Suicidal Terrorism: A Dying Strategy

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Suicidal Terrorism, A Dying Strategy

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In partial fulfillment of the
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by

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ABSTRACT

Suicidal Terrorism, A Dying Strategy

By Michael Jessee Adkins

This study identifies a causal model for suicidal terrorism consisting of three primary blocks of factors. First, terrorist organizations must desire to expel a social entity from a geographic area and typically operate with a perception of religious asymmetry. Second, members of terrorist organizations must undergo active exposure to specific socialization practices that directly glorify martyrdom and render suicidal behavior socially acceptable within the context of their community. Third, terrorist organizations must adopt an organizational philosophy that indicates they are capable of achieving victory. This study analyzes the characteristics of several high-profile terrorist organizations to demonstrate the noted factors are causally responsible for the emergence of suicidal terrorism. All information was gathered exclusively from textual sources. Given a clear identification of causation, several strategies are proposed to counter the looming threat of suicidal terrorism.
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Introduction

This body of research is directed toward understanding the sociological factors that give rise to the perpetration of suicidal terrorist attacks. Identifying causal factors of suicidal terrorism will help facilitate strategies directed toward preventing such actions. This particular brand of terrorism emerged in the early 1900’s and has progressively increased in frequency and lethality. This body of research primarily focuses on suicidal terrorist acts that have occurred during the past three decades. The threat of suicidal terrorism is of paramount concern to the United States. This project seeks to provide an objective analysis, rooted in sociology, which will clearly define the problem, identify causal factors, and propose theoretical solutions.

The proposed model of causation for suicidal terrorism focuses on a six-block process. Block 1 refers to the process by which a social entity develops a grievance against a government. Block 2 refers to the establishment of a terrorist organization. The terrorist organization then follows a triadic process that leads to the implementation of suicidal tactics. The triadic process is composed of blocks 3, 4, and 5. Each stage of the triadic process must be met before terrorists result to suicidal tactics. Failure to meet any part of the triadic process will result in a failure to adopt suicidal tactics. Block 3 refers to specific precipitating factors that include (in order of general magnitude) a desire for expulsion, a perceived religious asymmetry, and/or a perceived cultural threat. Block 4 encompasses the socialization, specific to martyrdom, which gives rise to altruism. Block 5
refers to the establishment of a perception that the terrorists can win. Block 6
refers to the actual adoption of suicidal terrorist tactics. The model of causation is
best illustrated by the flow chart in figure 1.

Each block of the triadic process is not necessarily mutually exclusive in
terms of a linearly defined developmental stage. Blocks 3, 4, and 5 can operate
independently from each other but they often occur during the same time. The
combination of factors described in the triadic process constitutes causation for
terrorist organizations to adopt suicidal tactics. All components of the triadic
process are necessary preconditions for the establishment of suicidal terrorism
perpetrated by terrorist groups. However, the triadic process requires the
presence of all three factors in concert to establish sufficient causation for the
organizational decision to perpetrate suicidal terrorism.
Figure 1: Causal Model For Suicidal Terrorism

1: Social Entity Establishes Grievance(s)
→ Yes
2: Social Entity Establishes a Terrorist Organization
→ Yes
3: Precipitating Factors
- Desire for Expulsion
- Perceived Religious Asymmetry and/or Cultural Threat
→ Yes
4: Members of a Terrorist Organization
- Experiences Specific Socialization Favoring Martyrdom
→ Yes
5: Members of a Terrorist Organization Perceive They Can Win
→ Yes
6: Terrorist Organization Adopts Suicidal Tactis

→ No
→ No
→ No

Terrorist Organization Fails To Adopt Suicidal Tactics
Chapter 1: Defining Terrorism

Defining the modern phenomenon known as terrorism has become problematic in recent years. No single definition has secured universal acceptance. However, some basic commonalities exist between most popular definitions. These commonalities include the use of violence, the desire to send a political or religious message, and the targeting of innocent people. The establishment of at least one primary grievance is a precondition for the establishment of a terrorist organization. Many terrorist groups establish multiple grievances against a national entity. Some common grievances include the desires to create an independent nation, to secure autonomy, to oust a foreign occupation, to fundamentally change an existing government’s style of government, and a general desire to gain power. Most terrorists operate in subnational groups that represent a political or religious minority. They often believe the use of violence will attract attention to their cause and aid their endeavor to change a societal component. “The group possesses collective preferences or values and selects terrorism as a course of action from a range of perceived alternatives” (Crenshaw, 1998, p. 8). Common terrorist acts include kidnapping, hijacking, assassinations, assaults, and remote/timed detonation of explosives. “The general purpose of terrorist acts is to frighten the target audience: indeed the word terrorism is derived from the Latin root terrere, which means ‘to frighten’” (Snow, 2007, p. 277).
Defining terrorism depends much on the perspective of the definer. Some contend that one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter. Most suicidal terrorists do not see themselves as terrorists but as holy agents of radical socio-religious change, liberators, or martyrs. Thus, from the perspective of the perpetrator, such acts are completely justified. Most suicide attackers prefer the label of martyr. Many perpetrators believe their targets, including women and children, are not innocent. Members of Islamic Jihad, for example, frequently and intentionally target Israeli women and children by detonating suicide bombs in public places. They believe all Jewish residents are guilty of occupying Palestinian land and thus deserve to die. This sentiment is flatly rejected by most of the world community. The simple and overwhelmingly accepted truth is that there is no excuse or justification for terrorizing innocent people. Those who believe otherwise are extremists who do not represent the views of the greater world population.

Terrorism is usually described within the context of three primary variants that include organizational terrorism, insurgency, and state sponsored terrorism. Each variant is not necessarily mutually exclusive from the others. Some terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, have become robust and dynamic by adopting multivariate terrorist strategies. Examining the noted variants will equip the reader with a framework for understanding the nature of terrorism.

A radical, politically homogeneous, and tightly knit minority usually perpetrates organizational terrorism (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 1). They are not able to muster mainstream
political support for their agenda. They adopt terrorist tactics to intimidate their adversaries and draw attention to their cause. Organizational terrorists can operate inside and/or outside of their home country or area of residence. The modern trend is for organizational terrorists to adopt transnational terror tactics directed toward influencing an audience and ultimately changing a governmental policy. “The most notorious example of a transnational terrorist group that is basically of the organizational variant is the Abu Nidal Organization, a radical Palestinian group that has targeted civilians indiscriminately in its terrorist operations in many different countries” (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 1).

Insurgency is a variant of terrorism that is usually manifested by means of a large revolt against a government or political entity (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 1). Ethnic separatists, who carry out terrorist missions, often in great frequency and with great subversion, are best categorized as insurgencies. Primary examples of insurgencies are the actions carried out by the Iraqi militant group commanded by Muqtada al Sadr. His insurgent group primarily became operational in 2004 and carried out terrorist attacks on U.S. assets and Iraqi civilians. Iraq is plagued with a vast amount of insurgent terrorist factions that fight each other as well as U.S. forces. Each insurgent group pursues its own political and/or religious agenda and is willing to commit acts of terrorism to advance its agenda. They feel that they are not able to adequately influence the government via democratic and/or bureaucratic means.
State sponsored terrorism is the third variant. This type of terrorism is funded, aided, or otherwise supported by sovereign nations who often attempt to hide, mask, or deny their support for terrorist operations (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 1). Establishing influence over foreign or domestic policy motivates them. “Some states sponsor terrorism to create or expand their power and influence among ideological or religious movements, or as a means of establishing credentials with revolutionary movements worldwide” (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 2). Hizballah is a prime example of a state sponsored terrorist organization. “Iran created the Hizballah movement, and some of Hizballah’s cadres are directly tied to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard contingent in Lebanon” (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 16).

Given the variants of terrorism, several prominent definitions follow. Mattox (2004) has defined it as “Politically motivated attacks, including assassinations and hijackings, usually inflicted on civilian targets” (p. 9). The Dictionary of Modern War defines terrorism as “The use of violence against civilians by covert or clandestine organizations for political purposes” (Luttwak & Koehl, 1991, p. 609). The United States Government has defined terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually to influence an audience” (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. viii). The basic operational definition of terrorism, for this body of work, is:
premeditated, politically and/or religiously motivated violence, intentionally directed toward innocent people for a coercive purpose.

This project primarily deals with suicidal terrorist organizations. The establishment of a regular terrorist organization is a precondition for the emergence of a suicidal terrorist organization. Terrorists do not simply start a campaign using suicidal tactics. They first use standard terrorist tactics and later employ suicidal tactics. The operational definition of suicidal terrorism, for this body of work, is: premeditated, politically and/or religiously motivated violence, intentionally directed toward innocent people for a coercive purpose, which resulted in the intentional self-destruction, or attempted self-destruction, of the perpetrator during a climactic moment of the violence. Most instances of suicidal terrorism involve a perpetrator using his or her body as part of a delivery mechanism for an explosion. A clear example of suicidal terrorism is the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. A young woman detonated a bomb, concealed on her body, when she was within close proximity to Gandhi.

Given the operational definition of suicidal terrorism, it is important to clarify some key circumstances that fail to meet the definition. Some terrorists engage in suicidal assaults in which they attack targets knowing that they will eventually be killed in the process by security forces. Although such missions may be suicidal in nature, they fail to meet the operational definition of suicidal terrorism because the perpetrators do not succumb to self-destruction. Rather, an opposing force kills them. Moreover, some terrorists commit suicide to avoid capture or after being captured. These suicides fail to qualify as suicidal terrorism.
because the terrorists’ death is not associated with a delivery mechanism
directed toward a climactic moment of violence resulting in the death or injury of
other people. These types of suicide, associated with terrorism, are not included
in the chronology of suicidal attacks that appears in the appendix.

The described operational definition of suicidal terrorism is exclusive to
this body of work. It may not apply to other works involving suicidal terrorism.
Suicidal attacks against United States military targets within Iraq are not included
within the body of this work or in the appendix describing a chronology of attacks.
This exclusion is due to the precarious situation involving the conflict between
Iraqi insurgents and U.S. military forces. It is a matter of great debate as to
whether insurgent attacks constitute guerrilla warfare or terrorism. In an effort to
circumvent this controversy, this work intentionally omits circumstances of
suicidal attacks against U.S. military personnel within Iraq. However, a plethora
of examples of Iraqi insurgent suicidal attacks against other Iraqis is included.
Chapter 2: Terrorist Organizations

This chapter’s goal is to present an overview of the various terrorist organizations that employ suicidal tactics. The following information is not exhaustive and does not include the many terrorist groups who do not use suicidal tactics. Ten primary terrorist groups have conducted the overwhelming majority of suicidal terrorist attacks during the last three decades. Each of these groups has established goals that serve to define their organization. The agendas of these groups can overlap or contrast with the goals of other terrorists. Terrorism is predominantly a social movement involving the development of social groups. Individuals rarely conduct suicidal terrorist operations without first securing membership in an established terrorist group that is waging a defined campaign.

Al-Qaeda is a terrorist network that is directly responsible for numerous attacks on U.S. interests abroad and the deadly homeland attacks of September 11, 2001. Founded by Usama bin Laden in 1988, Al-Qaeda seeks to oust all western influence from the Middle East and establish states that will adhere to Islamic law. Other objectives include the destruction of Israel, dislodging U.S. Military assets from Iraq, and establishing a safe haven for terrorist training camps. The organization has also publicly called for all Muslims to personally wage war on Americans. They once operated a plethora of terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. However, U.S. military actions have eliminated much of their ability to conduct open and prolonged training operations. “While the bulk of the al Qaeda leadership settled in sympathetic areas of Pakistan, the
organization remained widespread, playing a supportive role on behalf of terrorist groups associated with Islam" (Westwood, 2003, p. 230). Al-Qaeda’s network extends around the world. No single country exclusively houses its members. They are known to employ sophisticated components of modern technology to facilitate their activities (Berkowitz, 2003, p. 15). They globally seek and recruit disgruntled groups of Muslims who constitute militias, terrorist cells, and tribal factions. One of the most well known social groups, recruited by al-Qaeda, is the Taliban. They are composed of tribal militants who share common grievances with al-Qaeda and are primarily operational within Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to Sir Martin Ewans (2002), many members of the Taliban are “ready to invite martyrdom for their cause” (p. 209). Al-Qaeda generates funding from drug trafficking, credit card fraud, fake charities, and especially from personal donations from supporters.

The Black September Organization emerged in the mid 1970’s as a terrorist group who violently supports the destruction of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian nation. “The group contends that both inter-Arab and intra-Palestinian terrorism are needed to precipitate an all-embracing Arab revolution that alone can lead to the liberation of occupied Palestine” (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 5). Its members are primarily operational in Lebanon, Israel, Syria, and parts of Europe. The group has historically received state sponsorship from Iraq, Libya, and Syria but generates independent funding through a host of illegal processes. Black September also operates under the names Black June Organization, Arab
Revolutionary Brigades, and the Abu Nidal Organization (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 5). Another terrorist group, known as Fatah, also used the name Black September from 1971 through 1974.

The Chechen Rebels are a conglomeration of insurgent terrorist groups seeking to establish an independent state under Islamic law. Their organizational philosophy closely adheres to militant Islamic fundamentalism. Their grievances, rooted in over 100 years of conflict, are primarily with the Russian government. Russian forces conquered Chechnya in the mid 1800’s despite violent opposition from fighters, such as Imam Shamil, who desired to create an Islamic nation. The Soviet Union granted autonomy to much of the Chechnya region during the early 1900’s. However, problems reemerged when Josef Stalin ordered the mass deportation of Chechens in 1944 on the basis that they were believed to have conspired with German forces. Many of the remaining Chechens were outraged by this incident and they began to develop armed resistance cells and a social movement directed toward a nationalist goal. The Chechen Rebels viewed the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union as a golden opportunity to establish a state. They declared independence and established a constitution in 1992. Russia did not recognize their proclamation and subsequently deployed large numbers of troops to the region in 1994. The years following the deployment were marked by a series of mutual attacks. The Chechen Rebel leadership imposed Islamic law beginning in 1999 and terrorist attacks substantially increased in frequency. The Chechen Rebels have emerged as a highly effective terrorist organization responsible for hundreds of innocent deaths and high profile incidents. They
make use of suicidal tactics and are especially known for employing female suicide bombers who are often referred to as Black Widows. The Chechen Rebels are responsible for the incredibly fatal 2004 Russian aircraft bombings and siege of a Russian school. Other terrorist acts include numerous suicide bombings throughout the country and the 2002 siege of a Moscow theater. The Chechen Rebels remain a vigilant and determined terrorist organization, despite ongoing Russian counterterrorism operations.

Fatah is a terrorist organization whose objective is to create a secular Palestinian state. The group was originally dedicated to reclaiming all of Israel. However, many members have recently contended that they may be willing to accept the creation of a geographically smaller state within the general area of the West Bank. “Formed by Palestinian exiles in Kuwait in 1957, the Fatah surfaced in 1959 and began to mount raids into Israel in January 1965” (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 12). The organization expanded rapidly following the Six Day War of 1967 and was once spearheaded by Yasir Arafat. Fatah has also used the names al-Asifa and Black September. The latter identification was only used from 1971 through 1974.

Hamas serves as a political party, relief service, and terrorist organization. It was founded in 1987 by a group of high-profile Islamic clerics (Davis, 2004, p. 99). The organization started as a political branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank and Gaza and it attracted a range of supporters from varied socioeconomic backgrounds (Davis, 2004, p. 99). The group finds refuge in all areas heavily populated by people of Palestinian identity. Their primary objective
is to secure a Palestinian state, principally within Israel. This group also conducts limited humanitarian relief missions that have served to increase its popularity and social acceptance. Public support resulted in the group winning Palestinian Parliamentary elections in 2006. Hamas retains a group of facilitators that conducts arms smuggling activities and fundraising in Syria and Lebanon. Iran is strongly suspected of providing additional support. Hamas has generated a large amount of funding from charities posing as humanitarian relief organizations. Prior to 2002, many of the noted charities were operational within the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. Subsequent counter-terrorism measures, especially the FBI’s Operation Green Quest, have dramatically reduced or eliminated Hamas’s ability to generate funding from U.S. sources.

Hizballah is an Iranian sponsored terrorist organization that integrates social, political, religious, ideological, and militant components (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 15). This group became operational during the early 1980’s with the direct and continued support of Iran. “The Hizballah and the Revolutionary Guards work in close concert on terrorist operations” (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 15). Support has also been clandestinely provided by Syria. The group is also known to generate capital via subversive fundraising activities in the United States and Europe. This movement desires to rid the region of Western influence, secure legitimate political authority, establish a Shiite Islamic state within Lebanon, and conduct violent operations against the state of Israel. Hizballah strongly and violently supports ousting all Jews from Jerusalem and
promoting a Palestinian state. The group primarily operates in Lebanon with training operations occurring in the Bekaa Valley. Hizballah is directly responsible for numerous suicidal bombings within Israel. They are able to quickly recruit, train, assist, supply, and deploy suicidal bombers primarily originating from Palestinian refugee camps. They garner widespread local support, especially from Palestinians, by providing limited humanitarian relief and launching anti-Zionist propaganda campaigns. They follow radical Islamic Shiite ideology and identify with the views brokered by Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah and the late Ayatollah Khomeini. Hizballah uses several operational names including Islamic Jihad, Organization of the Oppressed, Party of God, and the Revolutionary Justice Organization (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 15).

The PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) is a Kurdish terrorist organization that is primarily operational in Southern Turkey and Northern Iraq. Founded in 1974, by Abdullah Ocalan, the group is mostly a Marxist-Leninist organization seeking to establish an independent state for the Kurdish people and expel Turkish military presence from Kurdish towns. Members believe they have received an unequal distribution of resources from the Turkish and Iraqi governments and have been victimized by ethnic injustice. Saddam Hussein is known to have violently attacked and killed thousands of Kurds with chemical weapons. However, all of the PKK’s violent terrorist activity to date has been directed exclusively toward Turkish interests. Northern Iraq has served as a fragile safe-haven for the group especially after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. However,
the potential for Turkish military action, along the border of northern Iraq, is growing. This group is not associated with radical Islamic agendas. The PKK is also known as Kongra-Gel, Kurdish Freedom Hawks, Kurdistan People's Congress, and The People's Defense Force.

The Shiite Insurgency of Iraq is a fragmented and decentralized conglomerate of terrorist cells. This particular network developed after the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. Their primary goals are to promote a withdrawal of U.S. military forces, establish Shiite political superiority, and conduct sectarian violence against the Sunni community. These terrorists often develop into well-armed militias. “Some are affiliated with the government, some are highly localized, and some are wholly outside of the law” (Baker & Hamilton, 2006, p. 5). They employ a multitude of tactics including ambushes, kidnapping, detonating bombs, staging executions, and suicide operations. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have provided material support, including explosively formed penetrators, to Shiite insurgent organizations.

The Sunni Insurgency of Iraq is also a fragmented and decentralized conglomerate of terrorist cells. This network developed after the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. “The insurgency comprises former elements of the Saddam Hussein regime, disaffected Sunni Arab Iraqis, and common criminals” (Baker & Hamilton, 2006, p. 3). Many Sunni Insurgent leaders were members of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party. This political party was rendered illegitimate during the initial year of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. “The de-Baathification order created a class of disenfranchised, threatened leaders” (Ricks, 2006, p. 191). Their primary
goals are to promote the withdrawal of U.S. military forces, establish Sunni political superiority, and conduct sectarian violence against the Shiite community. These terrorists typically operate in small groups. They employ a host of tactics to include conducting ambushes, sniper assaults, kidnapping, exploding bombs, staging executions, and suicide operations. A minority of wealthy residents of Saudi Arabia is strongly suspected of providing funding and moral support for Sunni insurgent organizations.

The Tamil Tigers (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) is a terrorist group that became operational in the 1970’s. “Long the strongest Sri Lankan militant group, the LTTE is the only major group that has fought the Indian Peacekeeping Force in Sri Lanka” (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 120). Having presented several grievances against the Sri Lankan government, they strongly desire to establish a separate state. Other objectives include sabotaging Sri Lankan political processes, preventing Indian troops from operating in Northern Sri Lanka, stopping the ideological spread of Buddhism from threatening Tamil culture, and gaining widespread international attention for the humanitarian problems suffered by the Tamils. The Tamil Tigers have launched multiple successful suicide missions as well as a plethora of conventional attacks against the Sri Lankan government. They are not ideologically bound by any religious philosophy but they fear the influence of Buddhism. However they strongly value their culture to the extent that they are willing to fight and die to preserve it. They are “a Marxist-Leninist group whose members are from Hindu families but who are adamantly opposed to religion”
(Pape, 2005, p. 4). The suicidal component of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam is known as the “Black Tigers.”
Chapter 3: Precipitating Factors

Several key factors contribute to the emergence of martyrdom among terrorists. “Religion, culture, and identity serve as ‘tool kits’ from which organizers of collective action strategically select narratives, traditions, symbols, rituals, or repertories of action to imbue risky activism with morality” (Hafez, 2006, p. 61). These factors are illustrated in block 3 of the triadic process of causation for suicidal terrorism and they serve to bolster the potential for mobilization. The key factors are: the desire for expulsion, religious asymmetry, and/or perceived threat to a cultural identity. These factors are not mutually exclusive and they can often overlap with the initial grievance(s) that paved way for the founding of a terrorist origination. However, after a terrorist organization is founded, these factors serve to push the organization toward adopting suicidal tactics. All suicidal terrorist organizations strongly desire to expel an entity from a geographic location.

Groups often perceive that they are being occupied or influenced by a social group who identifies with a different religion. The term “religious asymmetry” refers to the situation in which a terrorist organization proclaims adherence to a particular religion that is different than the perceived religion of their enemy. Many terrorist organizations conduct suicidal operations because they believe that an outside force threatens the survival of their cultural identity. These factors, combined with certain socialization practices and a belief in the potential for winning, set the stage for the emergence of suicidal terrorism.

The United States of America has been victimized by suicidal terrorist attacks at home and abroad. The horrific events of September 11, 2001
exemplify the enemies’ determination to terrorize the American public. Embassies and tourists have historically been attacked abroad. Even the military has felt the blow of suicidal terrorists. Public safety can be achieved only by an unwavering commitment to eradicate terrorism. Such a commitment necessitates understanding, not only how, but also why suicidal attacks occur. Two terrorist organizations, Al-Qaeda and Hizballah, have conducted the majority of suicidal terrorist attacks against U.S. targets. These organizations have well defined grievances against the U.S. An examination of these organizations and their grievances will reveal valuable information explaining why they target the United States.

Al-Qaeda seeks to expel all western influence and presence from the Middle East (Pape, 2005, p. 42). Their primary grievance with the United States is rooted in vehement opposition to the presence of U.S. military forces in the Middle East generally and in Saudi Arabia specifically. Their secondary grievance focuses on a perception that Western/American values corrupt Islamic values. American society is generally accepting of premarital sex, alcohol consumption, liberal fashion trends, divorce, feminism, and religious diversity. The lifestyles associated with such actions are inversely related to the ideals perpetuated by Islamic Fundamentalism. Members of al-Qaeda feel threatened by the social transmission of American lifestyles. Thus, they perceive a threat to their culture. Al-Qaeda combats their perceived threat by means of terrorism.

Hizballah also strongly opposes the presence of U.S. troops in the Middle East, especially in areas within close proximity to Israel. They adamantly contest
U.S. support for Israel. The U.S. has veto power within the United Nations and has used that power to override U.N. actions unfavorable to Israeli operations. For example, Israel has waged war against terrorist organizations in neighboring states. Israel has received sharp international criticism for their ability to conduct these military operations because innocent people inadvertently suffer from such operations. If the U.N. presents a resolution to cease a given operation then the U.S. will likely veto that measure in support of Israel. Moreover, the U.S. has provided Israel with weapon systems and aircraft that have been used against terrorists in neighboring states. Israel would undoubtedly become a substantially weaker state without such overwhelming support from the U.S. Palestinians, seeking a nationalist goal, views the United States as a primary obstacle to their endeavor. Hizballah seeks to directly combat the United States through a campaign of terrorism. They attacked the U.S. embassy on April 18, 1983 by means of a truck bomb and killed over 60 people. Their most notable attack occurred on October 23, 1983 when they employed a truck bomb to attack a U.S. Marine facility in Lebanon. The suicidal attack produced over 200 U.S. casualties.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is central to much of the violence in the Middle East and to the radical Islamic fundamentalist hatred toward the U.S. An overview of the conflict will shed light on the foundation of the Islamic fundamentalist grievances against the U.S. The modern state of Israel is seated along the eastern shoreline of the Mediterranean Sea. The land has historically been occupied by a plethora of groups and is often referred to as historic
Palestine. This land is considered native soil to Hebrew Tribes who immigrated there and ruled the area as Israelites. They eventually created a Jewish nation, named Judea, in 168 BC. However, their nation was toppled by the Roman Empire approximately 300 years later. Many Jews were forced to relocate to other geographic areas. The years that followed the Roman acquisition and rule by the Ottoman Empire resulted in an influx of Arabs into the area and it was subsequently referred to as Palestine. The Jewish community slowly began to adopt a strategy of a gradual reoccupation. The Ottoman Empire was toppled during the end of World War One and Palestine fell under Western authority. Britain subsequently sanctioned autonomy to both Arabs and Jews who occupied Palestine but they did not initially establish clear geographic boundaries for such autonomy. Tensions escalated between Arabs and Jews over control over the land until it was officially partitioned by Britain in 1922. The Jordan River then served as the official partition between what was established as the Emirate of Transjordan to the West and Palestine to the East. This geographical partition precipitated tensions between Arabs and Jews to the extent that they began to wage low intensity warfare against each other and jointly oppose Britain. The Zionist movement gained substantial momentum following the horrific events associated with the holocaust of World War Two. Much of the world community sympathized with Jews and favored the reestablishment of a Jewish state. Accordingly, the state of Israel was officially established in 1948. The founding of the state of Israel outraged several key Arab states. An Arab-Israeli war ensued with Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan combating Israel. The Israelis
emerged victories despite sustaining heavy casualties. “Israel captured the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem” (Pape, 2005, p. 47). However, many Palestinians were displaced and forced to live in refugee camps. General hostilities continued especially over access to the Suez Canal. However, the United States brokered the Camp David Accords in 1979 that lead to an agreement between Israel and Egypt in which Egypt regained land to include the Sinai Peninsula. In turn, Israel secured diplomatic relations and relative peace with Egypt. This resolution was widely condemned by much of the Arab world to the extent that Egypt was ousted from the Arab League. Festering tensions resulted in the first intifada (uprising) in which Palestinians engaged in mass riots and perpetrated organized terrorism against the Israelis. The Palestinian uprising was predominantly invoked by control over the regions known as the West Bank and Gaza Strip although the Syrians exacerbated the issues by staking claim to the Golan Heights. The first intifada sparked international pressure to develop a peace process. An opportunity presented itself during the end of Operation Desert Storm, a U.S. dominated offensive against Iraq that included multinational assistance from both the Western and Arab countries, in 1991. The unique partnership between Arab and Western powers paved way for the establishment of the Madrid Conference of 1991. The conference was largely a mutually symbolic event characterized by Israelis, Arabs, and Westerners working together to resolve the disputed land occupied by Israelis. The conference did not result in a definitive resolution but it did pave the way for the Oslo Accords of 1993 in which secret negotiations were held in Norway. These negotiations
resulted in an agreement to gradually transfer power to Palestinians in some areas. Subsequent agreements stipulated that areas within the Gaza Strip would be granted Palestinian autonomy, Israeli Defense Forces would withdraw from key locations, and the expansion of Israeli settlement would halt in other areas. The implementation of these ill-defined agreements proved problematic and both sides disagreed on who would control Jerusalem. Tensions invariably escalated and a second intifada that was launched in 2000. All Palestinian terrorist organizations stepped up attacks against Israel who, in turn, responded with military strikes. The situation continued to deteriorate and violence escalated. Israeli military action peaked in 2006 when Israeli Defense Forces launched an all out assault against Hizballah within Lebanon. This assault was marked by plethora of noncombatant casualties on both sides. Israel significantly, though temporarily, damaged Hizballah’s operational capability. Much of southern Lebanon’s infrastructure was severely damaged, thousands of civilians were displaced, and the economy of both nations suffered. The violence was mitigated by a United Nations resolution for a ceasefire. An agreement was established in which Israeli and Hizballah combatants jointly withdrew from Southern Lebanon and allowed Lebanese military forces and a small UN force to occupy the area. Given the long history of violence and grievances rooted in historic events spanning several hundred years, the prospect for peace is dim at best.

The eradication of terrorism necessitates a keen understanding of how and why suicidal attacks occur. Al-Qaeda and Hizballah have conducted a series of spectacular suicidal terrorist attacks against the United States. Both
organizations have adopted radical Islamic fundamentalist principles that serve to justify their actions from their perspective. The role of the United States, in terms of its support for Israel, exacerbates an already intense hatred and desire to terrorize American citizens. Understanding the dynamics of this situation will enable policy makers to maximize the effectiveness of foreign policy and developed strategies for eradicating terrorism.

Members of every suicidal terrorist organization desire to expel a social entity from what they perceive and/or define as their homeland. Many terrorist organizations differ in whom they target for expulsion. However, all suicidal type terrorist groups are currently attempting to expel their enemy from particular geographic locations. Al-Qaeda wants to expel Western military forces from the Middle East. Black September desires to expel all Israelis from Israel. The Chechen Rebels want to expel Russian forces from their historic homeland. Fatah’s current goal is to expel Israelis from the West Bank. Hamas is dedicated to expelling all Jews and foreign entities from Israel. One of Hizballah’s primary missions is to oust foreign military forces from Lebanon. The PKK seeks to expel Turkish influence from semi-autonomous regions within southern Turkey. The Shiite Insurgency desires to expel foreign military forces and Sunni influence. The Sunni Insurgency desires to expel foreign military forces and Shiite influence. The Tamil Tigers aspire to oust the Sri Lankan government from regions that were previously under Tamil control. All of the noted terrorist organizations employ suicidal tactics and vehemently desire an expulsion.
Members of al-Qaeda believe that Western influence corrupts Islamic values. They perceive that the West is waging a war against Islam. Accordingly, they have adopted terrorism tactics that are directed in large part toward the expulsion of Western influence. They see such influence as a threat to their culture and way of life. Pape (2005) noted the following:

Although Saudi Arabia is not under American military occupation, at least from the perspective of the United States, and although the terrorists have political objectives against the Saudi regime and others, one major objective of al-Qaeda is the expulsion of U.S. troops from the country. (p. 42)

Black September has attempted to expel Israelis from Israel by means of terrorism. This group contends that the Palestinian people are the rightful heirs to the land that is now established as the state of Israel. They believe that the Israelis are occupying their homeland. Consequently, they have brutally fought to re-establish Palestinian control and ownership of the noted land. Black September’s primary objective has been to provoke an expulsion (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, 2002, p. 5).

The Chechen Rebels have a long history of waging an expulsion campaign directed toward ousting Soviet/Russian forces from the greater Chechnya area. Many Chechens have historically opposed Soviet/Russian rule. Achieving autonomy within the Soviet Union temporarily mitigated their opposition. However, the collapse of the U.S.S.R. led to a revitalization of the nationalist movement. Their chief objective is to expel Russian authority,
influence, and security personnel from Chechnya. They operate from a belief that Russian military personnel have violated their human rights.

Fatah’s present objective is to expel Israelis from the West Bank. They too believe the Israelis are occupying their native soil. Unlike other Palestinian organizations, Fatah is seeking the establishment of a secular state (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 12). They operate from the underlying perception that they were severely victimized by the establishment of the Israeli state. Unable to tolerate their perceived victimization, they resort to terrorist tactics directed toward expelling their enemy.

Members of Hamas also believe the Israelis are occupying their native land (Pape, 2005, p. 47). They conduct suicidal operations in an effort to oust the Jewish presence. The matter is exacerbated by a dual attachment to the city of Jerusalem. Both Jews and Muslims believe that the city is religiously sacred. Hamas strongly desires to expel all Jewish presence from Israel and especially from sites sacred to Islam.

Hizballah has a multitude of strategic goals. One of several primary objectives is to prevent the Israeli Defense Forces from operating within Lebanon. The organization is largely composed of militant Shiite Islamic fundamentalists. “The Hizballah espouses an intense hatred of any influence that does not support its views of Shi’a Muslim ideology” (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 15). They maintain that the Palestinians, who live mostly in refugee camps within Lebanon, have consistently suffered from attacks brokered by Israel. Hizballah also views the United States
as a substantial threat because of its ongoing political and material support for Israel. Accordingly, Hizballah also seeks to expel United States military assets from the greater Middle East.

The PKK has a primary objective of establishing a Kurdish homeland (Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, 2002, p. 98). Accomplishing their goal requires at least one expulsion. The Kurds currently manage autonomous regions within northern Iraq and semi-autonomous regions within southern Turkey and northwestern Iran. This terrorist group represents a minority within the Kurdish cultural community yet they seek to expel Turkish influence from southern Turkey.

The Shiite Insurgency of Iraq wishes to establish political and cultural control over most of Iraq. Shiites were a political minority and underwent gross discrimination, by way of intentional political exclusion, during the reign of Saddam Hussein. The United State’s 2003 invasion of Iraq has resulted in a power vacuum that Shiites are attempting to fill. A minority of the Shiite community has resorted to suicidal terrorism as a means of establishing power. Accomplishing their goal requires the expulsion of United States military forces and Sunni influence.

The Sunni Insurgency of Iraq desires to institute political and cultural control over much of Iraq. Sunnis were a numerical minority yet they constituted the political majority. They were granted special privileges during the reign of Saddam Hussein. The United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq has caused a power void that Shiites are aggressively attempting to fill. A minority of the Sunni
community has resorted to suicidal terrorism as a means of establishing power. However, the operational minority enjoys vast support from the greater Sunni community. Accomplishing their goals will require the expulsion of United States military forces and Shiite influence.

The Tamil Tigers are pursuing the establishment of an independent Tamil nation (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, 2002, p. 120). Their terrorist actions are not motivated by radical religious philosophies. They specifically want to create a Tamil state within Sri Lanka’s northern and eastern provinces. Like all other terrorist groups, they are unable to accomplish their objective by peaceful means so they have resorted to orchestrating a plethora of suicidal attacks and employing standard guerrilla warfare tactics. Indian military forces once combated the Tamil Tigers and served as a peacekeeping force. The Tamil Tigers succeeded in expelling Indian peacekeeping forces by means of guerrilla warfare but failed to use suicidal attacks against the Indians. The Tamil Tigers believe that they must continue efforts to expel Sri Lankan political and religious influence in order to establish a state in what they perceive as their native land.

In summary, every terrorist organization that has employed suicidal tactics has clearly manifested a desire to expel a political or cultural entity from a particular geographic area. However, many other terrorist organizations that do not resort to suicidal tactics also desire expulsions. The Basque separatist organization (ETA) is a terrorist group seeking independence and an expulsion yet they do not wage a campaign using suicidal tactics. Accordingly, the desire
for expulsion is a precipitating causal factor that is necessary, but not singularly sufficient, for the establishment of suicidal terrorism.

Religious differences also serve to precipitate the emergence of suicidal terrorism. Many terrorist organizations strongly identify with religious beliefs. Their targets often identify with a religion that is very different from that of the terrorists. For example, al-Qaeda identifies with radical Islamic fundamentalism. Members of al-Qaeda believe that the United States is a Christian state. This creates a perception of religious asymmetry. In reality, the United States does not unilaterally adopt a national religious identity. Rather, individual citizens are free to exercise any religious belief. Christianity is arguably the most popular religious system within America. Thus, terrorists have the perception that the U.S. is a Christian state. It doesn’t matter if their perception is correct or not. If they believe something is true then they will act in accordance with their beliefs. The mechanics of human perception is critical when considering consequences of beliefs. Merton (1967) stated, “once they have assigned some meaning to the situation, their consequent behavior and some of the consequences of that behavior are determined by the ascribed meaning” (p. 422). Terrorist organizations that believe they are fighting a country with a different religious identity are more prone to adopt suicidal tactics. Moreover, the notion of religious asymmetry also applies to opposing components or sects within the same general religion. Eight of the ten described terrorist organizations encompass the notion of a religious asymmetry between the coercer and the coerced.
“The politics of religious difference is central to al-Qaeda’s campaign of suicide terrorism against the United States” (Pape, 2005, p. 119). They are practitioners of Wahhabism and Salafism but they adhere to a radical side of the Islamic Fundamentalist spectrum. The radicalized versions of these beliefs are not compatible with a peaceful religious coexistence with other cultural groups. Radical Wahhabism seeks to demonize other religions and even other forms of Islam. It calls for adherence to a strict ancient code and views any deviation as sacrilegious. “Houses and clothes must be plain; joking, music, and gold ornaments are forbidden” (Noss, 1960, p. 737). Radical Salafism encompasses similar beliefs and focuses on the credibility associated with the direct scriptures and actions involving the prophet Mohammed (Pape, 2005, p. 106). Both sects promote a movement toward adopting more traditional lifestyles while rejecting the legitimacy of any other religious tradition. Al-Qaeda maintains that people with a different religious affiliation are infidels. Thus, Al-Qaeda operates with a religious asymmetry. They employ their radical beliefs in an effort to justify their actions. “Like all major religions, Islam prohibits the killing of innocents, a principle that Islamic fundamentalists have ‘reinterpreted’ in order to justify precisely such acts” (Pape, 2005, p. 223). Pape (2005) found the following:

Throughout virtually all the statements, interviews, sermons, and books by Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda leaders over the past decade, the United States is portrayed as a religiously motivated ‘Crusader’ on an aggressive mission to subdue, occupy, and transform Muslim societies. (p. 119)
Al-Qaeda’s perception of religious asymmetry is a precipitating factor causally related to the perpetration of suicidal terrorist attacks against the United States.

The Black September Organization is a Palestinian terrorist group that vehemently opposes a diplomatic resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This group has historically attacked moderate Muslims as well as Jews. They have adopted a radical Islamic fundamentalist organizational philosophy. They operate with a well-defined religious asymmetry. This asymmetry is a precipitating factor that has fostered an ideology that is accepting of suicidal terrorism.

The Chechen Rebels predominantly subscribe to militant Islamic fundamentalism. In fact, most Chechens are a part of a distinctive Muslim group. They officially adopted Islamic law in 1999. Many Chechens practice a peaceful existence but the Chechen Rebels defiantly operate from a perception of religious asymmetry. Subscribers of militant Islamic fundamentalism function from a perspective that maintains a categorical opposition to any belief system that differs from their own. They frequently demonize alternative religions and even alternative perspectives within Islam.

The terrorist organizations known as Hamas and Hizballah identify strongly with Shiite Muslim ideology. Unlike Black September, they do not routinely attack other Muslims. However, they do adamantly seek the establishment of a Palestinian state on what is now Israeli land. Their religious asymmetry is rooted in the divide between Muslims and Jews. Both groups’
concept of religious asymmetry serves to precipitate the development and implementation of suicidal terrorism.

The Shiite Insurgency of Iraq, as an organization, has adopted a radical Shiite philosophy that stands at odds with both the United States’ military occupation and the Sunni political minority. Shiite insurgents are stubbornly opposed to the U.S. occupation because they believe that it represents a Christian encroachment upon Muslim land. Moreover, they are also opposed to the Sunni minority. Thus, they perceive a religious asymmetry both within Islam and outside of Islam. The noted asymmetry is a precipitating factor leading to suicidal terrorism.

The Sunni Insurgency of Iraq, as an organization, has adopted a radical Islamic type of philosophy that stands at odds with the United States’ military occupation and the Shiite political majority. Sunni insurgents are tenaciously opposed to the U.S. occupation because they believe it represents a Christian infringement upon Muslim land that serves to pervert fundamental Islamic values. The Sunni Insurgency has launched far more attacks against U.S. and Iraqi targets than their Shiite insurgent counterparts. Moreover, they are also opposed to the Shiite political majority. They also perceive a religious asymmetry both within Islam and outside of Islam. The prominent asymmetry is a precipitating issue leading to their suicidal terror campaign.

The Tamil Tigers are a terrorist group that lacks a radical religious comportment as part of their organizational philosophy. However, they do operate from a perception of religious asymmetry and cultural threat. The Tamils
have a largely Hindu culture that stands at odds with the Buddhist ethnicity associated with Sinhalese culture (Baker, 1998, p. 158). Their religious stance is more defensive than offensive insofar as they desire to thwart the spread of Buddhism to their communities. They are not attempting to establish a religious state, violently seek a mass conversion, or use religion as a primary reason for launching operations. Stated differently, the Tamil Tigers have not attempted to violently export their religion but they endeavor to stop the import of Buddhist ideology.

The Tamil Tigers operate from a perception of a threat to their cultural identity. “The rise of Tamil militancy parallels the increasing Sinhalese encroachment on Tamil culture and resources” (Pape, 2005, p. 141). They feel particularly vulnerable to cultural change that can occur as a result of the spread of Buddhism. Pape (2005) noted the following:

Especially after the new Sinhalese constitution took effect in 1972, the Tamil community has increasingly come to believe that the Sinhalese government is deliberately pursuing policies that serve to stamp out core attributes of Tamil national identity, and Buddhist religious goals are the driving force behind this program. (p.140)

A religious asymmetry exists between Tamil and Sinhalese cultures. This asymmetry has manifested itself by way of a conflict regarding control over a key geographic area. Tamil land is of special interest to Buddhists. A popular Sinhala-Buddhist belief maintains that Buddha personally created Sri Lanka and visited parts of the land on three separate occasions (Pape, 2005, p. 147). One
of these occasions involved a visit to Nagadipa, which is located in the Northern section of the Jaffna Peninsula. Sinhala-Buddhist’s subsequently bestowed sacred significance upon this geographical area. Accordingly, religious differences are precipitating factors behind much of the suicidal terrorist operations conducted by the Tamil Tigers against the Sri Lankan government.

A comparative examination of a special situation will demonstrate the importance of religious asymmetry within the context of Tamil conflict. Indian peacekeeping forces were once deployed to Sri Lanka. These troops presented a grave threat to the Tamil Tigers, carried out violent eradication operations, and raped hundreds of Tamil women. “Torture, intimidation, and massacres were common on both sides” (Baker, 1998, p. 160). “Although the Tamil Tigers carried out suicide terrorist attacks against their Sinhalese opponents both before and after the Indian intervention, there were no suicide attacks against the Indian troops by the LTTE or any other group” (Pape, 2005, p. 151). Rather, they employed standard guerilla warfare tactics. The absence of martyrdom operations is attributed to the religious symmetry between Tamils and Indians. Pape (2005) found the following:

While the Tamils (Hindu) fear that the Sinhalese (Buddhists) are seeking to implement a religiously motivated program to transform the core characteristics of their national community, the Tamils (Hindu) did not view the Indian army (Hindu) as a religiously motivated occupier seeking to transform their society- and that is the most likely reason why one case led to suicide terrorism and the other did not.” (p.151)
This case demonstrates that the presence of religious asymmetry, as opposed to religious symmetry, within the context of an armed struggle is a precipitating factor causally related to the establishment of suicidal terrorism.

A perceived threat to a cultural identity is also a precipitating factor leading to the implementation of suicidal terrorism. Groups who feel they may fall victim to a cultural annihilation will often develop extreme measures directed toward cultural preservation. However, they must also believe that they can win. Although religious affiliation is often a very large part of cultural identification, it is not the sole criterion for the establishment of a cultural identity as a whole. Thus, some terrorists seek to preserve their culture even outside of religious considerations of their community. Two of the ten noted terrorist organizations, Fatah and the PKK, fall within this category.

One special circumstance best frames the argument that a perceived threat to a cultural identity is a precipitating factor that fosters suicidal terrorism. A teenage Christian woman has secured legendary status within Palestinian refugee camps. Loula Abboud was the first female Palestinian suicide bomber to target Israeli Defense Forces. She also was the leader of a small militant group who conducted operations against the Israeli occupation of Lebanon (Davis, 2004, p. 68). Abboud was a Christian living within a predominantly Muslim community. She was not motivated by the religious asymmetry between Muslims and Jews. Rather, she viewed the Israeli Defense Force as a threat to her homeland. Her self-determination was rooted in the desire to act in accordance with what she believed was in the best interest of the Palestinian community.
Thus, the IDF presence was seen as a threat to the Palestinian culture. Accordingly, the perceived threat to her cultural identity was a precipitating factor leading to the performance of suicidal terrorism.

Fatah also seeks to preserve the cultural identity of the Palestinians by establishing a secular state. Thus, from an institutional standpoint, they are not employing religion as a primary justification for their actions. They argue that the Palestinian people were unjustly fragmented and dislodged from their homeland. They also maintain that the Palestinians are experiencing a humanitarian crisis while exiled to refugee camps. Fatah is not exclusively interested in securing holy land but simply land. Thus, the desire to preserve the Palestinian cultural identity is also a precipitating factor leading to the performance of suicidal terrorism.

The PKK also lacks a religiously motivated agenda. Their traditional Kurdish communities are comprised of both Sunni and Shiite Muslims. Unlike most other suicidal terrorist groups, the PKK does not have widespread grassroots support. This may have contributed to the low frequency, low intensity, and low casualty-producing nature of the PKK suicide attacks. Pape (2005) noted the following:

Although the PKK’s suicide terrorism occurred while the Kurdish homeland was under Turkish military occupation, the origins of the PKK’s suicide terrorism, more so than any other case, are most likely due to a narrow commitment to the group’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan. (p. 163) While in prison, Ocalan called for his supporters to specifically conduct suicide attacks in an effort to secure his release. Thus, the PKK’s motivation for the
suicidal component of their operations is rooted in a desire for cultural preservation and personal loyalty to their leadership.

A perceived danger to a cultural identity is a precipitating factor leading to the establishment of suicidal terrorism. Groups who believe they may fall victim to a cultural obliteration will often develop intense reactions directed toward safeguarding their cultural. Religious attachment is often a great part of cultural identification but it is not the lone criteria for the establishment of a cultural identity as a whole. Loula Abboud and terrorist organizations such as Fatah and the PKK seek to defend their culture even outside of spiritual considerations. Thus, independent of radical religious motivations, the notion of a looming danger to a group’s cultural identity is a precipitating factor leading to the development of suicidal terrorism. The precipitating factors, noted within this chapter, constitute block 3 of the triadic process that is accountable for the decision of terrorist organizations to establish and sustain suicide operations. The necessary causal factors include a desire for expulsion, perceived religious asymmetry, and/or cultural threat. The precipitating factors are not individually or collectively sufficient for the establishment of suicidal tactics. Two additional factors must be present before martyrdom operations occur. These other factors include socialization practices and an internal perception that the given terrorist organization can win.
Chapter 4: Socialization as Causation

Specific processes of socialization serve as dominant factors that are causally responsible for the establishment of suicidal terrorism. These dominant socialization factors constitute block 4 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism. This chapter systematically describes how each of the top ten suicidal terrorist organizations fit the criteria outlined in block 4. This chapter also provides a reinforcing account of the effects of the socialization processes by way of explaining the role of altruism. Socialization is a lifelong process of learning, adaptation, and assimilation that directs individuals to behave in a manner consistent with the expectations of a group of people. “It begins very early, and in due course the child learns to take part in group life and to embody in some degree the values of his society and of groups within it” (Broom & Selznick, 1970, p. 84). Children are born into a pre-existing social system without an innate knowledge of the mechanics of the given system. Newborns, for example, are not born with knowledge regarding religion, nationality, or ethnicity. Knowledge bases develop over time through specific socialization practices. Stated differently, people are taught how and what to think, especially during childhood. This chapter describes several key socialization mechanisms that give rise to the practice of suicidal terrorism.

Many people are socialized into a particular religious group and behave in accord with the expectations of the given religious component. Concepts ingrained in radical Islamic philosophy foster a social environment conducive to
suicidal terrorism or martyrdom operations from the standpoint of the perpetrator. Not all suicidal attacks originate from radical Islamic beliefs. However, the role of such beliefs cannot be ignored. Moreover, all suicidal terrorist attacks to date, specifically directed toward the United States of America, have been carried out by subscribers of militant Islamic fundamentalism. A brief overview of basic Islamic beliefs and radical Islamic ideology will serve to build the basis for the argument of socialization as a causal factor for suicidal terrorism.

Islam is a religion that combines elements of Christianity and Judaism. It began in the year 610 when, according to believers, the Archangel Gabriel contacted the prophet Muhammad and transmitted a divine message (Davis, 2004, p. 18). Muslims believe that Muhammad is the latest prophet of God. “These revelations, conveyed by the angel Gabriel, are recorded in the Qur’an” (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 49). “The Muslim creed consists of five basic articles of faith: belief in one God, belief in angels, belief in the revealed books, belief in the prophets, and belief in the day of judgment” (Haskins, 1973, p. 144). Muhammad rapidly attracted followers and Islam sprang forward onto the world scene with great momentum.

Muhammad’s death was followed by a sharp split within Islam that eventually set the stage for the integration of martyrdom ideology within the religion. A portion of Muslims believed that a relative should have succeeded Muhammad, while others maintained that a kinship succession was non-obligatory. “It was at this time that the two major sects of present-day Islam were formed” (Haskins, 1973, p. 142). The Shiites steadfastly maintain that
Muhammad’s successor should always be established by kinship. Conversely, the Sunnis believe that Muhammad’s successor should always be established on the basis of an election.

“Hussein ibn Ali, Muhammad’s grandson, is known as the Master of Martyrs, especially among the Shia” (Davis, 2004, p. 97). Hussein fought to establish himself as the head of Islam. His failed endeavor directly resulted in the embrace of martyrdom ideology. Islamic history maintains that Hussein was severely tortured prior to his execution. More importantly, many Muslims believe that he was tortured because of his adherence to Islamic values. “Whatever the details, Hussein’s death at Karbala split Muslims into two distinct sects, Sunni and Shia, and set the standard of martyrdom in Islam” (Davis, 2004, p. 48).

The overwhelming majorities of Muslims maintain a peaceful existence, respect other religions, and welcome diversity. However, minorities subscribe to militant Islamic fundamentalism. This belief system demonizes many modern governments and policies that, from an extremist perspective, have lead to a decline in the world power brokered by the followers of Islam. The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) noted the following:

The extreme Islamist version of history blames the decline from Islam’s golden age on the rulers and people who turned away from the true path of their religion, thereby leaving Islam vulnerable to encroaching foreign powers eager to steal their land, wealth, and even their souls. (p. 50) Such sentiments fuel the increasing trend of martyrdom. In fact, this ideology manifests itself by way of specific socialization practices that encourage suicidal
terrorist operations. A systematic presentation of key examples, across the cultural spectrum, will enlighten the readers understanding about the nature and mechanics of these socialization practices.

Little is known about the socialization processes of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. Gathering detailed cultural data is problematic, and would probably lead the researcher astray, because al-Qaeda is not operating within a well-defined geographical or cultural arena. Their network and recruitment base is not exclusive to any particular region. Indeed, the identities of these terrorists are shrouded in secrecy. It is problematic for even the best intelligence services to gather data regarding their identity, personal history, and movements. The vast majority of public knowledge regarding such members focuses on those who have already died in suicide missions. What is known is that Al-Qaeda members adopt a philosophy of radical Islamic fundamentalism. Adherence to this philosophy mandates an intense hatred directed toward the United States and Israel. Moreover, all religious systems are transmitted via socialization. Radical Islamic fundamentalism is no exception. The necessarily social transmission of this belief system constitutes a type of socialization. Its rationalization for employing martyrdom serves to mentally prepare its members for suicidal operations.

Many members of al-Qaeda have attended special training camps. Most camps were located in Afghanistan. Mohammed Atta, a leader among the 9/11 hijackers, attended one of these camps during the late 1990’s (Pape, 2005, p. 223). The purpose of these camps was to train recruits to conduct terrorist
operations. Only devout Muslims were admitted (Pape, 2005, p. 223). These training programs, like conventional military training, served to assimilate the trainees into the group. Al-Qaeda hosted a special two-week course on radical Islamic fundamentalist philosophies. “The purpose of the two weeks of religious lectures was to ensure that the recruits had a common justification rooted in Islam for the acts they were already intent on committing” (Pape, 2005, p. 223). This course is a prime example of the social transmission of ideology favoring martyrdom operations. Additional training, composing of 3 phases, focused on combat skills. “In the first, lasting about a month, recruits were taught how to use an impressive array of light weapons, such as pistols, sniper rifles, and machine guns” (Pape, 2005, p. 224). The second phase, lasting about 2 weeks, taught recruits how to employ conventional explosives and produce improvised explosive devices. “The final several weeks were devoted to the use of heavier weapons, such as mortars, grenade launchers, and anti-aircraft weapons” (Pape, 2005, p. 224). These terrorist-training camps taught recruits to justify and perpetrate acts of violence against civilian targets. This type of training is an example of the socialization processes that give rise to the establishment of suicidal terrorism.

Black September, Hamas, and Fatah all operate under very similar cultural and religious circumstances. They all desire to establish a Palestinian state. Black September and Hamas subscribe to militant Islamic fundamentalism. Fatah remains secular but is unquestionably influenced by Islam. Moreover, they function largely within Palestinian refugee camps. These camps share a common
culture. Examination of the socialization practices that are exclusive to such camps will reveal a myriad of causal behaviors that give rise to the social acceptance and perpetuation of martyrdom.

Children who live in Palestinian refugee camps are often socialized into the role of a terrorist by means of exposure to television propaganda. They are taught at an early age that they must participate in an armed struggle against Israel. Many television shows, specifically designed for children, demonize Israel and the United States. These shows are visually comparable to children's television programming within the United States insofar as they employ attractive colors, fuzzy characters, and the presence of children. One show has included a character that appears strikingly similar to Mickey Mouse. However, the spoken messages of these shows often encourage martyrdom and foster a social acceptance for violence against Israel. Many Palestinians, to include children, conceptualize death as something separate from martyrdom. They often describe martyrdom, within the context of Jihad, (shahada) as sweet and beautiful. They believe that they will immediately unite with Allah after the execution of a martyrdom mission. Given the distraught lifestyle associated with refugee camps, many Palestinians strive for an afterlife in paradise.

Terrorist training camps also provide young Palestinians with socialization and indoctrination that is specifically directed toward violence. Munir al Makdah is a militant leader who operates from a Palestinian refugee camp. He serves as a figurehead for the Palestinian militancy against Israel and personally oversees terrorist training camps. “In Ain al Helwah, there are no Boy Scout camps, sports
clubs, or video arcades to command the attention of growing boys; so Al
Makdah’s jihad camps fill the gap” (Davis, 2004, p. 148). These highly
clandestine camps teach children how to operate firearms, grenades, and other
weapons. More importantly, children learn that they must actively participate in
the violent struggle against the Israelis. These camps serve as a socialization
and indoctrination mechanism directed toward establishing suicidal terrorism as a
socially accepted means of opposition.

Palestinian refugee camps are inundated with propaganda campaigns
directed toward fueling hatred for Israel and the United States. Many mosques
blast anti-Zionist messages directed toward fostering hatred among the general
public. Children are especially susceptible to messages of hate. “All of them have
been raised singing praises of martyrs and believing that there is no nobler act
than to die fighting” (Davis, 2004, p. 154). Moreover, they are raised to believe
that they will immediately join with God upon completion of a martyrdom mission.
Such ideological sentiments are transmitted by way of religious and political
propaganda. These sentiments fuel the escalating fire that burns away all
inhibitions preventing the implementation of suicidal terrorism. Accordingly, such
propaganda campaigns serve as a socialization mechanism that gives rise to the
socially accepted philosophy that suicidal terrorist operations are fully warranted.

The Internet is playing an increasingly prominent role in the transmission
of terrorist propaganda. Palestinian terrorists often videotape suicide bombers
prior to their mission. They often make final statements that reference their
family, religious beliefs, and desire to combat the Israelis. Many of these videos
are subsequently posted on the Internet. Many of these web sites include political
cartoons and written statements that demonize Israel and the United States.
They send a clear message that terrorist behavior is not only socially acceptable
but also favorable.

Students attending the Al Najah University once produced a highly
controversial propaganda display that served to glorify suicidal terrorism. “The
exhibit, designed to mark the first anniversary of the Palestinian intifada, featured
a recreation of the Sbarro bombing scene” (Davis, 2004, p. 132). The display
focused on an incident that occurred on August 9, 2001 when a young
Palestinian named Izzidene al Masri detonated a bomb inside the Sbarro
Pizzeria in Jerusalem. “Some students associated with Hamas even went as far
as to splatter fake blood and body parts around the room” (Davis, 2004, p. 132).
Such acts of propaganda serve to socialize Palestinians into adopting a mentality
that glorifies, encourages, and justifies suicidal terrorism.

The culture of Palestinian refugee camps specifically cultivates a special
and honorable social status for mothers of martyrs. Members of the community,
even the international community, often monetarily compensate them for the
services of their children who conduct suicidal terrorist operations. Many entities
are known to provide such compensation including the former government of
Saddam Hussein, individuals from the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabian
residents, King Abdullah, Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, and the Women’s
Societal Welfare Fund (Davis, 2004, p. 124). Additionally, members of the
various Palestinian refugee camps often console and support mothers of martyrs.
These practices are examples of socialization practices that give rise to the social acceptance and perpetuation of suicidal terrorism.

“Suicide terrorist organizations commonly cultivate ‘sacrificial myths’ that include elaborate sets of symbols and rituals to mark an individual attacker’s death as a contribution to the nation” (Pape, 2005, p. 29). “The United States has accused Iran of being a state sponsor of terrorism by sending money and arms to support the Palestinians and for encouraging Palestinian youths to become martyrs” (Davis, 2004, p. 62). Iranian Shiites practice a ritual known as the Ashura ceremony. Women, dressed in black veiled clothing, carry out self-mutilation exercises in honor of the tortuous struggle endured by Hussein. Men also participate in self-mutilation and many observers use chains to beat themselves and draw blood. “Ashura morning sessions are regularly held in Iran to remember Hussein’s suffering and death and to promote the reverence of martyrdom” (Davis, 2004, p. 49). These ceremonies are often held in public places and thus exert influence within the public sphere. Members of the public, especially children, learn of the importance of martyrdom via this socialization practice and are thus inclined to behave in accordance to what they learned. Shiite religious leaders, especially the late Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini, encouraged these rituals. “Shias identify strongly with the death of Hussein, and his martyrdom set the tone for everything that has happened since in their world” (Davis, 2004, p. 49).

Martyrdom ideology is ingrained in many aspects of Iranian culture. This ideology has served as a foundation for the establishment and moral justification
of operations conducted by Hizballah. “Pictures of young men and many women martyrs hang from lampposts or are plastered across walls in cities throughout the country, and artists use public spaces to create memorials to those proclaimed martyrs of Islam” (Davis, 2004, p. 46). Martyrs are granted a very high social status after their death. “Streets and alleys are named in their honor, and the country’s religious leaders are careful to regularly pay homage to those who died helping to create their Islamic republic” (Davis, 2004, p. 46). A plethora of cemeteries specifically memorialize martyrs. The capital city even houses a special museum for martyrs. “The long entrance hall to the Martyrs Museum in Tehran is carpeted in blood red and a giant sign overhead proclaims: ‘In the Name of God of Martyrs and the Honest’” (Davis, 2004, p. 45). The transmission and perpetuation of martyrdom ideology, especially within the public sphere, accounts for a type of socialization. The totality of such socialization practices results in the inclination for groups and individuals to serve as martyrs in the future. Pape (2005) noted the following:

The more suicide terrorists justify their actions on the basis of religious or ideological motives that match the beliefs of a broader national community, the more the status of the terrorist martyrs is elevated, and the more plausible it becomes that others will follow in their footsteps. (p. 28)

The Tamil Tigers also operate within a social system that gives rise to martyrdom by way of socialization. “Numerous journalists and scholars who have visited Jaffna report that the local population supports suicide operations and commemorates LTTE martyrs” (Pape, 2005, p. 145). The LTTE has a very high
degree of popular support from the Tamil community. The community itself feels threatened by the encroachment of the Sri Lankan government and spread of Buddhism. It is no surprise that the LTTE leader, Prabhakaran, uses public fear as a means of fostering support and mobilizing suicidal terrorists. He and his supporters often give public speeches that specifically justify their actions. “In numerous speeches, Black Tiger operations are centrally linked to the common welfare” (Pape, 2005, p. 144). The noted speeches and the pre-existing public fear of cultural annihilation are forms of socialization that generate a social environment that favors martyrdom operations.

Public speeches alone do not fully and causally account for the establishment of suicidal terrorism by the Tamil Tigers. A plethora of socialization practices, operating in unison, foster social acceptance for such actions. “Black Tigers often have their own monuments, built near public spaces in Tamil towns” (Pape, 2005, p. 144). An abundance of monuments, large and small, dot the landscape and seek to venerate martyrdom. “These displays are conscious efforts to cultivate broad public support for martyrdom” (Pape, 2005, p. 144). The notion of imminent death is ingrained within the operational terrorists. “Moreover, the Tamil Tigers require something no other major militant group has ever required: that every member, male and female, wear a vial of cyanide, refreshed every few months, on a leather thong around the neck” (Pape, 2005, p. 143). They are instructed to kill themselves to avoid capture. Over six hundred terrorists have committed suicide in this fashion (Pape, 2005, p. 143). They too are considered martyrs from the perspective of their community. Wearing these
suicide capsules is a form of socialization that serves to psychologically and operationally prepare terrorists for death. They believe that they are serving a higher cause and that their community will support their actions.

“Expectation of community support is a key reason so many individuals are willing to commit suicide for the Tamil Tigers” (Pape, 2005, p. 143). In fact, Tamil communities celebrate an annual holiday known as Heroes Day on July 5th. This holiday commemorates martyrs who died in an effort to gain independence, expel unwanted entities, and thwart the encroachment of Buddhism. “Those who carried out suicide attacks for the LTTE attached great importance to how the community would interpret and remember their actions” (Pape, 2005, p. 143). Accordingly, the terrorists often go to great lengths to publicize acts of martyrdom. Individuals often carry a letter or special identification card that serves to explain why they committed suicide in an attempt to kill others (Pape, 2005, p. 143). This makes it easy for law enforcement officials to clearly determine the attacker’s identity and motivation. Armed with such information, media outlets then distribute the facts to the public (Pape, 2005, p. 143). The community then engages in exercises of praise and glorification of the suicidal action. Such actions are forms of socialization that encourage future operations.

The PKK membership is granted some degree of moral support from the public. Sympathizers collectively stress the monumental importance of their nationalist agenda. The PKK’s martyr-specific socialization is grounded in the nationalist social movement and not in religious beliefs. Community proponents
of establishing a Kurdish state maintain that death is justifiable in pursuit of independence. This concept is not uncommon within nationalist movements in general. Most of the PKK’s martyrs were longstanding members of their organization, as opposed to being newly recruited volunteers. This suggests that they had time to undergo prolonged indoctrination and assimilation into the terrorist group and that they rationalized the use of suicidal attacks. PKK suicide bombers have acted with the belief that they were serving a higher agenda. Thus, their martyrdom missions are a direct reflection of the socially created ideological principles that are transmitted via socialization.

The Shiite and Sunni Insurgencies of Iraq are a comparatively recent phenomenon. They began during the United States invasion in 2003 and have progressively expanded into lethal forces that employ suicidal tactics to kill their enemies. These terrorist organizations did not exist under the rule of Saddam Hussein but the socialization of insurgents occurred prior to the invasion. Sunni and Shiite extremists maintained a dichotomized existence under Hussein. However, they did not resort to high levels of mutual violence. This is due to the strong authoritarian style of government headed by Hussein and ruthlessly enforced by his designated agents. Stated differently, Sunni and Shiite extremists could not establish opposing militias because the legitimate government would have destroyed them. The U.S. invasion resulted in a power vacuum that left the Iraqi socio-political field wide open. The Iraqi government lost the ability to maintain control of the dichotomous tensions between Sunnis and Shiites. The Sunni and Shiite extremists were able to develop well-armed militias and conduct
terrorist operations against each other and strike coalition forces occupying their country precisely because no one could legitimately stop them. Although the U.S. invasion and occupation is a precipitating factor that ultimately set the stage for the development of these insurgencies, the terrorists were socialized into their role by way of the sharp religious divide between Sunni and Shiite Islam. The socialization practices typical of radical Islamic fundamentalism are primarily but not exclusively accountable for the establishment of these terrorist insurgencies.

The Chechen Rebels also operate from a radical Islamic fundamentalist perspective. This belief system is necessarily transmitted by social interaction. Social acceptance for martyrdom missions is common among the rebels. They employ religion and nationalism to justify martyrdom. They typically operate in small, highly cohesive groups. Several Chechen Rebel operations have employed multiple family members. Terrorists with shared kinship committed airline and subway bombings in August of 2004. The presence of kinship, associated with suicide missions, suggests the perpetrators were socialized into their role. The family serves as the chief transmission mechanism for the diffusion of cultural principles (Merton, 1967, p. 158). Joint martyrdom among family members indicates the presence of joint moral support. This type of support is necessarily transmitted via socialization. The Chechen Rebels receive martyrdom-specific socialization from their community, through active adherence to radical Islamic fundamentalism, and from within their family.

Altruism is an effect of the noted socialization processes. Most suicidal terrorists adopt an altruistic comportment regarding their martyrdom missions
that is exclusive to their organization. The typical notion of altruism focuses on a selfless comportment directed toward facilitating the overall welfare of others. Some researchers may argue that suicidal terrorism is in no way facilitating the overall welfare of humanity. This argument is valid from the perspective of the victimized society. However, understanding the underlying motivation of suicidal terrorists requires an examination from the perspective of the individuals composing a terrorist organization that employs martyrdom tactics. These terrorists operate from the personal belief that they are serving the overall welfare of their organization. They further contend that their organization’s agenda serves the long-term interest of humanity. Thus, from an internal perspective, suicidal terrorists adopt an altruistic comportment. Accordingly, the argument for an internal altruistic comportment is paradoxically valid. The altruistic comportment is a precondition for the overwhelming majority of suicidal terrorist missions. “Suicide is the end result of a process, not the process itself” (Beck, Resnik, & Lettieri, 1986, p. 4). The social process leading to suicide deserves some attention.

A brief overview of suicide typologies will assist the reader in understanding the peculiar relationship between altruism and suicidal terrorism. Emile Durkheim (1897/1979) was a classical sociological theorist who pioneered studies on suicide. He developed four particular types of suicide known as egoistic, anomic, fatalistic, and altruistic (Durkheim, 1897/1979). These typologies remain relevant to modern suicidal phenomena. Durkheim believed
that individuals must live within a state of equilibrium with their society. Deviations from the equilibrium can result in suicidal behavior.

Egoistic suicide stems from a personal lack of social integration that can disrupt the individual’s equilibrium with society. Individuals who lack a suitable amount of integration will feel as if they are not wholly a part of society. They feel at odds with their given social situation. Unfavorable personal feelings, created by a lack of integration, are causally related to acts of suicide. In fact, egoistic suicide is the most common type. However this type rarely, if ever, is applicable to martyrdom missions because such missions are executed for the benefit of a social entity (Pape, 2005, p. 181). Particular communities, especially within Palestinian refugee camps, wholly support many suicide missions. Support is publicly manifested by way of celebratory praise, memorials, and financial support to family members of suicide bombers. Mothers frequently and publicly praise the acts of martyrdom perpetrated by their children. These circumstances operate conversely from social reactions to egoistic suicide in which the individual is often criticized for suicidal behavior, memorials are considered taboo, and parental support is overwhelmingly nonexistent. “Publicity is rarely sought and commonly shunned” (Pape, 2005, p. 177). Members of terrorist organizations seek to glorify the suicides associated with martyrdom missions. Thus, egoistic suicide is not predominantly associated with terrorism (Pape, 2005, p. 181).

Anomic suicide occurs when significant social events are substantially disrupted. Sudden disruptions often result in a shift in the equilibrium between
the individual and society. “These disruptions are likely to leave individuals dissatisfied because there is little control over their passions, which are free to run wild in an insatiable race for gratification” (Ritzer & Goodman, 2004, p. 177).

Individuals are socially influenced by major disruptions and are inclined to act upon them. Suicidal acts are usually generated by an unhealthy and dependent personal connection with the event that was disrupted. Suicides associated with dramatic changes in the stock market are best categorized as anomic. This variation of suicide may partially account for some martyrdom missions that were motivated, at least in part, by a desire to seek the gratification associated with revenge. Some Tamil women became suicide bombers after Indian military forces killed their family, raided their village, and gang raped them (Pape, 2005, p. 226). These events surely constitute a sudden and dramatic disruption to daily life. However, subsequent martyrdom missions also occurred as part of a well-defined campaign directed toward a common good from the perception of the perpetrator. This consideration suggests that Durkheim’s suicide typologies are not necessarily mutually exclusive. However, anomic suicide is not the overwhelming type applicable to the majority of martyrdom missions. Anomic suicide, at best, accounts for only a small portion of the motivation behind the totality of suicidal terrorist attacks.

Fatalistic suicide occurs in situations involving acts of significant social oppression and/or excessive regulation. Some people choose to commit suicide because they have absolutely no hope for the future insofar as the root cause for losing hope stems from societal regulation. In such situations, suicide may be
viewed as a better alternative than the oppression, especially if the nature of the oppression involves torture. Slaves who killed themselves because they did not wish to endure the hardships of slavery best exemplify fatalistic suicide. Durkheim viewed fatalistic suicide as comparatively unimportant to the other types because few cases existed. This typology may apply to terrorists who kill themselves to avoid capture but it does not apply to martyrs who kill themselves as a means to kill others. Suicidal terrorism is not fatalistic because the perpetrators have not lost hope for a suitable future. Rather, they commit suicidal terrorism precisely because they want future changes to occur in favor of their organizational goals. Thus, fatalistic suicide is not associated with martyrdom operations.

“Many acts of suicide terrorism are a murderous form of what Durkheim called altruistic suicide” (Pape, 2005, p. 179). This type of suicide operates conversely from the egoistic model. In this case, individuals may feel overshadowed by social institutions or society at large. In essence, an individual can become too integrated and buckle under social pressure. Over-integration results in the disruption of equilibrium between the individual and society. The social nature of suicidal terrorist attacks is causally related to the over-integration of the attackers. Martyrs commit suicide because they believe they are serving a higher purpose. “All these cases have for their root the same state of altruism which is equally the cause of what might be called heroic suicide” (Durkheim, 1979, p. 240). However, the standards that foster a perception of serving a higher purpose are unavoidably socially determined. Thus, when society exerts
too much pressure on individuals, they can become over-integrated and prone to commit altruistic suicide.

Altruistic suicide is the primary type applicable to suicidal terrorism. “Many suicide terrorists are acting on the basis of motives fundamentally different from those that underlie ordinary suicide and would probably not commit suicide absent the special circumstances that created these motives” (Pape, 2005, p. 172). Suicidal terrorism is primarily a tactic of maximizing damage to a perceived enemy for the benefit of the perpetrators organization and/or supporting community. “Numerous suicidal terrorists are acting at least partly to serve their community’s interest in fighting the national enemy” (Pape, 2005, p. 173). A supreme notion of duty to an organization or community is apparent in most cases of martyrdom. Terrorists truly believe they are acting in line with a greater cause that is beneficial to their community. Specific situations of socialization, especially glorification and overt encouragement, causally account for this perception. “In such situations, society can exert pressure on the individual to make personal sacrifices, including the sacrifice of one’s life, for purely collective goals” (Pape, 2005, p. 174).

The establishment of teamwork within the context of suicide operations bolsters the argument that suicidal terrorism is best characterized as altruistic (Pape, 2005, p. 186). Al-Qaeda, Tamil Tigers, and the Chechen Rebels frequently deploy suicidal terrorists in teams. Individuals rarely perpetrate suicidal attacks alone. “In fact, many suicide attacks involve multiple individuals working together for weeks, sometimes even months, to gather intelligence, plan, and
rehearse a joint mission” (Pape, 2005, p. 185). They virtually always have a supporting network of terrorists who construct explosives, reconnoiter targets, plan missions, and assist with logistics. Additionally, many suicide operations coordinate the use of more than one suicide bomber when conducting attacks. This notion of teamwork is contrary to normal egoistic suicides in which individuals commit the act in great privacy if not outright humility. “The prevalence of team suicide attacks strongly indicates the presence of altruistic motives among a significant number of suicide attackers” (Pape, 2005, p. 186).

Given that a minority of suicide bombers are somewhat motivated by anomie, the notion is overshadowed by altruism. Pape (2005) noted the following:

Even if all suicide attackers had some personal motive to die, suicide attackers who work together as a team must also be motivated, at least partly, to achieve a collective purpose, the completion of a group mission that serves a cause beyond their own personal death. (p. 186)

This chapter has demonstrated that the top ten terrorist organizations, that employ suicidal tactics, categorically undergo specific socialization processes that favor the establishment of martyrdom as a legitimate means of combating their enemy(s). Block 4 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism maintains that these socialization practices are a necessary precondition for establishing suicidal tactics. This chapter further concludes that the adoption of an altruistic comportment, exclusive to the given terrorist organizations, is a direct result of the noted socialization processes. The adoption of this particular type of altruism demonstrates that the decision to perpetrate suicidal terrorism is not an a priori
judgment. Rather, martyr-specific socialization occurs first and the described altruistic comportment is a proximal result. In consideration of these findings, it is a safe assertion to maintain that the top ten suicidal terrorist organizations must undergo specific socialization processes that favor the establishment of martyrdom as a legitimate means of combating their enemy(s), before such tactics are socially accepted and subsequently implemented by any given terrorist organization.
Chapter 5: Perceived Strategic Feasibility

“The previous generation thought the Cold War might bring the end of creation, but the West now faces a determined, disciplined, and persistent enemy that is not only willing to die, but cherishes death as a path to martyrdom” (Davis, 2004, p. 217). The perpetrators of suicidal terrorist attacks are operating under a perception of positive tactical feasibility insofar as they believe they are capable of winning. “They are prepared to fight for generations, and are convinced that they ultimately will win” (Davis, 2004, p. 216). This attitude is a necessary precondition for the establishment of suicidal terrorist tactics as outlined in block 5 of the causal model. This chapter seeks to provide a basic account explaining how the top ten suicidal terrorist organizations specifically believe they can achieve their goals.

The tactic of using suicide-type operations to inflict damage on an enemy is an adaptation to a very specific scenario. Subnational and militarily weaker forces usually direct such attacks toward democratic nations with superior military capabilities (Pape, 2005, p. 44). “In suicide terrorism, the coercer is the weaker actor and the target is the stronger” (Pape, 2005, p. 30). Terrorists view democracies as being particularly vulnerable to attacks in terms of a target government’s potential to provide concessions. The United States, Israel, Sri Lanka, France, Britain, and Turkey have been consistently targeted by suicidal terrorist operations. These democratic governments theoretically establish foreign policies on the basis of popular desires manifested by way of votes.
Terrorists believe that inflicting damage and generating fear within a democracies public arena will lead to voters mandating a change in policy commensurate with the wishes of the terrorist organization. Suicidal terrorist organizations specifically target democratic nations because they believe they have a better chance of winning.

Suicidal terrorists have not systematically targeted other types of governments such as dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, and communist systems. This is largely due to a perception of tactical infeasibility. Terrorists believe that these types of governments would be more inclined to inflict catastrophic damage on the perpetrating suicidal groups. “The Kurds, who straddle Turkey and Iraq, illustrate the point that suicide terrorist campaigns are more likely to be targeted against democracies than authoritarian regimes” (Pape, 2005, p. 45). The Kurdish terrorist organization, known as PKK, has conducted systematic suicidal terrorist operations in Turkey. They are a Marxist-Leninist association whose agenda is to establish an independent Kurdish state. “Although Iraq has been far more brutal toward its Kurdish population than has Turkey, violent Kurdish groups have used suicide attacks exclusively against democratic Turkey and not against the authoritarian regime in Iraq” (Pape, 2005, p. 45). This is attributed to the late Saddam Hussein’s ability to inflict uninterrupted genocidal damage on Kurdish populations within Iraq. The Iraqi citizens would have been powerless to stop their government’s actions. Moreover, Hussein frequently targeted Kurds for assassination and mass execution to the extent of employing his military forces to use weapons of mass
destruction against them. Accordingly, the PKK was deterred from launching terrorist operations within Iraq. This situation best illustrates that non-democratic nations are not systematically targeted by suicidal terrorist campaigns largely because the ability to win or gain concessions is diminished.

Suicidal terrorism allows perpetrators to tactically maximize their destructive capability. “An attacker who is willing to die is much more likely to accomplish the mission and cause maximum damage to the target” (Pape, 2005, p. 28). A lone attacker can easily conceal explosive material on his or her body without attracting undue attention. Moreover, lone attackers are capable of altering their plans as needed to maximize damage. “They are also better able to infiltrate heavily guarded targets, because they do not need escape plans or rescue teams” (Pape, 2005, p. 28). Suicidal terrorist tactics are often aimed at nations that boast a superior military. The tactical significance of suicidal terrorism is that terrorists maximize damage to their enemy while minimizing damage to their organization. Essentially, suicidal tactics can cause more damage with little strain on the terrorist organization. These operational tactics are directed toward winning in terms of mission success and prompting concession.

“At its core, suicide terrorism is a strategy of coercion, a means to compel a target government to change policy” (Pape, 2005, p. 27). Radical Islamic terrorists, for example, desire the U.S. to withdraw all military forces from the Middle East and abandon support for Israel. Unable to achieve their goals by way of conventional means, they resort to suicidal operations directed toward
spawning official concessions. “Targets may be economic or political, military or civilian, but in all cases the main task is less to destroy the specific targets than to convince the opposing society that it is vulnerable to more attacks in the future” (Pape, 2005, p. 30). This accounts for why symbolic targets are often chosen. Suicidal terrorist desire to maximize their influence on the society targeted. They believe that such influence will bring about concessions and/or policy changes that will best serve the interests of the terrorist organization.

Unfortunately, terrorist organizations have some valid historical foundations for believing that suicidal tactics will lead to concessions. Many terrorist organizations have the perception that several governments have yielded to demands that were made while employing suicidal terrorism strategies. Suicide attacks conducted by Hizballah prompted the United States to withdraw from Lebanon in 1983. The Sri Lankan government agreed to participate in sovereignty negotiations with the Tamil Tigers after the group conducted a barrage of suicide operations. The Israelis have historically released prisoners in an effort to appease radical Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organizations that employed suicidal assault tactics. The targeted governmental bodies may or may not define their responses as concessions. The critical point is that terrorist organizations believe that the noted examples are concessions. This leads to a perception within terrorist groups that they can win.

“The American and French withdrawal from Lebanon was perhaps the most clear-cut coercive success for suicidal terrorism” (Pape, 2005, p. 65). Military components of the United States, France, and Britain participated in
peacekeeping missions within Lebanon in 1983. The presence of these troops outraged the radical Islamic fundamentalist community. Several terrorist organizations believed that the military presence constituted an occupation and facilitated the interest of their common enemy (Israel). These circumstances prompted Hizballah to conduct suicidal bombing missions against U.S. and French forces on October 23, 1983. A suicidal terrorist drove an automobile, equipped with explosives, into a U.S. Marine facility in Beirut. The attack resulted in the death of hundreds of Marines. A second suicidal truck bomber drove into a French military facility and detonated his explosives. Over 50 French soldiers were killed. United States, French, and British forces were subsequently withdrawn from the country. President Ronald Reagan expressed overwhelming support for the withdrawal citing the large cost of American lives. “This move was seen by many Islamic militants as proof that the use of terrorism would succeed” (Mattox, 2004, p. 110).

The Tamil Tigers have conducted multiple suicide missions and conventional attacks against the Sri Lankan government. Their primary goal is to establish a sovereign state within parts of Sri Lanka. The group’s leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, has stressed the coercive effectiveness of suicidal operations. “Prabhakaran was especially impressed by Hezbollah’s 1983 suicide attack against the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon and concluded that the same tactic could be employed to compel the Sri Lankan government to accept Tamil independence” (Pape, 2005, p. 73). His assessment was partly valid insofar as the Sri Lankan government conducted official negotiations with the terrorist group
in 1993, 1994, and 2001 (Pape, 2005, p. 65). These negotiations were specifically directed toward exploring the possibility of actually establishing a separate state for supporters of the Tamil Tiger separatist movement. The establishment of these official negotiations was viewed as a victory for the Tamil Tigers. They realized that suicidal terrorism could effectively force governmental concessions.

The Israeli government has historically organized prisoner releases on the basis of attempting to pacify terrorist groups who are known to conduct suicidal operations. Israeli Defense Forces also withdrew from Lebanon in 1985 partly as a result of ongoing suicidal terrorist operations. “Palestinian terrorist groups were also encouraged by their assessments of the success of Hezbollah’s coercive efforts to believe that suicide terrorism would be an effective way of coercing Israel” (Pape, 2005, p. 73). These actions are perceived as significant concessions.

The noted concessions served to bolster the terrorist resolve, generate a perception of positive tactical feasibility, and embolden a new generation of attackers. Terrorists believe they can and will achieve victory. They are not operating under conditions of complete irrationality or madness. Rather, these groups see themselves as effective brokers of their agenda who are waging organized campaigns against target governments. A single disgruntled individual rarely perpetrates suicidal terrorism. Most suicidal terrorist attacks involve meticulous strategic planning at the organizational level. Most attackers are aided by well-established support systems. These conditions lead groups to adopt a positive outlook regarding the tactical feasibility of suicidal operations.
The Bush Administration has developed and unwaveringly maintained an ironclad policy of refusing to give concessions to terrorists. “In principle and in the abstract, the refusal to give in to terrorist demands has overwhelming appeal because it is a more virile response than negotiating with terrorists” (Snow, 2007, p. 281). This philosophy developed, in part, because terrorist groups were emboldened by formerly extracted concessions. The strategic concept of the Bush Administration’s policy is directed toward discouraging future attacks by eliminating any possibility for a change in policy corresponding to the desires of terrorists. According to advocates of Bush’s policy, terrorists may begin to believe that the U.S. will not yield to their demands and consequently cease their attacks.

Each of the top ten terrorist organizations, that employ suicidal tactics, believes they can eventually emerge victorious. All of them are particularly emboldened by the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Lebanon in 1985. All of the noted organizations categorically believe they are capable of winning the campaigns they are waging. The perception of an optimistic tactical feasibility is a necessary precondition for the establishment of suicidal terrorism. This precondition is outlined in block 5 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism and constitutes part of the triadic causal process.

Members of al-Qaeda believe victory is not only achievable but also mandated via divine intervention. This belief is central to much of the militant Islamic fundamentalist philosophy. Usama Bin Laden vocalized his attitudes toward winning in an interview prior to September 11, 2001. “Citing the Soviet army’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, as proof that a ragged army of dedicated
Muslims could overcome a superpower, he told the interviewer: “We are certain that we shall – with the grace of Allah – prevail over the Americans”” (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 48). Given the Bush Administration’s failure to concede to their demands, they now largely view the U.S. as a hard target in terms of coercing a military withdrawal from the Middle East. This fact was manifested by an official al-Qaeda web publication in 2003. Pape (2005) noted the following:

The forty-two-page document assumed that new spectacular attacks directly against the United States would be insufficient to compel America’s withdrawal, and so it would be more effective to attack America’s European allies, who could be coerced to withdraw their forces, thus increasing the economic and other burdens that the United States would have to shoulder in order to continue the occupations of Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Arabian peninsula. (p. 55)

Given this new strategy, al-Qaeda maintains a philosophy that victory is achievable. They specifically targeted Spain with the contention that terrorist strikes would provoke a withdrawal of Spanish military forces. It was believed that the Spanish withdrawal would greatly influence Britain to also withdrawal their military forces. “These strikes did occur and Spain did withdraw its forces from Iraq, just as the document predicted” (Pape, 2005, p. 57). British Prime Minister Tony Blair subsequently succumbed to the British population’s mass disapproval for the war in Iraq and withdrew a substantial number of military forces. Al-Qaeda views these withdrawals as positive concessions. These
concessions fuel their perception that they can win. Accordingly, al-Qaeda fits the criteria specified in block 5 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism.

The case of the perception of an achievable victory for Black September hinges on two factors. First, they are encouraged by Israeli concessions in general. Second, they are also encouraged by the precepts outlined by hardcore militant Islamic fundamentalism. The Black September organization has historically been emboldened by concessions from the Israeli government, especially toward similar terrorist organizations. The extraction of one terrorist organization's concession can have a dramatic effect on similar organizations. The Israeli government's prisoner releases have spawned a type of legitimacy for terrorists that, in the absence of such releases, would not occur. The Israeli government's willingness to concede to terrorists gives the terrorists a sense of legitimacy. The very act of negotiating with the legitimate political wings of terrorist organizations opens the possibility of extracting a concession. Thus, many Palestinian terrorist groups, to include Black September, believe they can win given Israel's track record of releasing prisoners and engaging in diplomacy with legitimate political wings of terrorist organizations that publicly claim to distance themselves from violent activity. The group's adherence to hardcore militant Islamic fundamentalist principles mandates that an eventual victory will be achieved. They believe they are engaged in a divine struggle in which they will, by divine decree, emerge victorious. Accordingly, the Black September terrorist organization fits block 5 of the causal model of suicidal terrorism.
The Chechen Rebels, like many other suicidal terrorist organizations, rationalize their actions by means of employing philosophies outlined by radical Islamic fundamentalism. They believe they are fighting a holy war against infidels. This rationalization provokes members to believe that a victory is supported by divine order. The collapse of the Soviet Union has served to bolster the group’s resolve. They view the collapse as a favorable event because it weakened Moscow’s control over the Chechen region. This loss of control strengthens the potential for the Chechen nationalist agenda. Given the group’s rationalization, combined with an improved potential to achieve statehood, they adopt a winning philosophy. This philosophy is commensurate with the precondition noted in block 5.

Fatah remains motivated and very much dedicated to establishing a Palestinian state. They enjoy popular support from the Palestinian refugee communities. Fatah sympathizers number in the thousands. This large support base fosters a perception that they can achieve victory. Continued material support and funding from entities abroad suggest they will not cease operations anytime in the foreseeable future. Consequently, Fatah fits block 5 of the causal model of suicidal terrorism.

Hamas mirrors Fatah in terms of widespread public support within Palestinian camps. This terrorist organization has in excess of 20,000 sympathizers and/or supporters. Winning elections in 2006 encouraged the Hamas leadership and the organization has subsequently gained momentum. Their newfound status as a legitimate political entity serves to validate their
pursuit of nationalist goals. Given the overwhelming Palestinian support and political energy, the Hamas membership maintains a perception that victory is possible. This perception is commensurate with block 5 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism.

Hizballah remains an emboldened terrorist organization that has influenced the tactics of other organizations. They are well known for their 1983 suicide attack on United States and French facilities in Beirut, Lebanon. The United States withdrew its peacekeeping forces as a direct result of this terrorist incident. This withdrawal was viewed as a major concession and many terrorists adopted similar strategies. This concession was a major victory for Hizballah. They believe they have in the past and will in the future achieve their goals. These beliefs fit the criteria outlined in block 5 of the model.

The PKK has gained momentum following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. They have begun to regroup, continue violent terrorist activities in Turkey, and use areas in Northern Iraq as a safe haven. The political turmoil and inherent governmental instability within Iraq has resulted in the perception that establishing a Kurdish state is now more feasible than ever. Members of the PKK encourage the fragmentation of Iraq insofar as a Kurdish state emerges. Their increase in momentum, combined with a very real possibility for the fragmentation of Iraq, suggests they are operating from a perception they can indeed achieve a nationalist goal. Accordingly, this organization meets the criteria specified in block 5 of the causal model.
The Shiite Insurgency of Iraq maintains a philosophy that they can win. A Shiite Insurgency victory would include securing political power and driving foreign military forces out of the country. Much of their actions are fueled by sectarian tensions. Members of the Shiite Insurgency support an uprising that will ensure economic and political superiority for Shiites. They believe they can win by taking advantage of the general instability and outright weakness of the Iraqi government. Moreover, they employ an interpretation of religious principles to justify their actions and create a perception that victory is in the hands of a divine entity. They believe they are capable of ousting foreign military forces, especially from the United States, by sustaining a massive casualty-producing campaign. They do not expect to kill all American forces but they believe they can kill enough to provoke a withdrawal. They intend to sway American public opinion in a direction that will result in a governmental withdrawal. In consideration of their rationalization and tactics, it is safe to maintain that they believe victory is achievable. The Shiite Insurgency of Iraq is fitting with block 5 of the causal model.

The Sunni Insurgency of Iraq also maintains a belief they can win. A Sunni Insurgency victory would incorporate securing political control and removing foreign military forces from the country. Sectarian tensions drive much of their actions. Sunni Insurgents support a revolt that will guarantee financial and political dominance for Sunnis. They trust that they will achieve victory by exacerbating Iraq’s instability. Additionally, they make use of an interpretation of religious values to rationalize their campaign and invoke a perception that victory
is supported by their religion. Sunni Insurgents believe that they can prompt a withdraw of foreign military forces, particularly from the United States, by continuing a campaign of terror. They believe they can cause enough damage to incite a departure of foreign forces. They specifically intend to influence the opinion of American voters in a way that will result in the demand for a wholesale military departure from Iraq. In light of their rationalization and strategy it is easy to conclude that they believe they can achieve victory. Accordingly, the Sunni Insurgency fits block 5 of the causal model of suicidal terrorism.

The Tamil Tigers perception of achievable victory is rooted in the massive grassroots support for their agenda and a history of extracting governmental concessions. The overwhelming Tamil support for nationalism fuels the momentum of this terrorist organization. They are unwilling to abandon their cause and will undoubtedly continue their campaign in the foreseeable future. The organization’s leadership has specifically stated they have adopted suicidal tactics in an effort to expedite the establishment of a Tamil state. They believe that the use of martyrdom and coercion will lead to victory. The Tamil Tigers are encouraged by concessions. For example, the Sri Lankan government has engaged in a series of negotiations with the Tamil Tigers that were directed toward exploring the possibility of founding a state (Pape, 2005, p. 65). These negotiations helped fuel the group’s momentum and belief that their nationalist goal is achievable. Accordingly, they fit the causal factor represented by block 5 of the model.
A belief in achievable victory is a necessary, but not singularly sufficient, precondition for the establishment of suicidal terrorism. This factor is outlined in block 5 of the causal model. This chapter has demonstrated that members of the ten noted suicidal terrorist organizations believe they can accomplish their goals. Their perception of achievable victory is largely the product of historic concessions and religious beliefs.
Chapter 6: Comparative Analysis

Proving the validity of the causal model for suicidal terrorism mandates a comparative analysis between terrorist organizations that employ suicidal tactics and terrorist organizations that do not. The presented model hinges on the triadic process that leads to the implementation of suicidal tactics. The triadic process is composed of blocks 3, 4, and 5 of the model. The factors described in each block of the triadic process must be present before terrorists resort to martyrdom. Failure to meet any piece of the triadic process will result in a failure of the terrorist organization to employ tactics involving martyrdom. Block 3 refers to explicit precipitating factors that include a desire for expulsion, a perceived religious asymmetry, and/or a perceived cultural threat. Block 4 encompasses the socialization specifically directed toward fostering a social acceptance for martyrdom. Block 5 refers to the institution of a perception that the terrorists can ultimately win and that suicidal tactics are worth the inherent costs. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 have demonstrated that suicidal terrorist organizations follow the causal model via adherence to the triadic process. This chapter’s analysis will focus on five major terrorist organizations that do not employ suicidal tactics. The terrorist organizations selected for examination include Aum Shinrikyo, Basque Fatherland and Liberty, Irish Republican Army, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, and Shining Path. Examining these five organizations will reveal that they do not fit the causal model.

Aum Shinrikyo is the most recognized terrorist organization in Japan. "A cult established in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, the Aum aimed to take over Japan
and then the world” (Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, 2002, p. 90). The cult practiced a bizarre combination of Buddhism, Hinduism, apocalyptic nihilism, and mysticism that was, according to believers, directly transmitted to the founder via divine intervention. The organization was successfully able to recruit a global following that peaked in the thousands during the mid 1990’s. “Approved as a religious entity in 1989 under Japanese law, the group ran candidates in a Japanese parliamentary election in 1990” (Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, 2002, p. 90). All Aum Shinrikyo candidates failed to win elections. This failure exacerbated an already intense hatred toward the Japanese government. “Over time, the cult began to emphasize the imminence of the end of the world and stated that the United States would initiate Armageddon by starting world war III with Japan” (Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, 2002, p. 90). The group began to recruit a central membership consisting of individuals who were well educated in the sciences. They began to develop an exclusive weapons of mass destruction program that focused on chemical warfare. It was during this time that the group underwent a restructuring process directed toward mirroring the Japanese government. It was believed that the new organizational structure would prove beneficial should the legitimate government collapse. Having successfully developed an arsenal of chemical weapons, the terrorist organization launched various attacks throughout Japan. “On 20 March 1995, Aum members simultaneously released the chemical nerve agent sarin on several Tokyo subway trains, killing 12 persons and injuring up to 6,000” (Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, 2002, p. 90). Subsequent investigations by Japanese authorities
revealed the extent to which the cult had developed into a terrorist organization. In consideration of the cult’s terrorist nature, the Japanese government rescinded the official classification as a religious organization in 1995. However, the membership was officially allowed to continue religious practices under intense governmental and public scrutiny beginning in 1997. Aum Shinrikyo continues to practice their brand of religion today. “Under the leadership of Fumihiro Joyu the Aum changed its name to Aleph in January 2000 and claimed to have rejected the violent and apocalyptic teachings of its founder” (Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, 2002, p. 90). However, the group is strongly suspected of gathering sensitive intelligence regarding nuclear technology in 2000. Additionally, components of the group’s Russian membership were suspected of planning a series of coordinated assaults against targets associated with Japanese childcare facilities. Accordingly, the cult remains under governmental surveillance and U.S. authorities assume the organization presents a threat to American security.

Aum Shinrikyo follows blocks 3 and 5, but deviates from block 4, of the causal model for suicidal terrorism. Blocks 3, 4, and 5 constitute a triadic process of causation. Block 3 requires the presence of precipitating factors to include a desire for expulsion, perceived religious asymmetry, and/or a perceived cultural threat. This organization desired to expel the legitimate Japanese government and secure supreme control over the country. They were operating from religious asymmetry in that any other religious institution was inferior from the group’s perspective because they defined themselves as brokers of the supreme truth.
Although the organization is in its infancy in terms of establishing itself as a cultural entity, they have experienced a cultural threat by the governmental revocation of an official classification as a religious institution. Block 5 requires the organization to believe that they are capable of achieving victory. The organization not only believed that they could win but they believed that it was their divine destiny to take over the world.

The factors described in blocks 3 and 5 were clearly present for Aum Shinrikyo but the factors described in block 4 were not. Aum Shinrikyo has never launched a suicidal terrorist attack. However, they have launched several non-suicidal terrorist attacks that targeted civilians traveling on the subway, residential neighborhoods, an office building, and judicial authorities. The failure to specifically adopt suicidal tactics is attributed to a deviation from block 4 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism. Block 4 constitutes a central component of the triadic causal process leading to martyrdom operations. This block maintains that the members of terrorist organizations must experience specific socialization processes conducive to the social acceptance of suicidal terrorism. This is not the case with members of Aum Shinrikyo. In fact, the embracement of martyrdom ideology is contrary to much of the organizations philosophy. The cult’s apocalyptic teachings focus on survival. Membership in this cult has been comparatively low considering that the group only consisted of several thousand members during its peak. Moreover, only a very small central core of the group was operationally responsible for terrorist acts. Accordingly, the strong desire for survival trumped the establishment of suicidal tactics because every individual
member was a highly valued asset. An additional factor preventing the establishment of socialization favoring martyrdom was time. The cult emerged suddenly in 1987 as a direct result of intense recruiting measures carried out by a charismatic leader. The groups’ philosophy and grievance was not rooted in a historically established social movement, as is the case with the terrorist organizations that have adopted suicidal tactics. Stated differently, the cult did not have enough time to establish socialization patterns favoring martyrdom. The factors represented by block 4 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism were absent. This absence accounts for the terrorist organizations failure to adopt suicidal tactics.

The terrorist organization known as Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) is one of the most recognized within Europe. It was “founded in 1959 with the aim of establishing an independent homeland based on Marxist principles in the southern Spanish Provinces of Vizcaya, Guipuzoca, Alava, and Navarra and the southwestern French Departments of Labourd, Basse-Navarra, and Soule” (Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, 2002, p. 91). ETA is an umbrella organization with a well-organized and sophisticated structure composed of several smaller factions pursuing the same agenda. “The ETA regularly targets Spanish Government officials, members of the military and security forces, and moderate Basques for assassination” (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, 2002, p. 36). ETA routinely conducts armed assaults utilizing small arms and remote detonated bombings. The nature of their bombings is unusual, for a terrorist organization, because they typically contact
authorities in advance and state when and where a bombing will occur. This tactic focuses on property damage and minimizes the loss of innocent life because the authorities are often able to evacuate a threatened area. However, this scenario is not always the case. Basque Fatherland and Liberty has unquestionably targeted innocent people and is responsible for the deaths of numerous civilians. ETA declared a permanent cease-fire in 2006 but subsequently exploded a car bomb in a Madrid airport terminal. Two members of the organization perished in the explosion. It is not known if they intended to die during the explosion or not. Thus, this singular incident may or may not constitute an act of suicidal terrorism. Nonetheless, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty movement is not historically associated with a protracted campaign of suicidal terrorism. They certainly have not developed an overall strategy of employing suicide as part of a means to kill others.

The Basque Fatherland and Liberty organization follows blocks 3 and 5, but deviates from block 4 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism. Blocks 3, 4, and 5 represent a triadic course of causation. Block 3 necessitates the presence of precipitating factors to include a desire for expulsion, perceived religious asymmetry, and/or a perceived cultural threat. ETA desires to expel French and Spanish authorities from defined regions within both states and establish an independent nation. Moreover, they also perceive a cultural threat. This threat is best manifested by the cultural encroachment of France and Spain within the Basque regions. ETA viewed the Spanish Parliamentary decision of 2002, which rendered their political wing (Batasuna) illegitimate, as an act of cultural
oppression. Block 5 requires the member of an organization to believe they are capable of winning. ETA has demonstrated that they clearly believe that they can win. “The ETA is one of the oldest Western European terrorist groups currently operating” (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, 2002, p. 36). Given their long track record, they must believe that their efforts are worthwhile. If they believed otherwise, they would have disbanded long ago. This evidence supports the contention that factors described within blocks 3 and 5 are present. However, ETA lacks established socialization practices that directly embrace martyrdom.

The Basque Fatherland and Liberty organization seems to place a higher overall value on human life, in general, than any other major terrorist organization. This value is manifested in their general willingness to warn authorities of upcoming bombings as a means to minimize civilian casualties. Moreover, they are very discriminate with their attacks insofar as they specifically target governmental entities and key individuals who pose a substantial threat to their organization. These tactics suggest they place a higher value on human life when compared to terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and Hizballah, which indiscriminately attack civilians without warning. These facts indicate that ETA lacks an altruistic comportment exclusive to their organization. On the contrary, ETA seems to have adopted a more generalized altruistic comportment favoring the perpetuation of human life in general even outside of their organization. By way of comparison, al-Qaeda and Hizballah have developed an exclusively internalized altruistic comportment manifested by way of indiscriminately killing
innocent people for the greater good of their organization. ETA, however, extends their altruistic comportment outside of their organization. The chief manifestation of this extension is displayed by way of issuing warnings for imminent bombings. In consideration of these facts, it is apparent that ETA fails to conform to block 4 of the triadic process constituting the chief causal factors leading to the establishment of a suicidal terrorism campaign.

The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was formed in 1969 as a secretive armed branch of the legitimate Sinn Fein movement. Their chief objective is to expel British forces from Northern Ireland, create a Marxist state, and promote Roman Catholic religiosity. The Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism (2002) noted the following:

Since Northern Ireland separated from the Irish Republic when the latter gained its independents in 1921, the Roman Catholic minority in Northern Ireland has protested discrimination by the Protestant controlled Government and has agitated for unification in both violent and nonviolent campaigns. (p. 56)

The modern IRA is likely composed of operational members numbering in the hundreds and sympathizers numbering in the thousands. “Its traditional activities have included bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, punishment beatings, extortion, smuggling, and robbery” (Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, 2002, p. 121). This terrorist organization is not known to employ suicidal tactics. The IRA has historically received funding and material support from Libya. Some U.S. citizens are suspected of generating funding for the organization. The Irish
Republican Army has recently agreed to cease violent activity and pursue their goals through peaceful means to the extent that they have signed a formal agreement with governmental officials and conducted limited disarmament. However, the group retains the potential to conduct future terrorist attacks.

The Irish Republican Army meets the criteria specified in block 3 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism but fails to adhere to the criteria outlined in blocks 4 and 5. Block 3 is composed of precipitating factors such as a desire for expulsion and a perceived religious asymmetry. The IRA strongly desired to expel British forces from Northern Ireland. They constitute a Roman Catholic religious minority and believed the Protestant majority has oppressed them. This situation is fitting of the standards for a perceived religious asymmetry. Thus, the organization fits block 3 of the model. Block 4 requires the members of terrorist organizations to experience specific socialization favoring martyrdom. The IRA membership lacks this specific type of socialization. In fact, their socialization operates in contrast with practices favoring martyrdom largely because of the profound suicide taboo associated with Roman Catholicism. Thus, the organization deviates from block 4 of the model. Block 5 stipulates the organization must believe they are capable of achieving victory. This terrorist organization initially believed they were capable of achieving their goals. However, after several decades of violence and a failure to achieve governmental concessions, they decreased the intensity of their violence in pursuit of a more peaceful means of advancing their goals. The organization experienced a turning point in 1998 when they officially declared an end to
casualty-producing violence. This turning point was a manifestation of a new organizational philosophy that maintained that victory was not achievable through violence. Accordingly, the factor represented by block 5 is not applicable to the IRA. The Irish Republican Army’s failure to adopt suicidal tactics is attributed to a deviation from blocks 4 and 5 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) are the most well known terrorist organization in South America. They are composed of approximately 10,000 operational terrorists. “Established in 1964 as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party, the FARC is Colombia’s oldest, largest, most capable, and best-equipped Marxist insurgency” (Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, 2002, p. 107). Their primary goals are to establish a communist government in Colombia and eliminate U.S. influence in the region. They primarily generate funding from robbery, kidnapping, extortion, and drug trafficking. “The FARC has a closer relationship with Colombian narcotics traffickers than do other Colombian insurgent groups” (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, 2002, p. 103). They frequently target tourists including U.S. citizens for kidnapping and subsequent acquisition of ransoms. They employ non-suicidal terrorist tactics in their endeavor to achieve victory.

The organizational philosophy of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia adheres to block 5, of the causal model for suicidal terrorism, but fails to encompass the factors described in blocks 3 and 4. Block 5 mandates that the terrorist organization must believe they can achieve success. This organization’s positive philosophy of attainable concessions is manifested in their commitment,
growth, and continuation of terrorist actions directed toward establishing a Marxist state. Given the longevity of the organization, they would have likely abandoned their cause if they believed their actions were not worthwhile. Accordingly, they reasonably fit the criteria outlined in block 5. Block 3 maintains that the desires for expulsion and/or perceived religious asymmetry are necessary preconditions for establishing suicidal terrorist tactics. The FARC certainly desires to expel the democratic government of Colombia and U.S. influence from the region. However, they are not operating from a substantial perception of religious asymmetry. Their operations are predominantly exclusive to Columbia. The overwhelming majority of Colombians practice Catholicism. Thus, they are not actively engaged in a conflict with a societal entity boasting a differing religious stance. Accordingly, their organization fails to meet the complete criteria for block 3 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism because the model mandates that both a desire for expulsion and a religious asymmetry must be present to constitute a precipitation of ideology directed toward embracing martyrdom operations. Block 4 of the triadic process of causation stipulates that terrorists must undergo specific socialization directed toward embracing suicidal tactics. These particular socialization practices do not occur within Colombian society. The lack of socialization supporting martyrdom is likely attributed to the Catholic taboo associated with suicide. Accordingly, the FARC fails to encompass the factor represented by block 4. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia’s failure to engage in suicidal terrorism is attributed to a deviation from blocks 3 and 4 of the presented model of causation.
“The Shining Path is a highly active and violent terrorist/insurgent group that claims a neo-Maoist orientation” (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, 2002, p. 106). This organization was founded by university professor Abimael Guzman in 1969 and began to launch violent terrorist operations beginning in 1980. The group’s native name is Sendero Luminoso and is often abbreviated as SL. Their overall goal is to evoke a proletariat uprising to overthrow the government and establish a communist state. The Shining Path membership is primarily operational within rural areas. They identify strongly with native Peruvian beliefs to the extent that they often mutilate their victims in a way consistent with native principles. “This feature of the SL operations is partly a reflection of an Indian belief that an unmutilated victim’s spirit can reveal its killer, and it also magnifies the terror effect of the killings” (The Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, 2002, p. 108). They are exclusively active within Peru and typically target governmental officials, foreigners, and Peruvian citizens who oppose their organization. They are directly responsible for attacks on the United States, Soviet, and Indian embassies during the 1980’s. The organization was composed of roughly 10,000 members during its peak. However, recent arrests and governmental counterterrorism strategies have greatly reduced the group’s membership and operational capability. The current membership numbers in the low to mid hundreds. They generate funding largely through drug trafficking, extortion, and robbery. They have not conducted suicidal terrorist operations.
The organizational philosophy of the Shining Path adheres to block 3 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism but fails to encompass the factors described in blocks 4 and 5. Block 3 specifies that terrorist organizations must experience precipitating factors to include a desire for expulsion and a perceived religious asymmetry/cultural threat as a precondition for establishing suicidal tactics. They fervently desire to expel the Peruvian government in an effort to establish a Marxist society. They also operate from a low intensity religious asymmetry/cultural threat. Religious asymmetry is apparent within the context of native beliefs. It is manifested by way of ritualistic mutation running contrary to Catholicism which is the primary religion associated with Peru. The religious strife was especially apparent considering the group’s terrorist acts against Christian entities. The Shining Path set a Christian church ablaze in August of 1984. They also stole food from a church in February of 1986 and threatened to execute a priest. A diminutive cultural threat is present due to the encroachment and/or expansion of modern Peruvian society into rural areas. Accordingly, the Shining Path meets the criteria described in block 3 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism. However, the criteria outlined within blocks 4 and 5 are not applicable to this particular terrorist organization. Block 4 requires terrorists to experience specific socialization directed toward establishing social acceptance for martyrdom. No such socialization occurs in Peru. Most of the urban population practices Catholicism, therefore, Peruvian society at large maintains a strong suicide taboo. The criteria noted in block 4 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism is not applicable to the Peruvian terrorists associated with the Shining
Path. Block 5 maintains that the members of terrorist organizations must believe they can win before they resort to suicidal tactics. Although the Shining Path was once a strong and determined organization consisting of thousands of members, recent events have eroded much of the group’s capabilities and morale. Most notably, Abimael Guzman was captured and imprisoned in 1992 and quickly called for a ceasefire. The Shining Path moderately observed his request and subsequently began to fragment. The organization’s loss of key leadership, extensive counterterrorism operations, and a sharp decline in membership suggests that the organization is on the verge of collapsing. In consideration of these facts, the organizational membership likely maintains a very low level of optimism. Thus, the Shining Path fails to meet the criteria specified in block 5 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism. Their failure to adopt suicidal terrorist tactics is attributed to the deviation from blocks 4 and 5 of the model.

Testing the validity of the causal model for suicidal terrorism required an analysis of terrorist organizations that do not use suicidal tactics. The presented model focuses on the triadic process that leads to the implementation of suicidal tactics. The triadic process constitutes blocks 3, 4, and 5 of the model. The factors described in each block of the triadic process must exist before terrorists resort to conducting suicide missions. The absence of any factor of the triadic process will result in a failure of the terrorist organization to make use of tactics involving martyrdom. Block 3 refers to specific precipitating factors such as a desire for expulsion, a perceived religious asymmetry, and/or a perceived cultural threat. Block 4 encompasses socialization practices purposely directed toward
encouragement and social acceptance for martyrdom. Block 5 refers to the presence of a perception that the terrorists can eventually win. This chapter’s analysis focused on five high-profile terrorist organizations that do not employ suicidal tactics. None of the examined organizations adhere to the complete criteria outlined by the triadic process of causation because each of the noted terrorist organizations deviated from at least one block of the model. All of the examined organizations deviated from block 4. This uniform deviation suggests that socialization is the most dominant factor within the triadic process.
Chapter 7: Conclusions

This research project examines the sociological factors that give rise to suicidal terrorism. These factors constitute a 6-block model of causation. Block 1 represents the process by which a social entity develops a grievance against a government. Block 2 represents the social entity’s decision to form a terrorist organization. Much of this project examines the factors that causally account for an organization’s decision to employ suicidal tactics. Terrorist organizations follow a triadic process that causally accounts for the implementation of suicidal tactics. The triadic process consists of blocks 3, 4, and 5. The factors outlined in each stage of the triadic process must be manifested in concert before terrorist organizations make use of suicidal tactics. Failure to meet any part of the triadic process will result in a failure to adopt suicidal tactics. Block 3 refers to specific precipitating factors that include a desire for expulsion, a perceived religious asymmetry, and/or a perceived cultural threat. Block 4 represents the specific kinds of socialization practices that lead to martyrdom. Block 5 refers to the institution of an internal group notion that the terrorists can win. Block 6 represents the actual adoption of suicidal terrorist tactics. Figure 1 visually illustrated the model of causation.

Ten terrorist organizations, known to employ suicidal tactics, were selected for this study. The overwhelming majority of suicidal terrorist attacks are attributed to these ten organizations. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 confirmed the presence of factors outlined by the triadic process of causation. None of the
examined terrorist organizations known to employ suicidal tactics deviate from any part of the model.

Chapter 3 showed that key factors serve to precipitate the terrorist organizations decision to implement suicidal tactics. Terrorist organizations must experience two key precipitating factors as a precondition for implementing suicidal tactics. First, the membership must desire to expel a social entity from a defined geographic area. Second, the membership must perceive that their religious beliefs are asymmetrically aligned with the entity that they desire to expel or that the entity poses a substantial cultural threat to the terrorist’s community. Each of the examined terrorist organizations, known to employ suicidal tactics, experienced the two key precipitating factors outlined in block 3 of the triadic causal process.

Chapter 4 demonstrated that members of the selected organizations, as well as many community members at large, undergo specific socialization that encourages martyrdom. Primary examples of this type of socialization include sacrificial myths, glorification, public praise of suicide operations, and overt parental admiration of offspring who carried out suicidal missions. The social characteristics reflected by the members of the 10 terrorist organizations fit the criteria outlined in block 4.

Chapter 5 revealed that the ten examined organizations, which employ suicidal tactics, believe they can achieve victory. An organizational philosophy encompassing this belief is a necessary precondition for establishing suicidal tactics. Many terrorist organizations are emboldened by historic concessions.
Several terrorist organizations believe victory is mandated through a divine order as interpreted by subscribers to radical Islamic fundamentalism. This study systematically confirmed that the members constituting each of the ten noted terrorist organizations believe they can win. The causal criterion outlined in block 5 of the triadic process exists within all of the examined terrorist organizations employing suicidal tactics.

Testing the validity of the causal model required an analysis of terrorist organizations that do not employ suicidal tactics. Chapter 6 examined five major terrorist organizations of this nature. Each of the five organizations deviated from at least one part of the triadic process. The factor of socialization (block 4) was uniformly absent within the context of terrorist organizations not employing suicidal tactics. These discoveries lend credibility to the causal model for suicidal terrorism.

This study found that 3 factors causally account for the establishment of suicidal tactics within the context of terrorism. First, the members of terrorist organizations must desire an expulsion and operate from a perceived religious asymmetry or cultural threat. Second, terrorists must experience socialization conducive to martyrdom. Third, terrorists must believe they can win. This trio of factors, manifested in concert, causally accounts for the implementation of suicidal tactics by terrorist organizations.

Pape (2005) concluded, “that national resistance to a foreign occupation, a democratic political system in the occupying power, and a religious difference between the occupied and occupying societies are the main causal factors
leading to the rise of suicide terrorist campaigns” (p. 126). The conclusions of this study are very similar to Pape’s conclusions. However, several key differences exist. Pape focused on nationalism as the primary causal factor for suicidal terrorism (Pape, 2005, p. 101). This body of work concludes that socialization is the most important causal factor. Nationalism is a product of socialization. Thus, socialization is a more proximal cause than nationalism. However, socialization as a singular factor is not sufficient. Terrorist organizations must also be exposed to precipitating factors (block 3) and they must believe they can win before they decide to conduct martyrdom operations.

Given a positive identification of the primary causes of suicidal terrorism, it is important to examine theoretical strategies directed toward eliminating this phenomenon. This body of work has made use of a block system. Each block represents specific causal factors that give rise to an organization’s decision to perpetrate suicidal terrorism. Eliminating suicidal terrorism can be accomplished by systematically eliminating, or decreasing the magnitude of, the underlying factors described in each block.

Two major strategies for suppression, antiterrorism and counterterrorism tactics, account for governmental efforts to eradicate, thwart, undermine, or prevent terrorist activity. “Antiterrorism refers to defensive efforts to reduce the vulnerability of targets to terrorist attacks and to lessen the effects of terrorist attacks that do occur” (Snow, 2007, p. 295). An example of an antiterrorism tactic is the use of barricades around federal buildings. The barricades can create a perception among terrorists that a facility is a hard target. Barricades can also
minimize the effectiveness of a car bomb by denying a vehicle the ability to come within close proximity to a facility. “The other form of terrorist suppression is *counterterrorism*, offensive and military measures against terrorists or sponsoring agencies to prevent, deter, or respond to terrorist acts” (Snow, 2007, p. 296).

Counterterrorism efforts seek to directly combat individual terrorists and terrorist organizations. An example, of a counterterrorism tactic, is an air strike on an operational terrorist training facility. Antiterrorism and counterterrorism tactics will continue to play a critical role in suppressing terrorism. An additional strategy, proposed in this body of work, is to manipulate aspects of social life in a manner that will eliminate or reduce the causal factors that produce suicidal terrorism.

Block 1 refers to a social entity that establishes grievances against a government. The establishment of grievances is a precondition for establishing a terrorist organization. Common grievances include disapproval of a governmental system, dissent regarding the distribution of wealth, a desire to establish a new state, a desire to expel an unwanted group, and a perceived cultural threat. The latter two factors serve to precipitate a group’s willingness to conduct martyrdom missions after they have established a terrorist organization. Brokering good governmental policies can minimize the intensity of such grievances. Many groups favor one type of government over another. Several terrorist organizations desire for capitalist governments to adopt Marxist systems. They do not simply desire to adopt Marxism for the sake of Marxism. Rather, they believe that a shift in a government’s typology will benefit the proletariat. This perspective requires a grievance rooted in the welfare of the proletariat. Many of
these types of grievances focus on a massively unequal distribution of wealth within a capitalist society. For example, a select few individuals possess large amounts of capital and live lavish lifestyles while a large amount of other people are very poor and barely manage to subsist within the context of a capitalist society. The primary grievance, against capitalism, is rooted in the extreme monetary dichotomy between classes. Capitalist governments can minimize such grievances by encouraging a less polarized distribution of wealth and expanding the middle class. Providing food and basic health care, to citizens who are incapable of generating enough capital to subsist, would go a long way to minimize the socialist grievances against capitalism. Many groups desire to establish their own separate country. Nationalist movements usually involve grassroots support and a well-defined cultural group. Their nationalist desires are often the product of perceived or actual suppression by another cultural group or governmental entity. This type of grievance can be minimized, in some cases, by granting autonomy or enhancing the conditions of an existing autonomy. Governments can also encourage disgruntled ethnic/cultural groups by promoting the transmission of peaceful cultural practices such as fine arts. Specific governmental programs can expand the transmission of such arts to the extent that the disgruntled ethnic/cultural entities may feel more included in a given social system. These types of actions, occurring in unison, can minimize the intensity of key grievances represented by Block 1 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism. Peacefully reducing the magnitude of these kinds of grievances will help prevent the establishment of terrorist organizations.
Block 2 refers to the point in which a group establishes a terrorist organization. Not every terrorist organization will employ suicidal tactics. However, history has demonstrated that terrorist organizations are capable of causing mass destruction by means of a plethora of tactics. The national security of the United States, and other nations, is clearly threatened by terrorism. This threat should be jointly combated by vigilant multinational cooperation, military action, and law enforcement. Counterterrorism and antiterrorism strategies will play a vital role in undermining terrorist activities.

Tracking terrorist organizations is of paramount importance. Several different nations often secretly hold critical pieces to a grand puzzle of terrorist activity. Members of the United Nations should participate in sharing intelligence information regarding terrorism. Such intelligence should specifically include information regarding the operational plans, capabilities, and movements of known terrorists. Sharing key information, in a cooperative manner, can lead to a heightened sense of mutual respect between countries. The act of sharing intelligence could be viewed as a peaceful, respectful, and productive international gesture. The information itself could easily save lives.

Military action is also a key feature of combating terrorists. However, it must be employed properly because the consequences of misuse can easily outweigh the benefits. The United States has adopted a policy of denying safe haven to terrorists. This policy is wholly warranted and has demonstrated effectiveness within Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda currently lacks the ability to operate overt large-scale terrorist training camps within Afghanistan. The U.S. military
should continue to seek and destroy terrorists throughout the world. However, most military actions against terrorists should make use of a minimum amount of military personnel and employ covert actions. A small number of highly elite military units are extraordinarily well equipped, trained, and operationally capable of seeking and destroying most foreign terrorist organizations. These assets should be quietly employed instead of massive invasions by conventional forces.

The misuse of military force can create monumental problems related to terrorism and regional stability. “If Islamic militants needed another reason to hate the United States, they found it on March 20, 2003, when American planes began bombing Baghdad” (Davis, 2004, p. 204). President George W. Bush and his narrowing band of supporters have caused a major crisis in the Middle East by launching the unwarranted invasion of Iraq. The initial justification, as noted by the President, was rooted in a strategic need to eradicate weapons of mass destruction. The invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq resulted in the official U.S. governmental judgment that such weapons were non-existent during the onset of the military action. This strategic blunder is causally responsible for a monumental loss of life, large-scale emergence of terrorism, refugee crisis, civil war, regional instability, and an unnecessary expenditure of trillions of dollars.

Given the consequences associated with deploying large amounts of United States military personnel to the region, future strategies should rely on vastly smaller elite strike forces that can achieve rapid results when specifically combating terrorists. Moreover, American citizens should never accept a war policy without examining supporting evidence or lack thereof. United States
military action within Iraq is seen as an act of conquest by much of the Muslim world. “And it is not just militant Islamists who hold this view; rather, people all over the Muslim world are expressing such thoughts” (Davis, 2004, p. 119). It matters not if the perception is accurate. If a substantial group of Muslims believe that the U.S. is operating as imperialistic conquerors, then they will act in accord with their beliefs. The U.S. involvement in Iraq is causally responsible for the emergence of disruptive social actors manifested by way of the Sunni insurgency, Shiite insurgency, and al-Qaeda in Iraq. The United States can avoid much of the perception of imperialism by withdrawing most military personnel from Iraq and steadfastly avoiding any unnecessary large-scale military action abroad. United States foreign policy should focus on eliminating the perception of imperialism because avoiding such perceptions will help quell terrorist sentiments.

Law enforcement agencies of all countries have an inherent responsibility to thwart terrorist activities within their particular areas of operation. These agencies should develop specific units directed toward counterterrorism activities. Moreover, law enforcement entities should model the post 9/11 examples, set by the United States, in which intelligence is shared between governmental agencies. The shared information can better facilitate a comprehensive identification of operational threats and serve to counter such threats. Law enforcement agencies should work together to oppose the threat of terrorism.
Block 3 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism encompasses precipitating factors. These factors include a desire for expulsion, perceived religious asymmetry, and/or a perceived cultural threat. The implementation of carefully crafted strategies can eliminate, or minimize the magnitude of, these factors.

The desire for expulsion is a very important factor that is causally related to the emergence of terrorist groups in general and suicidal terrorism in particular. Many terrorist organizations seek to expel military forces from geographic areas they consider sacred or native. Al-Qaeda, for example, wishes to expel United States military personnel from the Middle East. The United States can minimize the magnitude of this key grievance by substantially decreasing the numbers of troops in the region. The presence of over 100,000 United States military personnel, within Iraq, has exacerbated al-Qaeda’s desire for expulsion to the extent that they now recruiting a vast array of militant organizations that carry out terrorist operations against the U.S. The results of efforts in Iraq differ sharply from results in Afghanistan. Much of the success in Afghanistan is attributed to the largely covert actions of the United States Special Forces, Central Intelligence Agency, and other elite entities. Elite soldiers, armed with an understanding of the host culture, often operate in very small groups. They frequently secure the trust and cooperation from tribal entities to the extent of conducting joint operations with a host culture component. This strategy minimizes the amount of military forces on the ground and minimizes the desire for expulsion. Moreover, most Special Forces operators conduct missions while
fully clad in local civilian attire. This strategy minimizes the host nation’s perception of the presence of foreign military activity. The lack of outright awareness of a military presence prevents groups from desiring to expel the forces. Special Forces tactics are minimally intrusive and maximally effective. These types of tactics should be employed in Iraq instead of conventional military activity involving large numbers of conventional military personnel. Removing the overwhelming majority of military personnel from Iraq will greatly reduce the magnitude of the grievance associated with a desire for expulsion. The inherent danger of this course of action is that a withdrawal could easily become viewed as a concession to terrorists. Thus, any substantial withdrawal should be accompanied by a massive propaganda campaign directed toward fostering a public perception of victory throughout the world community. This type of propaganda campaign could, in effect, serve as a damage control mechanism.

Conventional U.S. military forces have recently started to employ civilian anthropologists and social scientists in an attempt to develop better relations between host nation entities and military personnel. These academic contributors, combined with military personnel, are known as Human Terrain Teams. They focus on understanding the subtleties of host cultures and brokering good relations. This strategy is proving effective, especially in Afghanistan, although it is also being implemented in Iraq. Commanders have reported a decrease in combat activity and they directly attribute the decrease to actions involving the Human Terrain Teams. Fostering a better working relationship between military forces and host nations will help eliminate or reduce
the grievances associated with block 3 of the causal model. Using Human Terrain Teams is an excellent short-term strategy. However, an overall reduction in troop levels will likely demonstrate greater long-term effectiveness.

The perception of religious asymmetry is another important factor that is causally related to the materialization of terrorist organizations in general and suicidal terrorism in particular. Many religious extremists, particularly among subscribers to radical Islamic fundamentalist beliefs, foster a dichotomist philosophy insofar as any given person is either for or against a particular set of radical beliefs. This dichotomous belief system is very much a matter of perception. Terrorists define their situational comportment as dichotomous and live with the consequences of their definition. “The initial definition of the situation which has set the circle in motion must be abandoned” (Merton, 1967, p. 424). Persuading terrorists to abandon their definition of the situation will be a very long and difficult task. Encouraging tolerance, diversity, liberalism, and multiculturalism can gradually minimize the extent of such dichotomous beliefs. Moderate Muslims can help the situation by discouraging radical behavior and launching an intellectual campaign directed toward promoting peaceful resolution to conflict.

Block 4 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism accounts for specific socialization mechanisms that give rise to the establishment of martyrdom. These mechanisms also serve to legitimate suicidal terrorism and render such behavior socially acceptable. Eliminating the socialization mechanisms will require a substantial change in the host cultures that exhibit the noted forms of
socialization. Governments and citizens who perpetuate such mechanisms must undergo a radical change in perception that is directed toward establishing peace. Although cultural changes are necessary, they will be monumentally difficult to implement. An overt strategy, directed toward fundamentally changing a culture, can easily be perceived as a threat to the host culture. Thus, highly clandestine and secretive strategies should be employed to circumvent or minimize a perception of a cultural threat.

A plethora of martyrdom-friendly socialization mechanisms occur via electronic media. Many terrorist organizations operate web pages that seek to recruit members, glorify martyrdom, and rally support for future terrorist activity. Television programming, particularly brokered by Palestinians and al-Jazeera, is a significant transmission mechanism for socialization. Many individuals are influenced and emboldened by the last words of suicide bombers and speeches by figures such as Usama bin Laden. Many governmental intelligence agencies, especially those serving the United States and Israel, have the capability to sabotage the electronic transmission of terrorist propaganda. These agencies should employ highly clandestine and subversive tactics to electronically infiltrate and render these media sources inoperable. Such tactics should remain highly classified as to eliminate or minimize the host culture’s perception of aggression. A significant clandestine campaign, directed toward denying terrorists the opportunity to transmit propaganda that serves to socialize individuals into adopting suicidal tactics, will reduce the magnitude of the causal factor outlined in block 4.
A portion of the monetary funding, associated with the survival of Palestinian television programming, comes from international aid. The reduction or elimination of such funding would have a dramatic effect on their ability to sustain media operations. International aid organizations should substantially reduce or eliminate monetary assistance directed toward Palestinians. The reduction of capital could be offset by providing material aide in the form of food, medical supplies, and other staples of humanitarian relief. The reduction, or outright elimination, of capital would reduce or eliminate their ability to transmit terrorist propaganda. This, in turn, will eliminate a portion of the socialization associated with the glorification and social acceptance of suicidal terrorism.

External actions to radically change the socialization mechanisms of host cultures can only reduce the problem. It is imperative for the culture(s) in question to internally implement changes directed toward eliminating the socialization mechanisms associated with the glorification and social acceptance of suicidal terrorism. Other governments can encourage productive behavior but the host culture(s) will have the final decision in the matter. Accordingly, peaceful encouragement and cross-cultural transmission can provoke host cultures to internally decide to abandon violent terrorist activities.

The best tools for provoking meaningful changes are education, employment, and communication. Education serves as a critical socialization practice. Children are heavily influenced by their educational systems. Many educational systems within problem areas are under-funded, substandard, or even non-existent. International aid can help facilitate better systems, with the
requirement that any funded system must promote peace and specifically discourage terrorist friendly socialization. The international community can also improve the situation by promoting programs directed toward relief services and transmission of multicultural ideas.

The globalization of communication, tempered by clandestine efforts to thwart terrorist communications, can serve to reduce terrorist sentiments by way of cross-cultural transmission. Such transmission was limited, in previous centuries, to human contact and physical dissemination of literary material. Modern technology, combined with increased literacy, has resulted in the ability to transmit cultural ideas on a global scale. The receivers of cross-cultural transmission often make use of the television, Internet, telephones, and radio. The exposure to outside influences can open the door for alternative ways of thought. Many members of terrorist organizations especially within historical Palestine, Pakistan, and Afghanistan receive a one sided account of history through propaganda. A dramatic exposure to other perspectives could sway public opinion, in the noted areas, toward adopting perspectives commensurate with establishing peaceful resolutions to conflict. Accordingly, governmental agencies should develop programs directed toward transmitting messages associated with peace and nonviolent conflict resolution.

Block 5 of the causal model for suicidal terrorism refers to terrorist organizations adopting a perception of achievable victory. A large reason for why they believe winning is possible is rooted in historic concessions. Failing to grant concessions and reducing the magnitude of any perceived concession can
significantly undermine this causal factor. The United States and other world powers should jointly deny concessions to terrorist organizations. All nations should refuse to negotiate with terrorists, deny terrorist motivated prisoner releases, and respond to terrorist attacks with shattering force. These actions can deny terrorist organizations coercive power and diminish their internal perception of authority. Some actions, despite the best of efforts, will be viewed as concessions. Propaganda campaigns can help diminish the perception of concessions relative to governmental actions.

This body of research has presented a causal model for suicidal terrorism. Terrorist organizations follow a triadic process that accounts for their decision to employ suicidal tactics. This causal process (outlined in Figure 1) focuses on blocks 3, 4, and 5. The factors outlined in each block are necessary and sufficient for causation when occurring in unison. Block 3 refers to explicit precipitating factors that include a desire for expulsion, a perceived religious asymmetry, and/or a perceived cultural threat. Block 4 represents the presence of specific socialization practices that directly glorify martyrdom and render it socially acceptable within the context of a terrorist community. Block 5 refers to the establishment of an internal group perception that they can achieve victory. Suicidal terrorism can be substantially reduced or eliminated by undermining the causal factors. Future strategic objectives should include a considerable decrease in the number of United States military personnel operating in the Middle East, amplified dependence on elite counterterrorism assets, vigilant antiterrorism measures, and sabotaging the transmission of terrorist propaganda.
Appendix: Selected Chronology of Suicidal Terrorist Attacks

This appendix seeks to inform the reader of the history and scope of suicidal attacks throughout the world. The chronology begins in 1906 and ends in 2007. This list is in no way exhaustive, however, it is a representation of notable suicidal attacks and includes key historical events that served to shape the perspectives and policies regarding terrorism. Understanding the history and scope of suicidal terrorism will better enable the reader to develop solutions for one of the greatest problems facing global security.

August 25, 1906: A terrorist incident occurred in St. Petersburg, Russia. “Two Socialist Revolutionaries disguised as police officers brought a powerful dynamite bomb hidden in a large, ornate vase into the villa of newly appointed Prime Minister Pytor A. Stolypin, where a reception was underway” (Mattox, 2004, p. 17). The bomb detonated killing over thirty people and injuring over 30 others. The Prime Minister survived the attack but his teenage daughter died and his 3-year-old son sustained injuries. Two accomplices were captured outside of the villa and were immediately incarcerated.

March 5, 1975: Eight terrorist, belonging to the PLO, entered the Savoy Hotel, located in Tel Aviv, Israel. They took multiple hostages, secured themselves on the highest floor, and attempted to negotiate the release of fellow terrorists who were in Israeli custody. Negotiations failed and Israeli forces launched a rescue mission during which 3 soldiers died and several hostages’ sustained injuries. “The terrorists retreated to a room and blew themselves up when commandos broke in” (Mattox, 2004, p. 91). Eight hostages died as a
One terrorist survived and stated, during a subsequent interrogation, that the attack was directed toward disrupting political talks between Egypt and Israel.


November 11, 1982: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Tyre, Lebanon. The perpetrator employed a truck bomb to target an Israeli Military facility. The blast resulted in the death of more than 70 people to include a large number of Israeli military personnel. “The Palestinian group Hizballah claims responsibility for the attack” (Maxwell, 2003, p. 447).

April 18, 1983: Beirut, Lebanon was the location of one of the first suicidal terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens. “Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for a suicide truck bomb attack on the U.S. embassy” (Mattox, 2004, p. 109). A stolen truck was equipped with a 400-pound explosive device that shattered the embassy killing 63 people of Lebanese and American nationality. Over a hundred others were wounded.

October 23, 1983: A suicidal terrorist drove a truck, equipped with over two thousand pounds of explosives, into a U.S. Marine facility in Beirut, Lebanon. “At 6:20 a.m., the explosives laden vehicle crashed through a wrought-iron plate, hitting the sand-bagged guard post, smashing through another barrier, and ramming over a wall of sandbags into the lobby, exploding with terrific force” (Mattox, 2004, p. 110). More than 200 U.S. Marines were killed as a result of the
explosion. The military facility was part of an international airport and included Marine barracks. “Less than two minutes after the initial attack, another suicidal truck bomber with 600 pounds of TNT plowed into a French paratrooper barracks two miles north and collapsed the building with its blast” (Mattox, 2004, p. 110). A total of 58 French soldiers died as a result of the attack. U.S. and French forces composed part of a peacekeeping force during the time of the incident. This incident prompted a withdraw of U.S. military forces in February of 1984. This withdraw was viewed as a great success for terrorists who aimed to dislodge the U.S. presence. This single incident rallied the terrorist community and demonstrated that suicidal terrorism can impact foreign policy. Hizballah was responsible for the attack.

December 12, 1983: Terrorist struck Kuwait City, Kuwait. Suicidal terrorist detonated a car bomb within close proximity to the U.S. Embassy. At least six people died and many others were wounded. A series of smaller attacks occurred throughout the country targeting U.S. interest, an oil facility, an airport, and other government offices. “Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility” (Mattox, 2004, p. 111).

September 20, 1984: A suicidal terrorist detonated a truck bomb on the site of a U.S. embassy annex located in Aukar, Lebanon. At least sixteen people were killed and a British ambassador was wounded. Over 50 people sustained injuries. “The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility” (Mattox, 2004, p. 112).

April 20, 1985: A suicidal terrorist attack was conducted in Aoun, Lebanon. A teenaged female militant leader orchestrated an attack against Israeli Defense
Forces. Loula Abboud and a small assembly of her supporters ambushed a group of Israeli soldiers. She subsequently became surrounded by IDF soldiers and detonated a bomb when they came within striking distance. She killed herself in an effort to kill others.

May 25, 1985: A terrorist attack occurred in Kuwait City, Kuwait. “The emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah, escaped death at the hands of a suicide car bomber” (Mattox, 2004, p. 115). The terrorist drove a car, equipped with explosives, into the sheikh’s motorcade. The ensuing explosion reportedly resulted in the death of two of the sheikh’s bodyguards, one innocent bystander, and the perpetrator. The perpetrator was a member of the Islamic Jihad.

May 21, 1991: A suicide bomber struck a political rally in Chennai, India. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam orchestrated this deadly and politically charged attack. A young Sri Lankan female infiltrated a rally where former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was present. She approached Gandhi, knelt at his feet, offered flowers, and then detonated her explosives laden belt. Gandhi died instantly. “Eighteen additional people including the bomber were killed in the blast and thirty-three injured; policeman made up less than half of both totals” (Mattox, 2004, p. 126). Gandhi was targeted, in part, because he ordered government forces to stop an uprising of the Tamil Tigers during his time in office. Investigations revealed that the attack was well planned and aided by over a dozen members of the terrorist group. Several successful prosecutions followed and at least 4 conspirators received a death sentence. “The two alleged masterminds of the plot, Sivarasan and Peria Santham, died in India in
confrontations with Indian police later that year, either in shoot outs or as suicides” (Mattox, 2004, p. 126).

May 1, 1993: President Ranasinghe Premadasa was assassinated by means of a suicide bombing in Colombo, Sri Lanka. A young girl rode a bicycle, equipped with explosives, into the presidential motorcade. “The authorities immediately suspected Tamil Tiger (LTTE) complicity and arrested forty people, mostly Tamils” (Mattox, 2004, p. 129). The subsequent investigation was inconclusive and evidence, supporting a conviction, was lacking.

October 19, 1994: A terrorist attack transpired in Tel Aviv, Israel. “A Hamas suicide bomber killed twenty-two civilians and injured forty-seven when he set off his explosives on a passenger bus in the center of the city” (Mattox, 2004, p. 132).

April 9, 1995: The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack in the Gaza Strip, Palestine. “A suicide bomber crashed an explosive-laden van into an Israeli bus, killing eight people” (Mattox, 2004, p. 133). Numerous others were injured.

August 31, 1995: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Chandigarh, India. The perpetrator targeted a political figure named Beant Singh. Pape (2005) noted the following:

The attack killed Minister Singh, fifteen of his security guards and aides, and the bomber himself, identified as Dilawar Singh, a young man in his early twenties who had left a note to his accomplices saying that his act was “in memory of the martyrs.” (p. 154)
The terrorist group known as Babbar Khalsa International was responsible for the attack.

November 19, 1995: Multiple Islamic militant groups claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack in Islamabad, Pakistan. “A suicide truck bomber drove into the Egyptian embassy compound and set off an explosion that killed at least sixteen and injured sixty persons” (Mattox, 2004, p. 135).

January 31, 1996: Suicidal terrorists launched an attack in Colombo, Sri Lanka. They detonated a 400-pound truck bomb outside of a bank. “The explosion that followed brought down a large section of the bank building and killed approximately ninety civilians, injuring more than 1,400” (Mattox, 2004, p. 135). A subsequent gun battle ensued between Tami Tigers and police forces.

February 26, 1996: A terrorist attack occurred in Jerusalem, Israel. “A suicide bomber blew up a bus near the Central Station, killing twenty-six persons, most of whom were civilians, and wounding as many as eighty” (Mattox, 2004, p. 136). The attack was most likely a Hamas operation.


March 21, 1997: An attack occurred in a public area in Tel Aviv, Israel. “A suicide terrorist killed himself and four other people by setting off a bomb on the terrace of a Tel Aviv cafe” (Mattox, 2004, p. 140). The attack resulted in the injury of at least 45 people.


August 7, 1998: Al-Qaeda orchestrated dual terrorist attacks in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. “Truck bombs exploded almost simultaneously outside two U.S. embassies almost 400 miles apart, killing at least 300 people” (Mattox, 2004, p. 144). Kenyans sustained the most casualties and over 4,000 people were wounded. Reports indicated that the Kenyan blast was equal to what would be produced by more than 500 pounds of TNT. The Tanzanian blast resulted in at least eleven deaths with over eighty people wounded. Damage was inadvertently mitigated because a water truck temporarily blocked the entrance to the embassy. The United States launched cruise missiles, into terrorist training camps, located in Afghanistan, approximately two weeks after the terrorist attacks. “A U.S. federal grand jury later indicted twenty-two men in connection with the attacks, including Saudi dissident and al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden” (Mattox, 2004, p. 144).

December 18, 1999: A Suicidal terrorists attack was conducted in Colombo, Sri Lanka. “President Chandrika Kumaratunga was wounded in the eye and thirty-eight people were killed in a suicide bombers attack at an election
rally” (Mattox, 2004, p. 149). At least 50 others were wounded. The Tamil Tigers were prime suspects in the incident.

January 5, 2000: A Suicidal terrorists attack was carried out in Colombo, Sri Lanka. “At least eleven people died and twenty-nine were wounded when a suicide bomber set off an explosion near the office of Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike” (Mattox, 2004, p. 150). The Prime Minister was not in her office during the attack and was not injured. Reports indicate the perpetrator was a woman who detonated her explosives when approached by authorities.

June 8, 2000: A terrorist attack occurred in Colombo, Sri Lanka. “A suicide bomber assassinated Industry Minister C.V. Gooneratne, himself, and twenty-four others, including the minister’s wife” (Mattox, 2004, p. 151). Several other people were wounded. The assassin was likely a Tamil Tiger.

September 15, 2000: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Colombo, Sri Lanka. “A suicide bomber, thought to be a Tamil Tiger, killed himself and six others in an apparent attempt to disrupt campaigning for the following months elections” (Mattox, 2004, p. 151). Other people sustained multiple injuries. The incident occurred within close proximity to the entrance to a hospital.

October 3, 2000: A Suicidal terrorists attack was conducted in Muttur, Sri Lanka. “A Tamil Tiger suicide bomber killed a Muslim parliamentary candidate, Mohammed Baithullah, who was departing a campaign stop” (Mattox, 2004, p. 152). Several fatalities occurred and over 20 people were wounded. Baithullah had survived several assassination attempts during his career.
October 12, 2000: Al-Qaeda perpetrated a terrorist attack against a U.S. Navy ship in Aden, Yemen. Terrorists employed a small watercraft to get within close proximity to the USS Cole while it was in port. They detonated a bomb that heavily damaged the ship. “Seventeen sailors were killed and thirty-nine injured in a suicide assault that set the stage for the attack on the United States proper eleven months later” (Mattox, 2004, p. 152).

October 19, 2000: A terrorist assault occurred in Colombo, Sri Lanka. A suicidal terrorist exploded a bomb in a town hall. Four people were reported killed and over twenty others were wounded. “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were thought to be responsible” (Mattox, 2004, p. 152).


June 1, 2001: A Hamas attack occurred in Tel Aviv, Israel. The target was a fashionable nightclub. “A suicide bomber approached the establishment and abruptly set off a blast that resulted in the deaths of twenty people and injury to well over 100” (Mattox, 2004, p. 154).

August 9, 2001: A suicidal terrorist detonated a bomb in Jerusalem, Israel. A young terrorist named Izzidene al Masri targeted the Sbarro Pizzeria. “Al Masri
killed sixteen people, six of them children” (Davis, 2004, p. 99). Over 100 civilians were wounded. The perpetrator was of Palestinian identity.

September 11, 2001: Al-Qaeda orchestrated a series of well coordinated, well funded, and dramatic terrorist attacks against the United States of America. Mattox (2004) noted the following:

- Al-Qaeda operatives, numbering nineteen in all, on a suicide mission crashed two fully fueled jetliners- huge flying incendiary bombs, in effect – into the Twin Towers of New York’s World Trade Center; another jetliner crashed into the Pentagon in Washington, headquarters and nerve center of U.S. military forces. (p. 155)

A fourth jetliner, likely targeting Washington, crashed in Pennsylvania. The death toll from this series of attacks exceeded 2,950 people.

December 1, 2001: Two suicide terrorists conducted an attack in Jerusalem, Israel. They detonated bombs inside of a popular mall. At least 10 people were killed and over 100 were wounded. Hamas claimed responsibility for the bombing.

December 2, 2001: A suicide attacker struck within Haifa, Israel. A member of Hamas detonated explosives while on a bus. Approximately 15 people were killed and several more were injured.

January 27, 2002: A female terrorist conducted an operation in Jerusalem, Israel. The perpetrator detonated a concealed bomb. She killed at least 1 person and wounded about 100.
March 2, 2002: A suicide bomber conducted an operation in Jerusalem, Israel. The perpetrator, later identified as 19 year-old Mohammed Ahmed Draghmeh, targeted a crowd of people exiting a synagogue. “Ten people were killed, including an 18-month-old Jewish girl” (Davis, 2004, p. 101). Over 50 others were wounded. The perpetrator served in the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade that was a component of the Fatah terrorist organization.


March 21, 2002: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Jerusalem, Israel. The perpetrator detonated a bomb that caused the deaths of at least 3 people and wounded approximately 80. Islamic Jihad, a component of Hizballah, claimed responsibility.

March 27, 2002: A terrorist attack was performed in Netanya, Israel. The perpetrator detonated a suicide bomb inside of a popular dining facility that was a part of the Park Hotel. More than 20 people died and over 100 more were injured. “Hamas claims responsibility for the attack” (Maxwell, 2003, p. 468).

April 11, 2002: A terrorist attack occurred in Djerba, Tunisia. A terrorist employed a truck bomb, equipped with propane, to strike a synagogue. Approximately 16 people died in the explosion and several others were injured. The victims were from France, Germany, and Tunisia. A radical Islamic fundamentalist group claimed responsibility.
April 12, 2002: A female terrorist conducted an operation in Jerusalem, Israel. She detonated a bomb that killed at least 5 people and injured approximately 90 others. The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, an element of Fatah, claimed responsibility.

June 19, 2002: A suicidal terrorist struck a public area in Jerusalem, Israel. The perpetrator detonated a bomb at a bus stop. At least 5 people were killed including 2 Americans. More than 30 others were injured. The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade claimed responsibility for the attack.

July 17, 2002: Two suicidal terrorists perpetrated an attack in Tel Aviv, Israel. Members of Islamic Jihad targeted a bus station by means of explosives. The blast resulted in at least 5 fatalities and numerous injuries. Chinese and Romanian citizens were among the victims.

August 4, 2002: A terrorist attack was conducted in Safed, Israel. A suicide bomber detonated explosives on a bus. The event caused the deaths of at least 8 people including 2 Philippine citizens. Many others were wounded including several members of the Israeli military. Hamas was responsible for the attack.

September 19, 2002: A terrorist attack was conducted in Tel Aviv, Israel. A suicide bomber exploded a bomb on a bus. The incident caused the deaths of at least 6 people. Several others were wounded. Hamas was accountable for the assault.

November 21, 2002: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Jerusalem, Israel. The perpetrator detonated a bomb on a bus. The event caused the deaths
of at least 10 people and many others were wounded. A Romanian citizen was among the dead. Hamas is accredited with the attack.

November 28, 2002: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Mombasa, Kenya. Terrorists who employed a car bomb targeted a popular tourist hotel. Approximately 15 people were killed and many more were wounded. Israeli tourists were known to frequent the hotel. Additionally, a non-suicidal terrorist mission was coordinated in addition to the car bombing. Terrorists shot two shoulder-fired missiles at an aircraft destined to arrive in Israel. Fortunately, both missiles missed their target. Al-Qaeda involvement is strongly suspected.

January 5, 2003: Two suicidal terrorist attacks occurred in Tel Aviv, Israel. The perpetrators employed explosives to inflict damage on innocent people. The explosions resulted in at least 22 deaths and 100 injuries. The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade was responsible for the violence.

March 5, 2003: A terrorist operation unfolded in Haifa, Israel. A suicide bomber exploded a bomb on a bus. Approximately 15 people died from the explosion. Many others were wounded.

March 30, 2003: A suicide bombing occurred in Netanya, Israel. A terrorist detonated explosives that injured approximately 35 people. Only the perpetrator died. Islamic Jihad stated that they orchestrated the attack on behalf of the Iraqi people.

May 12, 2003: Al-Qaeda conducted a highly coordinated terrorist attack in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Several suicide bombers attacked residential compounds that housed foreign employees. Approximately 25 victims were killed during the
attacks. Citizens of the United States, United Kingdom, Philippines, Ireland, and Saudi Arabia were among the dead. Nine perpetrators also died from their suicide bombs. Subsequent investigations resulted in the identification and arrest of several suspected operatives who had links to al-Qaeda.

May 16, 2003: A series of well-coordinated terrorist attacks were orchestrated in Casablanca, Morocco. Twelve perpetrators, armed with suicide bombs, attacked 5 separate targets. A Belgian Consulate, Jewish community, Jewish cemetery, hotel, and Spanish restaurant fell victim to suicide bombings. The series of operations resulted in the death of at least 40 people, injury of over 90 others, and substantial property damage. Al-Qaeda involvement is strongly suspected.

May 18, 2003: A suicidal terrorist struck a target in Jerusalem, Israel. The perpetrator employed a suicide bomb to attack a bus. The explosion killed at least 6 people and wounded others. Hamas declared responsibility for the attack.

May 19, 2003: A female terrorist conducted an operation in Afula, Israel. She detonated a suicide bomb inside of a shopping center. The explosion killed and wounded several people. At least two separate militant Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organizations claimed responsibility for the attack.

June 11, 2003: A suicide terrorist attack occurred in Jerusalem, Israel. The assailant detonated a bomb on a bus. Approximately 16 people were killed and at least 65 were wounded. Hamas affirmed responsibility citing revenge for Israel’s attack on Hamas leader Abdelaziz al-Rantisi as motivation for the operation.
August 19, 2003: A suicide bombing occurred in Jerusalem, Israel. The terrorist targeted a bus. Approximately 20 people died from the explosion and at least 90 others were injured. Several American citizens perished in the blast. Hamas and Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the violence.

September 22, 2003: Terrorists targeted the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad, Iraq. The perpetrator detonated a car bomb. At least 1 person was killed. Several others were injured.

October 4, 2003: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Haifa, Israel. A Palestinian woman, targeting a restaurant, detonated a suicide bomb. The blast resulted in at least 15 fatalities and approximately 50 others were wounded. Islamic Jihad, a component of Hizballah, was responsible for the act.

October 12, 2003: Suicidal terrorists conducted an operation in Baghdad, Iraq. Two separate terrorists, working together, drove car bombs within close proximity to a Baghdad hotel. Both explosions resulted in a death toll of at least 5. More than 30 others were wounded. People inside of the hotel, including several American citizens, were not injured.

November 12, 2003: Suicidal terrorists detonated a bomb in Baghdad, Iraq. The perpetrators employed a vehicle borne improvised explosive device to attack an Italian military police facility. The blast killed at least 15 Italians and 11 Iraqis. Approximately 100 other people sustained injuries.

November 15, 2003: Terrorists used suicidal tactics when they launched two attacks in Istanbul, Turkey. Perpetrators detonated two truck bombs outside of two separate synagogues. The combined death toll was at least 20 with
hundreds more wounded. Numerous terrorists claimed responsibility including a Turkish militant group and several militant Islamic fundamentalist organizations. It is unclear which terrorist organization actually orchestrated the attack but al-Qaeda is among the suspects.

November 20, 2003: Terrorists conducted dual attacks in Istanbul, Turkey. The perpetrators targeted the British Consulate General and a British bank. They used truck bombs to attack their targets. The combined death toll was at least 25 and over 400 others were injured. Roger Short, a Consulate General, was killed in the attack. Al-Qaeda is strongly suspected of arranging the suicide bombings.

December 5, 2003: A deadly terrorist attack unfolded in Yessentuki, Russia. A suicidal attacker detonated an explosive on a commuter train. The explosion killed at least 40 people, injured many others, and caused substantial property damage. The Chechen Rebels are suspected of carrying out the operation. Aslan Maskhadov, a rebel leader, denied involvement.

December 9, 2003: A suicide bombing occurred in Moscow, Russia. A woman detonated a bomb targeting the National Hotel. Approximately 5 people were killed and about 20 more were sustained injuries.

December 15, 2003: A terrorist attack took place in Ameriyah, Iraq. The assailant detonated a vehicle borne improvised explosive device and targeted Iraqi police forces. Several policemen were wounded.

December 24, 2003: A terrorist attack occurred in Irbil, Iraq. A suicide car bomber attacked the Kurdish Interior Ministry. The explosion killed at least 5 people and wounded about 100.
December 25, 2003: A high profile terrorist attack was conducted in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. Two suicidal terrorist targeted president Musharraf while he was traveling via motorcade. The perpetrators detonated vehicle borne explosives that killed at least 10 people and injured more. The president was uninjured. Terrorists, who subscribe to a militant Islamic fundamentalist philosophy, are suspected of organizing and perpetrating the attack.

March 28, 2004: A female terrorist detonated a bomb in the Bukhara region of Uzbekistan. The suicide bomber targeted an apartment block. The blast resulted in several deaths and injuries.

April 21, 2004: A terrorist incident transpired in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. A suicidal terrorist used a car bomb to attack a police headquarters. The attacker may have targeted a high profile U.S. representative who was scheduled to participate in a nearby meeting close to the time of the explosion. The explosion resulted in several fatalities and over 100 injuries. The U.S. representative was not injured. Al-Qaeda is strongly suspected of organizing the attack.

May 7, 2004: A suicidal terrorist operation occurred in Karachi, Pakistan. More than 20 people were killed and over 100 sustained injuries when a terrorist detonated a bomb in a mosque.

May 22, 2004: A suicidal terrorist attempted to assassinate a political figure in Baghdad, Iraq. A suicide bomber targeted a Deputy Interior Minister who was a member of a Shiite political party. The terrorist employed a vehicle borne improvised explosive device to deliver an explosion outside of the Deputy Interior
Minister’s home. The explosion caused several deaths and injuries. The Deputy Interior Minister sustained injuries but survived the attack.

August 24, 2004: A highly coordinated dual terrorist attack occurred in Russia. Two commercial airplanes crashed as a result of suicide bombers. None of the occupants survived the crashes. The attacks are attributed to two female “Black Widows” identified as Satsita Dzhebirkhanova and Amanata Nagayeva. Both women were Chechen Rebels.

August 31, 2004: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Moscow, Russia. A female terrorist, identified as Roza Magayeva, concealed explosives as she approached a crowded subway station. She detonated her explosives outside of the entrance killing at least 10 people and injuring dozens. Magayeva was also linked to the deadly airline bombings by way of a kinship with one of the hijackers and membership in the same terrorist group. The Chechen Rebels were responsible for the attack.

September 9, 2004: A terrorist attacked the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia. A suicide bomber drove an explosives laden vehicle within close proximity to the Embassy and detonated the explosives. Several people died in the explosion and over 170 people were wounded. The Jemaah Islamiya terrorist organization, a radical Islamic fundamentalist group, was responsible for the attack.

January 20, 2005: A suicidal terrorist conducted an operation in Sheberghan, Afghanistan. The bomber targeted a religious/political leader as he
was participating in social event inside a park. The target was not injured but the blast did injure several others.

February 19, 2005: A suicide terrorist operation occurred in Baghdad, Iraq. A team of suicide bombers detonated explosives in a public area. They targeted a group of religious people who were participating in an Ashura ceremony. At least 4 people were killed and more were injured.

March 19, 2005: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Doha, Qatar. An Egyptian terrorist detonated a vehicle borne improvised explosive device as he crashed the vehicle into a theater. The blast caused several injuries and possibly one fatality in addition to property damage. The theater was likely targeted because it was popular among westerners and it was in close proximity to a British school. Several terrorist organizations, with militant Islamic fundamentalist agendas, claimed responsibility.

April 7, 2005: A suicide bombing occurred in Cairo Egypt. An engineering student, attending Zagazig University, constructed a bomb using a bag filled with TNT and nails. He detonated his device inside of a popular bazaar. The explosion resulted in several fatalities and injuries. One American and two French nationals were among the dead. A terrorist organization, boasting a militant Islamic fundamentalist agenda, claimed responsibility for the attack via an Internet posting.

April 14, 2005: A terrorist attack occurred in Mahaweel, Iraq. A suicide bomber detonated explosives in a market. The explosion produced fatalities that included a several policeman. Several others were injured.
April 30, 2005: A terrorist attack occurred in Cairo, Egypt. A suicide bomber jumped off of a bridge and detonated his explosives in mid air. The explosion injured several people, including foreign tourists, who were visiting a popular square below. This incident is connected with the attack that occurred on April 7, 2005.

May 23, 2005: A suicide terrorist struck a target in Baghdad, Iraq. The bomber used a vehicle borne improvised explosive device to kill Iraqis attending a religious service outside of the Abul-Fadi Abbas mosque. Several Shiites were killed or wounded in the attack. The Sunni Insurgency of Iraq was likely responsible for the attack.

May 7, 2005: A suicide bombing occurred in Kabul, Afghanistan. The perpetrator detonated explosives inside of an Internet cafe that was frequented by foreign nationals. The explosion killed and injured several of the occupants and caused property damage.

May 27, 2005: A suicide terrorist attack took place in Islamabad, Pakistan. The suicide bomber detonated explosives at the site of a Shiite mosque. At least 15 people were killed and approximately 100 were injured.

June 11, 2005: A terrorist conducted an attack in Baghdad, Iraq. A suicide bomber struck the Slovakian Embassy. The attack was carried out by way of a vehicle borne improvised explosive device. At least 3 people were injured in the attack. No fatalities were reported with exception to the perpetrator.

July 4, 2005: A terrorist operation took place in Bande Sardeh, Afghanistan. A suicide bomber, riding a bicycle, detonated an explosive as a car
passed. A Turkish engineer was traveling in the vehicle. The driver of the vehicle was killed.

July 7, 2005: A series of well-coordinated suicidal terrorist attacks occurred in London, England. Four suicide bombers targeted the London transportation system. They detonated explosives within 3 separate subway cars and one bus. The attack resulted in the death of over 50 innocent people. Numerous injuries and material damage was also reported. Subsequent investigations suggest that Al-Qaeda was responsible for the attack.

August 24, 2005: A suicide terrorist attack occurred in Baghdad, Iraq. The perpetrator detonated a vehicle borne improvised explosive device within close proximity to a government convoy. An Iraqi Defense Minister was targeted but not killed. Several bystanders sustained injuries from the blast.

October 1, 2005: A series of coordinated suicide bombings occurred in Bali, Indonesia. Several terrorist detonated explosives in facilities frequented by foreign tourists. At least 20 people were killed and over 100 were injured. A small number of Americans were among the wounded. The Jemaah Islamiya terrorist organization, a radical Islamic fundamentalist group, is strongly suspected of orchestrating the deadly attacks.

November 7, 2005: A suicidal terrorist attack was attempted in Lashkar Gah, Afghanistan. The attacker detonated a car bomb within close proximity to a government official. The explosion was non-casualty producing and few injuries were reported. The bomber survived however he lost all of his arms and legs. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the failed attack.
November 19, 2005: A terrorist attacked citizens in Abu Saida, Iraq. A suicide bomber employed a vehicle borne improvised explosive device to strike a Shiite funeral tent. Approximately 50 people were killed and many more were wounded. Sunni insurgents were responsible for the attack.

June 28, 2006: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Baqubah, Iraq. The perpetrator employed a vehicle borne improvised explosive device. The explosives were detonated outside of a Sunni mosque. The attack killed and wounded several civilians. Shiite insurgents are suspected of organizing the attack.

July 14, 2006: A terrorist operation took place in Abbas, Pakistan. A suicidal terrorist detonated a bomb within close proximity to the home of a Shia political leader. The blast killed the leader and one of his relatives. Several other people, including law enforcement officials, were injured.

August 6, 2006: A terrorist executed a suicide mission in Tikrit, Iraq. The perpetrator detonated a concealed bomb inside of a funeral tent. The funeral honored a relative of a local politician. At least 8 people died in the attack and several others were injured.

August 10, 2006: A suicide bomber conducted a terrorist operation in Najaf, Iraq. The perpetrator targeted a highly populated area with symbolic religious significance. The terrorist detonated a bomb within close proximity to the Imam Ali Mosque and a market. The mosque is an extremely sacred site for Shiites because it houses the tomb of Ali, who was a relative of the Prophet
Mohammad. The blast killed over 30 people and injured over 100 others. Sunni insurgents were responsible for the attack.

September 11, 2006: A terrorist attack occurred in Hisarak, Afghanistan. A teenaged terrorist detonated a suicide bomb during a funeral ceremony. The funeral was for the governor of the Paktia Province who recently died during a Taliban attack. Several civilians were killed and others were wounded during the funeral bombing.

September 18, 2006: A terrorist incident transpired in Herat, Afghanistan. A terrorist detonated explosives, concealed on his body, outside of a mosque. At least 10 people were killed and several others were injured.

October 3, 2006: A suicidal terrorist launched an attack in Baghdad, Iraq. The perpetrator detonated a bomb, concealed on his body, while walking through an outdoor market. Several civilians were killed and at least 15 people sustained injuries. The attack occurred in a mostly Sunni district of the city. Shiite insurgents are suspected of organizing the attack.

October 16, 2006: A carefully planned terrorist attack occurred in Baghdad, Iraq. A suicidal terrorist made use of a vehicle borne improvised explosive device when he targeted a Shiite funeral tent. The explosion caused numerous civilian fatalities and injuries. A subsequent explosion targeted the emergency response personnel who responded to the incident. Members of the Sunni Insurgency were responsible for the attack.

October 19, 2006: A suicidal terrorist attack transpired in Mosul, Iraq. The perpetrator drove a fuel tanker, outfitted with explosives, into a police station. The
ensuing explosion killed and injured several people including civilian bystanders. The attack caused substantial damage to the station and rendered many police vehicles inoperable.

October 31, 2006: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Andar, Afghanistan. The perpetrator detonated concealed explosives outside of a government office. One police officer was killed and another was injured. The Taliban is suspected of arranging the attack.

November 7, 2006: A terrorist incident took place in Khost, Afghanistan. A suicidal terrorist detonated explosives within close proximity to a politician’s vehicle. The perpetrator targeted the district chief of Tanai. The chief was wounded as well as his driver and bodyguards.

November 9, 2006: A suicidal terrorist targeted civilians in Baghdad, Iraq. The perpetrator detonated explosives as he drove a vehicle into a populated market. Several civilians died and others were wounded from the explosion.

November 17, 2006: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Peshawar, Pakistan. The perpetrator, later identified as Nadeem Khan, detonated explosives beside of a police van. Two police officers were injured.

November 19, 2006: A terrorist operation took place in Hillah, Iraq. The perpetrator convinced a group of job seeking citizens to gather around his car by offering them a job. Once the predominantly Shiite crowd was within close proximity to the perpetrators vehicle, he detonated a suicide bomb. The explosion resulted in the death of more than 20 civilians. At least 40 of the
survivors were wounded. Sunni insurgents were suspected of planning the attack and foreign nationals from Syria and Egypt were allegedly involved.

December 3, 2006: A terrorist attack transpired in Bannu, Pakistan. A suicide bomber detonated his explosives as police officers approached his vehicle. The incident occurred at a checkpoint. One police officer was killed and another was wounded by the blast.

December 9, 2006: A terrorist targeted a religious site in Karbala, Iraq. The perpetrator detonated a vehicle borne improvised explosive device within very close proximity of the al-Abbas shrine. The religious site is of particular importance to Shiites because it is the last resting place of Imam al-Abbas, who was a key historical leader for Shiite Muslims. Several civilians perished in the blast. Over 40 survivors sustained injuries. Sunni Insurgents were responsible for the attack.

December 12, 2006: A suicide bomber conducted an attack in Helmand, Afghanistan. The perpetrator detonated a concealed bomb inside of a political office. The governor of Helmand, who was unharmed by the blast, was the intended target. Several people died in the blast and others sustained injuries. The Taliban was responsible for the bombing.

January 6, 2007: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Ambalangoda, Sri Lanka. A woman detonated explosives, concealed on her body, while traveling on a bus. More than 10 passengers died and more were wounded. The “Black Tigers” component of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam were responsible for the attack.
July 6, 2007: A series of suicide attacks occurred throughout the Diyala province of Iraq and resulted in the death of over 40 civilians. The attacks appear to have been a coordinated effort by the Sunni insurgency. Several Shiite interests were targeted including a market that sold Iranian merchandise and a funeral tent.

July 7, 2007: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Amerli, Iraq. The perpetrator(s) detonated a truck bomb that was equipped with approximately 2 tons of explosives. The blast occurred in a populated marketplace and resulted in over 100 fatalities and a plethora of injuries. The incident occurred in the Salaheddin province and specifically targeted civilians. Kurds and Shiite Turkmens predominantly occupied the targeted area. The attack was likely orchestrated by the Sunni insurgency.

July 16, 2007: A substantial suicidal terrorist attack was conducted in Kirkuk, Iraq. A truck bomb exploded in a crowded area. More than 75 civilians were killed and over 100 were wounded. The explosion left behind a 30-foot crater and damaged a section of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s main office. Kirkuk has the potential to produce large amounts of oil and generate substantial capital. The city has served as a hub for tensions between most political, residential, and insurgent groups who operate in Iraq.

July 24, 2007: A failed suicidal attack was conducted in the Baluchistan province of Pakistan. The perpetrator, Abdullah Mehsud, detonated explosives as Pakistani security forces approached him. He succeeded in killing himself yet failed to inflict serious damage on his target. Mehsud was once incarcerated in
the U.S. operated prison facility located in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. He was released in March of 2004. Mehsud was a ranking member of the Taliban and supported Al-Qaeda operations.

July 25, 2007: Suicide bombers conducted two separate operations in Baghdad, Iraq. The first operation targeted scores of civilians who were celebrating in the street following an Iraqi soccer team victory. The bombing resulted in the death of more than 25 people and injury of at least 70. The second operation occurred within close proximity to an Iraqi army checkpoint. Terrorists employed a vehicle borne improvised explosive device that killed at least 20 and wounded about 60 people.

July 27, 2007: A suicidal terrorist operation was carried out in Islamabad, Pakistan. A suicide bomber targeted a restaurant that was in close proximity to the iconic Red Mosque. The mosque has served as the symbolic center of resistance for Pakistan’s pro U.S. president. The government had ordered a repainting of the mosque days earlier. The structure lost its red color that symbolized martyrdom. Protestors rallied against the mandated change, staged shootings, detonated roadside bombs, and engaged in the noted suicide mission as a means of expressing disapproval for the change.

August 14, 2007: A series of 4 coordinated suicide bombings were conducted in the Ninawa province of Iraq. Kurdish and Yazidi communities were targeted. The operation resulted in at least 175 fatalities and 200 injuries. Several homes were destroyed. A local political figure, equipped with Kurdish intelligence information, stated that the attacks were conducted by Al-Qaeda in Iraq.
August 22, 2007: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Baiji, Iraq. A terrorist, employing a vehicle borne improvised explosive device, targeted a police station located in the Salaheddin province. The explosion killed at least 35 people and injured many more.

September 5, 2007: A suicidal terrorist attack took place in Mosul, Iraq. A suicide bomber drove an explosives laden vehicle into a police checkpoint and detonated the explosives. The attack resulted in the death of at least one Iraqi policeman. Approximately 25 bystanders, including some merchants, sustained injuries.

October 25, 2007: A terrorist operation transpired in Mangora, Pakistan. The perpetrator employed a suicide bomb as he targeted law enforcement officials. The blast resulted in the death of more than 20 people. Taliban insurgents are suspected of organizing and executing the suicide mission.

October 30, 2007: A suicidal terrorist attack occurred in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. The perpetrator concealed explosives on his body as he attempted to walk through a security checkpoint. Security personnel approached the perpetrator as he detonated the explosives. The blast killed at least 5 people and wounded several others. The incident occurred near President Musharraf’s office.

November 6, 2007: A suicide bomber triggered an explosion in the Baghlan Province of Afghanistan. The perpetrator targeted a sugar factory during a special visit by local and national officials. The explosion killed more than 40 people including many children. A large number of bystanders sustained injuries.
References


