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HORSE-TRADING IN SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS: POWER IN THE 2008 WEST VIRGINIA REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL CONVENTION

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Master of Arts

Political Science

by
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Abstract

Horse-Trading in Smoke-Filled Rooms: Power in the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention

Nora Kay Ankrom

The 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention was the first of its kind and presents an intriguing case study of power in politics. A small percentage of West Virginians are Republican and an even smaller percentage of those Republicans participate in politics. Based on this situation, the elite members of the West Virginia Republican Party would be expected to produce their candidate as the winner of the state’s first ever presidential convention. This, however, was not the case. A perceived second tier candidate claimed victory instead, much to the anger and dismay of the party regulars. This study interprets and explains this upset with three theories of power. I argue that three dimensions of power were at play and that an understanding of these dimensions allows readers to comprehend West Virginia Republican politics, the 2008 convention, and future actions within the party.
Preface

This thesis is a detailed examination and explanation of the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention and its result, Mike Huckabee's victory. In the national political scene at the time, this was merely a blip on the media’s radar; however, in West Virginia, in the Republican party, and in my own life, the convention was monumental and would have effects reaching further than any of its participants could have predicted.

The fall of 2007 marked the beginning of my last year as an undergraduate political science student, the birth of my first child, and the unexpected end of my husband Michael’s job with the West Virginia Republican Party. Needless to say, voluntarily heading up a campaign to win the state’s first ever Republican presidential convention was the last thing on my mind (second only to writing a thesis about it). My husband, however, had a different idea. Having met Governor Mike Huckabee a few years before, Michael was excited about the possibility of helping Huckabee win the state presidential convention, even if he was not paid to do so. Having been employed by the state party during the conception and writing of the rules and procedures for the first ever West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention to be held February 5, 2008, Michael determined a winning strategy. We began traveling the state, telling our friends about the convention and registering them to participate.

Even as we recruited others to participate, I really did not understand the convention processes at all. Everyone that I knew in the party seemed very excited about the convention, but no one really seemed to have a grasp on exactly what would happen and how all of the complicated rules would come together to produce a state-wide delegation. In fact, while my husband was still employed by the state party, he travelled to a few different counties to explain the convention process to the very people who voted unanimously in favor of it. Even after Michael explained the convention to me several times my understanding was vague at best, mostly because it seemed pointlessly complicated and fairly inconsistent. For instance, I had no idea why a county would have both automatic and at-large
delegates; it seemed to me that one would make the other either impossible or unnecessary. Nonetheless, my concern at the time was not about the quality of the convention process but about winning a campaign in which my husband was involved. Apprehension about the convention in terms of democracy, though, was always in the back of my mind.

In the weeks prior to the convention people across the state voted in online elections for county-level delegates to the convention. When my husband and I had to walk almost every Huckabee supporter through the voting process, I knew I was not alone in my confusion. I heard about people who registered to vote online but never received the necessary passwords, as well as people who showed up to courthouses hoping to vote there. Also, the fact that everything occurred online was puzzling to me, as I knew many registered Republicans were not very technologically savvy. I knew this could not bode well for the West Virginia Republican Party, which was not exactly popular in the state anyway. I could not understand why the state’s underdog for so long opted for a convention process which effectively disengaged a majority of its very small number of supporters.

As the process when on, I came to understand that my husband and our otherwise nonpolitical friends supporting Huckabee were in the minority and frowned upon among party actives. I discovered that most of our political ‘friends’ universally supported Mitt Romney and put forth little effort to involve anyone else. In fact, other than Ron Paul’s, no other campaigns were attempting to reach anyone outside of the party regulars. The fact that Michael, who had never really veered from the party ‘norm’ before, refused to support Romney and active worked for Huckabee among people who had never been involved in the party at all was suspected and even openly criticized as divisive. Again, this made no sense to me; wasn’t Michael doing what everyone else was doing by supporting his choice candidate?

Because I was not necessarily convinced that Huckabee could win the convention, I was leery of upsetting basically everyone else that we knew within the party; working for many of them had been
our livelihood at one time or another. I thought it did not make sense that they wanted us to get behind
the party-favored candidate; however, I was not sure it was worth displeasing those with whom we
would have to work in the future. I was also leery of associating with the more radical Ron Paul
campaigners, who I heard referred to as ‘kooks’ more than once. I knew that Huckabee and Paul were
seen as idealistic and unviable. Even those supporting other candidates like Fred Thompson and Rudy
Giuliani were somewhat excused from supporting Romney because their candidates had ‘viability’,
whatever that meant. It did not seem very smart to me to spend political capital on a candidate who
could not win.

Once the online voting was completed, Michael informed me that his strategy (which I did not
understand) for getting Huckabee delegates elected was successful and that Huckabee boasted more
elected delegates than any of the other candidates. In fact, Michael and I were the state’s highest vote-
getters with 69 and 68 votes respectively. As much as I tried to be impressed with my husband’s success,
I was shocked at how few people had actually participated. This miniscule number of Republicans was
going to decide 18 of the state’s 27 delegates to the Republican National Convention? And if I was
shocked about this as a participant, what were people thinking who were not able to participate? In
fact, what they thought was nothing because they did not even know there had been an election in
which to participate. Questions as to the legitimacy of this election grew stronger in my mind.

Some outside of the party regulars who were able to participate somewhat were Ron Paul
supporters, although they had a great deal of difficulty as well. My husband had several meetings with a
few of the Paul campaign’s leaders, one of which I attended. While they discussed a strategy for the day
of the convention involving several rounds of voting and forming a coalition, I listened, confused and
skeptical. The day of the convention sounded just as complicated as the process for getting there. And
was this conspiring between campaigns allowed? It seemed very out of character for Michael, who is
very personally conservative, usually always favors the status quo, and almost never rocks the boat.
Additionally, collaborating with the Ron Paul campaign seemed to be asking for trouble; as far as I could tell, no one else in the party even spoke to these people. All of this made me very nervous about facing off against our political ‘friends’ on the day of the convention.

On February 5, Michael and I were at the Charleston Civic Center very early, making sure all of our ragtag delegation made it to the convention and were checked in. We recruited from every pocket of influence we had across the state, including from my hometown. So as the other campaigns checked in their delegations made up of party actives, community leaders, party donors, and legislators, I checked in my mother and childhood friends. I was almost embarrassed by this, thinking that the Huckabee supporters seemed very out of place among the rest of the convention’s attendees. In the back of my mind, though, something seemed wrong about an election process where some Republicans were out of place.

As the convention was about to begin, Michael and I switched our focus from our delegates to locating our candidate; Huckabee was set to speak and he had not arrived yet. The party leaders in charge of the convention spoke harshly and condescendingly to my husband, asking him where his candidate was. We finally got word that Huckabee was in the building and I met him for the first time. He seemed very appreciative for our hard work, but I do not think he expected to win that day. When Huckabee spoke, however, the crowd was ignited. Even attendees who were not supporting him said Huckabee delivered the best, most relevant speech of the day.

After all of the candidates spoke the first round of voting commenced. Even though I knew the party regulars did not favor Huckabee, after his dynamic speech, I thought for sure he would win on the first round. This was not the case. Romney boasted the most votes on the first round and Huckabee ran a close second. McCain received a low number of votes, just above Paul’s number, so Paul would be dropped and the delegates would vote a second time. The convention went to a lunch break before the second round and everyone seemed to get their lunches and disappear. I learned that each campaign
other than Huckabee’s had a room reserved for their delegation, so I ate lunch in the hallway with my 6 month old in tow and returned for the second round. I assumed that Romney would win, which made me feel a little like democracy had been hijacked.

My husband then informed me that he had an interesting lunch break that did not involve eating. He told me that he and the Paul campaign had agreed weeks before the convention that, if one of the campaigns was dropped, its delegates would join the other in hopes of forming a winning coalition. This sounded great; with the Paul supporters, Huckabee might win. Michael then told me that the Romney campaign had visited the Paul delegates during the break and asked them to vote with Romney instead. I actually laughed when I heard this because I knew that there was a lot of animosity between the Romney and Paul supporters; these were two very different groups of people, to say the least. Although my husband said he would not know their decision until the voting began, as they had met privately to decide, I knew there was no way the Paul delegates would vote with Romney.

Just before voting commenced, I saw people I knew to be leaders of the McCain campaign walking on the parameter of the convention floor with handmade signs that said ‘McCain delegates vote for Huckabee’. I thought Michael had made a visit to that lunch room as well, but later learned that McCain himself instructed his delegates to get behind Huckabee after hearing of the Paul-Huckabee coalition in order to block a Romney win. Again, I was very confused by all of this; how could people democratically elected to support Paul and McCain vote for another candidate?

As the second round of results appeared by county, it was clear that the Paul delegates were true to their word and the McCain delegates were obedient to their leaders. Huckabee had the most total votes when all the counties reported totals; however no one was announcing him as the winner. I saw a small group of heavy hitters in the party all congregated around the chairman and saw my husband quickly make his way into this group. Later I found out that there was controversy about Huckabee’s win and some were trying to get a recount. The chairman finally said no, that the results
stood, and that Huckabee won. He announced this win and, since Huckabee had left after speaking, Michael and a friend of ours accepted the win on his behalf. I was very happy for my husband, but could tell from the expressions and comments of others that this was by no means the end. I knew the others were angry that they had lost, but I had no idea the extent of the bitterness.

After leaving the Civic Center and celebrating at lunch where we saw a clip of Michael on CNN, I was ready to put the whole convention behind us. In the months that followed, especially when all of the Huckabee delegates attended the national convention (and, more importantly, when party elites did not), tempers remained hot within the party. Many who had been our close friends were very angry at Michael for ‘upsetting’ the convention; some even blamed him for McCain’s nomination and President Obama’s eventual victory. We chalked it up to doing what we could to help the candidate we supported and left it at that, although questions of the convention’s lack of democracy and its overall legitimacy lingered in my mind.

In the fall of 2009, I began my second year of graduate studies in political science with a class entitled Seminar in Political Theory, better known as ‘the power class.’ I learned about the first, second, and third dimensions of power theories. The more I learned, the more I thought about the convention. I could see connections between the theories I studied and the reality I observed. In fact, thinking about the convention and all of its complexities in terms of the theories of power presented in that class made the experience much clearer and addressed many of my questions. I could see that there were forces at play, actors that exercised power in three different dimensions. The convention was a phenomenon of power, one that is worth exploring.
Introduction

In the 2000 presidential election, West Virginia’s five electors cast their votes for George W. Bush, representing the first time since Herbert Hoover’s candidacy in 1928 that West Virginia supported a non-incumbent Republican presidential candidate (History Central). Between 1928 and 2000, West Virginia was a red state only three times; in the re-election of Dwight Eisenhower in 1956, the re-election of Richard Nixon in 1972, and the re-election of Ronald Reagan in 1984 (History Central). Needless to say, Bush’s victory in the state in 2000 exhilarated the West Virginia Republican Party. The excitement nearly exploded with Bush’s impressive showing in West Virginia in 2004. Contrasted with state-wide politics where Republicans have not held a majority in either state house since 1933 and thus boast little to no political power, this excitement and the sweetness of victory becomes understandable. For the West Virginia Republican Party, it looked as if, at long last, the state might be solid red on the national stage.

However, a closer look at the actual participation of individuals from West Virginia on the national Republican scene causes the excitement to wane. In a national arena where West Virginia Republicans seem to finally be gaining some ground, those individuals able to participate are the delegates to the national presidential nominating conventions. These delegates are traditionally elected from a very long, alphabetized list at the bottom of the ballot in West Virginia’s Republican primary election held in early May of election years. Due to high media attention for early primaries and caucuses such as those in Iowa and New Hampshire and on Super Tuesday in early February, the West Virginia primary is usually little more than a ceremonial practice. As such, West Virginia’s voice is somewhat lost in nominating procedures and the delegates elected to the national conventions are, again, ceremonial. A glance at the list of delegates from West Virginia to the 2004 Republican National Convention reveals almost all names that are readily recognizable as Republican party activists and insiders; those that are not instantly recognizable all have last names beginning with either ‘A’ or ‘B’.
The leadership of the West Virginia Republican Party in 2005 saw at least part of this as a problem. West Virginia was doing well on the national Republican stage, becoming a serious player in the party. Why should its voice be limited by other states’ earlier primaries and caucuses? The leadership thought West Virginia should get a share of the media and campaign attention. From this line of thinking, the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention was conceived. Because the party could not move the date of West Virginia’s primary (as this is up to the state’s legislature where Republicans have very little control), the best prospect for allowing West Virginia to play on the national Republican stage was to craft a nominating convention to be held as early as the national Republican party would allow (February 5, 2008) to decide 18 of West Virginia’s 27 delegates to the national convention\(^1\). The drama of a nominating convention whose results would be announced by midday on Super Tuesday would surely attract campaigns and media, as well as fuel the ongoing excitement about national politics in the state Republican party.

Another benefit of a nominating convention which may or may not have been considered by the leadership crafting the convention was the prospect of increased participation in the national party by those within the state. The convention’s procedures called for delegates to the state convention to be elected by county according to the presidential candidate to whom the prospective delegates were pledged. Whichever candidate won the state-wide convention would choose from among his delegates 18 national delegates. Thus, the 18 delegates to the national convention decided by the state convention would have been elected based on the votes of their county and their candidate preference, rather than those elected in the May primary whose victory rested on their popularity within the party or the first letter of their last names.

The 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention presented two distinct opportunities for the party: to put West Virginia in play on the national political stage by gaining attention and to

\(^1\) The state code dictates that a portion of national delegates must be decided by the May primary.
decide the state’s national delegates in a more democratic way by allowing Republicans outside of party activists the chance to become national delegates. Both of these opportunities were seized and achieved; however, both were not conventional or celebrated within the party. The first opportunity, the chance to gain attention from campaigns and media in the state, was achieved and celebrated as an enormous success of the convention. This was the main goal of the party’s leadership, insiders, and activists and everyone involved in the convention would tout this as an uncontested victory. The second opportunity, the chance for average Republicans in the state to be delegates to the national convention, was also achieved but was not very celebrated within the party. This was because the convention produced an unexpected winner, Mike Huckabee, who was not supported by most party regulars.

As I will demonstrate, throughout the entire convention process few outside the party regulars were expected to exercise their ability to participate in the convention. Thus, the expectation was that party activists joined by perhaps a few outsiders would host a nominating convention that might not necessarily be more democratic in representation, but would be better on the national stage for the state as a whole. When this did not happen because of several anomalies and the convention produced an unexpected winner supported largely by those outside of the party activists, resentment and anger within the party ensued. The bitterness toward the convention’s outcome is evidenced in post-convention interviews, articles, and lingering sentiments within the party today. The convention’s unexpected results and resultant negativity are the subjects of this study.

In the pages that follow I outline the convention and its procedures from conception, focusing largely on the historical political backdrop against which the convention occurred. In order to best and fully understand the situation presented here, I utilize theories of power to explain the current state of Republican politics in West Virginia, specifically the one-, two-, and three-dimensional power theories. By applying the theories to the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention, I offer a theoretical explanation of the convention’s unexpected outcome.
What Democracy Should Be

Aside from the immediate importance of the 2008 WVGOP Presidential Convention in state and local politics, this study demonstrates the broader importance of this example to the condition of democracy within the Republican party of West Virginia and in political parties in general. This study makes the normative assumption that a democratic system should be participatory. However, there is no single, academically-accepted definition of what a democracy is (or should be), especially regarding participation. There are traditional definitions, such as that of Joseph Schumpeter in the 1940s:

“[Democracy is] that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (1943, 269). A more modern definition, and thus a more viable one for this study, is found in Schmitter and Karl’s What Democracy Is… And Is Not: “Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives” (2006, 247). The authors mention Schumpeter’s definition but point out that their definition diverges from his, especially in terms of “the accountability of rulers to citizens and the relevance of mechanisms of competition other than elections” (Schmitter and Karl 2006, 256). As seen here, a more modern view of democracy places a higher importance on the connectedness or awareness between rulers and citizens, assuming their participation, as well as the indirect means by which rulers come to power. These added emphases indicate that, within modern democratic systems, there is at least the possibility of a disconnected citizenry (which is assumed to be negative) and paths to power beyond public elections.

In light of these modern concerns, what can citizens expect of a democratic system? How can the democratic health of a system be judged? Schmitter and Karl argue “[f]or democracy to thrive... specific procedural norms must be followed and civic rights must be respected. Any polity that fails to impose such restrictions upon itself, that fails to follow the “rule of law” with regard to its own
procedures, should not be considered democratic” (2006, 251). Thus, if participation is necessary and good in democracies, citizens of a democracy (and in the case of this study, registered Republicans in West Virginia) can expect well-defined rules to be widely understood, so much so that they are ‘norms’, and systematically followed.

**Participation in Elections**

In addition to expectations from a democratic system, democratic theorists also argue for the responsibility of members to the democratic system. In her discussion of democratic theory, Carole Pateman seeks to define participatory democracy, about the place of participation in a “modern, viable theory of democracy” (1970, 1). Representing participatory democratic theorists, Pateman calls elections the most important aspect of participation in a democracy: “Elections are crucial to the democratic method for it is primarily through elections that the majority can exercise control over their leaders” (Pateman 1970, 14). Since elections are so significant in a democracy for Pateman, this study’s focus on the 2008 WVGOP Presidential Convention as an election process is a plausible paradigm from which to discuss the democratic system in which it occurred (the West Virginia Republican Party).

Pateman goes on to make the argument that elections are crucial beyond their existence; she insists that participation in elections by citizens is vital to democratic health. To demonstrate this, Pateman cites the arguments of ‘classical’ democratic theorists Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill. Pateman argues that both theorists stress the importance of participation of individuals in civic life, both for the health of society and for the well-being of its citizens. For instance, “Rousseau’s entire political theory hinges on the individual participation of each citizen in political decision making and in his theory participation … has a psychological effect on the participants, ensuring that there is a

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continuing interrelationship between the working of institutions and the psychological qualities and attitudes of individuals interacting within them” (Pateman 1970, 22). Pateman claims of Rousseau’s argument that the connectedness between the citizen and the institution (or, as Schmitter and Karl put it, rulers and citizens) depends upon the participation of individual citizens. However, Pateman also submits that, beyond the health of the individual and the system, both Rousseau and Mill argue for the educative function of participation - that in order to achieve a healthy system and citizenry, the individual citizen must not only participate but also remain educated and informed, even if they must be ‘forced’ to do so (1970, 29).

If an educated and informed citizenry participates, Pateman argues participation is self-propelling. “Once the participatory system is established... it becomes self-sustaining because the very qualities that are required of individual citizens if the system is to work successfully are those that the process of participation itself develops and fosters; the more the individual citizen participates the better able he is to do so” (Pateman 1970, 25). Pateman argues that participation is necessary, must be educated, and forms and maintains a healthy system.

WVGOP as a Democracy

In this research I treat the Republican Party of West Virginia like a democratic system. This treatment makes the normative assumption that the WVGOP (like the United States government) should be interested in the participation of all of its registered voters (like the citizens of the United States). In treating the WVGOP like a democratic state, I assume that the WVGOP is responsible for treating all registered Republicans in West Virginia with equality; the same way adherents to democracy assume a government should treat its citizens. These assumptions are plausible for two reasons: they are academically-accepted and they are explicitly stated by the party itself. According to Huckfeldt and Sprague, “One of the major good works of political parties is to engage citizens in the political process. Parties play an important role in democratic politics when they mobilize the electorate to turn out and
vote, thereby involving citizens in democratic governance” (70). In other words, political parties play a vital role in the effective functioning of a democratic society and thus have a large responsibility to involve citizens. Beyond this academic treatment, the West Virginia Republican Party itself states in its platform:

[E]lections must be clean, fair and above reproach. The practices of vote-buying, corruption and undue political influence -- too often prevalent in our history -- must be eliminated by all possible means. In order for the people to have confidence, trust and faith in our government, West Virginia government must be truly of the people, by the people and for the people. (2008 WVGOP Platform, my emphasis)

If, as the platform states, ‘elections should be fair and above reproach’ and ‘government must be truly of the people, by the people and for the people’, presumably this means ensuring that paths to participation for all of those within the party are free of obstacles, especially when it comes to participating in something as important as choosing the state party’s presidential nominee.

This study’s treatment of the WVGOP as a democratic system means that West Virginia Republicans can expect the WVGOP to treat them equally (especially in terms of participation) and to have well-defined, widely-understood, and systematically followed rules and procedures. Further, in order for the WVGOP to function democratically on a system and an individual level, individual Republicans must be able to provide the WVGOP educated participation in elections. If, as I will demonstrate, these things are not true, the democratic health of the organization in question (the West Virginia Republican Party) cannot be considered good. While this is only one party in one state across the country, the tenets of democratic organizations examined here are fundamental; their absence indicates a deep problem in the case under review and is not likely an isolated incidence. It is not plausible to claim that one state
party in the country is the lone offender of participatory democracy. As such, this study’s conclusions should be closely examined for political parties in the surrounding region as well as nationally.

**Methodology**

**A Subjective Approach**

The questions of power explored here are based largely on my personal experience. As such, and to “emphasiz[e] [my] own narrative action” (Chase 2005, 657), I will use the first person extensively. This presentation is used and supported by narrative researchers such as Susan Chase of the University of Tulsa who specializes in narrative inquiry.

I approach this study as a delegate to the 2008 WVGOP Presidential Convention, as well as the spouse of Michael Ankrom, unofficial Huckabee for President representative in West Virginia. My position is unique in that I am approaching a situation academically in which I was involved, although my involvement in the situation was not at all academic. At the time the convention was held (February 2008), I was an undergraduate student and had only a vague understanding of the theories of power discussed here. It was not until the fall of 2009 that I learned the dimensions of power theory, at which time I made connections in my mind back to the convention. The more I understood the first, second, and third dimensions of power, the more clearly I understood the events that took place in early 2008.

Studying a situation like this one raises some methodological concerns that must be addressed. First, because the question I chose to research is an interesting event in my own life, does it still have merit to the academic community? To address this concern, I refer to Clifford Christians, chair of Illinois College’s Doctoral Program in Communications and an expert in communication ethics. He writes “[i]n the social sciences the stimulus to the posing of scientific problems is in actuality always given by practical “questions.” Hence, the very recognition of the existence of a scientific problem coincides
personally with the possession of specifically oriented motives and values…” (Christians 2005, 142). According to this, the fact that I chose to research an event in which I was involved is really no surprise. Further, were it not for my own experiences, this study could not exist. Therefore, this question does have merit in academia and is not disqualified because its origins are based on personal experience.

A second methodological question deals with the issue of objectivity. Methodology in social science research has always been under heavy surveillance and for a long time demanded absolute objectivity (See the SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research, 3rd ed. for a full discussion). More recent researchers, however, challenge that demand, arguing that no matter how much effort one puts forth, objectivity will never be completely realized in the social sciences. As Christians points out above, even the formation of questions and the recognition of problems are permeated with values and motives.

More recent trends in qualitative research shift from a focus on absolute objectivity to a focus on the formation of meaningful insights and aiding the public discourse and discernment within the community of study: “Therefore, the mission of social science research is ... equipping people to come to mutually held conclusions. The aim is not fulsome data per se, but community transformation. The received view assumes that research advances society’s interests by feeding our individual capacity to reason and make calculated decisions” (Christians 2005, 151). As Christians notes, the primary focus of social science research should be upon the individuals or community being studied; therefore, less ‘science’ and more ‘social’.

A third methodological question asks, does this approach lead to a great deal of moral judgments for me, as the researcher? Christians, along with University of Illinois professor and author Norman Denzin, would say, ‘yes, absolutely.’ Discussing Denzin, Christians writes, “[c]ommunitarians challenge researchers to participate in a community’s ongoing process of moral articulation... Therefore,

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ethnographic texts must enable us “to discover moral truths about ourselves”; narratives ought to “bring a moral compass into readers’ lives” by accounting for things that matter to them” (Christians 2005, 154). Rather than shy away from moral judgments, these authors suggest fully embracing morality, at least the morality of those being studied⁶. That is precisely what I do in this study – I make a value-ridden judgment and examine a situation from that point of view. This judgment, though, is not just my own, although I do share it since I am part of the community being studied. As discussed above, I assume that the WVGOP should act a democratic system, and all of the values that go along with that assumption (also discussed above). I demonstrated that these assumptions and values are in fact held by the WVGOP.

The Researcher and the Researched

Methodologically, this study comes closest to narrative analysis, a method of research that uses narrative accounts to understand a situation or phenomenon. Carol Riessman, a professor of sociology and social work at Boston University, describes the method of narrative analysis as simply the study of narratives as storytelling (1993, 1). She explains that this interdisciplinary methodology “emphasized that we create order, construct texts in particular contexts” (Riessman 1993, 1). Narrative analysis, then, studies both the story being told as well as the way in which it is told (Riessman, 1993, 2). By focusing on the methods of a narrative in addition to the facts related in the narrative, I am able to gain insight beyond what is immediately apparent in the text of an interview or oral history. Riessman argues “[s]tudying narratives is additionally useful for what they reveal about social life – culture “speaks itself” through an individual’s story. It is possible to examine ... practices of power that may be taken for granted by individual speakers” (1993, 5). As Riessman points out here, narrative analysis is particularly useful for observing power that is otherwise difficult to study, like I do in this research.

However, this study varies in two ways from other narrative analyses: 1) I was personally involved in the phenomenon being studied, but not as a researcher and 2) my own understanding of the phenomenon, not just the understanding of my ‘subjects’, is very consequential. These divergences do not necessarily discredit my research; however, they do present further considerations that must be made.

The first consideration should be made to both me (the researcher) as well as my interviewees (the researched): to understand that telling a story, or narrating, is not simply recounting events as facts. Instead, professor of Sociology at the University of Tulsa Susan Chase says that “[n]arrative is retrospective meaning making – the shaping or ordering of past experience. Narrative is a way of understanding one’s own and others’ actions, or organizing events and objects into a meaningful whole, and of connecting and seeing the consequences of actions and events over time” (2005, 656). In other words, when either an interviewee or I recount events, I must remember that the telling of a story is a story in itself. A person’s recollection of events is very context-dependent and should be treated as such. Narratives are not meant to be fact-for-fact accounts; rather “narrative researchers treat narratives as socially situated interactive performances – as produced in this particular setting, for this particular audience, for these particular purposes” (Chase 2005, 657). For me as the researcher, this means three things. First, it means that I must deconstruct my own narrative and identify the setting, audience, and purpose for which I am recounting my understanding of the phenomenon in this way. Second, it means that I must not only understand the facts related by interviewees; I must also listen and identify indicators for them of setting, audience, and purpose. Third, it means that I need to support narrative claims that are important to my argument with objective evidence as much as possible.

The second consideration that must be made because of my unique position in this study is my proneness to make assumptions about interviewees. I have known each person being interviewed for this study in at least a political setting for a minimum of three years. Thus, I am likely to assume to know
more about them and their characteristics than I would about random interviewees chosen in a specifically academic context. Recognizing this tendency is important, but not enough. Another step is to make the communication between me and the interviewees in relation to this study as transparent and available as possible to my readers: “It bears emphasizing that when these researchers present extensive quotations from narrators’ stories, they make room for readers’ alternative interpretations” (Chase 2005, 665). By providing the interviewees’ own words alongside the conclusions I draw from the interviews, I provide the reader with the opportunity to make the same conclusions or to disagree.

Another caveat of the second consideration that must be made for this study is the formation of the interview questions themselves and the manner of the interview. It is certainly understood that questions may be written to lead to a certain answer and that as a researcher - especially one so closely related to the interviewees - I am able to exert certain influence upon those I interview. What I strive for in this study is “[p]olyphonic interviewing, where the voices of the respondents are recorded with minimal influence from the researcher” (Fontana and Frey 2005, 709). In other words, I have muted my own views as much as possible when recounting the views of interviewees. Certain steps are mandated by the Institutional Review Board to oversee the actual wording of interview questions; for instance, all questions must be submitted to and approved by the Board as well as the project’s advisor. Beyond this, however, I took further precautions by conducting interviews via email. Though not the most expedient or convenient method of interview, emailed questions give the opportunity for respondents to consider their answers longer than in a face-to-face interview. Also, an emailed interview all but removes pressure or influence from the interviewer; plausibly, interviewees should feel most at ease to express their most accurate recollections and thoughts on the questions posed or to abstain from answering any questions that may be uncomfortable.
Practical Considerations

The most important methodological consideration I can make in this study is to be aware of and transparent about my own tendencies and biases. Writing about autoethnography, personal narrative used to express the writer’s life experience, Stacy Holman Jones submits “[t]exts aspire to purposeful and tension-filled “self-investigation” of an author’s (and a reader’s) role in a context, a situation, or a social world. Such self-investigation generates what Gornick (2001) termed “self-implication,” that is, seeing “one’s own frightened or cowardly or self-deceived part” (pp. 35-36)” (Jones 2005, 767 quoting Gornick 2001, 35-36). Jones insists that for this research to be truthful, more complete, and all-around more valuable, my own perception of my story must be shamelessly candid. Because of my unique position in this research, I must consider my own standpoint tangibly and practically. As I did this, as I became more aware and honest about my own position, this research took on a different - and I would argue better - disposition.

Finally, in terms of practical considerations for this type of methodology, I refer to Anthony Kwame Harrison’s research presented in *Hip Hop Underground* (2009). Harrison performed ethnographic research while actively participating in the underground hip hop movement in San Francisco. He recounts his original intent to distance himself from those he researched, keeping only the persona of a researcher (Anthony Kwame Harrison); however, after a short time, he realized his research would benefit greatly from his own participation in the community he was studying (as emcee Mad Squirrel) (2009, 5). Unlike Harrison, I did not enter the phenomenon studied here as a distanced and observing participant. However, Harrison eventually decided he could better understand the situation he was studying by becoming an active participant, like I was. Of this methodological turn, Harrison writes:

> Anthropologists continue to grapple with their prime directive not to intervene in the communities they study. Only recently has a “small
“revolution” within the discipline advocated the virtues of acknowledging
and encouraging the fact that ethnographic researchers share the world
with the people they work among (Turner 2007). This project...
recognizes the methodological benefits of such inextricable
involvement. ... [A] fully immersed ethnographic project allows for a
more profound exploration... (2009, 14 quoting Turner 2007)

As Harrison concludes, there are certain aspects of phenomena that simply cannot be studied from
anywhere but the bottom up or the inside out. The same vantage point Harrison gained in the
underground hip hop movement I held for the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention.
Though the position causes further measures and considerations to be made, ultimately this study
benefits from and certainly could not exist in the same form without my perspective.

**Paper Outline**

In this study, I demonstrate a structure of subtle influence and control within the West Virginia
Republican Party which was manifest, challenged, and partially undone through the 2008 West Virginia
Republican Presidential Convention. I chose three specific theories through which to study the
convention and the relationships of power among its participants. The first theory is the one-
dimensional power theory, which basically argues that, in a given situation, power is exercised when B
knowingly acts or chooses something that B would not otherwise do or choose because of the
observable action or influence of A. The second theory, the two-dimensional power theory, agrees that
power is exercised in the first dimension, but adds another dimension, the second dimension, in which
power is also exercised when A prevents the grievances or preferences of B from being addressed by
controlling access to decision-making arenas. The third and final theory, the three-dimensional power
theory, argues that when the first and second dimensions of power are exercised together over a long
period of time, a third dimension of power is erected in which B internalizes a sense of powerlessness
and inevitability toward $A$, leading to disengagement and quiescence. I chose these theories because of their interrelation to one another and because of their applicability to the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention.

Before these theories can be applied, however, the reader must understand the circumstances of the situation. In Chapter One - History, I discuss the history of the Republican Party, especially as it relates to the West Virginia Republican Party, as it built a structure of professionals and determined those with influence within the party. I also relate the history of the West Virginia Republican Party as told by itself, revealing its self-explanation of the party’s lack of political success in the state as well as demonstrating the message of unity the party wishes to portray. Finally, I discuss the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention, including its conception and adoption, its rules and procedures, the activities of those within the party in the months leading up to the convention, and the events of the day of the convention. When understood as a whole, the history of the party and the convention will suggest that Mitt Romney should have won the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention. However, as the history will also show, this was not the case. Mike Huckabee won the convention. I explain in Chapter One that this did in fact happen; in Chapter Two-Theoretical Perspectives I explain why this happened.

In Chapter Two- Theoretical Perspectives, I explain the one-, two-, and three-dimensional power theories in full. I discuss the history of the power debate among political scientists and how the one-dimensional power theory emerged from this debate. I explain how its proponents, especially Nelson Polsby and Robert Dahl, argue for a scientific definition and approach to the study of power. Specifically, I present one offshoot of one-dimensional power theory, William Riker’s game theory, in which the observer attempts to scientifically predict the outcome of decisions by a group by quantifying actions and ordering preferences, ultimately producing a mathematical equation.
Against proponents of one-dimensional power arose proponents of the two-dimensional power theory. I discuss two-dimensional power theorists, especially Peter Bachrach, Morton Baratz, and E. E. Schattschneider, and how their theories specify the ways in which those in advantageous positions prevent those outside such positions from influence, such as setting the rules of the game and determining the scope of the conflict.

Finally I describe the three-dimensional power theory that arose after the one- and two-dimensional power debate and sought to combine the two, arguing for a third dimension of power in which the consciousness of those outside of advantageous positions and the decision-making arena is shaped by those on the inside. I relate this ‘radical’ view of power, as authored by Steven Lukes, as well as its largest and most notable application in John Gaventa’s *Power and Powerlessness*. Because it deals with ascribing value and consciousness upon people, the third dimension of power is very contested; thus, I discuss in detail its claims regarding the powerful, the powerless, and the outside observer.

After explaining each dimension of power, I apply each one to the phenomenon studied here. In Chapter Three – Three-Dimensional Power I focus on the building and maintenance of three-dimensional power in the West Virginia Republican Party through the use of the first and second dimensions over a long period of time. I use a historical approach, also used by John Gaventa in his application of the three-dimensional power theory in *Power and Powerlessness*. Then, transitioning into Chapter Four – Two-Dimensional Power, I demonstrate how, in this particular situation, the third dimension of power was deconstructed, allowing the exercise of power to only operate in the first and second dimensions. There, I discuss the exercise of two-dimensional power by a few different groups within the party. Ultimately, I demonstrate how those favored in the third-dimension of power were engaged in a two-dimensional conflict amongst themselves in which both sides utilized features and tactics of the second dimension of power. In Chapter Five, then, I discuss how circumstances culminated in the actual convention, where power was observable and quantifiable, operating in the first dimension
only. There, I utilize William Riker’s game theory from *The Theory of Political Coalitions* to explain the convention’s unexpected outcome, Mike Huckabee’s victory.

In the paper’s conclusion, I re-examine the original question regarding the democratic health of the Wet Virginia Republican Party. After taking into account all of the events discussed, the history of the party and the convention from theoretical perspectives of power, I ultimately conclude that the convention *could have been* a democratic victory for the party, an improvement from its past. However, as I point out, the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention turned out to be even more of an offense to democracy in the party. I also note that the difficulty in such a claim is that no one person is responsible for this outcome, nor can any one person improve the democratic nature of the party. It is my hope, however, that the examination of power relationships in this study will assist the party in its future operation, allowing it to function more democratically. I also address questions for which the scope of this study is too limited, as well as further consideration that might be made from this study.
Chapter One - History

“[A] historical approach helps to document the shaping in the past of roles or routines of power which continue in the present, without visible conflict”

(Gaventa 1980, viii)

In order to understand the current state of Republican politics in West Virginia, as well as the 2008 WVGOP Presidential Convention from a theoretical perspective, the reader needs some background information. The argument of this study has to do with the Republican Party (especially in West Virginia) as a long-standing power structure whose power has been derived over a very long period of time. First in this chapter is a brief history of the national Democratic and Republican parties, focusing on their moves to nationalization and professionalization. I demonstrate in Chapter Three how these moves made in the 1960s effect West Virginia Republican politics very much today. Second, I recount the history of the West Virginia Republican Party in the context of the last seventy years from the perspective of the party itself. Examining its history this way allows readers to observe the party’s view of its own position in the state as well as the party’s logic, motivation, and justification of its own actions, things that are crucial to discover when utilizing the three-dimensional theory of power, which measures the amount and accuracy of a person’s consciousness to determine power relationships. Third, I conclude with a history of the events within the West Virginia Republican Party from the summer of 2005 until February 5, 2008, the date of the WVGOP Presidential Convention. This final discussion depends mostly on documents from the West Virginia Republican Party (such as meeting minutes and resolutions) and first-hand accounts from active participants in the party. Again, approaching the history this way gives the reader a kind of ‘behind-the-scene’ look at the events being discussed, from the perspectives of those directly involved. Telling this history identifies the building and maintenance of a three-dimensional, consciousness-forming power structure that is manifest in the
action (or inaction) of the powerful and the quiescence or inactivity of the powerless\(^7\). Thus, observing events from the perspective of these actors provides the necessary framework from which to apply this theory.

**The National Parties**

Since the 1860s and the candidacy of the first Republican presidential contender Abraham Lincoln, the Republican Party has been one of the United States’ two major parties. It is traditionally associated with conservatism; however, with only two options for political parties neither party is able to be too distinct in its ideals. Although there certainly have been ‘third parties’ present since the 1860s, the past several decades indicate that the Democratic and Republican Parties are not going anywhere and are not in any real danger of a serious threat from a third party competitor. In fact, Arend Lijphart claims that, due to our plurality elections and presidential system, the United States will always be heavily prone to a two-party system (2006, 257).

Early in party history, while both had the ultimate goal (and for a long time, the only goal) of winning presidential elections, the two parties took distinctively different paths to achieve this. John Aldrich (1995), in his account of the origins and histories of political parties, recounts the national parties’ histories as they both moved from a loose confederacies of state parties to much more unified, organized, and truly national parties. This move, he claims, although gradual for the most part, took a huge leap around the 1960s and 1970s (Aldrich 1995, 241-274). Around this time, Aldrich claimed that “[people saw] the parties and their nominees as holding very different policy positions than their opposition [did] ... And yet the public also believe[d], and increasingly so, that parties [were] irrelevant” (Aldrich 1995, 251).

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\(^7\) The terms “power,” “powerful,” and “powerless” will be defined in the section titled “West Virginia Republican Party”. 
In response to this, parties set out to change their organizations in an attempt to strengthen themselves: “One set of changes was the “nationalization” of the rules and procedures of both parties... The second set of changes was the strengthening of the resource bases and the levels of professionalization of the party organizations at all levels: local, state, and national” (Aldrich 1995, 254). Aldrich demonstrates that, while both parties made both kinds of changes, the Democratic Party did more in terms of the nationalization of rules and procedures. In turn, “[t]he Republicans’ path to reform emphasized strengthening the party’s resources and raising levels of professionalization, especially of its national party organization” (Aldrich 1995, 254). Aldrich claims these reforms were intended to better assist Republican candidates (1995, 256).

Aldrich argues that today’s parties are different from their predecessors because they have a very hierarchical flow and because they “are not the point of contact with the voter, the candidate is” (1995, 258-259). In other words, parties became more and more distant from voters. Aldrich goes on to say that “[i]n former times [voters] would see and hear the party and its spokesmen: it was their campaign as much as it was the candidate’s – or more. Today, no matter how necessary the party professionals may be, they stay well in the background, and they will be successful to the extent that their efforts are unobserved (and unobservable) by the voters” (Aldrich 1995, 259). Although voters make up the mass of a political party, Aldrich points out that the parties place a good deal of significance on party leaders instead.

As influence within the party goes, then, average voters within the Republican Party structure are at the bottom of the hierarchy (See Figure 1 for a breakdown of the Republican Party structure from national chair to average voters). An average registered Republican in West Virginia has only six people he or she may directly vote for in the entire party structure, while positions in the West Virginia Republican Party alone number roughly 160. Further, those positions that are popularly elected are virtually unknown.
Figure 1 - Republican Party Structure

Elected by Republican National Committee

RNC Chairman

Republican National Committee

Elected by West Virginia Republican Executive Committee

National Committee Woman

WVGOP Chairman

National Committee Man

West Virginia Republican Executive Committee
141 members, including the 3 above

County Chairs elected by County Republican Executive Committees

55 Republican Executive Committee Chairs (1 per county)

34 males (2 per state senate district)

34 females (2 per state senate district)

15 appointments by the Chair

County Executive Committee

1 female per district

1 male per district

* Yellow boxes denote popularly-elected positions

**Individuals are permitted to (and often do) hold more than one position at a time. For example, the current National Committee Woman is also the current 7th Senate district representative. However, individuals are only allowed to vote once.
Since the national parties began making the changes Aldrich mentions in the 1960s, both have become much more professional and national. The structures of both have also become much more concrete and established. Consequently, the parties became much less democratic.

**West Virginia Republican Party**

The changes in the national parties, specifically the national Republican Party, had a kind of trickledown effect on the West Virginia Republican Party. West Virginia is somewhat of an anomaly in the United States’ two-party system. Both parties exist in West Virginia; however, one has a severe political advantage over the other. In West Virginia it is widely known that the Democratic Party’s candidates are far more successful in gaining public office than the Republican Party’s candidates. A glance at the history of the West Virginia House of Delegates shows that Republicans have not held a majority there, and so have not held political power to control the legislative agenda or chair committees, for example, since 1928 (West Virginia Legislature/House). Republicans boasted more than 40 out of 100 members in the House only twice since 1950 (West Virginia Legislature/House). Currently the West Virginia House membership consists of 65 Democrats and 35 Republicans.

The WVGOP’s prospects do not improve much in the Senate. Republicans have not held a majority in the State Senate since 1933 and currently only hold six of the Senate’s 34 seats (West Virginia Legislature/ Senate). These statistics become somewhat less surprising when we learn that, as of 2008, registered Republicans make up less than 30% of voters in West Virginia, with only Doddridge, Grant, and Ritchie Counties reporting a Republican majority (Herald Dispatch/Elections/Voter Registration by County).

Examining the West Virginia Republican Party’s history of itself provides interesting insight as to why the Democratic Party enjoys so much dominance in the state. The WVGOP refers to the “hard times” of the 1930s that helped “sweep Democrats into office” and claims that the New Deal policies of Franklin Roosevelt formed the “foundation of [WV Democrats’] power” (WVGOP/History). The history
states that “Republicans watched helplessly ... as [WV Democrats] moved in and used New Deal patronage to construct a powerful Democratic machine,” both across the state and through “county machines” (WVGOP/History). The history goes on to say that New Deal policies, both official and unofficial, inspired gratitude and loyalty from West Virginians to the Democratic Party (WVGOP/History).

The WVGOP recounts that “John F. Kennedy’s primary campaign raised the sleaze to a new level ...[when] tens of thousands of dollars poured into the hands of Democratic Party bosses” (WVGOP/History). Continuing the argument of the Democratic machine, party favors, and party loyalty, the history concludes by recounting some more recent electoral success (President George W. Bush, U.S. Congresswoman Shelley Moore Capito, Secretary of State Betty Ireland), with an overall message that the Republican Party can provide West Virginia with a step forward, primarily in economic terms (WVGOP/History).

At least from the WVGOP’s perspective, then, the political influence distribution in the state’s political parties was set in motion decades ago. Interestingly, the WVGOP seems to believe the reason the West Virginia Democratic Party continues to hold power, and thus the WVGOP’s biggest obstacle, is because of the ‘loyalty’ of West Virginia voters.

In a situation as grim as the West Virginia Republican Party, the political influence of the parties is undoubtedly clear. Influence within the party, however, is not so clear. After all, it stands to reason that there must be some power within the WVGOP. Otherwise at this point, why would there be a WVGOP? The question then becomes, what kind of power does the WVGOP hold and exactly who holds it?

Power-Holders

Structurally, the West Virginia Republican Party mimics the national Republican Party in its hierarchical make-up (Figure 1). Any power that the party has is heavily allocated to those at or near the

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8 Because of its limited scope, the irony of this statement in relation to this study cannot be examined here. It will, however, appear as a further consideration in the conclusion section.
top of the party’s structure, such as the State Executive Committee Chairperson, the State Executive Committee, and county Republican Chairpersons and members. Such hierarchies are not unusual, especially within long-established organizations. However, these hierarchies are troublesome in terms of uneven distribution and abuse of power when a situation occurs such as that of the Republican Party in West Virginia. As shown above, the West Virginia Republican Party has not boasted any political influence, at least not on a party level, in almost 80 years. Consequently (or coincidentally), Republican voter registration makes up less than 30% of the state’s registered voters. Thus, the Republican Party’s political power is diminished to a point of almost non-existence and only a small percentage of the state is even part of the Republican Party. At this point, it is understandable that those at the top of the hierarchy within the party, though they are technically elected to such positions, are widely unknown.

Most Republicans in West Virginia likely have no idea of their representatives on the county and state executive committees. A clear example of this is the 2010 primary election in the fifth senatorial district (which includes Cabell and a part of Wayne County): only about 3,000 of approximately 20,000 Republicans voted to elect Republican State Executive Committee representatives (West Virginia Secretary of State/Primary Election Results; West Virginia Legislature/Senate; Herald Dispatch/Elections/Voter Registration by County). Unfortunately, this turnout is about the average for the state.

Therefore, in a state political party with no political influence for a long time and less than a third of the state’s registration, there is a disconnect between the party leadership (which is allocated most power within the party because of the structural hierarchy) and the party members. However, the allocation of power is only as important as the power itself.

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9 Exact numbers are difficult to obtain because of the district lines. All but one State Senate districts (and thus Republican state committee districts) in West Virginia include partial counties (only a portion of at least one county, sometimes more). None of the voter registration break downs for West Virginia counties are available online; only in-person at each county seat. So, determining the number of registered voters in a Senatorial district is literally impossible without visiting all of the county courthouses within that district. The WVGOP uses Senatorial districts for the election of state committee representatives.
Power

What kind of power is held by the leadership of the West Virginia Republican Party? Obviously the goal of any party is to gain political influence; however, this is not something the Republican Party in West Virginia holds at this time. In fact, outside the party itself, Republicans wield very little influence. The place to look for power, then, is inside the party.

The West Virginia Secretary of State’s office lists the qualifications and privileges of official political parties in the state (West Virginia Secretary of State). Qualifications include obtaining at least 1% of the vote in the preceding gubernatorial election. Most privileges would appear to be inconsequential for Republicans; after all, what is the value of being allowed to raise money as a declared candidate for a party that has almost no chance of winning? One privilege that went untapped for years by the West Virginia Republican Party is the ability to conduct nominating procedures for its general election candidates. This ability went virtually unnoticed until one West Virginia Republican Party Chairman thought he might change the party’s electoral fortunes by changing the nominating procedures for the Republican presidential candidate West Virginia’s delegates would support at the Republican National Convention.

The 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention (Figure 2)

On January 14, 2006 at the bi-annual meeting of the West Virginia State Republican Executive Committee, members voted in favor of the first ever West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention (Appendix A – Resolution). Chairman Robin Capehart, among others, crafted the convention procedures and rules to be used in the next election of West Virginian delegates to the Republican
Figure 2 - Timeline for the 2008 WVGOP Presidential Convention

January 14, 2006 – WVGOP State Executive Committee votes to elect a portion (18) of its delegates through a state convention in addition to the traditional May primary.

March 8, 2007 – Bob Fish appointed as CEO of the WVGOP Presidential Convention, Inc.

July 14, 2007 – WVGOP State Executive Committee issues a call for the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention to elect delegates to the 2008 Republican National Convention to be held February 5, 2008 at 9:00 AM in Charleston, WV.

September 1 – December 31, 2007 – Presidential candidates file electronically with the state party and pay $5,000.00 filing fee.

September 1 – November 30, 2007 – Registered Republicans in West Virginia submit an online form to the state party in order to participate in the balloting process for the state delegate. Upon verification by state party officials, enrollees are mailed a password to be used to vote online.

October 29, 2007 – The West Virginia State Republican Executive Committee enters into an official agreement with the West Virginia Presidential Convention, Inc to conduct the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention.

November 1–30, 2007 – State delegate candidate filing

- File by completing online certificate of candidacy and paying candidacy fee to the state party.
- Candidates may choose (but are not required) to indicate their preference for a presidential candidate.

December 1, 2007 – Presidential candidates submit candidates for delegates to the 2008 Republican National Convention. Candidates to convention also submit a filing fee.

January 1–14, 2008 – Delegates to the state presidential convention that are allocated to the county executive committees are selected.

- At-large and “bonus” delegates to the state presidential convention are elected.
  - Balloting is conducted online.
  - County executive committees may choose to conduct a county convention in addition to the online balloting during the time frame.

January 18, 2008 – Delegates to the state presidential convention certified by the state chairman.

February 5, 2008 – Presidential convention convenes at 9:00 AM.
National Convention where the next Republican presidential candidate would be decided. The ‘buzz words’ around the convention said it would bring West Virginia into play in the national political scene, since it would occur on Super Tuesday, February 5th, the earliest any state is allowed (Ankrom 2011, email; Lucas 2011, email). In fact, when asked about the rationale behind holding a convention in West Virginia, the convention’s CEO Bob Fish replied at length, citing the lackluster nature of West Virginia’s former primary election procedures for choosing national convention delegates (Fish 2011, email): “The West Virginia voters lose out because the candidates have no reason to contend for West Virginia delegates” (Fish 2011, email). States like Iowa and New Hampshire gain tremendous media attention despite their size because of their early caucuses. West Virginia, however, does not hold its primary election until May and only offers 27 national delegates. Thus, the state receives little to no attention and those elected as national delegates tend to be the first 27 on the ballot, or those with high name recognition. Referring to the traditional primary election held in May, Mr. Fish insists that it is a disservice to West Virginians, calling it “mostly a beauty contest” (Fish 2011, email) because by the time West Virginia votes for its national convention delegates, the presidential candidate is already decided. Ron Paul campaigner Ed Burgess agreed, calling the traditional May primary a “popularity contest,” with advantage to names known State-wide or regionally by Congressional District – Everyday and Locally Active Republicans had very little chance on a Primary ballot” (2011, email). While Fish highlights the lack of electoral influence for West Virginia with the traditional May primary, Burgess highlights the lack of opportunity for participation for ‘Everyday Republicans’.

Along these same lines of reasoning, Fish stated of the 2008 convention: “The objective of the West Virginia Party Leadership in 2008 was to offer the Party an opportunity to be relevant in the selection of the GOP Presidential Candidate in 2008. To that objective, we were successful beyond all

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10 Interviews with convention participants and campaign leaders were conducted via email after receiving the approval of the Marshall University Institutional Review Board. When quoting from interviews, I purposely quote at length without much interruption to give readers the opportunity to draw their own conclusions. I also left all quotes from interviewees unedited, allowing readers to observe nuances and emphases in the responses.
measure!” (Fish 2011, email). According to Mr. Fish, then, the rationale behind holding an early nominating convention to choose delegates to the Republican National Convention was to provide West Virginia Republicans with an opportunity to truly participate in the nominating process for the Republican presidential candidate. Because the West Virginia legislature is required to vote to move the primary election and Republicans have little to no control in the legislature, an early convention to elect part of the national delegates is one of only a few options for West Virginia Republicans to participate on the national scene. From that perspective, the convention truly was successful; its crafters found a way to involve the state in national politics without having to go through the Democrat-controlled West Virginia legislature.

It is easy to see how this new convention was very exciting to those to whom it was presented. Conrad Lucas, a delegate to the convention, wrote that he “was excited by the attention that [he] believed the state would receive by being part of “Super Tuesday”” (Lucas 2011, email). Burgess also expressed excitement, but for a different reason. “Going to the National Convention was commonplace for the Party Elites or the Party Powerful. A Convention offered an opportunity for Everyday Republicans to have the same chance as the Powerful and Elite, and the opportunity to represent a choice of more West Virginia Republicans” (Burgess 2011, email). These differences in expectations for the convention are important to note and eventually became important lines of division within the party. Where some were excited about attention and West Virginia as a whole, others were more enticed by the possibility of a more democratic procedure in which everyone, not just well-known people within the party, could participate in a meaningful way.
Rules

The rules for the convention\textsuperscript{11} were much more complicated than exciting. For example, the rules state six different categories of delegates to the state convention. 60\% of delegates were automatic, or they already held positions within the party, such as state or county executive committee members. The remaining 40\% were at-large, or popularly elected. Each county was allotted a certain number of at-large delegates in proportion to its number of registered Republicans. Some counties received “bonus” at-large delegates in proportion to their at-large delegation if the majority of those counties’ votes went to the Republican candidate in the last presidential election (See Figure 3 for a breakdown of delegates by county).

At the level of the common Republican voter, the convention’s rules were incredibly complex and foreign. In order to participate in the election of at-large delegates to the state convention, Republicans had to submit an enrollment form online to the state party. Once verified as an eligible Republican, enrollees were mailed a user name and password to be used for the online election of at-large delegates. In addition to online elections, each county had the option of hosting a county convention to elect its at-large delegation. Should a county choose to do this, the votes at the county convention would be added to those cast in the online balloting.

Even more complex was the process for running as a delegate to the convention. A Republican who chose to run for an at-large delegate position in the county had to file a certificate of candidacy (something I was not even sure I was qualified to do, initially) with the state party by mail, in-person, or online and pay a $25.00 filing fee to the state party. At the time of filing, automatic and at-large delegates could choose to indicate their preference for a presidential candidate, but were not required to do so.

\textsuperscript{11} Official rules of the convention in their entirety appear in Appendix B and will provide the reader with a fuller understanding of the proceedings.
Figure 3 – County-by-County Breakdown of Delegates to the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention

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<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
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The rules themselves make no indication as to how Republicans outside of the structure of the party were to be informed of these new procedures. In a ‘preliminary guide’ to the convention, CEO Bob Fish refers to the intense national media and campaign attention he anticipates for the convention (Appendix C). The assumption within all of the rules, procedures, and guides is that Republicans across the state would understand and participate in the convention. This is a fairly plausible assumption for those within the party because they truly believed candidates would court West Virginia voters just as they court Iowa and New Hampshire voters. However, this was not the case because, at the same time, other states across the nation had the same idea. Many moved their primary elections up to the same day, February 5, 2008, deemed “Super Duper Tuesday”, “Giga Tuesday”, and “Tsunami Tuesday” in the media (CNN 2007; Observer 2008; MSNBC 2007). Although West Virginia was still the only state to hold a convention that day, so its winner would be announced by midday rather than in the evening like all the others, its 18 delegates to be chosen paled in comparison to California’s 173, for instance. As such, only a few campaigns paid much attention or time in West Virginia. Thus, if the crafters of the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention had an influx of campaigning and candidate presences
in mind, especially for the purposes of encouraging participation in the convention, they were likely disappointed.

No other plan was given for informing Republicans in the state of the convention. When asked if he understood the procedures of the convention, convention delegate Conrad Lucas replied

In terms of the procedure, I didn’t understand anything of what was going to happen. I didn’t receive a rulebook or a guide or any information prior to the convention about what would happen. For example, I didn’t even know that the winner needed to receive a majority of votes and that there would be multiple ballots. (Lucas 2011, email)

Lucas was no stranger to the party; he was a delegate to the 2000 Republican National Convention as well as an intern and aide to Congresswoman Shelley Moore Capito (Lucas 2011, email). Ron Paul campaigner Ed Burgess echoed concerns about the lack of understanding of the convention procedures, relating them to most other party procedures as well: “Although much of the knowledge of this process [the party’s nomination procedures] is available to anyone, it is practically “insider information.” And there are nuances to the process that are impossible to know of without experience” (Burgess 2011, email). Of the new convention procedures specifically, Burgess wrote, “For the most of Ron Paul’s supporters in West Virginia, the whole of the process of Nomination as it is today, was bewildering. Many expressed feelings of frustration and powerlessness – of being on the outside looking in” (2011, email).

Conversely, however, Convention CEO Bob Fish claims that participation in the convention was a huge success and that “delegate positions were highly sought” (Fish 2011, email). There is a clear disconnect here between those running the convention, and therefore privy to information pertaining to participation, and those simply participating in the convention. This disconnect is not likely outright
disbelief but rather a reflection of the difference of consciousness of the two groups; one honestly sees the participation in the convention as a success and one honestly does not. Because these are isolated cases, we cannot generalize their views; however, it is important to note the difference in perspective regarding the rules for the convention and the ability of Republicans to participate. These differences play an important role in the theories of power discussed in the next chapter.

The Romney Campaign

Although the campaign attention in the state was significantly less than expected, probably the most attention from a presidential campaign in West Virginia in 2008 came from the Mitt Romney for President campaign. Romney staffer and life-long West Virginia Republican activist Bill Phillips noted that Romney visited the state personally four times in the months leading to the convention (2011, email). Phillips also cites “over 1,000 volunteers and delegates” (2011, email) for the campaign. When asked about the Romney campaign’s structure and strategy, Phillips replied that “[a] small strategy group worked with a statewide Romney Committee... to recruit delegates to attend the convention” (2011, email). The types of delegates recruited by the Romney campaign appear to be automatic delegates. This is a wise strategy, as 60% of the convention’s delegates were automatic. These included members of county executive committees, elected members of the state legislature, and members of the state executive committee. Although a large majority (about 64%) of these automatic delegates signed up as uncommitted to any candidate, of those that did commit to a candidate, Romney supporters represented almost 40%. The next two highest percentages of pledged support from automatic delegates were for Fred Thompson (24%) and Rudy Giuliani (15%), both of whom were out of the race by the day of the convention. With Mike Huckabee receiving about 10%, Ron Paul receiving about 3%, and John McCain receiving about 5% of pledged support from automatic delegates, those pledged to Thompson and Giuliani, as well as those uncommitted automatic delegates, likely dispersed along these percentages. Thus, the largest percentage of automatic delegates most likely supported
Romney. Conrad Lucas, an uncommitted at-large delegate, cites “prominent Republicans who were universally supporting Romney” (2011, email). These ‘prominent Republicans’ were likely members of the county or state executive committees or legislators, and thus automatic delegates.

**The Paul Campaign**

The Ron Paul campaign for the convention took a different approach than targeting automatic delegates, according to campaigner Ed Burgess. Calling himself the “lead West Virginian” for the campaign, Burgess says he was an “inactive Republican [before the convention] and my renewed involvement with the Party was directly related to campaigning for the Good Doctor” (2011, email).

Burgess was very typical of the Paul campaigners, stating that “[t]hose attracted to Dr. Paul and his Campaign were overwhelmingly younger and although astute in political philosophy, were neophytes to the modern political process whereby the two pseudo-governmental organizations choose their Candidates for the run-off election in November, the General Election” (2011, email). Thus, the Paul campaign took more of a grassroots approach, targeting at-large delegate positions through those with specific interest in Ron Paul as a presidential contender, rather than focusing on automatic delegate positions where party members were weighing options between candidates. Any Ron Paul delegates were involved in the convention for the sole purpose of campaigning for Ron Paul.

Burgess indicated that “hundreds, perhaps thousands” became involved in the Paul campaign, whose official structure operated through county and state level staffers (Burgess 2011, email). He noted, however, that many interested in Ron Paul “expressed or acted in mistrust of the PCC [Presidential Campaign Committee] generally, and specifically, its employees in-State at the State HQ” (Burgess 2011, email). The reason for this distrust was probably that employees and leaders of the official campaign, such as Burgess, were actives and held positions within the Republican Party and grassroots supporters of Paul were not associated with the party before the convention (Burgess 2011, email). These grassroots supporters formed a kind of parallel campaign organization, according to
Burgess, but the information about the convention on which they operated was not always correct (2011, email). Thus, “our greatest strength was at the same time, our greatest weakness – there is misinformation, as well as disinformation, on the Computer Screen,” where the grassroots supporters received most of their information (Burgess 2011, email).

In discussing the Paul campaign’s strategy, Burgess stated “there was no shortage of willing supporters. Had these “willing” been “ready and able” to navigate themselves all the way to the Convention Floor, a First Ballot victory was as likely for our champion, as it was for the Party Regular’s favorite” (2011, email). Burgess felt confident, then, that the number of grassroots supporters favoring Paul was large enough to win the convention on the first ballot. The problem was that these supporters were unfamiliar with the party and somewhat distrustful of those who were. Understanding the convention’s procedures, Burgess knew that Paul would have sizable support, but probably not enough for a first round victory because of the nature of the campaign’s supporters. Thus, he sought a ‘plan B’.

This, he says, came about when he met Michael Ankrom of the Huckabee campaign.

**The Huckabee Campaign**

Other than Ron Paul, the other ‘dark horse’ of the convention candidates was Mike Huckabee, former Governor of Arkansas, who was very conservative with an evangelical background. Although this candidate was expected to resonate best with West Virginia Republicans (Lucas 2011, email), Huckabee was viewed as “2nd tier” according to Huckabee campaign leader Michael Ankrom (2011, email).

Attracted to the campaign by Huckabee’s ideology and presence, Ankrom voluntarily lead the unofficial Huckabee campaign in hopes of “win[ning] this state for Huckabee and giv[ing] him a boost on Super Tuesday” (Ankrom 2011, email).

Ankrom had a unique position in the party in the months prior to the convention; he was employed as Political Director for the West Virginia Republican Party when the convention procedures were written and decided upon (Ankrom 2011, email). However, his position was eliminated in
September of 2007, at which time he “contacted [Mike Huckabee’s] campaign... to inquire about helping his efforts in West Virginia at the convention. I was somewhat concerned because they had no idea what was going on with the convention. They had no staff in West Virginia and really no organized volunteer efforts” (Ankrom 2011, email). Thus, Ankrom headed up efforts for Huckabee for the convention.

As for strategy, Ankrom states that, as of September 2007 when he started campaigning for Huckabee, “[t]he people who were already a part of the party structure had either already identified their support for another candidate or had at that point decided to stay uncommitted” (2011, email). In other words, Ankrom says that most automatic delegates (those members of the party that held positions in its structure), and thus 60% of the convention’s delegates, were already pledged to another candidate or decided to remain officially uncommitted. Therefore, Ankrom concentrated on the at-large delegate positions allotted to each county which made up the remaining 40% of the convention’s delegates (Ankrom 2011, email): “For example, in Cabell County there were 27 at-large delegate positions. We won all 27 spots. We did this in 6 large counties. In fact, we won more at-large delegates than any of the other candidates. I went to socially conservative people, pro-life, evangelical Christians, who were not involved in the Party structure” (Ankrom 2011, email). Of Huckabee’s delegates and supporters, Ankrom relates “[t]hey weren’t legislators, they weren’t state executive committee members. Some were activists for certain movements, like pro-life groups, family groups, but they were outside of the party structure” (2011, email).

Unlike other campaigns that targeted automatic delegates, which made up 60% of the total convention delegates, Ankrom targeted those outside of the party structure to fill at-large delegate positions.
Paul and Huckabee

During the registration process for candidates for convention delegate, Ankrom met the Paul campaign’s leadership, specifically Ed Burgess (Ankrom 2011, email). Burgess said of this chance meeting: “Inside the office [the State Party’s office] he [Ankrom] spoke and introduced himself. This was unusual as most other Republicans were not as friendly, or not so openly friendly in the presence of others, as he was” (2011, email). Burgess goes on to relate that after he had finished his business and walked away from the office, “Mr. Ankrom came out and approached us with the words, “… you know we have a convention coming up.” This was music to my ears, and knew instantly his meaning – he was continuing to treat us as fellow Republicans – as equals, and offering the possibility of a Second Ballot contingency plan – we would have our “Plan B” after all” (2011, email). Because both Huckabee and Paul were considered ‘dark horse’ candidates and because both campaigns took more of a grassroots approach in targeting at-large delegate positions, rather than trying to sway automatic delegates, Ankrom “wanted to reach out to [the Paul leadership]” (Ankrom 2011, email). After some initial hesitation due to the fact that some within the leadership of the Paul campaign were “political process neophyte[s] and didn’t fully grasp what Mr. Ankrom’s approach meant for our Campaign” (Burgess 2011, email), the Paul leadership met with Ankrom and they decided to assist each other in the election of at-large delegates to the convention: “For example, if a county had 20 at-large slots available and Huckabee only had 15 candidates running, my goal would be to get Huckabee voters to vote for Huckabee and Ron Paul. That way, other candidates’ delegates would be blocked and the Paul and Huckabee delegates would be elected. The Paul campaign agreed to this strategy” (Ankrom 2011, email). Ankrom says that this strategy did not necessarily provide phenomenal results; it did, however, build trust between the two campaigns (Ankrom 2011, email).
The online voting, as well as ten county conventions, decided the at-large delegates for the convention. As Ankrom indicated, the Huckabee campaign boasted the most at-large delegate wins with each county’s delegation led in total votes by all of Huckabee’s candidates for delegate, proving his strategy was successful. The overall turnout, however, was incredibly low, with the highest vote getter in the state receiving only 69 votes. Several at-large delegates were elected with just one vote. Although Mr. Fish stated that the delegate positions were “highly sought”, only 1,629 Republicans registered to run as delegates (Fish 2011, email). In many cases counties failed to run enough candidates for at-large delegates, so after the state chairman certified the delegates elected by online balloting and county conventions on January 18, county chairs began appointing people to fill those positions from January 19 until January 25. Ten days prior to the convention on January 26, the state chairman appointed any unfilled at-large delegate positions.

Because of the convention’s rules that a candidate had to receive a majority of the votes to win the convention, and because there were four candidates still in the race on the day of the convention, the likelihood of a first round victory for any candidate was low. Although Romney held the lead in total delegates pledged to vote for him, Huckabee ran close behind him in his delegate total. For this reason, Ankrom knew he needed to make plans for additional rounds of voting, when the lowest vote-getter would be dropped after each round (Ankrom 2011, email). Ankrom thus called on the relationship he built with Ed Burgess and the Ron Paul campaign: “We reached a deal” Ankrom writes “that if Ron Paul was eliminated, they would support Huckabee and if Huckabee was eliminated, we would support Ron Paul. In return, if one of the two campaigns were to win the convention, the other campaign would be able to send three people of their choosing to the national convention as delegates” (Ankrom 2011, email; Burgess 2011, email).
This strategy seems logical enough; however, neither the Romney nor the McCain campaign attempted to form a coalition with any of the other campaigns in the event of more than one round of voting at the convention. Interviewees representing the Romney and McCain campaigns did not address this issue; however, Ankrom stated that “the Romney campaign thought they would win on the first round. Romney had the support of a lot of the party structure. They were counting on people who were committed to Thompson and uncommitted delegates to put them over the top on the first round. I don’t think they saw the need to form alliances with other campaigns” (Ankrom 2011, email). Referring to candidates that were in the running when delegates to the convention filed, such as Fred Thompson or Rudy Giuliani, as well as delegates that remained uncommitted on paper, Ankrom insinuates that the Romney campaign felt they would ultimately gain those delegates.

This mentality, also in the McCain campaign according to Ankrom, stemmed from the idea that the Romney and McCain campaigns would “ride the national media’s tide” (Ankrom 2011, email). In other words, as Super Tuesday drew closer and candidates began dropping out of the race, Romney and McCain were seen as front runners while Paul and Huckabee were not seen as viable. In West Virginia, this translated to Romney being the front runner because McCain was more of a moderate candidate than a staunchly conservative one. Thus, the Romney campaign in particular counted on the following of uncommitted and previously-committed delegates to vote for Romney, allowing him to win a decisive victory during the first round of voting.

February 5, 2008

The day of the convention was filled with activity and excitement at the Charleston Civic Center. Major media outlets were present, as well as three of the four candidates to be voted on that day. Romney, Huckabee, Paul, and a representative from McCain’s national campaign all spoke before the first round of voting. The election commission approved and certified a total of 1,207 convention delegates. Upon entering the convention, delegates were registered and mingled until the convention
officially began. Campaigns were busy ensuring that all of their pledged delegates showed up and were registered appropriately.

Of the total convention delegates, 1,133 voted in the first round at the convention. Delegates were seated by county and each county’s Republican executive committee chairperson conducted a roll call vote within their county’s delegates. The votes were hand written by county chairs (the record of which apparently no longer exists). Once all counties had completed their roll call votes, the state chairman conducted a county-by-county roll call vote, reporting totals for each candidate in each county (the record of the county-by-county totals also apparently no longer exists). After all counties had reported their vote distributions, Mitt Romney led with 464 votes. Mike Huckabee followed closely with 375 votes. John McCain trailed with 176 votes. Ron Paul had the lowest number of votes, 118, and would thus be dropped from the ballot and a second round of voting would ensue.

Before the second round, the convention went to a lunch break. Very few, however, actually ate lunch. All of the campaigns except Huckabee’s had rooms reserved at the Civic Center in which they met during this intermission to discuss strategy. At this time, Ankrom saw that a Huckabee win was certainly possible with the help of the Ron Paul delegates. Although Ron Paul was no longer on the ballot, the delegates pledged to him were allowed to vote on the second round for whichever candidate they chose. Ankrom relates: “I went to visit the Paul campaign to encourage them to stay and uphold the agreement made with their leadership” (Ankrom 2011, email). Ankrom was not the only one to visit the Paul campaign, however. Upon learning that the Paul delegates planned to stay and vote in the second round, “[t]he Romney campaign came and made a pitch to the Paul campaign, as well. They asked for their support in the second round of voting” (Ankrom 2011, email). Specifically, once they learned of the proposition of three national delegates from the Huckabee campaign, the Romney campaign attempted to entice the Paul campaign by offering five national delegates, should Romney win. “The Paul people,” Ankrom writes, “held firm to our deal and encouraged their delegates to vote for Huckabee” (Ankrom 2011, email).
The deal Ankrom made was with the Paul leadership and each delegate was free to vote for anyone, so encouragement from the leadership was really all Ankrom could hope for.

The McCain campaign was in another room during the intermission. During this time, “John McCain contacted Governor Huckabee and asked for his delegates to vote for McCain on the second round of voting” (Ankrom 2011, email). It would appear that McCain himself counted on the national tide and assumed Huckabee would go ahead and get behind McCain’s candidacy. However, “Huckabee said no because he was in a good position” (Ankrom 2011, email). In several meetings with Huckabee since the convention, he related to me personally that there had been several instances like this, where Huckabee was told to ‘go to the back of the line’, or wait his turn within the Republican Party, but he refused. Because of his refusal, “McCain instructed his delegates to support Huckabee in the second round, in order to block Romney” (Ankrom 2011, email). Operating from the same ‘national tide’ mentality, the McCain campaign apparently reasoned that if McCain could not win the West Virginia convention, they at least wanted Romney to lose so he would not gain any steam from an early Super Tuesday win: “At this point, McCain delegates, Huckabee delegates, and Paul delegates all formed a coalition in the second round of voting” (Ankrom 2011, email).

The second round of voting proceeded as the first, with roll call votes within county delegations, then a county-by-county reporting of vote totals for each candidate. In the second round, McCain still received 12 votes, Romney received 521 votes, and Huckabee won with 567 votes. Again, a record of individual votes cannot be located, so it is impossible to identify which coalition put Huckabee over the top. However, I can confidently say that Huckabee’s second round supporters came from the Paul and McCain, as well as the Romney campaign. Delegate Conrad Lucas is just one example: he was officially uncommitted, but unofficially had given his word to vote for Romney on the first round (Lucas 2011, email). On the second round, however, Lucas voted for Huckabee:
There were a few reasons for this. First, those from my county who were elected to their positions were supporting Huckabee thus I felt a duty to serve as a representative of the county and support the person who the elected representatives were supporting. Second, I had only committed to my friends to support Romney on the first ballot. Third, after spending some time considering my actual values and positions, Huckabee was the obvious personal choice for me. (Lucas 2011, email)

Lucas was not likely an isolated case. The three-way coalition, completely above par and even to be expected in a brokered-style convention, was not received well, however. In an article two days after the convention, Lawrence Messina wrote that “bitterness remains after midstream horse-trading delivered Huckabee the convention. Short of votes to win, McCain's campaign threw in with the former Arkansas governor to deny Romney early momentum” (2008). The Paul campaign was not mentioned at all, even though Paul’s pledged delegates far outnumbered McCain’s. Additionally, the article’s use of ‘horse-trading’ suggests negativity and secrecy, when in reality, this type of balloting, an exhaustive ballot, is very commonly utilized and expected to end only with a brokered convention (for a very commonplace source, see Wikipedia/ Exhaustive Ballot). Messina goes on to write that “Romney backers cried foul. The other camps [other than Romney] accused them [the Romney campaign] of indulging in the same sort of dealmaking, while treating victory as inevitable” (2008). As this article states, the assumed outcome by Romney backers - and thus a large majority of the Republican state executive committee, county chairs, and county committee members - was that Romney would have a clear, decisive victory.

Post-Convention Stress and Disorder

The article above continues, citing that “[r]eports of Republicans showing up at shuttered polling places, mistaking Charleston's convention for a statewide primary, seemed to confirm fears that
the party had not sufficiently advertised or explained the convention” (Messina 2008). Messina quotes interviewee Bill Phillips “‘A lot of Republicans still don’t know about it. The few that did know about it, didn’t understand it,” Phillips said. ”They felt like they had been disenfranchised. Quite frankly, that was a concern that I had from day one.’”(2008). This article represents well the sentiment following the convention. The general feeling was anger at a convention where the number of Republicans that sought to be at-large convention delegates was only 1,629, representing less than one half of 1% of registered Republicans in the state (Fish 2011, email; Herald Dispatch). Republican Party office secretary Marti Riggall writes “the main complaint that I heard from numerous phone calls in the office for weeks afterwards were that people felt “disenfranchised” from the process in that “backroom deals” were apparently used to secure the eventual winner” (Riggall 2011, email). If ‘putting West Virginia on the map’ were the buzz words before the convention, ‘disenfranchisement’ was the buzz word after the convention. In at least one case in Wood County, signatures were collected on a petition voicing disapproval of the convention and were sent to Chairman McKinney.

The reasons for the negative environment and feelings toward the convention vary from person to person and can be only speculated. Chairman McKinney’s response to the petition from Wood County pointed to the democratic mechanism used to elect delegates to the convention and suggested that the petitioners, none of whom, McKinney noted, were monetary contributors to the West Virginia Republican Party, were simply complaining about a process in which they were unwilling to participate. Marti Riggall wrote that she felt at first that anger was being expressed by ‘sore losers’ who were just disappointed that their particular candidate did not win, “but as time went on, I came to the realization that the convention and the way that things were conducted led to some permanent rifts within the WV GOP that will take years to heal” (2011, email). Her response suggests that perhaps the structure, procedures and operation of the convention were the cause of the post-convention stress and disorder.
Romney campaigner Bill Phillips issued his post-convention input in the form of a memorandum to CEO Bob Fish, in which he cited at length many procedural and rules-based issues that he claims led to confusion for his campaign, as well as Republicans in the state (Phillips 2008, email). Phillips writes, “[t]his should never be done again unless all registered Republicans are provided an official notification, not charged $25.00 to become a candidate for delegate or asked to take a day off from work. Finally, this entire process should have been run by the membership of the West Virginia Republican State Executive not a private corporation” (Phillips 2008, email). Phillips argument is more of a democratic one, as he argues for more clearly-defined rules, more information, and more accessibility for West Virginia Republicans.

Ron Paul campaigner Ed Burgess identifies the problem experienced in the convention as a lack of dissemination of information, a problem he sees in the overall functioning and structure of the party as a whole: “The one effort that should have been the best and most effective, turned out to be the most disappointing – the County Committees members informing their Republican neighbors. Membership on these Committees being by geography, vacancies exacerbated the problem” (Burgess 2011, email). The vacancies he refers to are on standing county-level Republican executive committees, the closest point of contact of the West Virginia Republican Party with ‘Everyday Republicans’. These vacancies and the problems they caused with the functioning of the convention, Burgess insists, are symptomatic of a larger problem: “disaffection with what could be called, the Party Powerful, or the Elitists of the Party” (2011, email).

Convention CEO Bob Fish rejects accusations of foul play or disenfranchisement. “The State Convention produced the largest business meeting of West Virginia Republicans in memory, occupying most of the ground floor of the Charleston Civic Center” (Fish 2011, email). Fish calls the convention an absolute success in the achievement of its purposes (Fish 2011, email). Again, the differences in perspectives are interesting and important to note. While Riggall suggests the problem was a lack of
unity and strength in the party’s structure, Phillips seems to argue for too much strength in the party structure and not enough with the voters in the party, Burgess argues the convention’s problems stemmed from the fact that the structure of the party is affected by perceptions of ‘Elitists of the Party’, all the while Fish denies that there was a problem at all. Again, this is not likely a stubborn refusal, but instead reflects a disparity of consciousnesses. Consider that, although the numbers of participants in the convention look very poor compared to the total number of registered Republicans in the state, people that have been in the party a long time understand that a very small fraction of that total have ever expressed interest or involvement in the party. From that perspective, the turnout could be considered fairly good. However, the involvement of the rest of the state’s Republicans must also be considered, no matter how idealistic it might seem. Therefore the perspective of a good turnout is understandable, but not necessarily acceptable.

The theories utilized in this study investigate a portion of the issues raised from this series of events. The arguments of interviewees above indicate differences in opinion regarding power: power of individuals, institutions, and voters. While participants and democratic theorists utilized in the introduction and conclusion discuss who should have power, the theories presented in the following four chapters relate who actually does have power in the history related in this chapter.
Chapter Two - Theoretical Perspectives

With an understanding of the circumstances, I now introduce the theoretical perspectives with which I examine the phenomenon of the convention. Like most of political science, this is a study of power. Most questions of relations among people, especially within politics, come down to questions of power: Who has power? What kind of power? What is power? Although these questions have been discussed and debated in academia for ages, one particular debate in the field of political science brought questions of power and the study of power to the fore. In a special one hundredth volume of the American Political Science Review, Benjamin Barber writes about this historical debate in political science in the 1960s. I introduce the three theories of power I utilize in this study through a discussion of Barber’s article, explaining how the three emerged in relation to one another and discussing the assumptions inherent in each. I then apply each theory to the phenomenon of the convention in each subsequent chapter.

Behavioralists and the First Dimension of Power

In his article, Barber relates the emergence of pluralists or behavioralists and their push for value-free theory to the social and political implications of the end of World War II: “Throughout the 1950s, a period during which both hard social science and normative political philosophy made major inroads in the discipline, the debate about the nature of science and its role in the study of society was already growing” (Barber 2006, 540). The debate produced a field of ‘scientists’ who attempted to be, according to Barber, apolitical. With a great deal of the world in political shambles and with traditional assumptions and impressions of totalitarianism and communism being challenged to their cores, the American behavioralists in the field of political science sought to pull back from normative, value-laden studies in favor of more scientific ones where they could be objective and scientific.

The rise of the behavioralist school in political science included more precise definitions of power in political and social settings, as well as stricter methodologies for the study of power. Within
this school were scholars like Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby, leading behavioralists whose theories of power operated in what would later be called the first dimension. According to these theorists, exercises of power are apparent and observable (Dahl 1957; Polsby 1963). Observing the winners and losers in a particular situation allows scientists to determine who has power.

A canonical example of the first dimension of power is Robert Dahl’s study of New Haven, Connecticut *Who Governs?* Dahl argues against the classical elitist model, the reigning school of thought in political science before behavioralism. Classical political theorists, whose work was based mostly upon historical and legal texts and was unapologetically normative, claimed that in every community was some ruling elite that acted either in public or behind the scenes to exercise its power. In *Who Governs*, Dahl claims that instead of a ruling elite, there are a plurality of different interests represented in a community that compete for their interests in the political sphere (1961). In *The Concept of Power*, Dahl argues that the ruling elite model of classical political theorists could not be called scientific because it “cannot even in principle be controverted by empirical evidence” (1958, 463). In other words, Dahl claims that the classical elitist model against which behavioralists rose touted a theory which was non-falsifiable and therefore could not claim to be scientific. Dahl argues that classical political theorists assume that some group either overtly or covertly controls happenings in communities, “constitut[ing] a ruling elite” (1958, 463). He says the theory is non-falsifiable because if no ruling elite can be found, “the theory can be saved by arguing that behind the overt leaders there is a set of covert leaders” (Dahl 1958, 463).

One of the major classical theorists in the field was Leo Strauss, who responded to behavioralism by claiming “it fiddles while Rome burns” (1962, 327). By this, Strauss attacked behavioralism by calling it coldly irrelevant; how germane, Strauss might ask, can a discipline be that refuses to engage in the world in which it operates? Strauss makes the stinging analysis that “the new political science puts a premium on observations which can be made with the utmost frequency, and therefore by people of
the meanest capacities. Thus it frequently culminates in observations made by people who are not intelligent about people who are not intelligent” (1962, 326). Although it produces more than a slightly elitist aroma, Strauss’ claim highlights the major downfall of the behavioralist approach: reduction of the field of political science to the study of the most common of denominators.

Dahl would not necessarily disagree with this claim; objectivity and scientific application are the main interests of behavioralism, therefore a distanced observer would gain the best empirical evidence. Dahl presents this scientific view and method of discovering power as such: “My intuitive idea of power, then, is something like this: A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl 1957, 202). Dahl explains his view of power with the example of traffic. He insists that if he were to stand on the side of the road and command vehicles to only drive on the right hand side of the road and they did, it would obviously not demonstrate his power. On the other hand, if a traffic officer were to stand in a busy intersection and command one vehicle to turn right, one to turn left, and to control the traffic pattern, that officer exercises power (Dahl 1957, 202). Nelson Polsby, another well-known behavioralist, agrees with this view of power, insisting that observing “who participates, who gains and loses, and who prevails in decision-making” (1963, 55) reveals who has power in a given situation or community. This view of power represents the one-dimensional approach.

Dahl indicates three particular aspects of this approach to the study of power. First, Dahl states that power is a relation between actors (1957, 203). With this statement, Dahl effectively reduces the definition of power to only relations between people, entities, offices, nation-states, and so on. This move is crucial to the one-dimensional approach because it limits the scope of observation of power, as Strauss criticized. Dahl rejects notions of power from environmental factors, cultural norms or values, or even positional limitations or freedoms. All of these may exist, Dahl would say, but they do not constitute power. Power in the first dimension is specifically defined as only occurring in a relationship between actors. Nothing else can be called power, according to the first dimension.
Second, Dahl calls the base of power “inert, passive. It must be exploited in some fashion if the behavior of others is to be altered” (1957, 203). Here, Dahl says the exercise of power by one over another is intentional. In its natural state, power is neutral, Dahl claims. A does not influence B without purposely doing so. Again, defining this facet of power in the first dimension serves to further limit its scope; unintentional influence does not constitute an act of power, according to Dahl.

A third feature of power, according to Dahl, is the necessary observable connection between A and B (1957, 204). In order for a power relationship to exist, there must be clear causal lines between the action of A and the reaction of B. For example, in *Who Governs*, Dahl discusses leaders allocating rewards to individuals and groups in order to build political coalitions (1961, 94). In other words, A makes the offer of a coalition more attractive to B by including rewards. This is an observable connection between the action of A and the reaction or decision of B. In the example of traffic above, power is evident when the actions of a traffic officer clearly effect the reactions of drivers to turn right when the officer points right and left when the officer points left. For Dahl, when power is exercised, it is clear: A’s action has a direct, observable effect on B’s action.

All three of these characteristics of one-dimensional power serve to limit the definition of power to observable, quantifiable actions between actors. Going back to the comparison between this view of power and the classical, elitist model, the behavioralists’ one-dimensional power is much more scientific and empirical. In fact, when all of these limitations on the definition of power are in place, and the outside observer knows the base, means, amount, and scope of the power of A, the observer can mathematically predict the likelihood that A will successfully alter B’s behavior (Dahl 1957, 203).

Although this view of power seems to be very straightforward and uncomplicated, John Gaventa points out three assumptions of the behavioralist approach that are important to an understanding of the first dimension of power. First, he writes, “grievances are assumed to be recognized and acted upon” (Gaventa 1980, 5). In order for power to be observed from behaviors, behaviors must be
considered pure manifestations of desires. Then, observing, measuring, and predicting power becomes mathematical. For example, $B$ has the desire to get to work on time. Without any other actors, $B$ will get to work on time. However, if $B$ is running a few minutes late one day and $A$ is patrolling traffic, $B$’s desire to avoid a speeding ticket competes with $B$’s desire to get to work on time. With a few more pieces of information, a behavioralist can predict the probability that $B$ will slow down, avoid a ticket, and arrive late for work. When this happens, behavioralists claim that $A$ has power over $B$ because $A$ caused $B$ to do something that $B$ would not otherwise do. Polsby asserts the assumption that desires are expressed in behavior when he writes that people simply participate in places and ways that express their values, and that a person’s interest can always be measured by where that person spends time and resources (Polsby 1959, 235). Simply put, participation expresses values.

William Riker, whose first-dimensional game theory will be utilized to explain the convention’s outcome in chapter five, agrees with the behavioralist assumption that actions are manifestations of desires, stating “[s]ince the only objective evidence we can gather about other persons’ scales of preference is the evidence of their behavior, the very act of following a chosen course must indicate that this course led to a preferred outcome” (1962, 19). Like all behavioralists, Riker is assured of the absolute objectivity of a person’s behavior as an indicator of that person’s preferences.

The second assumption Gaventa identifies in the first dimension of power is that “participation is assumed to occur within decision-making arenas, which are in turn assumed to be open to virtually any organized group” (1980, 5). After all, if observing behaviors is observing values and power, the arena in which behaviors occur must be considered neutral, open territory. The environment cannot be a factor in the first dimension of power. In order to be as pure a measure of value as the first dimension claims to be, the arena in which decisions and behaviors occur must be considered accessible. Polsby makes this assumption when he writes the idea that in a democratic government where there are many channels of access, any given group may have their values addressed (Polsby 1963, 118). Riker’s game
theory also makes this assumption by speaking of coalition-formation by equal participants in an open arena (1962). For example, Riker would say that in a particular contest all participants would rank their preferred winners and form coalitions based on the number of participants with the same first, second, or third preferences. The assumption is that all options are available to all participants.

The third and final assumption Gaventa finds inherent in one-dimensional power is that “because of the openness of the decision-making process, leaders may be studied, not as elites, but as representative spokesmen for a mass” (1980, 6). Presumably in one-dimensional power, democracy works as well in life as it does in theory: people elect representatives to act on their behalf and in their interests. In a democracy leaders do not have agendas separate than those of their constituents and if they did, their constituents would simply fail to re-elect them in the next election. In this way, behavioralists see that constituents have power over representatives, not the other way around where the representatives are self-interested elites. Riker states that “[t]he means by which leaders [attract followers to their proto-coalitions] is the offer of ... side-payments” (1962, 105). Side-payments are the private agreements between players about the division of the payoff for winning. In other words, leaders form winning coalitions by appealing to the interests or values of constituents or other leaders, by offering them a portion of the winnings.

For proponents of one-dimensional (or the first dimension of) power, then, $A$ has power over $B$ to the extent that $A$ can get $B$ to do something that $B$ would not otherwise do, assuming that 1) $B$’s actions are indicative of $B$’s values or desires, 2) $B$ is capable of acting within an open, decision-making arena, and 3) anyone acting as $B$’s representative actually represents $B$’s values or desires.

Writing from this view of power, William Riker forms a game theory of political coalitions. For, as mentioned above, if values are measured according to behaviors, a person’s behavior may be predicted using mathematical formulas. This is just what Riker does in terms of coalitions. He argues that anytime a group of more than two people have to make a decision, that group will always form coalitions in
order to come to a decision. (Riker 1962, 12). According to Riker, groups make decisions by forming
teams or coalitions within themselves according to their preferences:

Typically, a prospective leader starts with a proposed decision...

Typically, also, a number of like-minded members join him immediately
in support of it and thereby become his followers. ... Assuming that no
more followers can be attracted to the proposal as it stands, the leader
can, nevertheless, still attract more followers with the same kind of
currency by the technique of modifying the proposal. (Riker 1962, 112)

A person on one side of a conflict, then, can attract others to that side simply because they agree with
the ideology of the side, and they will form a coalition. Once this is finished, the sides are set. Then,
Riker says, leaders of coalitions can modify their proposals to attract members of other coalitions.
Coalition leaders do this by utilizing what he calls side-payments. This is when players reach a private
agreement about the division of the payoff for winning (Riker 1962, 34).

Thus, he claims that the strategy for forming a winning coalition abides by the size principle: “In
social situations similar to n-person, zero-sum games with side-payments, participants create coalitions
just as large as they believe will ensure winning and no larger” (Riker 1962, 47). To interpret this
mathematical jargon, Riker claims that in any decision-making arena with more than two people where
only one decision can enjoy the results of winning and each side is allowed to bargain within the rules of
the arena, people form the smallest possible coalition necessary to win. The important thing to note
here is that bargaining is allowed and even expected, for after all we are talking about politics. What
exactly each side may bargain with depends upon the situation. When all of these things are taken into
account, an observer may conceivably predict the winner of a political contest by the mathematical
application of Riker’s coalition theory.
Again, Riker’s entire theory operates from a one-dimensional view of power. He assumes that the game is open to all and that choosing a coalition is simply a matter of ordering preferences. In chapter five I apply this theory of power and coalitions to the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention, specifically the formation of a coalition between the Huckabee and the Paul campaigns, as well as the unintentional coalition between the Huckabee and the McCain campaigns. Although I argue that the first dimension of power is evident in the convention phenomenon, I have to agree with the classical theorists mentioned above, however, and assert that a one-dimensional view of power alone gives only a limited understanding of one part of the overall phenomenon.

The Second Dimension of Power

Another group of theorists arose in the 1960s whose lens of power presents a more complete view of the phenomenon presented here. These theorists insisted that power, in addition to operating straightforwardly in readily observable situations as in the first dimension, also operates in a second dimension. Proponents of this view, including Peter Bachrach, Morton Baratz, and E. E. Schattschneider, argue that exercises of power are not strictly confined to concrete, quantifiable actions or behaviors, as the behavioralists would like to claim (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). They agree with the classical theorists that the first dimension is too narrow to encompass all exercises of power. In addition, proponents of two-dimensional power insist that students of power must look not only at the outcome of a particular scenario but also at things like who makes the rules by which the scenario is played and who decides what the scenario is about. In other words, according to two-dimensional power theorists, the set-up of a given conflict is just as important as the outcome when identifying power relationships.

Of one-dimensional power, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz ask, “can a sound concept of power be predicated on the assumption that power is totally embodied and fully reflected in “concrete decisions” or in activity bearing directly upon their making? We think not” (1962, 948). Bachrach and Baratz reject the behavioralist, first dimension of power’s assumption that power only operates where it
is observed through behavior. They go on to say that “power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A” (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 948). What they claim here is that power is exercised beyond observable decisions. Bachrach and Baratz argue that power is also being wielded when A prevents B’s grievances from being addressed by erecting barriers to participation: “To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A’s set of preferences” (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 948). In order to maintain power, A can prevent B from participating in decision-making arenas.

A can prevent B from participating in at least two ways: by setting or utilizing the rules of the game and by determining the scope of the conflict. First, when the rules of the game are set in such a way as to favor one set of preferences or concerns over another, A, who is advantaged by the rules, exercises two-dimensional power over B. The ability to set the rules is power, according to the second dimension. Simply utilizing rules which happen to be advantageous to a certain group is also power in the second dimension; for example, tall players are advantaged by the rules of basketball. Behavioralists would argue that this is not the case; that leadership and representatives act on behalf of those they represent and therefore do not set rules to the advantage of some and to the disadvantage of others. However, in the second dimension of power, not only can the decisions of those in power adversely affect those without power, those in power can also set the rules of the game such that those without power are unable to voice their grievances in decision-making arenas. For example, behavioralists might claim that a city council acts as a representative of the city’s population and therefore addresses grievances of anyone in the city. However, if the city council set its agenda exclusively around addressing the issue of lost puppies, Bachrach and Baratz would say this is power, too. Concerns having to do with
something other than puppies are not addressed. E. E. Schattschneider agrees that two-dimensional power is achieved through setting the rules of the game. He states “[a]ll forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out” (Schattschneider 1975, 69). In other words, by organizing or setting rules or agendas, those in power exercise more power by preventing some issues from being ‘organized into politics’.

The second way A can prevent B from participating and thus can exercise two-dimensional power is to designate the scope of the conflict. This concept comes from Schattschneider, who thought that those in power will strive to prevent conflict from even beginning (1975, 15). Schattschneider refers to the conflict that might occur between the interests of A and the interests of B. He says that it only makes sense for A to attempt to avoid the conflict altogether, especially if the strength of B is unknown. Schattschneider goes on to make the point that almost all theories dealing with politics have to do with who can and who cannot get “into the fight” (1975, 20). When A excludes B (or any other actors) from the fight, A is determining the scope of the conflict. Take the same city council example. Behavioralists would claim the city council is representative of the entire city. However, if the city council ruled that only those with at least a Bachelor’s degree could address their concerns to the council, Schattschneider would claim they exercise two-dimensional power.

Schattschneider’s infers, however, that the scope of the conflict can be advantageous to the powerless as well as the powerful. He says that those on the outside can decide the winner of the conflict and that “every change in the number of participants, every increase or reduction in the number of participants, affects the result” (Schattschneider 1975, 2). So, in a given conflict where A and B are opposing sides, A is stronger than B. Therefore, it is in A’s best interest to keep the scope of the conflict the size it is because the current majority of participants favor A. But it is in B’s best interest to expand the scope of the conflict to involve those in the audience who are not yet participating, because “[i]t is
the loser who calls in outside help” (Schattschneider 1975, 16). Schattschneider argues that widening the scope of the conflict, or socializing the conflict, is unpredictable; that of those who join, some are likely to join A and some are likely to join B (1975, 3). However, as the current loser of the conflict, B has nothing to lose by expanding the scope of the conflict, yet A could potentially lose everything. Therefore, B will seek to expand the scope of the conflict and A will do everything to maintain the current scope.

Schattschneider as well as Bachrach and Baratz argue that beyond the behavioralists’ first dimension of power, there is another, second dimension of power that is wielded when those in power 1) set or utilize the rules of the game or 2) control the scope of the conflict, so as to prevent those without power from participating and voicing grievances. I apply the two-dimensional argument to the events leading up to the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention in chapter four, specifically discussing how the Huckabee and Paul campaigns expanded the scope of the conflict by disseminating information, strengthening their own sides of the conflict. I demonstrate how, although their proponents disagree with each other, the second dimension of power adds to the first dimensional, behavioralist explanation, allowing a more complete view of power in the phenomenon of the convention.

Marriage of the First and Second Dimensions

The debate between one-dimensional and two-dimensional power theorists was not a fight that finished quickly or quietly in political science because it had implications beyond the study of power. The essence of the fight centered on the ‘scientific-ness’ of the study of politics. One-dimensional power theorists and behavioralists wanted to define power as straightforwardly as possible in order to quantify it and make their work empirical, and thus scientific. Classical theorists like Leo Strauss thought this version of political study, although it might achieve its goals of being scientific, would disengage the field and limit its study to only those questions which could be discovered empirically. Two-dimensional
theorists seem to have been somewhat caught in the middle. On one hand they disagreed with the narrow definition of power put forth by behavioralists. On the other hand, however, the push to be more scientific as a field was very enticing. After all, being called a ‘scientist’ gives a certain air of legitimacy and respectability, both inside and outside of academia.

Ultimately, the behavioralist school won, as indicated in the most recent edition (2002) of *Political Science: State of the Discipline* published by the American Political Science Association, which presents a section relating popular and frequently-used methodologies in the field. From comparative studies to institutionalism to American government to international relations, each article written about emerging and widely-used methodologies focuses on things like rational choice, game, and formal theory. All of these reflect the behavioralist school and the effort of political scientists to remain ‘scientific’. Barry Weingast of Stanford University writes about the “comparative advantages of the rational-choice perspective when studying Institutionalism” (Katznelson and Milner 2002, 626). Robert Powell of the University of California, Berkeley suggests utilizing game theory as a research tool in analysis of International Relations, arguing that by formalizing, research can better fit in the existing field of study (Katznelson and Milner 2002, 755). Charles Cameron of Columbia University and Rebecca Morton of New York University argue that “formal theory provides empirical analysis with a guide” (Katznelson and Milner 2002, 628). While all of these scholars are writing about different subfields of political science, one thing they all hold in common is their base in behavioralist tradition.

The study of power, at least between one-dimensional and two-dimensional theorists, is no different. Today, both approaches are vibrant in political science; however, both seek to be quantifiable and empirical. Even when studying such things as myths and non-decisions, two-dimensional power theorists still place great importance on conducting value-free, objective research. This kind of approach represents the majority of the field.

The Third Dimension of Power
There are, however, those political scientists who do not place as much value on the objectivity and scientific-ness of research, but rather favor more meaningful and practically related research. At the end of his article on this historic debate in political science, Benjamin Barber cites what he would call a step forward in the field, as far as regaining relevancy. “An APSA taskforce chaired by then APSA President Theda Skocpol completed a careful but influential study of political and economic inequality in America and its insidious impact on political voice” (Barber 2006, 544). This study, he proudly claims, was not value-free, but it was most definitely “prudent sound research and scholarship” as well as “a model of sound political science” (Barber 2006, 544). Barber clearly claims here that political science can operate successfully and perhaps better while still possessing value.

Translated to the study of power in the field, this faction of social scientists who accept normative approaches includes Steven Lukes, author of the three-dimensional theory of power. Lukes argues for a third dimension of power that results from the exercise of the first and second dimensions over a period of time, causing those upon whom power is exercised to internalize a sense of powerlessness. This dimension is subtle, barely detectable, and assigns to the powerless motives and values that they would be very unlikely to own. This approach to the study of power is highly controversial within the field, mainly because of its normative approach. In fact, when the second edition of Lukes’ book *Power: A Radical View* was published in 2005, a sizable academic debate ensued and Lukes’ critics questioned the academic legitimacy of such an approach, reminiscent of the behavioralist debate in the 1960s.

In their explanation of two-dimensional power, Bachrach and Baratz claim:

> [f]or the purposes of analysis, a power struggle exists, overtly or covertly, wither when both sets of contestants are aware of its existence or when only the less powerful party is aware of it. The latter case is relevant where the domination of status quo defenders is so
secure and pervasive that they are oblivious of any persons or groups desirous of challenging their preeminence. (1970, 50)

In other words, they argue that power may be exercised even when those exercising it do not realize because of the security and longevity of their positions. Wondering about the consistency of this statement, John Gaventa asks “if the power of the ‘defenders of the status quo’ serves to affect their awareness that they are being challenged, why cannot the powerlessness of potential challengers similarly serve to affect their awareness of interests and conflict within a power situation” (1980, 11)? In short, Gaventa (via Lukes) argues that, if the first and second dimensions of power are exercised on the same people for long enough, a third dimension of power arises in which the interests of the powerless are shaped and perceived in such a way as to prevent conflict and secure quiescence. Gaventa’s conception of power comes from Steven Lukes’ theory of three-dimensional power.

Lukes argues that the exercise of power goes beyond observable actions as in the first dimension of power and control of the arena or discourse in which decisions are made as in the second dimension (2005). In *Power: A Radical View*, Lukes posits that there is an even more “insidious exercise of power” (2005, 28) that actually affects the consciousness of those upon whom it is exercised. Lukes calls this the third dimension of power. Unlike the one-dimensional power, power operating in three dimensions is not observable, but instead subtle and difficult to detect. And unlike two-dimensional power, the full effects of three-dimensional power are not recognized by those upon whom they are exercised; the powerless are not simply kept out of the arena, they are unaware of the arena or that they could participate in it. Gaventa insists that the three-dimensional theory claims that power may be exercised in such a way as to change the powerless’ own ideas about their own situation, distorting the presence and degree of disparities (1980, vii).

Lukes determines that this conception of powerlessness in the third dimension of power depends and builds upon the first and second dimensions of power. He defines power as such: “A
exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests” (Gaventa 1980, 11 quoting Lukes 1974, 34). Gaventa, utilizing Lukes’ theory, argues that A is able to do this by “affecting B’s conceptions of the issues altogether… [plausibly] in the absence of observable conflict” (1980, 12).

Basically Lukes’ theory claims that in the third face of power, not only are B’s interests ignored or opposed; B does not even know or recognize B’s interests anymore. Lukes’ theory argues that this kind of power is achieved through the successful and successive exercise of power in the first and second dimensions over a period of time:

If the victories of A over B in the first dimension of power lead to non-challenge of B due to the anticipation of the reactions of A, as in the second-dimensional case, then, over time, the calculated withdrawal by B may lead to an unconscious pattern of withdrawal, maintained not by fear of power of A but by a sense of powerlessness within B, regardless of A’s condition. (Gaventa 1980, 16)

As Gaventa suggests here, power is accumulative as well as cyclical in nature. As the first dimension of power builds, the second follows, then the third. All the dimensions simultaneously and continually reinforce one another to form a virtually impregnable power structure, called the third dimension of power.

When this happens, when people live within a three dimensional structure of power that prevents them from even recognizing their own grievances: “they accept their role in the existing order of things, wither because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial” (Lukes 2005, 28). In other words, in the third dimension of power, the powerful (A) exercises power over the powerless (B) by shaping B’s very conception of B’s own interests. If this is true, then the third dimension of power is exercised without observable conflict.
In claiming a three-dimensional power structure, Lukes first recognizes the need to tie the inequalities of a situation with the action or lack of action of a person or persons in order to claim an exercise of power (2005, 43). Second, the actions of the powerless must be considered. Lukes insists that, in order for me to call something an exercise of power, I must demonstrate the counterfactual; that the powerless actually would have acted, thought, or behaved differently were it not for the action or inaction of the powerful (2005, 44). Finally, Gaventa points out that when power is exercised in three dimensions, there must be a difference between the interests or preferences of the powerful and the powerless (Gaventa 1980, 12).

When utilizing the three-dimensional power argument, all of these assumptions must be addressed according to the nature of the situation and characters being studied. Each scenario has a different classification of powerless, powerful, and outside observers. However, anywhere the third-dimension of power is claimed, all of the above assumptions inherent in the theory must be identified and accounted for; if not, claims of three-dimensional power can easily be discredited. In addressing these assumptions about the three-dimensional view of power, I first discuss the powerless (B) in the power relationship. Then, I address the powerful (A) and the characteristics necessary to be called the powerful in the third dimension. Finally, I examine what three-dimensional power assumes for and requires of the researcher or an outside observer.

**Powerless (B)**

In three-dimensional power, the consciousness of those upon whom power is being exercised has been affected by power relationships. Not only are their interests not addressed, they do not even recognize that their interests are not being dealt with, or do not recognize their interests at all. This is a tricky claim, to suggest that a person or group of people has an interest other than what they themselves would voice. Yet Lukes insists “[the three-dimensional] conflict is latent in the sense that is it assumed that there would be a conflict of wants or preferences between those exercising power and
those subject to it, were the latter to become aware of their interests” (Lukes 2005, 153). The awareness of the interests of the powerless is the key. Another way of phrasing it might be to call it consciousness, reminiscent of Karl Marx’s false consciousness. Though this is dangerous ground to tread, Gaventa agrees with Lukes on this conception of three-dimensional power. He reasons that “[i]t is participation itself which increases political consciousness [so,] those denied participation … also might not develop political consciousness of their own situation or of broader political inequalities” (Gaventa 1980, 17-18).

Gaventa gives us a clue as to how this political unconsciousness comes about; a lack of participation because of denial leads to a lack of understanding of a person’s own lack of efficacy. In other words, if a person or group is denied participation because those in power from the conflict in the first dimension control the rules of the game and the scope of the conflict in such a way as in the second dimension, then, over a period of time, those denied participation will begin to internalize a feeling of powerlessness, inefficacy, or acceptance of their circumstances. Again, this claim is controversial because it essentially tells the powerless in a given situation that they really do care about something other than what they believe they care about and that the circumstances they accept as best for them really are not.

Lukes and Gaventa are not the only theorists to buy this controversial claim. Keith Dowding also insists that “[t]he best intentional explanation of someone’s behavior may not be those reasons offered by the individual herself. She may deny having the reasons we impute to her” (Dowding 2006, 138). Again Dowding refers to a kind of false consciousness a person may have when under a three-dimensional power structure. The powerless may completely deny the power she operates under, offering alternative explanations for her behavior; however, third dimension theorists would the powerful affect her consciousness. Dowding goes on to quote D. C. Dennet, who claims “[i]ntentions do not have to find conscious expression in the mind of those to whom the intentional explanation of their action is applied (Dennett, 1987 quoted in Dowding 2006, 138). In other words, Dennet agrees; the
minds of those under a particular three-dimensional power structure are somewhat unable to offer a full explanation of their powerless state and behaviors.

What do the powerless in this particular study look like? Since this study makes the claim that the current state of Republican politics in West Virginia operates in a three-dimensional power structure, then the powerless in this situation would be those West Virginia Republicans without power in the West Virginia Republican Party. To narrow this down, I need to again define power within the West Virginia Republican Party. In the discussion of a democratic system in the introduction, I determined that, in order to operate as a healthy democracy, the West Virginia Republican Party must treat its members with equality and systematically follow widely-defined rules and procedures. In addition, Republicans in the state must provide educated participation within the party. Therefore, the powerless in this situation are those that are not participating or are not educated to participate in the party. This can be assumed to be the majority of Republicans in West Virginia, indicated by the 85% that did not participate in the last election for the State Republican Executive Committee (presumably none of the 85% ran for any positions within the committee and did not vote). Their lack of participation makes them powerless in the party. The powerless (B) are referred to as rank and file Republicans.

In a three-dimensional power scenario, then, the powerless (B) are those whose consciousness has been affected by power relationships, such that the powerless no longer recognizes the inequalities of the relationship. Because this is a study of a democratic system, the powerless are those that do not (or cannot) participate in the system and are thus no longer conscious of their lack of efficacy in the system. They are the rank and file Republicans.

Powerful (A)
The position of the powerful in the third dimension of power is a little more difficult to identify. Lukes himself is somewhat unclear on this concept because “[p]ower is a capacity not the exercise of that capacity (it may never be, and never need to be, exercised)” (2005, 12). If power is a capacity and not necessarily the exercise of that capacity, identifying who it is that holds that capacity becomes complicated. Further, Lukes even mentions that he regrets having to use the term “exercising or the exercise of power” because it naturally implies intention on the part of the power holder, when Lukes claims that power in the third dimension can be exercised either consciously or unconsciously.

However difficult the task may be, those who Lukes claims exercise a three-dimensional power structure must be identified. To do this, Lukes points out a few characteristics of the powerful in the third dimension. He writes “[w]here power is held to be exercised unconsciously in this sense (i.e. in unawareness of its consequences), the assumption is being made that the exercises of exercisers could, in the context, have ascertained those consequences” (2005, 54). In other words, the first characteristic Lukes identifies for those with a capacity for power is responsibility for the exercise of that power, whether the power is exercised consciously or unconsciously. The idea is similar to ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse for breaking it’. Just because a person in power does not realize she is exercising it to the detriment of someone else, she is not excused from the consequences of her actions. This is a very heavy implication Lukes makes, filled with value-latent judgments. He justifies his assignment of responsibility, however:

That is why I quoted C. Wright Mills’ idea that we should attribute power to those in strategic positions who are able to initiate changes that are in the interests of broad segments of society but do not, and his claim that it is “now sociologically realistic, morally fair and politically imperative to make demands upon the men of power and to hold them responsible for specific courses of action” (Mills 1959: 100). This,
incidentally, shows that the question of responsibility is not only ‘moral’ 
but also, and mainly, political. (Lukes 2005, 67).

So, Lukes assures his readers that responsibility for the actions of those in power is not just a moral 
judgment but also a political one. He insists that, aside from morality, those in powerful positions have 
an inherent political responsibility to those over whom they hold power (Lukes 2005, 67). Lukes 
presumably derives this political responsibility from ideas of democracy and representation, although he 
does not specifically state this. Peter Morriss, who takes issue with other parts of Lukes’ third dimension 
of power, does agree with this assignment of responsibility, calling it the “moral capacity of power” 

The second characteristic of the powerful that Lukes identifies is that the exercise of their power 
induces compliance: “Power can be at work, inducing compliance by influencing desires and beliefs 
without being ‘intelligent and intentional’” (Lukes 2005, 136). Dowding agrees with Lukes, writing that 
compliance can be achieved fairly easily and unconsciously for those in power; if an action of the 
powerful brings a desired result, the powerful will simply repeat the action, whether or not they are 
aware of the side effects (2006, 140). For Dowding, the process is a simple cause and effect, excluding, 
of course, the moral capacity of power. For, as Uncle Ben so profoundly put it in Spider-man, “with great 
power comes great responsibility” (Lee, Ditko, and Koepp 2002). When their power induces compliance, 
the powerful are ignorant of, ignoring, or denying their responsibility for the consequences of such 
compliance.

Continuing his argument for the responsibility of the powerful, Dowding points to a third 
characteristic of those in power in the third dimension: they possess and control some amount of 
information. “… [W]e should say that if [the beneficiary of a power relationship] is ignorant [of the 
effects of his actions] but should not be, then he is dominating. He may not be conscious of his 
dominance – but he should be. And as we learn more about how economic and social life works then
responsibility grows” (Dowding 2006, 141-2). Dowding makes an interesting, albeit undeveloped, point here. He insinuates two things: that information itself is powerful and that knowledge of that information implies responsibility to those without such knowledge. The fact that information is vital to power is an important one, especially in the events discussed in this study. Information is one of the main things that separate the powerful from the powerless in the case of the WVGOP and the 2008 WVGOP Presidential Convention.

A fourth and final characteristic of the powerful in the third-dimension of power that is particularly important to this study is that the group called ‘powerful’ can be made up of people with different amounts of responsibility for the power relationships: “... [W]e should point out that once we realize how our institutions affect the interests of ourselves and others, then anyone who does not act to change those institutions for the better is part of the structure of domination. However... we should not claim that those so implicated in the structure of domination are necessarily themselves dominators” (Dowding 2006, 142). In other words, Dowding makes the point that a person may benefit from the power structure, fully recognizing that others are being harmed because of it, and thus be a part of the powerful (A); however, that person is not necessarily the cause of the structure or the strongest adherent to the morality of the structure. A person like that is a kind of accomplice. Though this person does not agree with the virtue of the power structure, he goes along with it because it benefits him. Though he may be under just as much pressure to internalize the power structure as are the powerless (B), the person that knowingly goes along with and is benefited by the power relationships is necessarily a part of the powerful (A). He is separated from the powerless (B) by information.

How do these four characteristics of the powerful in the third dimension impart such a position on their possessors? According to the third dimension of power theory, the powerful comes to power through many victories in the first and second dimensions over a period of time. In this way, by holding
powerful positions (first dimension) and controlling and utilizing the rules of the game and the scope of the conflict (second dimension), the powerful (A) usher in the third dimension of power in which they mask the interests of the powerless (B). The advantage of being the winner in the first dimension gives an advantage in the second dimension. If the winners of the first and second dimensions are the same and win for long enough, they will eventually hold power in a three-dimensional structure. Amit Ron puts it this way: “We can assess and discuss the rationality of different players in the political arena only once we recognize the vast asymmetries in their abilities to shape the discourses through which their understanding of their own interests takes place” (2008, 273). In other words, an individual’s interests or preferences are limited by the arena in which they are formed. It stands to reason, then, that those who affect the formation of the arena, those who are the powerful in the second face and set the rules of the game and the scope of the conflict, are more likely to find their true interests as viable options within that arena. Conversely, those upon whom power is exercised in the second face, those whose interests fail to be organized into the arena, are more likely to take on interests that are not their own, or at least fail to recognize their own interests as such, because their interests are not options in the arena.

The powerful in a given three-dimensional power structure benefits from the power relationship with the powerless and 1) is responsible for the exercise of power, 2) induces compliance or agreement from the powerless, 3) possesses knowledge of the power structure and information vital to its existence and 4) may be made up of members that are more responsible or less responsible than others. Going back to my definition of a healthy democratic system (the West Virginia Republican Party), I can say that the powerful are those who benefit from and are responsible for the rules of the party, understand the procedures of the party, and are able to act, whether they chose to or not, in such a way as to curtail the unjust results of the rules and procedures of the party. Because being ‘powerful’ has so much to do with information, the makeup of the powerful (A) in the WVGOP changed somewhat along
the way to the convention. Though it is probably an overestimation, for empirical purposes I can say that anyone who participated in the election of the West Virginia State Republican Executive Committee, including committee members, is a part of the powerful (A), from here referred to as the party activists. In addition to committee members, this would presumably include the party faithful as well as county chairs and county committee members, totaling about 15% of Republicans in the state.

**Outside observer (Researcher)**

Because the claims made in the third dimension of power theory are so controversial (See *Political Studies Review*, 4 (2006), 115–73), a final character that must be considered in the power structure is the outside observer. In a three dimensional power scenario, the outside observer basically claims to understand the real interests of the powerless when they themselves do not. Many have criticized this approach as unempirical (for examples, see Morriss 2006 and Shapiro 2006), wondering how Lukes or any other researcher can claim to be privy to the inner thoughts of the powerless, which they would not recognize. Others in academia (Dowding 2006, Ron 2008) disagree with this critique and have provided support for such a claim.

Utilizing the same reasoning used in the methodology section of the introduction above, Ron argues that “[s]tudies of social power always take place within an existent public sphere. Therefore, the normative validity of even putative arguments about interests has to be understood against this backdrop” (2008, 291). Ron suggests that questions of social power always take place within a particular realm with a spectrum of interests, from which the powerful, powerless, and the outside observer all form their own ‘real’ interests. Ron does not see the need to provide “rock-bottom justification of the reality of real interests [as such a demand would] overlook the situated characteristic of the study of power and see the philosophical justification to the skeptic as the only relevant standard of justification” (2008, 291). In other words, Ron asks, ‘why throw out the baby with the bath water’? In a study of social relationships and power, why essentially kill research that is not entirely quantifiable? Ron does not
mean to completely dismiss any scientific requirements of serious research and is not looking for a free license to study power amuck. He is simply claiming that empirical requirements can go too far:

[T]he danger with understanding [the question of real interests] as primarily an empirical question is that it overlooks its interpretative and normative dimensions. It pushes the researchers into the unnecessary position of claiming to have a superior knowledge of people’s real interests. Such a position is unnecessary because the argument that is being made by the researcher to the public is not simply that they do not know what is good for them, but rather, it is a call to consider possible power relations as part of the understanding of the terms by which the debate is carried out. (Ron 2008, 291)

In other words, Ron does not claim that outside observers in a three-dimensional power situation know better and are superior to the powerless (B). Rather, he asks that outside observers be allowed to question the validity of the spoken motives of those under a complex and nearly undetectable power.

For an outside observer in a three-dimensional power structure, then, it is not altogether necessary to claim to know the explicit interests of the powerless (B) that would be expressed, were it not for the influence of the powerful (A). For the purposes of this study, this means that I do not need to demonstrate, for instance, that those rank and file Republicans who did not or could not participate in the WVGOP would have had a particular presidential candidate preference different from the party activists’. What I do have to demonstrate is that the powerless (B, rank and file Republicans) would have participated were it not for the actions or inactions of the powerful (A, party activists).

One Dimension + Two Dimensions = Three Dimensions
Although the one-, two-, and three-dimensional theorists argue amongst each other, the two- and three-dimensional theories cannot do without the one-dimensional theories. The two-dimensional approach relies on the first and second dimensions of power, and the three-dimensional approach relies on all three dimensions. The theories are interrelated, however distasteful this may be to some of their proponents. For this reason, I chose these three approaches as the lens for this study. The concepts have been highly debated and honed, allowing most of the ‘kinks’ to be worked out and the essentially contested parts of the theories to be well-known. Further, the phenomenon studied here, the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention, is a stellar example of each of the three dimensions of power, their relation to one another, and the process by which each exercise of power can be overcome.

In the chapters that follow, I apply each theory to the phenomenon studied here. In chapter three I focus on the building and maintenance of three-dimensional power in the West Virginia Republican Party through the use of the first and second dimensions over a long period of time. To do this, I use a historical approach, also used by John Gaventa in his application of the three-dimensional power theory in Power and Powerlessness. Then, transitioning into chapter four, I demonstrate how, in this particular situation, the third dimension of power was deconstructed, allowing the exercise of power to only operate in the first and second dimensions. In chapter four I relate the conflict leading up to the convention according to the second dimension of power, telling how both sides in the conflict used the features and tactics of the second dimension, as discussed specifically below in E. E. Schattschneider’s The Semi-Sovereign People. In chapter five, then, I discuss how circumstances culminated in the actual convention, where power was observable and quantifiable, operating in the first dimension only. There, I utilize William Riker’s game theory in The Theory of Political Coalitions to explain the convention’s unexpected outcome.

Conclusion
As I pointed out in the beginning of this chapter, question of power and the study of power have been debated in the field of political science for a long time. The particular theories of power presented here have been contested amongst each other since the rise of the behavioralist school in the 1950s and 1960s. Although their proponents are staunch defenders of their own theories of power, the first, second, and third dimensional theories of power are all interdependent. In the following chapters, I pair theory with contemporary politics to demonstrate how the three views of power relate to one another, as well as how each can be deconstructed to reveal the next.

In the first dimension, A has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do, assuming that 1) B's actions are indicative of B's values or desires, 2) B is capable of acting within an open, decision-making arena, and 3) anyone acting as B's representative actually represents B's values or desires. This is the lens that I use to interpret the last portion of the history, the convention itself, in chapter five.

In the second dimension, power is wielded when those in already in power because of victories in the first dimension 1) set and utilize the rules of the game or 2) control the scope of the conflict, preventing those without power from participating and voicing grievances. This is the lens through which I examine events and relationships in the months leading up to the convention in chapter four.

In the third dimension, “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests” (Gaventa 1980, 11 quoting Lukes 1974, 34) and maintains power because of B’s internalized sense of powerlessness. The powerless (B, rank and file Republicans) are those 1) whose consciousness has been effected by the power structure and, in this study, 2) who do not or cannot participate because of their perceived lack of efficacy. The powerful (A, party activists) benefit from the power relationship with the powerless (rank and file Republicans) and 1) are responsible for their exercise of power, 2) induce compliance or agreement from the powerless (rank and file Republicans), 3) possess knowledge of the power structure and information vital to its existence and 4) may be made up of members that
are more responsible or less responsible than others. The outside observer, although able to detect the inequalities of the power structure, needs only to demonstrate that the powerless (rank and file Republicans) would have participated in the convention were it not for the action or lack of action of the powerful (party activists). I utilize the three-dimensional power theory to explain the state of the West Virginia Republican Party in chapter three.
In the third dimension, “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests” (Gaventa 1980, 11 quoting Lukes 1974, 34) and maintains power because of B’s internalized sense of powerlessness. The powerless (B, rank and file Republicans) are those 1) whose consciousness has been effected by the power structure and, in this study, 2) who do not or cannot participate because of their perceived lack of efficacy. The powerful (A, party activists) benefit from the power relationship with the powerless (B, rank and file Republicans) and are 1) responsible for their exercise of power, 2) induce compliance or agreement from the powerless (B, rank and file Republicans), 3) possesses knowledge of the power structure and information vital to its existence and 4) may be made up of members that are more responsible or less responsible than others. The outside observer, although able to detect the inequalities of the power structure, needs only to demonstrate that the powerless (rank and file Republicans) would have participated in the convention were it not for the action or inaction of the powerful (party activists).

In order to demonstrate that the events leading to the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention can be interpreted through the lens of three-dimensional power, I must demonstrate that the victories of the party activists in the first and second dimensions of power built upon one another and caused the withdrawal and internalization of powerlessness of the rank and file Republicans. In other words, I have to demonstrate how the first and second dimensions of power formed the third dimension I am claiming. To do this, I discuss first the professionalization of the party to establish the first dimension of power. Then I recount the party activists’ use of two-dimensional power to control information, allowing it to maintain and further ingrain their powerful positions. Next, I demonstrate how the combination of party professionalization and the control of information planted the beginnings of the three-dimensional power by instilling false conceptions in the powerless. Following that, I discuss the Republican Party’s eighty year positions as the state’s underdog as a mediating factor in the third dimension of power. After that, I present the party’s hierarchy as another
exercise of two-dimensional power, further establishing the party activists’ power. Finally, I discuss the formation and structure of the 2008 WVGOP Presidential Convention as an example of the three-dimensional power that has been successfully constructed in the West Virginia Republican Party.

So What?

In this chapter, I argue that the structure of the West Virginia Republican Party, both the official structure as well as the unofficial paths to influence, built over decades works to the benefit of some positions and individuals and to the detriment of others. In terms of the overall argument, the benefits and detriments discussed here are in relation to a healthy democracy. Thus, a benefit in a democracy is the ability to participate and voice a preference in a given arena, for this study, the West Virginia Republican Party. Conversely, a detriment is not being able to participate in any meaningful way and either not voicing a preference or not having a preference at all. As I lay out these arguments below, keep in mind that I am discussing a party who claims to be democratic, whose actions claim to be representative of the state’s Republicans. In terms of a healthy democracy, then, rank and file Republicans can expect to be treated equally by the WVGOP, especially in terms of participation, and to have well-defined, widely-understood, and systematically followed rules and procedures. Further, in order for the WVGOP to function democratically on a system and an individual level, rank and file Republicans must be able to informatively participate in elections.

Methodology

As I lay out this argument, I refer to the definitions of the powerful and the powerless described above. Again, because I am discussing the WVGOP as a democratic system whose health is in question, the powerful, or A, are those who benefit from the rules of the party, understand the procedures of the party, and are able to act, whether they chose to or not, in such a way as to curtail the unjust results of the rules and procedures of the party. The actual names of those included in the powerful change as information is disseminated or withheld, for information is what separates the powerful from the
powerless. For the most part, though, I can identify the powerful as those within the party structure, including the state and county executive committees and chairs, and party activists. I can estimate this to be about 15% of the Republican population in West Virginia, based on turn out in the last State Executive Committee election (West Virginia Secretary of State; West Virginia Legislature; Herald Dispatch). These are referred to as the party activists. The powerless, or B, then, are those that do not (or cannot) participate in the system and are thus no longer conscious of their lack of efficacy in the system. Again, exact identification is difficult to nail down, but I can estimate about 85% of the Republican population in West Virginia makes up the powerless. These are referred to as rank and file Republicans.

In his application of three-dimensional power, John Gaventa focused his study on the powerless, giving his readers a bottom-up view of the power structure. Because of my own position and experience with actors and information within the party, a bottom-up view is not possible for this study. However, because of the subject matter, the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention, a bottom-up view is not necessarily the best perspective from which to understand the power structure. For, as I argue below, those on the ‘bottom’ are likely entirely unaware of the event in question even now, years later. In fact, when I mention this study to peers outside the party, I usually have to explain what the convention was and when it took place. For the purpose of understanding the power structure on which the convention was built, then, I use a top-down vantage point. All of the interviews I conducted were necessarily from individuals with knowledge of the convention and are therefore implicated as part of the party activists (the powerful, A). The participation and responsibility for the injustice of the power structure of interviewees varies a good deal; however, all must be considered powerful rather than powerless because of the information they possess.
Party Professionalization

When the national Republican Party made the move to more professionalization in the 1960s (Aldrich 1995, 254), a division was formed in the party. This division was indicative of the first dimension of power. There were the average voting members and there were the professionals, those with special knowledge and information about the party, candidates, and strategy. Simply by calling them ‘professionals’, the party imparted to this elite class of Republicans a status and set them apart from the mass of the party, giving them advantageous positions over average voting Republicans. The idea that John Aldrich’s history portrays is that these professionals with their superior knowledge and expertise would provide legitimacy, both for the party to outsiders and for the higher position within the party to the rest of the party. Therefore, the actions of the party’s elites were accepted as authoritative, important, and something the party was lucky to have.

This same mentality of the legitimacy and value of ‘professionals’ working in and on behalf of the party has a legacy in the West Virginia Republican Party and is very prevalent among party activists today. Those with the most influence in the WVGOP are those who hold the highest positions and those who have held their positions for a long time, again giving them power in the first dimension and positional advantages. For example, Donna Gosney is a State Executive Committee Member and is also West Virginia’s National Committee Woman and a close advisor to the WVGOP Chairman. Her letter regarding the most recent election for WVGOP Chairman was likely instrumental in the newest chairman’s election. Gosney would certainly be considered a party professional; her institutional knowledge of the party, as well as her connectedness to others within the party, makes her very valuable to the WVGOP. When conducting research for this study, I was pointed to her almost immediately as an absolute authority on all things Republican in West Virginia. Gosney holds positional, one-dimensional power in the party. Another example of how the WVGOP values ‘professionalism’ comes from a recent email from the new WVGOP Chairman Mike Stuart to the State Executive
Committee. In it, he issues a few announcements for the party, including the hiring of the party’s new ‘Executive Director’ Chad Holland; the title itself carries a tone of professionalism and legitimacy (Stuart 2011, email). Citing qualities such as “personable, experienced, and mature” Chairman Stuart assures his readers that the WVGOP conducted a “nationwide search” and that West Virginia is “extremely fortunate to land [Holland],” a former employee of the National Senatorial Committee (Stuart 2011, email). The qualities touted here are professional ones that the chairman certainly chose in order to legitimize this hire to the State Executive Committee, imparting to him the same positional, one-dimensional power. Committee Woman Gosney and this email from Chairman Stuart are just two examples of the value the WVGOP and party activists place on professionalism within the party.

By striving for professionalization, the Republican Party essentially defines the powerful within the party. The powerful have some level of professionalism; an elite class that can offer something to and foresee what is best for the party. The focus, both nationally and now in West Virginia, became strategy and winning rather than participation and responsiveness to the masses of Republicans. Though the party is still technically democratic, the goal of a winning strategy is on at least equal, if not higher, footing with the goals of “engage[ing] citizens in the political process” (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992, 70) and electing a government “of the people, by the people and for the people” (2008 WVGOP Platform), values I attribute to political parties in this study.

One major importance of party professionals and elites in relation to power is that the goal of professionalization was *legitimacy*. Although Aldrich says the Republican Party professionalized in order to gain legitimacy in the eyes of voters, party professionals and elites now also *define* what or who is legitimate. Professionals within the party, such as the WVGOP’s new Chairman or Executive Director, provide the standard to determine who wins and who loses in the party, which candidates or issues are ‘legitimate’. For example, regarding the 2008 convention, Huckabee campaigner Michael Ankrom refers to the Huckabee and Paul campaigns when he says “[n]either of our campaigns was considered tier one
and no one thought we had the chance to win” (Ankrom 2011, email). Who decided which campaigns were ‘tier one’ and which candidates had the chance to win? The answer can be found in convention Delegate Conrad Lucas’ interview. “I felt that Huckabee had the strongest chance ... based on his stances, values and general connection to the citizens of West Virginia” (2011, email). Lucas indicates here that Huckabee had the best chance in West Virginia in his opinion. However, he goes on to say that “the night before the convention took place, I assumed that Romney was going to be the clear winner” (Lucas 2011, email). Why, if Lucas felt Huckabee had the best chance in West Virginia, did he predict Romney would win the convention? He explains:

This rationale was based on the fact that I was courted by several prominent Republicans who were universally supporting Romney. The Republicans who were courting me held positional and institutional power and were personal friends thus I believed that Romney would emerge victorious from a professional and personal perspective. Also, simply based on paraphernalia at the Civic Center, it seemed that Romney had the strongest presence. (Lucas 2011, email)

It was those Republicans with ‘positional and institutional power,’ then, that ‘universally’ supported Romney. What Lucas indicates here is that the Republicans within the party structure, the party activists, determined legitimacy and declared Romney the legitimate candidate, thereby exercising their positional advantages gained by victories in the first dimension of power. Huckabee campaigner Michael Ankrom supports this claim, relating that before the convention, “the national media was really portraying that this was between Romney and McCain, and McCain was viewed more as a moderate [(a bad thing in West Virginia)]. Romney had the money to run a general election campaign. These were portrayed as the options, since Huckabee and Paul were seen as 2nd tier candidates from the beginning” (Ankrom 2011, email). Again, the party activists determined that Romney was the legitimate candidate.
This ability to establish the legitimacy of a candidate is evidence of positional power gained in the first dimension. By attributing this power to professionals and elites rather than voters within the Republican Party, the party established the first dimension of power. Those with power are the party professionals, elites, and anyone to whom they granted ‘legitimacy’. Those without power were those whose preferences may be passed over or considered illegitimate.

**Unobserved (and unobservable) Party Professionals**

A key to the continuing power of these party professionals is that, as Aldrich points out, they are most successful when their actions are undetected: “Today, no matter how necessary the party professionals may be, they stay well in the background, and they will be successful to the extent that their efforts are unobserved (and unobservable) by the voters” (Aldrich 1995, 259). Since the professionals, the elite class within the party, are the powerful, their efforts and success at remaining unobserved and unobservable reflect the control of information used to exercise two-dimensional power. Because party activists are in power already due to their victory in the first dimension, gaining legitimacy over rank and file Republicans, party activists are able to control the dissemination of information within the party while remaining unobserved and unobservable.

The WVGOP’s history of itself provides an interesting look into how the party shapes information and portrays itself to rank and file Republicans. Throughout the history, the reoccurring theme is a vague sense of injustice in the state caused by the Democratic Party. Portraying itself as a kind of lone ranger fighting for justice, the WVGOP appears to be helpless when faced with the evils of the Democratic machine, patronage, and money, according to its history. We can see, then, that the WVGOP would have its members focus their anger over the Republican Party’s lack of political power on the Democratic Party. E. E. Schattschneider calls this displacing the conflict, or drawing a cleavage (1975, 60-74). He portrays the scope of conflict (in this case, the West Virginia Republican Party) as a circle. A line can be drawn through that circle vertically or horizontally, representing two different cleavages of
issues or conflict. If the line is drawn vertically, those on the right will be united against those on the left. However, if the line is drawn horizontally, those on the top will be united against those on the bottom. Thus, the conflict or issue in focus decides which sides are in opposition. In the scope of the West Virginia Republican Party, the powerful party activists who have positional advantages have drawn the line of conflict, an exercise of two-dimensional power, so that Democrats are on one side and Republicans on the other. The problem of why Republicans have little political power in the state, according to the WVGOP, is the Democratic Party and its stranglehold on the state. Because party activists have one-dimensional positional power, they can determine the flow of information by drawing the line of conflict, an exercise of two-dimensional power. Not only does this focus the anger and frustration of rank and file Republicans on the Democratic Party, it also unites rank and file Republicans, discouraging conflict within. Schattschneider writes, “It follows that conflicts divide people and unite them at the same time, and the process of consolidation is as integral to conflict as the process of division” (1975, 62). In other words, it is just as important to party activists that rank and file Republicans feel compelled to be united within themselves as it is that rank and file Republicans disagree with, dislike, and disdain Democrats. That way, the conflict is focused on Democrats versus Republicans, rather than a Republican versus a Republican. By determining the terms of the conflict, party activists exercise two-dimensional power.

False Conceptions

Because of their positions as powerful within the West Virginia Republican Party (first dimension of power), then, party activists have used the control of information to displace any conflict that would arise within the party (second dimension of power). This has, in turn, effected the conceptions of the powerless rank and file Republicans, indicating a third dimension of power. The common conception among rank and file Republicans is that Republicans simply cannot win in the state because of the loyalty of West Virginians to the Democratic Party. Electorally, this would appear to be true. A common
sentiment might be, ‘No matter who we (Republicans) run, the Democrats will always win’ or, sarcastically, ‘Is there a Republican Party in West Virginia?’ The stranglehold of the Democratic Party on the state is certainly widely accepted by rank and file Republicans. Convention Delegate Conrad Lucas observes that “there is often a “drop off” point where those new to party activities will enter, remain active for a few years, then cease any activity within the party structure itself” (Lucas 2011, email), giving credence to the notion that efforts within the party by newcomers simply wither, so there is no reason to try to participate within the party. Perhaps the powerless’ conceptions of themselves as helpless victims of the Democratic Party is accurate, but, as Amit Ron suggests, “consider possible power relations” (2008, 291) when determining the cause of inequalities. The powerful in the West Virginia Republican Party are the elites and professionals, the party activists. Their first dimensional power decides legitimacy, including the candidates that are most legitimate. In that case, the problem of inequalities between the parties in the state goes further than a Democratic stranglehold. The problem is the lack of interparty competition and the focus on unity by the powerful party activists. When they decide which candidates are legitimate, which ones ‘have a shot at winning,’ rank and file Republicans do not really have a choice between Republican candidates. Thus, according to the theories presented here, the problem exists long before a Republican runs against a Democrat; the problem is that there are no viable cases of Republicans against Republicans.

Let us examine the most recent campaigns for the third congressional district in West Virginia for an example. In the 2010 primary season there were four Republican candidates for Congress: Marty Gearheart, Conrad Lucas, Lee Bias, and Spike Maynard. Marty Gearheart had run for the office several times before, while Lee Bias and Conrad Lucas were first time candidates, but lifelong Republicans. Spike Maynard, however, was a registered and very public Democrat until just before he filed to run for Congress, at which time he changed his registration to Republican. Gearheart, Lucas, and Bias all campaigned hard in the primary season. Maynard, however, made very few public efforts or
appearances. For example, all but Maynard participated in one of the only debates for Republican Congressional candidates held at Marshall University. However, because of his name identification and connections to wealth, Maynard was considered by party activists their most likely chance to beat Democratic Congressman Nick Rahall in the general election (therefore, legitimate). A typically low turnout in the primary election, which translates to party activists turning out, gave Maynard a huge victory. When Maynard, and thus Republicans, failed to beat Congressman Nick Rahall in the general election, party activists blamed the stranglehold of the Democratic Party. Their advice to rank and file Republicans was to donate more to the party, get more involved in Republican campaigns, and so on. They did not question whether Maynard was the best candidate to run against Rahall or the process by which he was elected, only that Republicans just did not have the resources to beat the Democrats. This sentiment was accepted by rank and file Republicans. They adopted the mentality of party activists, accepting their position as ineffectual in the state. Republicans across the state pushed for Maynard in the general election without question and blamed the Democratic stranglehold for his defeat, never questioning Maynard’s legitimacy as a Republican candidate. This situation demonstrates the false consciousness under which rank and file Republicans operate, made possible by the positional advantages of party activists in the first dimension of power combined with their dissemination of information in the second dimension of power.

WVGOP: The Out Party

As noted in chapter one, the Republican Party in West Virginia has had little to no political influence or power in the state since the 1930s. Although this is not necessarily an exercise of power (at least not in the terms considered here), the political condition of the WVGOP has a considerable effect on the power relationship within the WVGOP; it is something like an environmental, mediating factor. A political party cannot be out of power for that long and remain unaffected or unchanged. The effect of being the “out” party is difficult to identify; however, at least two conclusions can be drawn.
First, I consider the effect of being the out party has upon registered Republicans in West Virginia. Consisting of only about 30% of the state’s registered voters, the Republicans in West Virginia have likely resigned themselves to the futility of action through or within the WVGOP. After all, is there any sense in voting in a Republican gubernatorial primary when the Republican candidate in the general is sure to lose? Or, for that matter, is there any sense in attending Republican committee meetings, volunteering at election headquarters, or donating to the Republican Party? The party’s lack of political power has not only decreased its registration to merely 30%; it has also diminished its members’ sense of efficacy in the state.

Low participation and disengagement by rank and file Republicans is acknowledged by party activists, at least the portion interviewed for this study. When asked about their impression of overall participation in the party by registered Republicans across the state, interviewees’ replies were fairly similar. State Republican Party office secretary Marti Riggall stated that her “impression of the overall participation in the party by registered Republicans across the state is an enthusiastic participation by a relatively small, dedicated core of principled conservatives (Riggall 2011, email). Convention Delegate Conrad Lucas writes “There is very little participation in the party by both rank and file Republicans and by Republicans in the state with positional power, perceived power and ascribed power… Further, state executive committee meetings are often sparsely attended (Lucas 2011, email). Huckabee representative Michael Ankrom and Romney staffer Bill Phillips agree, stating respectively that “[T]he workload of the party is done by a few” (Ankrom 2011, email) and “[p]articipation in the party is limited” (Phillips 2011, email). Paul representative Ed Burgess also states that “participation by registered Republicans, what I call Everyday Republicans, is poor, owing to a disaffection with what could be called, the Party Powerful, or the Elitists of the Party” (2011, email). Burgess goes on to include uncontested races and vacancies on county committees as possible explanations for a lack of participation. Therefore, most in the party understand that participation and engagement by rank and file Republicans
is very low. Only Convention CEO Bob Fish presented a different perspective, arguing that “[s]ome [Republicans] run for office, some serve in political party executive committees, some help during elections, and some stay actively informed. I absolutely reject any thought that our citizens do not carefully consider their choices before voting” (Fish 2011, email). Fish’s difference in perspective is interesting for two reasons. First, he seems to refer to Riggall’s ‘small, dedicated core of principled conservatives’ rather than all Republicans in the state when he discusses participation. Second, Fish’s response indicates a need to defend the educated participation of rank and file Republicans. This defense is reflective of the second effect of being the out party in the state.

Second, I consider the effect of being the out party has upon the leadership of the WVGOP, specifically the state and county executive committees and chairs, and party actives. As Bob Fish’s quote above indicates, there is a push within the WVGOP for absolute unity. In discussing the convention and the possibility of a future convention, Marti Riggall indicated that the worst thing about the convention was that it “led to some permanent rifts within the WV GOP that will take years to heal” (Riggall 2011, email) and that in the future, the state party would need to be even “stronger” (Riggall 2011, email). Conrad Lucas doubts whether he will participate in the next convention, “[b]ased on the hurt feelings, division and disgruntled nature of all who were involved with the convention process in 2008” (Lucas 2011, email). The sentiment from these WVGOP members, party activists, is that division within the party is something to be strongly avoided. This is a by-product of being the out party for so long; unity is absolutely vital to the West Virginia Republican Party if it is ever going to improve its fortunes in the state.
In addition to the control of information, another positional, first dimension of power advantage of being the powerful in the Republican Party is the ability to set the rules of the game in such a way as to secure these positions and inhibit competition for these positions. This is just how the Republican Party is structured (See Figure 1). Anyone from West Virginia wishing to hold any influence on the Republican National Committee, for example, would have to be one of two national committee members from the state or the chair of the state’s Republican Executive Committee. None of these positions is popularly elected. Instead, all of West Virginia’s influence on the Republican National Committee comes from the West Virginia State Executive Committee.

In order to have influence there, a Republican must rely on four senatorial district representatives on the committee. Representatives are listed on the WVGOP’s website by senatorial district, which is complicated at best as every district but two encompasses more than one county, including a portion of a county (for example, the fifth senatorial district consists of Cabell County and a small portion of Wayne County); senatorial district information is not available on the WVGOP’s website (WVGOP/Elected Members). Should a Republican in West Virginia wishing to contact their State Committee representative access this website and determine the correct senatorial district, contact information for representatives is limited to email addresses. Ten of the 68 representatives list nothing or “N/A Mail Hard Copy” under “Email”; there are no mailing addresses given. (WVGOP/Elected Members).

The other option for a Republican wishing to influence the WVGOP Executive Committee is through a county chair, all of which are also on the State Executive Committee. County chairs are not popularly elected; they are elected by county committees. The Republican wishing to influence the county committee could do so through their representative on the county committee, which is
determined by party-defined districts within the counties; these are also not available from the WVGOP’s website.

Clearly, the positional advantage of setting the rules of the game has been utilized well in the construction and maintenance of a complicated structural hierarchy. Understanding and influencing any part of this hierarchy is difficult enough, much less attempting to become a part of it. I myself have never missed an election, have been active in several campaigns, am married to the Cabell County Republican Executive Committee Chairman, and have a Bachelor’s degree in political science, and did not understand the party’s hierarchy until this very study. Party activists have exercised the second dimension of power by setting the rules and procedures for voicing opinions or grievances within the party in such a way as to discourage and prevent those outside the existing structure from participating. Whether or not this was the intended result is arguable; however, the difficulty for outsiders attempting to influence the party remains. This second-dimensional exercise of power is found in what Bachrach and Baratz call the “mobilization of bias... A set of ... institutional procedures (“rules of the game”) that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others. Those who benefit are placed in a preferred position to defend and promote their vested interests” (1970, 43). The party’s hierarchy is a set of institutional procedures that benefit party activists, who have informational advantages. Because of their positions within the hierarchy, these officials are better able to maintain those positions.

2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention

Because of the existing party hierarchy (first and second dimensions of power), the lack of political power in WVGOP for so long (mediating factor), and the false conceptions of rank and file Republicans that the problem lay solely with the Democratic Party (third dimension of power), rank and file Republicans as a whole are incredibly disengaged in the West Virginia Republican Party. This is evidenced by the 15% turnout for the 2010 West Virginia State Republican Executive Committee
election (West Virginia Secretary of State; West Virginia Legislature; Herald Dispatch). With this set up, then, it is not surprising that the rules of the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention were set unanimously by the state executive committee, were very exclusive in nature, and were not questioned by rank and file Republicans until after the convention. Remember that exercises of power in the third dimension are difficult to detect, especially by those upon whom they are exercised. The development and execution of the 2008 convention is an example of the exercise of three-dimensional power by party activists on rank and file Republicans.

When the convention was decided upon by the state executive committee, no oversight from the Secretary of State’s office was necessary; the WVGOP has complete authority to conduct its nomination procedures in any way the Republican National Committee will allow. Again, party activists have strong positional advantages in the WVGOP based on first-dimensional victories. The positional advantages are even stronger within the convention rules. Sixty percent of the delegates to the state convention, about two thirds, were automatic delegates (See Appendix B – Rules of the Convention). Automatic delegates were made up of the entire state executive committee, twelve members of each county executive committee plus the county chairs, and any and all Republicans holding elected public office, such as state legislators or the Secretary of State. And, as interviewees attest to, the large majority of these automatic delegates were understood to be Romney supporters; whether or not they actually were, the important thing to note is that those in powerful positions were understood to be united in preference. In at least one case, Conrad Lucas, this perception influenced the vote of those convention delegates who had very little information about the convention and its procedures. More importantly, however, the fact that a great majority of automatic delegates, all of whom were privy to a complete understanding of the convention, mostly supported the same candidate meant that any appointments they made would likely be for people who would vote for their candidate as well. The problem with all of this, of course, is that automatic and appointed convention delegates were not
acting as representatives of their counties to the state convention in a democratic manner. Gaining
delegate positions by appointment was about winning, not representation, thus undermining the
process meant to be and touted as an exercise of democracy.

The remaining 40% of delegates to the state convention were at-large, or popularly elected. However, the process for filing, running, or voting for at-large delegates was very foreign and complicated to rank and file Republicans. Forms necessary to file for at-large delegate were only available online. Voting for at-large delegates was conducted online, with each county given the option to hold in-person county conventions in addition to the online voting (only ten counties out of 55 did this). In at least two counties, Mineral and Monongalia, this caused even more confusion and complication. If the at-large delegate positions in a county were unfilled, as 21 counties’ were, automatic delegates were able to appoint people to at-large delegate positions. One of this study’s interviewees, Conrad Lucas, was appointed to the position of delegate because his county’s (Lincoln County) at-large positions were not filled. He writes: “I had several relatives who were elected and selected as delegates and the county chair was also a relative thus I asked him to be appointed” (Lucas 2011, email). Lucas’ experience is not likely an isolated incident. Based on the results of the online election of convention delegates, Barbour, Boone, Braxton, Calhoun, Clay, Doddridge, Gilmer, Grant, Hancock, Lincoln, Marshall, McDowell, Mingo, Pocahontas, Ritchie, Roane, Tyler, Upshur, Wetzel, Wirt, and Wyoming Counties, thirty-eight percent of West Virginia’s counties, failed to elect all of their allotted at-large delegates (some elected none at all). In several of these counties, people were registered as candidates for delegate but received no votes, indicating that they did not also register to vote in the online election. The state’s highest vote-getter received only 69 votes. This signifies two things: first, the positional (first dimension of power) and information (second dimension of power) advantages held by party activists and certainly not held by rank and file Republicans and second, the

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12 In an email to State Chairman Doug McKinney, a Mineral County Republican calls for an investigation of the Mineral County GOP Convention, suspecting foul play (Howell 2008, email).
enormous lack of consciousness (third dimension of power) of rank and file Republicans about the
convention and its procedures.

If any delegate positions remained unfilled ten days prior to the convention, the state chairman
had the ability to appoint delegates for these positions; according to emails on hardcopy at the state
party headquarters, a very minimum of 15 delegates were appointed by the state chairman, though at
least twice that number is likely. Thus, the positional advantage of party activists extended all the way to
appointments made by the state chairman.

For all practical matters, party activists held most if not all control of the 2008 West Virginia
Republican Presidential Convention. Little opportunity was given for the participation of rank and file
Republicans, or anyone outside of party activists, for that matter. Information was crucial to
participation in these complicated new processes and mechanisms for disseminating that information
were vague at best. The county committees and chairs were more or less assumed to be responsible for
getting information to their county’s Republicans since each county had the option of holding an in-
person county convention in addition to online voting; this responsibility, however, is not written
anywhere. However, even if there were no official responsibility given to the county chairs and
committees to educate their Republicans, the responsibility is assumed to come with the power of
information and representation (Lukes 2005, 67; Morris 2006; Dowding 2006).

The problem from a democratic standpoint, then, was that the only people who could have
disseminated information vital to participation were also delegates themselves, and so had a stake in
which candidate won. The county committees and chairs were not unbiased and were not expected to
be. Their roles of 1) representatives of their county’s Republicans and 2) delegates for a presidential
candidate collided. Whether or not they acted purposely, their support of a candidate influenced
anyone they may have shared information with, by appointing as delegate or otherwise. Some acted
purposely, some did not. However, the responsibility to provide the means for participation, when it
was carried out, was done so in a biased matter, not allowing the full and unaltered participation of rank and file Republicans. This is to be expected of campaigners, but, from a democratic standpoint (at least the one presented here\textsuperscript{13}), it is not acceptable from county chairs and committees.

A final note on the power structure of the West Virginia Republican Party in relation to the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention is the outcry that came from those who stumbled upon the convention and its procedures too late. The day of the convention there were many reports of people around the state showing up to their polling places, county courthouses, and even the convention itself, intending to cast their vote for a presidential candidate (Messina 2008). Needless to say, they were fairly upset to learn they completely missed the procedures necessary to participate. The party has on record numerous written complaints of disenfranchisement, fielded many angry phone calls (according to office secretary Marti Riggall), and received a great deal of emails regarding the lack of information and participation in the convention. In an email to the convention’s CEO, Chairman McKinney indicates publicity as one of the most important things to consider for the next convention: “[We] need to give thought about how to reach those who “never heard about it”” (McKinney 2008, email). Romney campaigner Bill Phillips suggests providing all registered Republicans with “official notification” (Phillips 2008, email). The WVGOP acknowledges the enormous outcry against the party due to the lack of information about the convention. This clearly indicates that rank and file Republicans, at least those who cried out after the convention, would have participated if it were not for the inaction of party activists.

Conclusion

Combining the history and the three-dimensional power theory shows that the powerless (rank and file Republicans) possessed altered conceptions of their political situation, believing that they were powerless against Democrats, and that they cannot or should not participate in the structure of the

\textsuperscript{13} The participatory democratic theory presented in this study assumes that those who are elected act as representatives of those who elected them, rather than acting as trustees.
West Virginia Republican Party. This is the false consciousness that results from the third dimension of power. Also, rank and file Republicans were incredibly disengaged and did not participate in any meaningful amount in the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention, and many that did participate did not do so fully by registering as a candidate but failing to register and vote for themselves, for example, or participated incorrectly by attempting to vote at a polling place on the day of the convention, for instance. The reason for this disengagement and nonparticipation is the inaction of the powerful, party activists. Those in power were able to effect the inequalities and disenfranchisement that eventually occurred but did not, whether because of oversight, a lack of understanding themselves, or purposely. This indicates their position as powerful in the third dimension. Because of the lack of engagement and education of rank and file Republicans and a lack of effort by party activists, those that were informed of the convention were induced to agree with the preferences of the party activist who informed them, thereby adopting the preferences of the powerful in the third dimension of power. Because party activists of the WVGOP possessed knowledge and understanding that rank and file Republicans did not, the WVGOP, as a democratic body, is implicated as responsible for disseminating information and removing barriers to participation.

Returning to this study’s definition of a healthy democracy, rank and file Republicans should be treated equally by the WVGOP, especially in terms of participation. As seen in this chapter, this was not the case, as those with positions and information of the party’s structure and nuances held tremendous advantages, specifically in the first dimension of power, over ‘Everyday Republicans’. Rank and file Republicans should also expect to have well-defined, widely-understood, and systematically followed rules and procedures; again, this chapter pointed out just the opposite, especially in terms of the 2008 Convention, indicating the exercise of two-dimensional power. Finally, rank and file Republicans should be able to informatively participate in elections, which was not possible, at least in terms of the convention, because of the exercise of three-dimensional power.
In the next chapter I discuss the events from the time the convention procedures were adopted until the day of the convention through the lens of the two-dimensional power theory. I explain that, in addition to the three-dimensional power structure examined here, there was a conflict that took place between party activists, but only in the first and second dimensions of power. I clarify how this conflict was possible in these dimensions, the particular facets of the conflict, and the outcome of the conflict in which both sides were on equal footing.
Chapter 4 – Two-Dimensional Power

In the second dimension, power is wielded when those already in power because of victories in the first dimension 1) set the rules of the game or 2) control the scope of the conflict, preventing those without power from participating and voicing grievances. This is the lens through which I examine events and relationships in the months leading up to the convention.

As established in the proceeding chapter, party activists utilized positional power in writing the rules of the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention and there was little participation by rank and file Republicans. Because the convention was portrayed and understood by many as a fight between McCain and Romney, and because a large majority of party actives supported or were understood to support Mitt Romney, Romney was the expected winner of the convention. This, however, was not the case. Romney received the most votes in the first round but lost the second round and the convention. This chapter and the next explain how this occurred, especially in an event taking place within a three-dimensional power structure. I argue first that some party activists, the powerful, had a different preference than Romney or McCain and acted upon their preferences, creating a two-dimensional conflict within the party activists (See Figure 4 – Divisions of Conflicts). In this conflict were the Old Guard and the New Blood\textsuperscript{14}, two categories within the party activists. The Old Guard represents the more powerful group within the party activists, favors the status quo including norms and traditions, and would generally prefer unity and the overall interests of the party over ideology. Conversely, the New Blood represents the less powerful group within the party activists, favors changes to the party, and is generally idealistic. Although the collective group of the New Blood is somewhat new within the party activists, its members are long-time Republicans who have recently coalesced.

\textsuperscript{14} These terms are original to Brian Casto in his characterization of the two groups of party activists within the West Virginia Republican Party.
Second in this chapter, I demonstrate how the scope of the conflict was used by both the Old Guard and the New Blood in attempts to win. Third, I show how both sides also used the rules of the game in different ways to enhance their campaigns.

This chapter essentially describes a conflict within a conflict (See Figure 4 – Divisions of Conflicts). Chapter three described the conflict (actually, lack of conflict) between the powerful party activists (A) and the powerless rank and file Republicans (B). This chapter analyzes the conflict between two groups in the party activists. Remember that information is what separated the party activists from rank and file Republicans in chapter three. This chapter is about a conflict that occurred in which everyone had information. It is a two-dimensional conflict because it deals with people who all possess a full consciousness of the situation, unlike the rank and file Republicans in chapter three. In this chapter, in a two-dimensional conflict, A’s have more power and B’s have less power, but are still entirely conscious of the situation and possess the same information as the A’s.

**Figure 4 - Divisions of Conflicts**

*Vertical conflict represents chapter three
Horizontal conflict represents chapter four*
So What?

In the terms of a healthy democracy as described in this study, this chapter’s conflicts and actors come closer to the mark. Republicans should expect equal treatment from the WVGOP, especially in terms of participation. Since the actors in this chapter were all party activists, their opportunities for equality and participation in the party were much improved from those of the rank and file Republicans in chapter three. Republicans should also expect well-defined, widely-understood, and systematically followed rules and procedures. Again, actors in this chapter have a better shot at understanding rules; however, I point out that the rules themselves were advantageous to some and disadvantageous to others. Finally, Republicans should be able to provide educated participation in elections. Leaders discussed in this chapter were able to participate with education; however this was not true for everyone involved in their campaigns.

Transitioning from Three Dimensions to Two Dimensions

As stated above, what separates the powerful A’s from the powerless B’s in a three-dimensional power structure is information and awareness or consciousness of the situation. In chapter three, party activists held power over rank and file Republicans because party activists were knowledgeable and aware of the entire political process, both officially and unofficially, and exercised that power in the creation of the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention. In this chapter I outline the events that occurred between the time the convention was decided upon and the day of the convention. The events discussed here transpired between actors within the party activists, all of whom were entirely aware and knowledgeable of the political process as well as the convention. Make no mistake: while these events were happening, there were still those completely outside the loop of information and were thus still under a three-dimensional power structure. However, as I explain below, some who were completely unaware and disengaged were given information, brought ‘into the fold’, so were then no longer under a three-dimensional power. Steven Lukes, author of the third dimension of
power, stated in an interview that people may ‘escape’ the third dimension of power when they are aware of it, further confirming the division of the third-dimension powerful from the powerless according to information, and also confirming that, although it is difficult, the third dimension of power can be overcome, at least on an individual level (Kearns 2006).

**WVGOP A’s and WVGOP B’s**

As noted in the section of chapter one entitled ‘2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention’, lines of division were drawn between party activists as soon as the new convention procedures were conceived. Recall that convention CEO Bob Fish praised the fact that the convention would bring West Virginia into play on the national Republican scene and allow West Virginia to voice its preference for a presidential contender before most other states. Conversely, Ron Paul campaigner Ed Burgess noted the convention’s opportunities for ‘everyday republicans’ to take a more active role in the choosing of their nominee for president, as well as to have a much better chance at representing West Virginia Republicans at the Republican National Convention as delegates. The two different vantage points here at first may not seem contrary to one another. However, a closer examination reveals two distinct categories within party activists: the Old Guard, what Ed Burgess called “the Party Elite” (Burgess 2011, email), and the New Blood.

Voicing the Old Guard’s vantage point, Fish’s discussion emphasizes the good of the state, the good of the whole Republican Party in West Virginia. His insistence that the new convention is undeniably good for all indicates a conception of unity. Everyone will have the chance to participate; everyone’s preferences will be heard (Fish 2011, email). However, judging from the convention’s low turn-out, this was not the case. By everyone or by speaking for all Republicans in West Virginia, Fish is likely claiming the convention will be good for those Republicans who, like him, are already active within the party and who understand the procedures and nuances of politics in the state; in other words, the
convention would be good for the party activists of chapter three. When the recipients of the ‘good’ are thus understood, a few things become clearer.

First, if the active, three-dimensional power-holding Republicans (party activists) are everyone, then everyone really did know about the convention, everyone did have a chance to participate, and the convention was truly democratic and a large success. Fish’s comments about the great turnout and great achievement regarding the convention are understandable, from this vantage point (Fish 2011, email). Second, the in-fighting, name-calling, and divisions within the party which several interviewees attest to are also more explicable (Riggall 2011, email; Lucas 2011, email; Phillips 2008, email). If party activists are everyone, that is less than 2,000 people, all of whom have worked together for a long time in the state party against the insurmountable force of the Democratic Party. The unity of the group is so essential to its hopes in the state, as stressed by almost every interviewee. Further, the delegate counts revealed that a very large portion of the convention’s automatic delegates either officially or unofficially supported the same candidate, Mitt Romney, granting him legitimacy over John McCain, and essentially counting out any of the other candidates as illegitimate. Thus, from this kind of unified group mentality, for a person or faction of that group to support a candidate who ‘could not win’ to the point of blocking a win for a candidate who was considered ‘viable’ was just selfish (Messina 2008). Perhaps to some readers this line of reasoning seems like a stretch; however, there are those party activists whom I have personally heard blame the outcome of the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention for the ultimate victory of President Obama. They rationalized that if Romney had won in West Virginia on Super Tuesday, his early announcement would have influenced the primaries still happening throughout the day, giving him more victories and eventually the nomination, and Romney would have been a much better contender than John McCain against Barak Obama. Although this line of reasoning is certainly not shared by most in the party, the point still remains that unity was very important and to have the state
party’s first presidential convention give a win to a second tier candidate when a majority of the party actives supported a ‘winning’ candidate was embarrassing to some and infuriating to many.

The contrary vantage point, that of the New Blood, is found in comments from Ron Paul campaigner Ed Burgess, as well as Romney campaigner Bill Phillips. Burgess notes the value of the convention format to what he calls “Everyday Republicans” who would have a chance to become a part of the democratic apparatus of the Republican Party in the state because they were able to voice their preferences as delegates to both a state convention and possibly the national convention (Burgess 2011, email). When the primary election was the only option, no ‘everyday Republican’ could hope to effect much by either voting in a very late election or by running for national delegate on a very lengthy alphabetized list at the bottom of a ballot. Phillips, in his post-convention comments, insisted that if a convention were ever to be held again, that each Republican in the state should be given official notification and should not be expected to pay a filing fee or take a day off of work to participate (Phillips 2008, email). Contrary to the Old Guard’s position, the New Blood seems to be more interested in the participation of those outside of the party actives as well as those on the inside. Burgess praised the convention for its democratic potential and although many Paul supporters distrusted the institutions and position-holders in the party, he feels it is, in theory, a wonderful option for the state party’s nominating procedures (2011, email). Truly, the convention would work much better than a primary in democratically representing the Republicans of West Virginia, at least on paper. By providing West Virginia Republicans with an opportunity to run for or elect their neighbors to run for county-level delegate positions, the convention had the potential to have a delegation that truly reflected the Republican population across the state.

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15 Although the majority of the party actives supported Romney, and the campaign was wise to target party actives, Bill Phillips personally expresses a very democratic mentality, placing him with the New Blood rather than the Old Guard. From his interview we can deduce that the Romney campaign’s targeting of automatic delegates was an excellent campaigning strategy, and not an indication that Phillips desired that influence remain only within the Old Guard.
So, there is a division within the party activists of the Old Guard and the New Blood. The Old Guard is what Burgess called the “Party Powerful” (2011, email) who stressed unity and who seemed mostly interested in the participation of the party activists, not necessarily all Republicans. The New Blood is more interested in the democratic nature of the convention, putting forth more effort toward involving those outside the party structure. This is not to say that New Blood was without its biases and strategies; everyone involved in the convention was campaigning in some way. However, whether because they were interested in being democratic or because their best chance at influence was outside the party structure, the New Blood during the convention campaigns was actively vying for the participation of rank and file Republicans.

The Scope of the Conflict

E. E. Schattschneider writes that “[e]very fight consists of two parts: (1) the few individuals who are actively engaged at the center and (2) the audience that is irresistibly attracted to the scene” (1975, 2). Put in terms of the West Virginia Republican Party, the ‘fight’ is the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention, the ‘few individuals actively engaged’ are the different campaign representatives within the party activists, and the ‘audience’ are those rank and file Republicans who have been given information, whose support the campaigners wish to obtain. In a situation like this, which Schattschneider would claim is all of politics, he says “the most important strategy... is concerned with the scope of the conflict” (1975, 3). Schattschneider goes on to explain that, in any conflict, it is unlikely that both sides are evenly matched, so one side is necessarily stronger that the other. In the case of the convention the two sides were the Old Guard and the New Blood. The Old Guard was the stronger side, since most all of them had a preference for Romney, while the New Blood was dispersed between at least Huckabee and Paul. The Old Guard was also the stronger side because they possessed positional and institutional advantages. While all of the party activists knew about the convention, the

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16 Although a few considered part of the Old Guard supported John McCain over Romney, this number was relatively small and generally frowned upon by the Old Guard who supported Romney.
Old Guard, including the Romney supporters, was made up mostly of automatic delegates who held positions within the party and understood the party’s structure and nuances. The New Blood, on the other hand, were volunteers for the most part, both for their campaigns as well as within the party. So they did not have the same advantages within the party as the Old Guard.

Schattschneider argues that it follows logically if the Old Guard is stronger than the New Blood in the conflict of the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention, it is in the best interest of the Old Guard to maintain the scope of the conflict (1975). For, as Schattschneider points out, why would the Old Guard unnecessarily risk involving more people by expanding the conflict to include members of the audience? On the other hand, the New Blood as the weaker side of the conflict have nothing to lose by involving more people, so they will necessarily seek to expand the scope of the conflict.

These two tendencies are just what happened. The Old Guard, made up of a great deal of automatic delegates, were mostly united in preference and had a large advantage against the other contenders. They had no reason to expand the conflict to include those who may or may not side with their candidate. For example, an unnamed county chair very vocally supported Romney, as did that particular county’s committee. Since automatic delegates made up a much larger percentage than at-large delegates, that county chair did not need to go out of the way to ensure the county’s at-large delegate positions were publicized or filled by anyone other than those supporting the same candidate. Thus, the county chair, a part of the Old Guard, did not make great efforts to inform Republicans in that county of the convention.

Conversely, the New Blood really had nothing to lose by expanding the scope of the conflict. As volunteers with little to no support from automatic delegates, the New Blood desperately needed to field at-large delegates. So, the strategy of Huckabee campaigner Michael Ankrom and Paul campaigner

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17 This is information I know of because of personal experience. This information would never be admitted publically, as it would clearly implicate the county chair involved.
Ed Burgess was to tell as many people as they could outside the party structure, the audience, about the convention and sign them up to participate. Thus, the New Blood expanded the scope of the conflict. Again, this is not to promote these campaigns to democratic sainthood; both campaigns clearly and unapologetically pursued only those outside the party’s structure who would support their candidates. For example, Michael Ankrom did not sign up any at-large delegates pledged to Romney, McCain, or any other candidate other than Huckabee. Burgess and the Paul campaign attracted Paul supporters and certainly did not make efforts to sign up anyone else. The New Blood were not simply dispensing information for the purposes of involving as many people as possible, ensuring the representation of all Republicans at the convention. These were campaigners who had strategies and goals of winning; their strategies just happened to work better by recruiting outside the party’s structure.

By controlling the scope of the conflict, both sides were operating in the second dimension of power. Neither side was forcing any delegate to support a certain candidate. The conflict here did not have to do with candidate preference, but with who was able to enter the conflict, who could get into the game. This was a conflict of gate-keeping, not decision-making. In this two-dimensional conflict, the stronger side, the Old Guard, had it in their best interest to maintain the scope of the conflict to the party activists, where they had a large part of the automatic delegates united in preference. The weaker side, the New Blood, had no chance within the scope of the party activists, so they expanded the scope of the conflict to include members of the audience, those rank and file Republicans they brought into the conflict by sharing information.

Rules of the Game

The rules of the game were utilized in a different way by the Old Guard and the New Blood. The Old Guard set the rules of the game, and the New Blood employed the rules to their advantage. As stated in chapter two, setting the rules of the game is a privilege of those who already hold positions of power. Translated to the West Virginia Republican Party, those who are able to set the rules
and who did set the rules of the convention are the state executive committee, which includes all county chairs. The rules of the convention had several aspects which were advantageous to those who set them. First, the convention rules gave 60% of the delegate positions to automatic delegates. These were made up of the state executive committee, the county chairs, and the county executive committees. Thus, if one side gained a sizable advantage with automatic delegates, that side would be the much stronger side in the overall conflict. Those in power set the rules of the game in such a way as to give themselves a sizable advantage. This was not necessarily done on purpose; the convention’s rules were set in 2005, three years before the convention itself and long before any presidential contenders announced candidacy. It is not as if a group of state and county committee members got together, decided to support Romney, then set the convention up so they controlled 60% of the delegates. It is not plausible to argue that this was a preconceived, maniacal plan. It is plausible, however, to argue that the unity desired by the Old Guard and the influence they hoped ‘everyone’ in West Virginia would exert on the national stage caused the Old Guard to set the rules so that they could exert a united preference and possess a sizable advantage over those outside the party structure who might support a candidate they would deem illegitimate.

The second way the rules were set in favor of the Old Guard had to do with their complexity. The knowledge and information required to understand how to participate in the convention was vast and difficult to obtain by anyone outside of the party. As Conrad Lucas attests, little to no information was dispersed to rank and file Republicans. And the convention was certainly not something one could stumble upon and easily understand. The delegate distributions were determined by mathematical formulas, every bit of participation required computer and internet knowledge, and aside from some generalized articles in the media with no detailed information, there was no publicity of the convention’s participation procedures. The convention’s complication and unfamiliarity is evidenced in the many reports of people showing up to vote at their polling places the day of the convention.
(Messina 2008), as well as the anger directed at the party after the convention (Riggall 2011, email). Again, making the rules complicated was not likely done to purposely keep Republicans from participating. Truthfully, it took a long time and a lot of study for party activists to understand them. However, whether or not the complexity and seclusion of the rules were intended to stifle participation of rank and file Republicans, this was certainly the effect.

The Old Guard, then, stood to benefit because they set the rules of the convention so that they controlled sixty percent of the convention’s delegates and because the rules were so complicated that anyone besides those who set them would have a very difficult time participating.

Although they were at a disadvantage because of the rules of the game and because of the scope of the conflict, the New Blood still found ways to utilize the rules of the convention in their favor. Two examples of this are 1) Michael Ankrom’s strategy to get at-large delegates elected for Huckabee and 2) the strategy between the Paul and the Huckabee delegates.

First, because Michael Ankrom had been employed by the West Virginia Republican Party, and was thus a part of the party activists, he had knowledge of the convention as well as the party’s nuances. He relates that he knew most automatic delegates were either pledged to Romney or were remaining uncommitted to any candidate, so Ankrom knew he had to target at-large delegates (2011, email). Thus, he utilized what he knew about the registration and voting procedures to get all of Huckabee’s at-large delegates elected. Ankrom, as a party activist, knew how many at-large delegate positions were allotted to each county. In those counties where he had the most influence, Ankrom registered just as many candidates for Huckabee as there were at-large positions and no more, so that Huckabee voters would not be competing with one another (2011, email). Additionally, Ankrom instructed every Huckabee supporter who registered as a candidate for delegate to also register to vote in the online election; this may seem self-evident, but there were many cases in which people registered as a candidate but did not register to vote for themselves (2011, email). Finally, Ankrom instructed all
Huckabee candidates and voters to vote for only the Huckabee candidates and no others, thereby ensuring all Huckabee candidates for delegate would receive the maximum number of votes, regardless of the individual’s name identification. Again, this may seem self-evident and something that every campaign would instruct their voters to do; however this was not the case. Many voters marked only a few names, some voting for delegates supporting different candidates. By possessing this information and also passing it on to Huckabee supporters, Ankrom used two-dimensional power tactics to improve the fortunes of a campaign of the New Blood that ultimately went on to win the entire convention.

Second, Ron Paul campaigner Ed Burgess combined his knowledge of convention procedures in general with Michael Ankrom’s institutional knowledge of the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention in particular to utilize the rules in order to benefit their two campaigns. Burgess relates understanding immediately when Ankrom approached him about the possibility of a Paul-Huckabee coalition at the convention, something that he had hoped for since learning of the convention. Unlike the angry sentiments and portrayal in the media of ‘backroom deals’ in ‘smoke-filled rooms’, coalitions are to be expected in a convention-type nominating procedure (this is discussed in detail in chapter five). Understanding the nature of conventions, Burgess knew the Paul campaign needed a “Plan B”. Although not necessarily as familiar with conventions in general, Ankrom knew the rules of this specific convention and could interpret the numbers enough to understand that coalitions were allowed and that he would need one. So, the two campaigns, working well within the rules and expectations of the convention, formed a coalition contingent on the outcome of the convention’s first round of votes.

Ankrom and Burgess demonstrated how the side of the conflict which is at a disadvantage by the rules of the game can utilize those rules in such a way as to even the playing field somewhat. Using

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18 The only exceptions to Ankrom’s instructions regarded Ron Paul candidates. Ankrom instructed Huckabee supporters to vote for Ron Paul’s candidates in the event that there were not enough Huckabee delegates registered (2011, email).
their knowledge of the rules, both academic and institutional, the Huckabee and Paul campaigns greatly improved their chances in the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention. Ankrom’s successful strategy for electing at-large delegates for Huckabee combined with the coalition formed between the Huckabee and Paul campaigns eventually gave victory of the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention and 18 national convention delegates to Huckabee.

Conclusions

In their exercise of the second dimension of power, the Old Guard worked to maintain the scope of the conflict to only party activists, where they had a large advantage of automatic delegates, and to set the rules of the game in such a way as to favor themselves, those within the party structure. Although according to Schattschneider and the second dimension of power the New Blood was disadvantaged by both the scope of the conflict and the rules of the convention, the New Blood nonetheless expanded the scope of the conflict and utilized the rules of the convention so that, upon entering the convention, the Huckabee campaign ran close behind the Romney campaign in total delegates.

Reviewing this study’s terms of a healthy democracy, this chapter paints a better picture of democracy in the West Virginia Republican Party than did chapter three. Those discussed in this chapter were treated fairly equally by the party in terms of participation because they were at least actives in the party. And although the rules were disadvantageous to the New Blood, those in this chapter at least had a chance to understand the rules enough to utilize them in campaigning. However, although leaders discussed in this chapter were able to participate with education, this was not true of everyone who attempted. Thus, the state of democracy in this chapter is improved from chapter three; however, this is

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19 Paul campaigner Ed Burgess stated “there was no shortage of willing supporters. Had these “willing” been “ready and able” to navigate themselves all the way to the Convention Floor, a First Ballot victory was as likely for our champion, as it was for the Party Regular’s favorite” (2011, email), indicating that Paul supporters could have been just as successful as Huckabee supporters.
only because the scope of consideration is much smaller (the party activists, as opposed to the Republican Party in West Virginia).

The next chapter relates the events of the day of the convention through the lens of the first dimension of power. I explain that, once the convention began, all participants were on equal footing. There were no longer questions of consciousness, or of who could or could not participate. Once it started, the convention operated in the first dimension of power.
Chapter Five – One-Dimensional Power

In the first dimension of power, A has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do, assuming that 1) B’s actions are indicative of B’s values or desires, 2) B is capable of acting within an open, decision-making arena, and 3) anyone acting as B’s representative actually represents B’s values or desires. This is the lens that I use to interpret the last portion of the history in chapter one, the convention itself. William Riker’s theory of political coalitions operates entirely within a one-dimensional view of power. He assumes that the game, in this case the convention, is open to all and that choosing a coalition is simply a matter of ordering preferences, or candidates. As seen in chapters three and four, these assumptions were not true for the circumstances leading up to the convention. In chapter three - three-dimensional power B’s actions, actually the inactions of rank and file Republicans, were not indicative of B’s values or desires, presumably to have a voice and participate politically, and those acting as B’s representatives, party activists, did not necessarily represent B’s values or desires. In chapter four – two-dimensional power, the ‘game’, the campaigns before the convention, was not played in an arena open to the participation of B, rank and file Republicans.

However, once the convention was set in motion, the elections for state delegates were over, and the campaigns gained as many committed delegates as possible, there were no more rules to be set and no more chances for any kind of covert exercises of power. The conflict, the convention, was then operating in only the first dimension of power. This was made possible in this specific situation by a few factors. First, the conflict, the fight to win the convention on that day, occurred between actors who all had complete knowledge of the situation, ruling out any exercises of three-dimensional power. Second,

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20 The observant reader will have noticed that chapters three, four, and five are progressively shorter. This is due to the complication of the theories they discuss. For example, chapter three’s third dimensional discussion is much more complicated than chapter four’s application of two-dimensional power. And, true to Leo Strauss’ accusations, the first dimensional, behavioral approach to the study of power in this chapter reduces its subject to the lowest denominator and is thus fairly straightforward, simple and takes about a third of the length of chapter three to describe.
the rules that were set for the convention which at first were advantageous to those to set them were more or less neutralized by strategies within the second dimension of power. With no more agendas to be set or gates to be kept, the convention’s contest can confidently be said to have been free of two-dimensional power. Understand that the argument here, of one-dimensional power only, refers only to those participating in the convention on that day, February 5, 2008. There were still those who were under three-dimensional power who had no idea the convention was occurring, as well as those under two-dimensional power who knew it was happening but were unable to participate. The argument in this chapter, however, is about those who did know about it and were at the convention.

Since the convention occurred in the first dimension of power, all actors’ preferences can plausibly be observed in their behaviors. Thus, we have to assume that if a certain delegate casts a vote for Romney, that delegate preferred Romney in that particular round of voting. There are, as I explain below, strategies that effect the ordering of preferences or candidates. The success or failure of these strategies can be measured by observing them with the convention’s outcome, as well as the preferences of participants.

So What?

In theory, since this chapter discusses one-dimensional power, it should reflect a healthy democracy. All participating Republicans should have been treated equally in terms of participation and should have had access to well-defined, widely-understood, and systematically followed rules and procedures. Additionally, Republicans should have been able to provide educated participation in the convention’s procedures.

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21 The very fact that this chapter’s argument must be so narrowly defined speaks to the limits of the first dimension of power, as outlined in the beginning of chapter two – theoretical perspectives.
22 Additionally, this argument is only about the contest of the presidential contenders. There were surely other exercises of power, likely in the third or even the fourth dimensions, regarding other issues. However, regarding the choice of a presidential nominee, the conflict occurred in the first dimension only.
In this chapter, I demonstrate how William Riker’s theory of political coalitions was perfectly exemplified on the day of the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention. First, I show how each delegate chose which candidate’s side to take. Then I illustrate the technique of modifying the proposal, as utilized by two of the convention’s campaigns. Finally, the size principle and the resultant winning coalition make the convention’s unexpected results clear.

Taking Sides

Riker’s theorizes that all groups of people charged with making a decision will ultimately behave the same way (1962). He reasons that within a given conflict, there are a finite number of options or sides to be taken. “Prospective leaders” begin by taking one of these sides and a “number of like-minded members join” the side because they agree with that option (Riker 1962, 112). Riker argues that all participants involved in the decision will give allegiance to one of the sides available (1962). This is what happened going in to the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention. Upon entering the first round of voting at the convention, each delegate had a particular candidate for whom they would cast their vote. This decision may have been made long before the convention began because of ideological preferences, as in the case of Michael Ankrom for Huckabee or Ed Burgess for Paul (2011, email). The decision may have been made during the campaigning process by a member of the WVGOP who determined that Romney was the most viable candidate for a general election and thus their first preference. The decision may have been made as late as the morning of the convention when all of the delegates heard candidates or candidates’ proxies speak before the first round of voting. An uncommitted delegate on paper, for instance, may have been swayed to vote for a particular candidate because of ideologies expressed in his speech. Whatever the reason and whenever the decision was made, every person who cast a vote in the first round at the convention determined which candidate was their first preference.
Thus, according to Riker’s theory, 464 convention delegates preferred Mitt Romney on the first round of voting, 375 preferred Mike Huckabee, 176 preferred John McCain, and 118 preferred Ron Paul. Had the convention been set another way, such as simply the most votes wins, Romney would have won the convention immediately and Riker’s theory would have no place in this study. However, since the convention was set up as an exhaustive ballot, a majority of votes was required to win, the lowest vote-getter would be dropped after each round of voting wherein a candidate did not receive a majority of the votes, and rounds of voting would continue until one candidate received a majority. Since the convention was set in this way, and especially since there were one hour time slots inserted between each round of voting and delegates whose original choice was dropped from the ballot were allowed to continue voting, Riker’s theory of coalitions is perfectly applicable. In fact, this type of election is very prone and expected to conclude with voting coalitions.

Modifying the Proposal

Riker posits that once sides are taken in a given conflict, leaders of each side can still entice members of other sides to join their side “by the technique of modifying the proposal” (Riker 1962, 112). In other words, Riker says the leaders of the different campaigns in the convention could attract the followers of other campaigns by modifying their proposals, or by making their candidate a more attractive preference than another candidate. For the Paul campaign, this would not be difficult to do, since their candidate was no longer an option on the ballot. Understanding this, both the Huckabee and the Romney campaigns courted the Paul delegates, attempting to submit an acceptable proposal for their delegates to support one of their candidates. Both campaigns modified their proposals by offering what Riker calls side-payments, “private agreement[s] about the division of the payoff for winning” (1962, 34). Regarding the convention, the payoff for winning was 18 delegates to the Republican National Convention supporting the winning candidate. Therefore, the Huckabee campaign’s offer was three delegate positions to the Republican National Convention to be filled by delegates supporting Ron
Paul (Ankrom 2001, email; Burgess 2011, email). The Romney campaign, learning of the Huckabee campaign’s offer, attempted to modify their proposal to be even more attractive with a larger side-payment of five delegate positions for Ron Paul supporters.

As stated in chapter one, however, the Huckabee campaign’s offer for a coalition was made weeks prior to the convention and was contingent upon either Paul or Huckabee being dropped from the ballot. Therefore, the coalition and the side-payment offered was somewhat stronger because there was a mutual agreement for support and the coalition existed for weeks, whereas the Romney campaign’s offer was very fresh and in the heat of the moment. One caveat of the Ron Paul delegates, however, was that they would not be instructed how to vote, especially because many of them distrusted the official campaigners involved with the party (Burgess 2011, email). Therefore, the leadership of the Paul campaign agreed to pitch both offers of side-payments and coalitions to the Paul delegates as a group and allow them to vote for either option, or to simply abstain from the second round of voting (Burgess 2011, email). Ultimately, though, on the advice of the Paul leadership, the Paul delegates decided to stay and vote for Huckabee in the second round of voting.

Meanwhile, the McCain campaign did not visit the Paul delegates. Based on their numbers, the McCain campaign did not have much hope for a win by gaining the Paul delegates. The campaign did, however, attempt to form a coalition. John McCain himself placed a call to Mike Huckabee himself, asking him to instruct his delegates to vote for McCain in the second round (Ankrom 2011, email). This request seems a little bizarre looking at the numbers. McCain was likely counting on the national media’s portrayal of him and Romney as frontrunners; however, this conflict really was occurring in the first dimension of power only, and as such, this portrayal in the media did not have the same influence as the number of convention votes for Huckabee. Had the delegates been under a three-dimensional power structure at the convention, they may have believed McCain was a viable option and Huckabee
was not. However, they were not and thus Huckabee refused to instruct his delegates to vote for McCain.

Because McCain could not attract Huckabee to his side to form a winning coalition, his preferences and the preferences of his delegates were changed. Although McCain’s first preference was to win the convention, the possibility of winning looked fairly grim. If he could not win, and since he believed the national media’s portrayal of the race as McCain versus Romney, his next highest preference was for Romney to lose. Based on the new order of preferences, as well as the Huckabee-Paul coalition, McCain instructed his delegates to vote for Huckabee in the second round of voting (Ankrom 2011, email). This instruction and this strategic move could not be more observable and certainly in the first dimension of power: I personally witnessed leadership in the McCain campaign walking through the hallways of the Charleston Civic Center as well as around the parameters of the convention floor with handmade signs that said ‘McCain delegates vote for Huckabee’.

The Size Principle

Unintentionally, then, the Huckabee campaign formed its coalition according to Riker’s size principle: “In social situations similar to n-person, zero-sum games with side-payments, participants create coalitions just as large as they believe will ensure winning and no larger” (Riker 1962, 47). The social situation was the second round of voting at the convention. It involved n-persons, more than two people, it was a zero-sum game, where only one side could enjoy the results of winning, and side-payments or deal-making was allowed and expected. Thus, Riker argues that the campaigns, specifically the Huckabee campaign, would create a coalition just large enough to win and no larger. According to the participation in the first round, 1,133 votes were cast. If the same number participated in the second round of voting, a candidate would need 567 votes to win. However, Riker submits that there is a limited amount of certainty a side, or a campaign, can have as to the loyalty of those pledged to that side.
(1962). Therefore, Riker argues that coalitions will attempt to make up for this lack of certainty by increasing their size somewhat. This is essentially what the Huckabee campaign did.

The Huckabee campaign would need to retain its 375 first-round voters and gain an additional 192 in order to win. The Paul campaign represented the largest portion of this, 118 voters, but even if all of these stayed and voted, Huckabee would still lack 74 votes to win. Thus, when the McCain campaign instructed his delegates to vote for Huckabee, Huckabee campaigner Michael Ankrom knew the coalition was a winning one (Ankrom 2011, email). As it turned out, only 1,100 votes were cast in the second round, so 551 votes would win the convention. Huckabee received 567 votes, the exact number needed to win, had the same 1,133 delegates voted in both rounds, Romney received 521 votes, and McCain received 12. Without an account of how each individual voted, it is impossible to tell which delegates, which part of the Paul-McCain-Huckabee coalition, put Huckabee over the top; however, the fact that 33 delegates did not vote in the second round and 12 still voted for McCain suggests that the McCain-Huckabee alliance was not as instrumental as was the Paul-Huckabee alliance.

Conclusions

The convention, then, was a classic example of William Riker’s theory of political coalitions. First, sides formed when each delegate decided which candidate to vote for on the first round. Then, the Romney and Huckabee campaigns modified their proposals to the Paul campaign in hopes of forming a winning coalition. Finally, the Paul-McCain-Huckabee coalition formed according to the size principle and won the convention for Huckabee.

In terms of democracy, then, the convention functioned very healthily. All participants were treated equally, as each had the freedom to choose which ever candidate they preferred on each round of voting. The rules and procedures of the convention were understood by its participants well enough that every campaign involved attempted to form some kind of coalition. All delegates seemed to
participate fully and even very strategically. In the very small scope of convention delegates, then, democracy functioned well.
Conclusions

In the proceeding chapters, a three-dimensional power structure was built and maintained in the West Virginia Republican Party, favoring the party activists and hindering rank and file Republicans. Through exercises of power in the first dimension, such as gaining positions of influence and professionalizing the party, combined with exercises of power in the second dimension, such as structuring the hierarchy of the party, controlling the dissemination of information, and setting the rules of the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention, a third dimension of power was formed in which rank and file Republicans held false conceptions of powerlessness within the West Virginia Republican Party and against Democrats in the state. Because of this three-dimensional power structure, rank and file Republicans had little knowledge about the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention and did not participate in any meaningful way. Within the power structure, the party activists, there was a two-dimensional conflict between the Old Guard and the New Blood in the months leading up to the convention. During this conflict, both sides utilized the scope of the conflict and the rules of the game in different ways to improve their fortunes in the convention. Because they were the more powerful side, the Old Guard was advantaged by the scope of the conflict remaining only as large as the party activists, as well as by the rules they set to give 60% of the convention’s delegate positions to automatic delegates. The weaker side, the New Blood, expanded the scope of the conflict by involving those outside the party activists in the convention, and utilized the rules of the convention to elect at-large delegates and form alliances with each other. The convention itself operated in a one-dimensional power structure because all delegates were able to participate without hindrance and all votes cast indicated preferences. In this one-dimensional power structure, political coalitions were strategically formed among the convention’s delegates, resulting in an unexpected outcome.
So What?

So what does all of this mean for democracy? The original question posed regarded the health of the West Virginia Republican Party which claims to be democratic. The original question also assumes that democracy, including that within a political party, should be participatory. According to Schmitter and Karl's *What Democracy Is... And Is Not* “[m]odern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives” (2006, 247). Because the West Virginia Republican Party explicitly claims to be democratic, I translated this definition of democracy in terms of the party in this study. I determined that, in order to be called a healthy democracy, this means that West Virginia Republicans can expect equal treatment from the party, especially in terms of participation, and well-defined, widely-understood, and systematically followed rules and procedures. Further, in order for the West Virginia Republican Party to function democratically on a system and an individual level, individual Republicans must be able to informatively participate in elections. As indicated in chapters three, four, and five, the party failed to be truly democratic in terms of all West Virginia Republicans, but improved as the measured scope of democracy decreased in size. In other words, in terms of all West Virginia Republicans, the party scores poorly as a democracy. In terms of all of the party activists, the party scores slightly better, although still not very well. In terms of convention participants, which are absolutely the most active participants in the state, the party did exceedingly well.

Potential for Democracy

For lovers of democracy, the question becomes: how can the rest of the states Republicans share the democratic success of the convention experienced by its participants? In other words, how can the West Virginia Republican Party become more democratic, outside of its most active members? After all, on paper and according to convention CEO Bob Fish and Ron Paul campaigner Ed Burgess, a
convention has extreme potential for the influence of the state as a whole as well as for individual, ‘every day’ Republicans, especially when compared to West Virginia’s traditional May primary. If done well, the convention could have been a representation of Republicans from every county across the state. Delegates could have truly represented the first preferences of their county’s Republicans on the first round of voting. After a candidate was dropped, delegates could have caucused and decided their county’s second preference. Exercised this way, the convention could have been a stunning example of democracy in action.

Failure of Democracy

Unfortunately, this is not what happened. Although the convention possessed the potential for democratic success, it was ultimately even more of an offense to democratic action than the May primary. After considering the events as well as the theories used to examine them, there are two major reasons the convention failed in its pursuit of democracy.

First, the power structure described in this study was and still is very real in the state. Rank and file Republicans are very much in the dark in terms of participation within the state party and those in the state party are, for the most part, content to keep them there, excepting of course when the party needs monetary donations or signs to be waved. Though this desire is not true for everyone in the party who is able to change the level of participation in the party, not many, if any, are willing to do anything about it. Many in the party are willing to blame the lack of participation by rank and file Republicans on their perceived apathy. If democracy is ever expected to flourish in the party, this mentality must instead be turned inward and the party as a whole must be willing to honestly examine and critique the structure of power. Even once the power structure is addressed, though, the party would have a lot of ground to make up before a convention such as the one discussed here could be conducted democratically. A great deal of extra effort would have to be made to educate rank and file Republicans about the entire Republican Party as well as the convention itself.
The second reason the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention failed to serve democracy was because of the structure mentioned above and its resultant bias in the convention’s rules. Whether or not it was done intentionally, a great many that had the responsibility to act as democratic representatives of Republicans across the state were also allowed to be biased participants in the convention as automatic delegates, to the tune of 60%. There is positively no way the convention could have been democratically conducted under these circumstances, with two-thirds of its delegates supposedly responsible for informing and recruiting the other one-third. The 60% had dual allegiances which conflicted with one another. Some may argue that those who made up the 60%, members in the structure of the Republican party, were already representing those that would make up the 40%, the Republican party as a whole, and were acting as trustees of those who elected them. However, given the 15% or less turn out to elect positions in the Republican party, no one could accurately argue that these positions were truly representative of their constituents. So, given the structure of power in the state combined with the rules of the convention, the democratic failure in 2008 could have been predicted from the start.

**Improvements for the Future**

All hope is not lost, though. The West Virginia Republican Party’s original agreement with the Republican National Committee and the West Virginia Secretary of State’s office was to hold two consecutive presidential nominating conventions, so in 2012 there will be a chance for redemption. The same failure of democracy does not have to be repeated, providing some sizable changes are made.

First, the inter-party emails as well as Bill Phillips’ memorandum should be heeded: publicity is the key. Yes, it will cost money to advertise. However, if the party wishes to tout itself as a democratic organization, it must make much better efforts at publicity. Additionally, contacting each of the state’s registered Republicans, as suggested by Bill Phillips (2008, email) is essential in combating the power structure described above.
Second, the delegation at the convention should be made up of many, many more at-large delegates, the percentage of which should outweigh automatic delegates by a very sizable amount, if there are any automatic delegates at all. Because the party structure cannot be called representative of the state’s Republicans due to the power structure described here, the delegate distributions must attempt to make up for this lack of representation in the number of at-large delegates. Additionally, the delegates certainly should not be appointed if at all possible. Every effort should be made for each and every at-large delegate to be elected.

Finally, because of the power structure and lack of representation, the convention absolutely must have more unbiased parties who are disinterested in the outcome. Specifically, I mean county chairs and committees should certainly not hold delegate positions at all. They are the means by which Republicans across the state will learn about the convention and how to participate; they cannot be perceived to be biased at all. If the power structure is truly to be undone and the positions in the party are to be truly democratically representative, the elected members of the party cannot have anything to gain from the lack of participation of those whom they represent.

**Further Considerations**

The scope of this particular study is limited to the West Virginia Republican Party and the 2008 West Virginia Republican Presidential Convention. It cannot hope to address the many questions of power that arose during its examination. However, those question should be noted, and hopefully formed into studies of their own in the future.

First, by examining the nature of the power structure in the West Virginia Republican Party, this study naturally points to questions of power in all political parties. After all, the hierarchy discussed here, as well as unofficial paths to influence in the party, is common to many if not most political parties. Does that mean that all such structures are prone to the same kinds of exercises of power? Is there something inherent in American political parties that makes a few very powerful and the rest
quiescent? I cannot make this conclusion based on the scope of this study; however, questions of this sort certainly could and should be asked of political parties’ hierarchies.

Second, the question of American political parties leads to a question of power structures in political parties operating within a two-party system. According to Arend Lijphart, the United States will always be heavily prone to a two-party system (2006, 257). Does this mean that there are specific structures of power inherent in the parties in a two-party system? How are they specific? Are they detrimental to the exercise of democracy in the United States? Again, the scope of this study does not allow this question to be answered, only posed for future study.

A final question, and probably the closest to this study, is about the power structure in West Virginia as a whole. As mentioned in chapter one, the West Virginia Republican Party claims West Virginians are loyal to the Democratic Party. Is there a power structure there? What about the state as a whole in terms beyond politics, such as economics. The state is very reminiscent of John Gaventa’s power study in an Appalachian coal community; perhaps something similar to Gaventa’s study can be applied to West Virginia. The state is unique politically; whether or not this reflects the same kind of power structure described in this study merits further investigation.

All of these questions are in their infant forms. Only the question of democracy in the West Virginia Republican Party, especially regarding the 2008 convention, was discussed here. It is my hope that the conclusions made in this study will assist the party in the future and that democracy will be served through and for Republicans in West Virginia.
RESOLUTION
CALL FOR STATE CONVENTION

WHEREAS, "The Rules of the Republican Party" adopted on August 30, 2004, by the 2004 Republican National Convention provide that delegates to the 2008 Republican National Convention must be elected in a state convention, and

WHEREAS, the Republican State Executive Committee of West Virginia by resolution adopted on February 4, 2006, decided to elect a portion of its delegates at a state convention, and

WHEREAS, rules adopted pursuant to said resolution require that a call for said convention shall be issued by the Republican State Executive Committee of West Virginia not later than January 1, 2008,

NOW, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Republican State Executive Committee of West Virginia, hereby call the 2008 West Virginia Presidential Convention for the purposes of electing delegates to the 2008 Republican National Convention and all other lawful purposes to be held commencing at 9:00 AM on Tuesday, February 5, 2008, in the City of Charleston, West Virginia, and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Chairman of the Republican State Executive Committee of West Virginia is hereby directed to cause to be delivered to the Republican County Executive Committees of West Virginia a copy of this resolution and the official apportionment of delegates, when certified.

ADOPTED BY THE REPUBLICAN STATE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF WEST VIRGINIA, January 4, 2007, in meeting assembled in the City of Huntington, West Virginia, at which a quorum was present.

______________________________
Douglas E. McKinney, Chairman

ATTEST:

____________
Jo Slaughter, Secretary
Appendix B – Official Convention Rules

West Virginia Republican State Executive Committee
Rules for Selection of West Virginia Delegates to the Republican National Convention

Rule No. 1
Governance

1.1 Subordination of Rules. The Rules for Selection of West Virginia Delegates to the Republican National Convention (the "Selection Rules") as hereafter set forth shall be subject to and not interpreted to violate:
   (1) The Rules of the Republican Party, as adopted by the Republican National Convention, August 30, 2004; (2) the By-laws of the West Virginia State Republican Executive Committee; (3) the laws of the United States; and (4) the laws of the State of West Virginia.

1.2 Rules Committee. The State Chairman shall appoint a Rules Committee which shall promulgate and approve the Selection Rules as well as consider and approve any additions, deletions or any other changes to the Selection Rules.

1.3 Election Commission. The Rules Committee shall appoint three of its members to serve as an Election Commission whose duty it shall be to administer the process set forth in the Selection Rules including rules for the conduct of the convention ("Convention Rules").

1.3.1 The Election Commission shall appoint a Chairman from among its members whose duty it shall be to conduct meetings and exercise all powers which are inherent to the Chairman's position.

1.3.2 The Election Commission shall serve as the final arbitrator for any and all disputes arising under the Selection Rules and the Convention Rules.

Rule No. 2
Definitions

For the purposes of these rules, the following definitions shall be used:

2.1 "At-large delegates" shall mean all National Delegates as determined by the National Party Rules excluding District Delegates, the State Chairman, the National Committeeman and the National Committeeewoman.

2.2 "By-laws" shall mean the By-laws of the West Virginia Republican State Executive Committee, as amended.
2.3 "Convention Rules" shall mean the rules of procedure adopted by the committee for the conduct of the State Convention.

2.4 "Convention Year" shall mean the year in which the National Convention is to be held.

2.5 "County Chair" shall mean the chair of the county Republican Executive Committee or his or her designee.

2.6 "County Committee" shall mean the Republican executive committee of each of the respective counties in West Virginia duly formed pursuant to the laws of the State of West Virginia.

2.7 "County Delegation" shall consist of all State Delegates elected or selected pursuant to Rule 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5. In addition, State Delegates serving pursuant to Rules 5.1, 5.2, 5.6 and 5.7 shall be members of the County Delegation of the county in which they reside.

2.8 "District Delegates" shall mean those National Delegates allotted to the state pursuant to the National Party Rules which provide for each delegation to the National Convention to include three (3) district delegates for each congressional district in the State of West Virginia.

2.9 "Electronic balloting" shall mean a process by which Eligible Republicans may vote for candidates for delegate to the State Convention on the internet through a secured method of authorization.

2.10 "Eligible Republicans" shall mean those individuals duly registered to vote as Republicans under the laws of the State of West Virginia on or before the 3rd day of November of the year preceding the Convention Year.

2.11 "Enrolled Republicans" shall mean those Eligible Republicans who have completed the Enrollment Process set forth in Rule 7.2.

2.12 "File" any derivative thereof shall mean (1) delivering in person or by common carrier or by mailing by U.S. Mail as indicated by the date postmarked to the designated party or (2) delivering electronically where authorized or required under the Selection Rules. In the event the required filing date is a Saturday, Sunday or a federal or State of West Virginia holiday the date for filing shall be extended to the next day which is not a Saturday, Sunday or federal or State of West Virginia holiday.

2.13 "National Convention" shall mean the Republican National Convention.

2.14 "National Delegates" shall mean delegates to the National Convention. The National Delegates" comprise the "State Delegation."

2.16 “Presidential Candidate” shall mean (a) any person who is qualified under the laws of the United States to serve as President of the United States and who is qualified for consideration at the State Convention or through the Primary Election, or (b) any committee, group or organization that promotes the nomination or election of a person who is qualified under the laws of the United States to serve as President of the United States and who is qualified for consideration at the State Convention or through the Primary Election.

2.17 “Primary Election” shall mean the primary election held pursuant to the laws of the State of West Virginia.

2.18 “Selection Rules” shall mean the Rules for Selection of the West Virginia Delegation to the Republican National Convention.

2.19 “State Chairman” or “Chairman” shall mean the Chairman of the State Committee or his or her designee.

2.20 “State Committee” and “State Party” shall mean the West Virginia Republican State Executive Committee.

2.21 “State convention” shall mean the Republican State Presidential Convention called by the Republican State Executive Committee for the purpose of selecting Delegates to the Republican National Convention.

2.22 “State delegates” shall mean delegates to the State Convention.

Rule No. 3
Method of Selection of Delegates to the Republican National Convention

3.1 Selection of At-large Delegates. At-large delegates shall be selected at a State Convention conducted pursuant to the Selection Rules and the Convention Rules.

3.2 Election of District Delegates. District delegates shall be selected at the Primary election pursuant to the Selection Rules.

Rule No. 4
Call of the State Convention
4.1 Issuance of the Call. Prior to January 1 of the Convention Year, the State Committee shall issue the call for the State Convention.

4.2 Time and Place of the Convention. The State Convention shall not be convened prior to the first Tuesday in the month of February in the year in which the National Convention is held, or any other time prohibited by the National Party Rules; or later than the second Tuesday following the second Monday in May of the Convention Year.

Rule No. 5
Allocation of Delegates to the State Convention

Subject to the provisions of Rule 6, the State Delegates shall be as follows:

5.1 Elect State Executive Committee Members. All members of the State Committee shall be duly elected pursuant to the laws of the State of West Virginia.

5.2 Appoint State Executive Committee Members. All voting members of the State Committee shall be duly appointed pursuant to the By-laws and the laws of the State of West Virginia.

5.3 County Committees. Twelve (12) members of each of the County Committees shall be elected or appointed in a manner determined under the rules by each County Committee.

5.3.1 The event a County Committee consists of fewer than twelve (12) members, each County Committee may appoint or elect additional persons pursuant to rules adopted by the County Committee in order to equal the twelve (12) delegates allotted to each county under this rule.

5.3.2 The event the County Chair is a member of the County Committee and, as such, a State Delegate under Rule 5.2, the County Committee may appoint or elect a person to serve as an additional State Delegate to represent the County Chair's position on the County Committee.

5.4 Proportional Delegates. One (1) delegate for each one thousand (1,000) registered Republicans and every fraction thereof in each of the fifty-five counties in West Virginia.

5.4.1 For the purposes of Rule 5.4, the determination of the number of registered Republicans shall be made by reference to the records maintained within the Office of the Secretary of State of the State of West Virginia as of July 1st of the year preceding the Convention Year.
5.4.2 The State Chairman shall ascertain and certify the number of registered Republicans pursuant to Rule 5.4.1 by no later than the first of the year preceding the Convention Year.

5.4.3 or before September 1st of the year preceding the Convention Year, the State Chairman shall certify the number of state delegates to which each county is entitled pursuant to Rules 5.4 and 5.5 of the Selection Rules.

5.5 **Bonuses**. Each county having cast a majority of its votes for the nominee for President of the United States in the preceding national election shall be entitled to one (1) additional delegate for every (4) delegates determined under Rules 5.3 and 5.4 of the Rules.

5.5.1 The fraction resulting from the calculation under Rule 5.5 shall be reased to the next whole number.

5.6 **Republican Legislators**. All Republican members of the West Virginia Senate serving in such capacity as of the beginning of the State Convention.

5.7. **Republican Members of the Board of Public Works**. All Republican members of the Board of Public Works serving in such capacity as of the beginning of the State Convention.

5.8 **Allocation of Delegates by County Committees**. Upon application to and approval by the Election Commission, County Executive Committees may allocate to specific areas or districts within the county a proportional number of those delegates determined under Rules 5.3, 5.4 or 5.5 to the State Convention based upon the number of registered Republicans within that area.

5.8.1 Specific areas or districts shall include, but not be limited to, precincts, groups of precincts, magisterial districts, election districts or zip codes.

5.9 **Fees to Delegates**. Delegates allocated under Rules 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 will be certified by registering with the State Party in a manner authorized by the Rules Committee and paying a fee of Twenty-Five Dollars ($25.00) to the State Party of its designee.

**Rule 6**

**Candidates for State Delegate**
6.1 Candidates for State Delegate. Any Eligible Republican may be a candidate for State Delegate allocated under Rules 5.4 and 5.5 by complying with a certificate of candidacy with the State Party in a manner authorized by the Rules Committee and paying a filing fee of Twenty Five Dollars ($25.00) to the State Party or its designee.

6.1.1 Candidates for State Delegate under this rule may file electronically in any other manner authorized by the Rules Committee.

6.2. Filing Period. Candidates for State Delegate must file a certificate of candidacy pursuant to Rule 6.1 and pay any required filing fee during the filing period which shall begin on November 1st of the year preceding the Convention Year and end on November 30th of the year preceding the Convention Year.

6.3 Certification of Candidacy. The Election Commission shall certify candidates for State Delegate upon receipt of their certificate of candidacy and the payment of the required fee.

6.4 Designation of Presidential Preference. Any candidate filing pursuant to Rule 6.1 may indicate their preference for a Presidential candidate by stating such on their certificate of candidacy.

6.4.1 The name of any candidate for President shall appear next to the name of any candidate for State Delegate who indicates a presidential preference under Rule 6.4.

6.5 Qualifications for State Delegates. All State Delegates whether elected, selected, or deemed under these rules or designated under Rule 6.4 must be Eligible Republicans residing in the county for which they represent.

Rule 7
Election of Delegates to the State Convention

7.1 Election by Electronic Balloting. Enrolled Republicans shall elect State Delegates allocated under Rule 5.4 and Rule 5.5 by electronic balloting during the balloting period which shall begin on January 1st of the Convention Year and to end on January 14th of the Convention Year.

7.2 Enrollment Process. During the enrollment period, Eligible Republicans in West Virginia may enroll electronically or by any other means established by the Rules Committee by completing and submitting a form to the State Party.
7.2.1 The enrollment period shall begin on October 1st of the year preceding the Convention Year and end on November 30th of the year preceding the Convention Year.

7.2.2 Upon receipt of the enrollment form, the State Party shall verify that the enrollee is an Eligible Republican and forward the enrollee a username, password or some other means of verification which will permit the enrollee to vote during the balloting period.

7.3 Use of County Convention for Selection of Delegates to the State Convention. In addition to the process required under Rule 7.1, the Chairman of each County Committee may call a county convention to be held during the balloting period at a time and place convenient to the residents of said county.

7.3.1 Any county convention conducted pursuant to Rule 7.3 shall be for the purpose of balloting for the candidates for State Delegate located under Rules 5.4 and 5.5.

7.3.2 The county convention, Eligible Republicans may ballot for those State Delegates allocated under Rules 5.4 and 5.5 pursuant to action adopted by the County Committee and approved by the action Commission no later than 60 days prior to county convention.

7.3.3 Any ballots cast during a county convention shall be added to those ballots cast pursuant to Rule 7.1 in determining the election of State Delegates.

7.4 Appointment of Alternates. Any person elected as a State Delegate may, or to the convening of the State Convention, designate an alternate to serve as a State Delegate in their stead should they be unable to serve. Such designation shall be reported in writing to the Chairman prior to the convening of the State Convention.

7.4.1 Any person duly appointed under Rule 7.4 shall meet the qualifications set forth in Rule 6.5. In addition, no person may serve as an alternate for more than one State Delegate and no State Delegate may serve as the alternate for another State Delegate.

7.5 Vacancies. In the event there is an insufficient number of candidates for the number of State Delegates allocated to a county under Rules 5.3, 5.4 or 5.5, any person elected, selected or designated under Rule 7 shall resign
person as been designated under Rule 7.4, the County Chair shall be
authorized to fill such vacancy.

7.5.1 if the event the County Chair fails to fill a vacancy on or before the
7th day preceding the convening of the State Convention, such
vacancy may be filled by the State Chairman.

7.6 Proxies Prohibited. The use of proxies by State Delegates at the State
Convention shall be prohibited.

Rule 8
Requirements of Candidates for President
and Nominees for National Delegates

8.1 Filing requirements – At Large Delegates. Any Presidential Candidate
seeking at-large Delegates under Rule 3.1 shall declare as a candidate by
filing with the State Chairman a Certificate of Candidacy and include a list
of nominees for At-large Delegates equal to the amount allocated by the
National Party Rules.

8.1.1 The filing period for Presidential Candidates under Rule 8.1 ends
December 31st of the year preceding the Convention Year.

8.1.2 Nominate National Delegates as defined by the National Party
rules shall be elected by the State Republican Convention to be
held during months of June, July, or August of the Convention Year.

8.1.3 Every Presidential Candidate filing pursuant to Rule 8.1 shall be
required to pay to the State Party or its designee a filing fee of Five
thousand ($5,000) Dollars no later than September 1st of the year
preceding the Convention Year.

8.2 Certification of Presidential Candidates. On or before January 31st of
the Convention Year, the State Chairman shall certify that each nominee
for At-large Delegate is qualified pursuant to the Selection Rules and the
Presidential Candidate is, therefore, duly qualified for consideration at the
Convention.

8.3 Filing requirements – District Delegates. Any Presidential Candidate
seeking District Delegates under Rule 3.2 shall declare as a candidate by
filing with the State Chairman a Certificate of Candidacy and include a list
of nominees for District Delegates equal to the amount allocated by the
National Party Rules.
8.3.1 Presidential Candidates for District Delegates shall further be subject to the laws of the State of West Virginia that govern the primary Election.

8.4 Qualification for National Delegate or Alternate Delegate. Any person listed as a nominee or alternate under Rule 8.1 and Rule 8.3 shall be a resident of the State of West Virginia; registered to vote as a Republican under the laws of the State of West Virginia; and qualified to vote therein; provided in addition, nominees for District Delegate shall, likewise, be a resident of the congressional district so designated.

Rule 9
Selection of At-Large Delegates to the National Convention

9.1 Convention Co-Chairs. The duly elected National Committeeman and National Committeewoman representing West Virginia on the Republican National Committee at the time of the State Convention shall serve as Co-Chairs of the State Convention (hereinafter referred to as “Convention Co-Chairs”).


9.3 Limitation of Agenda. The agenda of the State Convention shall be limited to the selection of At-large Delegates to the National Convention and certain ceremonial activities set forth in the Convention Rules.

9.4 Voting. Each State Delegate shall be entitled to one (1) vote, which may be cast by an alternate delegate in the absence of the delegate.

9.4.1 A person serving as a State Delegate shall be entitled to more than one (1) vote at the State Convention including circumstances in which the State Delegate holds more than one position.

9.5 Delegations. All State Delegates qualified under Rule 5 shall be seated by the county of their residence.

9.5.1 The County Chair or his or her designee shall serve as chair of the county delegation to the State Convention.

9.6 Announcement of Presidential Candidates. The State Chairman shall announce the list of Presidential Candidates that have qualified pursuant to Rule 5 of the Selection Rules.
9.6.1 In conjunction with Rule 9.6, the State Chairman shall also announce the qualification of the nominees for At-Large Delegates.

9.4 Method of Election. At-Large Delegates shall be elected by a roll call vote of the counties by reference to the Presidential Candidate.

9.4.1 Each county shall announce its vote by reference to the Presidential Candidate.

9.4.2 At the conclusion of any ballot, the majority of State Delegates of any ten (10) County Delegations may demand a record vote of each State Delegate from any county. A “record vote” means each State Delegate from a county individually indicating for the record or her vote for a Presidential Candidate.

9.5 First Ballot. If any Presidential Candidate receives more than fifty percent of the State Delegates present and voting on the first roll call vote, the Chairman shall declare the State Convention’s selection of that Presidential Candidate’s corresponding list of At-Large National Delegates as duly selected as such.

9.6 Second Ballot. In the event no Presidential Candidate shall receive more than forty percent of the State Delegates present and voting on the first roll call vote, a second roll call vote shall be taken among the Presidential Candidates with the three highest numbers of votes in the first roll call vote.

9.6.1 In the event no Presidential Candidate shall receive more than fifty percent of the State Delegates present and voting on the second roll call vote, the Chairman shall declare the State Convention’s selection of that Presidential Candidate’s corresponding list of At-Large National Delegates as duly selected as such.

9.7 Third Ballot. In the event no Presidential Candidate shall receive more than forty percent of the State Delegates present and voting on the second roll call vote, a third roll call vote shall be taken among the Presidential Candidates with the two highest numbers of votes in the second roll call vote.

9.7.1 In the event no Presidential Candidate shall receive more than fifty percent of the State Delegates present and voting on the third roll call vote, the Chairman shall declare as duly selected the corresponding list of At-Large National Delegates of the Presidential Candidate receiving more than fifty percent of the State Delegates present and voting on the third roll call vote.
9.8 Tie Votes. In the event of a tie between two or more Presidential Candidates following the conclusion of any roll call vote, the prevailing Presidential Candidate shall be the Presidential Candidate who receives the most votes of the County Delegates among the tying candidates in the greatest number of counties.

Rule 10
Election of District Delegates

10.1 Primary Election for District Delegates. District Delegates shall be elected at the Primary Election pursuant to the laws of the State of West Virginia and the Selection Rules.

10.2 Ballot Requirements. The Primary Election ballot shall list the names of the candidates for President of the United States who have filed pursuant to the laws of the State of West Virginia.

10.2.1 Each candidate listed pursuant to Rule 10.2 shall also list adjacent to the names of the District Delegates so designated by the candidates under Rule 3.

10.3 Election of District Delegates. The candidate for President of the United States receiving the most votes in each respective Congressional District shall be entitled to the District Delegates so designated under Rule 7 of the Selection Rules.

Rule 11
Vacancies in National Delegates

11.1 Vacancy in At-large Delegates. In the event there is a vacancy among the At-large Delegates in the State Delegation, the vacancy shall be filled by the remaining At-large Delegates who are members of the State Delegation.

11.2 Vacancy in District Delegates. In the event there is a vacancy among the District Delegates in the State Delegation, the vacancy shall be filled by the remaining District Delegates who are members of the State Delegation.

11.3 Vacancies Filled by State Chairman. If a vacancy exists forty (40) days before the National Convention for any reason including the failure of the appropriate National Delegates to fail to fill a vacancy pursuant to Rule 11.1 and 11.2, then such vacancy may be filled by the State Chairman.
Rule 12
Certification of Election

12.1 All National Delegates selected or elected pursuant to these rules shall be certified by the appropriate State Party officer or officers in compliance with the National Party Rules.

Adopted this d day of July, 2007.

Douglas E. McKinney, MD
Chairman
Appendix C – Preliminary Guide to the Convention

Dear Fellow Republican:

On January 14, 2006, the West Virginia Republican State Executive Committee unanimously approved a resolution that dramatically changes the method in which West Virginia will choose their delegates to the 2008 Republican National Convention.

With a new date and process, West Virginia is now in Play... In '08!

In past years, candidates for Delegate to the National Convention ran in the May. The process produced a long, tedious list of candidates, often numbering in the hundreds. Moreover, since the number of West Virginia’s delegates was relatively small and the election was held so late in the primary season, neither the candidates nor Republican voters in West Virginia paid little attention.

Under the Party’s new approach, thousands of Republican voters will elect over 1,400 delegates to a State Convention that will begin at 9:00 a.m. on Tuesday, February 5, 2008 – the first day that delegates can be selected under National Party rules!

The draw and anticipation of a winner-take-all convention where some of the first delegates – will be officially selected – will surely draw national attention.

In fact, the Republican Party of West Virginia regarding the new system. In response, the State Party has prepared “A Preliminary Guide to West Virginia’s Presidential Convention" which will provide an outline of the delegate selection process. In the next few months, the Rules Committee will finalize the rules and procedures. Until then, it’s our hope that this guide will be helpful as we prepare for the excitement of 2008 campaign!

Yours in Victory,

Robert B. Fish, CEO
WVGOP Presidential Convention, Inc.
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