the Reserves, affecting the lives of countless families all over the country, as seen by the 180,000 Reservists serving in that war and General Powell’s assertion that it was a “major political decision.” It was reasoned that the Reservists were needed to serve in support functions of the military; they were the ones building barracks, driving supplies, and cooking meals. Yet, when the U.S. government decided to outsource those tasks to private companies, in order to save money, the need for activating the Reserves disappeared. Now, the number of families affected would decrease, communities would not be as disrupted, people would not be missing from their jobs. Those staple, in-your-town, influential community members would not have to be called to active duty; their support functions were now undertaken by companies. The privatization of the military effectively brought with it the antidote to the Abrams Doctrine.

Take, for example, the number of contractors serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, outlined on the following page:
Before the privatization of the military, the number of contractors serving would have been negligible. Under the Abrams Doctrine, those hundreds of thousands of contractors would have instead been Reservists. The number of lives disrupted by the war would have been in the millions; that was the point. Privatization of the military brought with it less noticeable warfare. The entire country no longer had to mobilize for war, because private companies shouldered most of the burden, while hiring nationals to augment their numbers. For example, in March 2013, of the 107,796 contractors serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, 74,689 were citizens of countries other than the United States. What that figure translates into is that nearly 75,000 Americans (active duty troops, Reservists, or American citizens in general) were not needed for
those excursions, thus minimizing the effects of war among the general population. As Major General Camille Nichols argues, “Deploying LOGCAP or other contractors instead of military personnel can alleviate the political and social pressures that have come to be a fact of life in the U.S. whenever military forces are deployed.”275 What had started as the idea of Dick Cheney and his colleagues at the Defense Department now accounted for a majority of the defense budget twenty years later.

While the First Gulf War and privatization of the military had seemingly negated the Abrams Doctrine, the third reaction explored throughout this thesis continued to greatly influence America’s foreign policy agenda: Neoconservatism. The calls to assert America’s military might abroad sharply defined Cheney’s Regional Defense Strategy of the ‘90s. In the H.W. Bush Administration, the Defense Department was filled with Neoconservatives, who continued to be influential figures in American foreign policy long after the early 1990s. By the end of the George H.W. Bush’s presidency, Neoconservatives’ assertion that the U.S. must spread its democracy abroad became the guiding tenet of American foreign policy for the next two decades.

NEOCONSERVATIVES AND THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE GEORGE H.W. BUSH AND BILL CLINTON ADMINISTRATIONS

As discussed in the first two chapters, the Neoconservative Movement’s formative years were in the late 1960s and 1970s. During the Reagan Administration, Neoconservatives began to have an active, tangible role in government, specifically in tailoring foreign policy ideas, with respect to Grenada, Iran-Contra, and presidential prerogative. As Reagan’s Vice President, George H.W. Bush filled his administration with several familiar faces, after becoming

President. Dick Cheney, a Congressman from Wyoming during the Reagan Administration, was a staunch supporter of presidential prerogative, emphasized in his Minority Report to the Iran-Contra hearings. As H.W. Bush’s Secretary of Defense, Cheney only furthered his views of presidential prerogative, specifically in support of Bush’s plans for the Persian Gulf. The Regional Defense Strategy pioneered by Cheney’s Defense Department reads very much like a Neoconservative foreign policy agenda. Arguing for the benefits of U.S. leadership abroad, the guide states, “... [the strategy will] enable the U.S. to lead in shaping an uncertain future so as to preserve and enhance this strategic depth won at such great pains.”

It was not just Cheney who advocated for this type of American leadership in the coming decades. The Regional Defense Strategy is often called the “Wolfowitz Doctrine,” named for Cheney’s Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz. Paul Wolfowitz made a name for himself in the Reagan Administration serving in ambassadorships and in a position with the State Department. What became evident in the first Bush Administration was that Wolfowitz and Cheney were “on the same team.”

Surprisingly, however, many Neoconservative think-tanks did not support the Bush Administration’s foreign policy agenda. Arguably, the Neoconservative Movement lost much of its gusto at the end of the Cold War. The Soviet Union was extinct, meaning America’s number one enemy was defeated. Many of the tenets of Neoconservative foreign policy, as seen in Chapter One, only have merit if American democracy is juxtaposed against a threat; this meant that because the Soviet Union was no longer a risk, the movement’s central foreign policy focus became irrelevant.

The dissolution of the U.S.S.R., coupled with the emphasis of scaling-back the post-Cold War defense budget, gave the impression that the United States’ priority was shifting to the

---

domestic agenda. As highlighted in this chapter, there were many politicians urging for the so-called “peace dividend” to be spent on domestic programs—i.e., education, infrastructure, healthcare. This shift in priorities negated the main crux of the Neoconservative argument. As the Neoconservatives were seemingly losing their political capital in Washington because of the Cold War’s end, Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait became their opportunity to reestablish their preeminence on foreign policy.

**NEOCONSERVATIVES AND THE FIRST GULF WAR**

With his invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein became America’s major enemy in the post-Cold War era. It was also the first opportunity for Neoconservatives to demonstrate how their foreign policy ideas could be implemented after the fall of the Soviet Union. The removal of Saddam from Kuwait was a hotly contested issue in America, but once the decision was made to expel Saddam from Kuwait, but not remove him from power, the Neoconservative Movement attacked the Bush Administration’s approach.

For Neoconservatives, the decision of the Bush Administration not to remove Saddam from power was a mistake. One of the more common suggestions of Neoconservatives was to empower the Iraqi people to rise up against Saddam, which Bush later did. In a speech to the American Academy for the Advancement of Science, President Bush urged the Iraqi people to depose Saddam before an invasion: “. . . [T]he Iraqi military and the Iraqi people [must] take matters into their own hands, to force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside.”

Renowned Neoconservative commentator Norman Podhoretz, however, criticized Bush’s lack of

---

exploitation of the Iraqi people’s sentiments, stating that Bush had called for the Iraqi people to mobilize against Saddam, but did nothing to effect that change.278

The decision not to remove Saddam from power created a schism within the Neoconservative Movement. The coalition’s overwhelming victory, led by the United States, further cemented the Neoconservatives’ belief that American leadership was the best in the world. Despite the victory, many Neoconservatives were unhappy with the lack of finality in the mission. In a speech in 1992, Dick Cheney, who became an outspoken advocate for Saddam’s removal in 2003, stood by the Administration’s decision to not overthrow the despot. “. . . I think we got it right, both when we decided to expel him from Kuwait, but also when the president made the decision not . . . to take over and govern Iraq,” Cheney claimed.279 Wolfowitz reiterated Cheney’s assessment: “A new regime would have become a [U.S.] responsibility. Conceivably, this could have led the U.S. into a more or less permanent occupation of a country that could not govern itself, but where the rule of a foreign occupier would be increasingly resented.”280

What is ironic about Cheney and Wolfowitz not supporting a regime change in Iraq during the First Gulf War is two-fold: one, they had created the Regional Defense Strategy, which has decidedly called for instances such as this, and two, they both strongly advocated Iraq’s regime change in the early 2000s. But these two men represent a larger constituency.


Neoconservatives’ writings further illustrate the differing viewpoints on American foreign policy in the 1990s.

NEOCONSERVATIVE WRITINGS OF THE 1990S

The American Enterprise Institute database reveals strikingly similar results about the First Gulf War as it did in the Reagan Administration in Chapter Two. The number of writings done by Neoconservatives during the First Gulf War pertaining to Saddam Hussein is merely three and the “Gulf War” returns four results, only two of which have any meaningful relevance to the First Gulf War.281 The number of writings on both subjects, as was the case with Reagan, exponentially increased after the actual events were over.282 What the numbers highlight is a great contradiction in the Neoconservative ideology. Undoubtedly full of ideas, Neoconservatives often wait until a controversial event or policy is over to defend or condemn its merits, as seen by this inquiry and by the Reagan era search.

After Bush lost the election to Bill Clinton in 1992, Neoconservatives faced another obstacle. They had struggled to find their movement’s niche after the fall of the Soviet Union, and now they were out of power for the first time in over a decade. The First Gulf War was a public relations godsend, the idea of military privatization found refuge in the Clinton Administration, and America’s military continued to be the standard all over the world. By 1992, the Neoconservative ideology had left its indelible mark on American foreign policy and politics. There was a concern among Neoconservatives, however, as to what would happen once they no longer dictated America’s foreign policy agenda.

281. As was the case in Chapter Two, I set the parameters of the search to a specific time period. For the Gulf War and Saddam Hussein search, I set the dates January 1, 1990 (months before Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait) to December 31, 1991 (months after the U.S. victory). The two articles worth noting on the Gulf War are J. Gregory Sidak’s “To Declare War,” and Douglas Besharov’s “Operation Domestic Storm.”

NEOCONSERVATIVES AND BILL CLINTON

When Bill Clinton became President, many Neoconservatives left political office. Clinton, in his First Inaugural Address, did not shirk America’s responsibilities abroad, but he did make it clear that his administration’s focus was on domestic affairs. “Raised in unrivaled prosperity, we inherit an economy that is still the world’s strongest but is weakened by business failures, stagnant wages, increasing inequality, and deep divisions among our own people,” Clinton stated, highlighting the challenges the country faced.\footnote{283} Clinton’s speech was remarkable in that it was the first time in fifty years that a President did not have to address the threat of Communism during his inaugural address.\footnote{284} As the focus of the Clinton Administration shifted to the domestic, the Neoconservative influence dissipated. Dick Cheney left office and became CEO of Halliburton. Paul Wolfowitz worked at Johns Hopkins University during the Clinton presidency. The authors of the Neoconservative-styled Regional Defense Strategy were no longer controlling America’s defenses. Although Neoconservatives were out of power, it did not mean that their ideas were not being used.

Clinton relied heavily on Cheney’s privatization of the military. Pulitzer Prize-winning Professor of Sociology Paul Starr notes that privatization is employed by Neoconservatives as a political strategy to shift the burden from the government; therefore, Clinton’s use of privatization meant that elements of Neoconservatism were still influential, even when Neoconservatives held no prominent roles.\footnote{285}

\footnote{283. William Jefferson Clinton, “First Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1993, Public Papers of the President of the United States.}

\footnote{284. Clinton did address Communism, but its defeat, not its threat.}

The Neoconservatives did not let their intermission from office mark the end of their opinions on the issues. It is no coincidence that many prominent Neoconservative groups were formed during the period between Bush Administrations. The Project for the New American Century (PNAC) is possibly the most well-known, Neoconservative organization formed at this time. Many PNAC founders, like Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Douglas Feith, and Paul Wolfowitz, later served the George W. Bush Administration in prominent foreign policy positions, often advocating the same principles listed in the PNAC founding documents.

**PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY AND ITS FOUNDERS**

Founded in 1997, PNAC sought to “promote American global leadership.” In the organization’s Statement of Principles, which was signed on June 3, 1997, PNAC’s founders explicitly attacked the foreign policy agenda of President Clinton, calling his policies “incoherent.” Republicans and Democrats were both subject to criticisms in the document, because both parties, in the founders’ views, had in one way or another allowed America’s superiority to fall. The Clinton era cuts to the defense budget, PNAC claimed, had hindered America’s ability to lead and halted American advances in global leadership. It was not only their present that Neoconservatives were concerned about: America’s future preeminence was also at stake.

“. . . [W]e are jeopardizing the nation's ability to meet present threats and to deal with potentially greater challenges that lie ahead,” PNAC’s founding principles argued. As seen in Chapter One, the Neoconservative Movement gained a reputation for seeking out real and

---


287. The Project for the New American Century.
perceived threats abroad. It was clear that this notion was shared by PNAC’s founders. It was also evident that PNAC supported the Reagan Administration’s Cold War strategy, advocating:

We seem to have forgotten the essential elements of the Reagan Administration's success: a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States’ global responsibilities.\(^{288}\)

The ideas of the Reagan Administration and their influence on the end of the Cold War can be debated. What is important, however, is that PNAC not only thought that the Reagan Administration’s foreign policy agenda was successful, but that it should be emulated.

This admiration for the Reagan Doctrine brings with it several challenges. First, the world’s political climate had changed dramatically since the Reagan Administration. The Soviet Union no longer deterred American foreign policy, and there was no new rival that presented a comparable threat. Many of the tenets of Reagan’s foreign policy were rendered irrelevant after the Soviet Union’s collapse: no longer could deficits caused by military spending be justified by a Soviet threat, and America no longer had to worry about its “sphere of influence” because it was the lone superpower. Secondly, the end of the Cold War had shifted America’s focus to the domestic, as seen by the calls for reforms in the early ‘90s and the cuts in the Pentagon’s budget to fund those reforms. Those key, drastic changes in the world did not deter PNAC from advocating the merits of having a global military presence.

In the conclusion of its Founding Principles, PNAC offered its four, clear objectives for American foreign policy: we need to increase defense spending significantly; we need to strengthen our ties our democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values; we need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad; and we need to

\(^{288}\) The Project for the New American Century, About PNAC.
accept responsibility for America’s [role as a superpower]. Acknowledging that these principles had fallen out of fashion in the post-Cold War era, PNAC maintained that they were the only way to ensure America’s prosperity in the future. Additionally, PNAC published its seminal foreign policy guide, “Rebuilding America’s Defenses,” arguing that cuts in defense spending would be detrimental and that American troops should be stationed abroad.

PNAC became most famous during the Clinton Administration for its letter to the President regarding Saddam Hussein. Sent on January 28th, 1998, the letter urged President Clinton to change his unsuccessful policy towards Iraq. “[Your] strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power,” the letter stated, though many of its signatories defended their decision not to remove Saddam from power just eight years earlier.

Arguing that the U.N. inspectors in Iraq and the coalition formed in the First Gulf War were no longer effective in deterring Saddam from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, PNAC advocated a much more aggressive policy towards Iraq, offering its full support to Clinton should he heed their warning. Of the eighteen people who signed the letter, eleven later served in the George W. Bush Administration, and its subsequent removal of Saddam Hussein from power in 2003: Eliot Abrams (Deputy National Security Advisor for Global Democracy); Paula Dobriansky (Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs); Zalmay Khalilzad (U.S. Ambassador to U.N., Iraq, and Afghanistan); Peter Rodman (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs); Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense); Paul Wolfowitz (Undersecretary of Defense); Richard Armitage (US Deputy Secretary of State);

289. The Project for the New American Century.


Jeffrey Bergner (Assistant Secretary of States for Legislative Affairs); John Bolton (US Ambassador to the United Nations); William Schneider, Jr. (Chairman of the Defense Science Board); Robert Zoellick (US Deputy Secretary of State). These appointments represented the culmination of the Neoconservative Movement’s influence, an influence that had been building since the Vietnam War.

CONCLUSION

The George H.W. Bush presidency was, for all intents and purposes, the amalgamation of the three reactions to the Vietnam War outlined at the onset of this thesis. The First Gulf War, which was the country’s first post-Vietnam, major military operation, brought with it several challenges to the Abrams Doctrine and the War Powers Resolution. The Administration wanted to limit the number of Reservists serving in the Gulf, and sought to take the country to war without the implementing the Abrams Doctrine—a strategy eventually overruled following General Colin Powell’s stark request for 500,000 troops, Reserves included. It was not until the privatization of the military, a concept first pioneered by Neoconservatives in the Defense Department in the 1990s, that the Abrams Doctrine’s objectives were negated by augmenting a fighting force with civilian contractors, thus limiting the number of troops needed for war.

The War Powers Resolution saw its constitutionality challenged repeatedly since its inception, but the ferocity with which it was defended in the months prior to the First Gulf War was admirable. Congressional leaders sought to reestablish themselves as the war-making branch of government, and eventually debated the merits of going to war in the Middle East. Although an authorization for war was not technically passed, the system designed by the Founding Fathers had worked: many opinions, arguments, and people were heard and, through the votes of elected officials, the country decided to go to war. The War Powers Resolution,
despite its inherent flaws and written-in loopholes, was adhered to for the First Gulf War, much to the chagrin of the Bush Administration. Later administrations continuously inhibited the Resolution’s potency, but it had effectively served its purpose for the Persian Gulf crisis.

Unlike its Vietnam-era counterparts, the Neoconservative Movement came out of the H.W. Bush Administration stronger. Although removed from power with the election of President Clinton, Neoconservative ideas were still frequently used; most notably, the privatization of the military, seen by the increased use of contractors in the Balkans. The Neoconservative influence continued to shape America’s foreign policy agenda arguably more so than any other political ideology during this time. And their repeated, persistent calls for American military superiority were accepted by the George W. Bush Administration and its subsequent War on Terror. While the Abrams Doctrine and the War Powers Resolution faded from the foreign policy sphere, the ideology that had formed in response to the loss in Vietnam had fully recognized its goals by the end of the twentieth century.

In the George H.W. Bush Administration, Neoconservatism, the Abrams Doctrine, and the War Powers Resolution had fully interacted with one another during the First Gulf War. While their inception was a result of the Vietnam War, their true test came nearly twenty years later. After being thoroughly tested in the early 1990s, only one emerged stronger than ever: Neoconservatism. The War Powers Resolution continued to be contested, and the Abrams Doctrine was no longer applicable because of military privatization. The two ideas arising in the post-Vietnam era to prevent the country from going to war had been defeated, while the ideology supporting military interventions abroad flourished. And it is this failure of two and success of one that has guided U.S. foreign policy most significantly in the last fifty years.
CONCLUSION

In the post-Vietnam era, the politics of war in America have changed significantly. It was out of that war’s failure that three reactions emerged to directly shape America’s foreign policy for the next five decades: Neoconservatism, the Abrams Doctrine, and the War Powers Resolution. The culmination of these three ideas and policies in the George H.W. Bush Administration was not an anomaly; the United States’ political landscape had shifted in such a way that their interaction with one another was inevitable. Their collision course was set into motion when Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964.

As seen in Chapter One, Lyndon Johnson’s authorization to use military force in Vietnam cultivated several domestic reactions: many Americans were outraged by the war’s seemingly endless nature; casualties of United States soldiers and Vietnamese citizens became the impetus for the antiwar movement in the late 1960s; and the war began to fracture America’s political parties, as some argued for the war’s end, while others maintained that the United States should stay the course. As the war’s failure became apparent, the arrival of a new political philosophy, Neoconservatism, gave the arguments surrounding America’s military adventurism a new sheen.292

While the war was becoming increasingly unpopular domestically, Neoconservatives’ arguments that the United States should continue its excursions in Vietnam catapulted them into the national spotlight. Though their ideas and arguments were not enough to prolong the conflict, they had carved out a political niche that would later find a home in the Reagan Administration, as explained in the latter part of Chapter Two. Arguing that the United States should and must promote its democracy throughout the world—often facilitated by military

might—Neoconservatives maintained a position that had fallen out of mainstream politics in the early-mid 1970s, but was reinvigorated by the anti-Communist fervor of the Reagan era. With its promotion of American superiority, the Neoconservative Movement eventually gained massive success, shaping foreign policies since the 1980s. What made Neoconservatism unique, however, is that it argued for the exact opposite approach taken by its Vietnam-era counterparts.

Highlighted in Chapter One, the Abrams Doctrine, named for U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams, who had served as commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam from 1968-1972, sought to prevent another military excursion like the war in Southeast Asia. Arguing that President Johnson’s decision not to call-up the Reserves for the war in Vietnam removed the conflict from the American consciousness too much, Abrams made Reservists an integral part of the military. Making certain that Reservists served in key support functions, like cooking meals, building barracks, and driving trucks, Abrams forced presidents to activate the Reserves if they wanted to go to war. Though the economic arguments surrounding the Abrams Doctrine are coherent, it is the Abrams Doctrine’s political implications that are most significant.

Reservists, when not serving on active duty, are often integral parts of their communities. As was the case with President Johnson, he realized that activating the Reserves would make the war more noticeable, because it meant disrupting the lives out countless individuals. Johnson’s decision to augment the fighting force with draftees, who came from less affluent parents and lower socio-economic backgrounds, meant that he avoided a call-up. A plan born out of political necessity had detrimental consequences for the military: soldiers lost morale, feeling as if they


were the only ones at war when the entire country was at war. It was in reaction to that feeling that General Abrams developed his restructuring, determined to never let another president ravage the military without causing as much disruption to the civilian population as possible. In effect, the Abrams Doctrine was hindering a president’s ability to wage war. Abrams was not alone in his pursuit; Congress sought to accomplish the same thing.

When the War Powers Resolution Act was passed in 1973, it sent a direct message to not just President Nixon, but to all future presidents: if there is going to be a war, there must be congressional approval. Citing Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress reasserted itself as the only branch vested with the ability to declare war. Realizing their mistakes with the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Congress made it clear that presidents were no longer permitted to wage war on their own accord. Challenged by presidents on the basis of its constitutionality, the War Powers Resolution saw its greatest challenges in the Reagan era and its excursions examined in Chapter Two. Neoconservatives, who had filled Reagan’s Administration, argued that the president had certain inherent powers, and that he could embark on military operations without Congressional approval. It was the disdain for this law that became apparent during the invasion of Grenada, interventions in Latin America, and the Reagan Administration’s involvement in the Iran-Contra Scandal. While Reagan’s successor, George H.W. Bush, adhered to the War Powers Resolution, subsequent presidents have continuously argued against its merits, leading to a slow degradation of its potency.

All three of these reactions to Vietnam remain as important today as they were at their inception. The Neoconservative Movement has helped shape the foreign policy agenda of every administration since Reagan, often by arguing against its Vietnam counterparts.

Neoconservative ideas, which started to gain prominence in the 1980s, arguably reached their apex of influence during the George H.W. Bush Administration and have continued to be influential until today, which formed the basis for the final chapter of the thesis. The Abrams Doctrine, which was designed to make the decision to go to war more challenging, has largely been negated. With the military privatization idea pioneered by Dick Cheney in the 1990s, presidents no longer are forced to call-up the Reserves in great numbers because they can hire contractors to fill those inherently non-combat roles that Reservists were required to do. The War Powers Resolution, though still in effect, has lost much of its power because of privatization, presidential prerogative, and other circumventions (like the use of drone strikes facilitated by the C.I.A., a non-military branch of government). The triumph of Neoconservative ideas and practices negated both the War Powers Resolution and the Abrams Doctrine, thus significantly shaping America’s foreign policy for the last thirty years, and, perhaps, well into the future.
REFERENCES


Gerald Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.


Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California.


The American Presidency Project

The Baltimore Sun, 1990.

The Los Angeles Times, 1986.

pnac.htm

The Project for the New American Century. “Rebuilding America’s Defenses.” Information
Clearing House, last modified September 2000, accessed March 21, 2015, March 17,

The Public Papers of the President of the United States 1984-1989.


U.S. Congress. House. Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U.S. Policy Options and Implications:
Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., September 11,
13; November 27, 28, 29, 30; December 3, 1990.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Senate Appropriations Committee Examining the Effectiveness of U.S.
Efforts to Combat Waste, Fraud, Abuse, and Corruption in Iraq. 110th Cong., 2nd sess.,

U.S. Department of Defense, National Performance Review, Report on Reinventing the
Department of Defense, September 1996.

Outsourcing and Privatization, August 1996.

January 1993.

accessed November 15, 2014,


Treaties.” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, n.d., accessed February 22,


April 29, 2015

Andrew Lore
3555 US Route 60 E, Apt. 302
Barboursville, WV 25504

Dear Mr. Lore:

This letter is in response to the submitted thesis abstract to examine three reactions to the Vietnam War – Neoconservatism, the Abrams Doctrine, and the War Powers Resolution – and argues that these reactions have shaped America’s foreign policy agenda in the last fifty years. After assessing the abstract it has been deemed not to be human subject research and therefore exempt from oversight of the Marshall University Institutional Review Board (IRB). The Code of Federal Regulations (45CFR46) has set forth the criteria utilized in making this determination. Since the information in this study does not involve human subjects as defined in the above referenced instruction it is not considered human subject research. If there are any changes to the abstract you provided then you would need to resubmit that information to the Office of Research Integrity for review and a determination.

I appreciate your willingness to submit the abstract for determination. Please feel free to contact the Office of Research Integrity if you have any questions regarding future protocols that may require IRB review.

Sincerely,

Bruce F. Day, ThD, CIP
Director