2014

What's the New Deal with Marshall? Depression Relief and Higher Education

Hubert Wesley Rolling
elvintry@yahoo.com

Follow this and additional works at: http://mds.marshall.edu/etd

Part of the Cultural History Commons, Labor History Commons, Political History Commons, and the United States History Commons

Recommended Citation

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Marshall Digital Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses, Dissertations and Capstones by an authorized administrator of Marshall Digital Scholar. For more information, please contact zhangj@marshall.edu.
WHAT’S THE NEW DEAL WITH MARSHALL?
DEPRESSION RELIEF AND HIGHER EDUCATION

A thesis submitted to
the Graduate College of
Marshall University

In partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

In
History

by
Hubert Wesley Rolling

Approved by
Dr. Kevin Barksdale, Committee Chairperson
Dr. Robert Sawrey
Dr. Robert Deal

Marshall University
May 2014
Dedicated to the memory of my mother, Carolyn Rolling.
Acknowledgements

I want to thank my thesis advisor Dr. Kevin Barksdale, and the other members of my committee, Dr. Robert Sawrey and Dr. Robert Deal, for offering advice and criticism to improve the manuscript. Also, I want to thank the staff of the Marshall University Special Collections and Archives, especially Nathaniel DeBruin, Lisle Brown, and Kathleen Bledsoe. Each endured my constant requests for books and documents that serve the backbone of my research. Additionally, the Marshall University Writing Center’s services helped me to improve the work’s overall quality. Marshall professors, Dr. Christopher White and Dr. Phillip Rutherford, offered their much appreciated guidance at points during the writing process. Several Marshall University students critiqued my chapters for the various classes that helped develop the thesis. These students included Jennifer Gehringer, Julia Woods, Steve Mays, and Kristopher Allen. Finally, I want to thank my family for their encouragement, support, and understanding.
## Contents

Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................ v

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ vi

Introduction: What’s Before the New Deal? .............................................................................. 1

Chapter 1: What’s the New Deal with Student Employment at Marshall? ............................. 15

Chapter 2: What’s the New Deal with the PWA and WPA at Marshall? ................................. 39

Chapter 3: What’s the New Deal with Politics at Marshall? ...................................................... 69

Conclusion: What IS the New Deal with Marshall? ................................................................. 92

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 97

Appendixes .................................................................................................................................. 103

Appendix A: Letter from Institutional Research Board ............................................................ 103
Abbreviations

Agencies Created by Herbert Hoover

ERA  Emergency Relief Administration
RFC  Reconstruction Finance Corporation

State Relief Agencies

TERA  Temporary Emergency Relief Administration (New York Agency)
WVRA  West Virginia Relief Administration

New Deal Agencies

FERA  Federal Emergency Relief Administration (Succeeded ERA)
NYA  National Youth Administration
PWA  Public Works Administration
WPA  Works Projects Administration (Succeeded FERA)

Other Abbreviations

AICP  Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor
WVU  West Virginia University
Abstract

Employing archival research, this study examines the history of the New Deal’s influence on higher education, focusing on Marshall University, at the time Marshall College, from approximately 1932-1940. First, it analyzes the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) and National Youth Administration (NYA) student part-time employment program’s impact on the college. Second, it discusses the PWA’s (Public Works Administration) and WPA’s (Works Progress Administration) building programs’ and flood relief efforts’ effect on Marshall. Finally, this study explores the political implications of the New Deal with emphasis on state politics and financial problems and their relationship to Marshall. A study of Marshall College illuminates better understanding of the New Deal’s influence on American higher education in a rural and frequently impoverished area. This, in turn, will expand the knowledge of how federal government involvement affected state-run institutions of higher education. The experiences of Marshall College demonstrate that the New Deal greatly affected higher education in both helpful and problematic ways.
Introduction
What’s Before the New Deal?

The study examines the history of the New Deal’s influence on higher education, focusing on Marshall University, at the time Marshall College, from approximately 1932-1940. First, it analyzes the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) and National Youth Administration (NYA) student part-time employment program’s impact on the college. Second, it discusses the PWA’s (Public Works Administration) and WPA’s (Works Progress Administration) building programs’ and flood relief efforts’ effect on Marshall. Finally, the study explores the political implications of the New Deal with emphasis on state politics and financial problems and their relationship to Marshall. A study of Marshall College fosters better understanding of the New Deal’s influence on American higher education in the Appalachian region. The research, in turn, will expand the knowledge of how federal government involvement affected state-run institutions. The experiences of Marshall College demonstrate that the New Deal greatly affected higher education in both helpful and problematic ways.

During the first decade of the 21st century, the United States experienced great financial turmoil from government “bail outs” of the automotive and banking industries to a reduction in America’s credit status. Economists, politicians, and pundits have compared it to the troubles experienced during the Great Depression.¹ In response to the economic woes of his time, 1932 Democratic Presidential nominee Franklin Delano Roosevelt proclaimed these immortal words, “I pledge you, I pledge myself, to a new deal for the American people.”² His “new deal”

involved the creation of numerous federal agencies, including FERA, NYA, PWA, and WPA, that oversaw relief efforts during the Great Depression. These agencies employed many students, built several buildings, and played a role in Marshall’s faculty make-up.

**Literature Review**

Considerable debate exists on the impact of the New Deal on higher education. Some historians, such as Arthur A. Ekrich and Hugh Hawkins, downplayed the New Deal’s influence. Ekrich argued that the federal government avoided aiding colleges fearing infringement on academic freedom. He contended that the relief aid from FERA and the student work program of the NYA only marginally affected higher education. Hawkins cited George Zook, president of the American Council on Education, who argued that the New Deal gave “totally inadequate consideration” to higher education’s role in “social progress and to the necessity of adequately supporting it from both public and private funds.”

Economist Alice Rivlin and historian Ronald Story offered a counter argument to the claims of Ekrich and Hawkins. Rivlin acknowledged that the New Deal had no direct policy toward higher education. According to Rivlin, although the New Deal student aid programs were short lived, they laid the groundwork for future federal involvement in colleges and universities, and New Deal building projects greatly expanded and modernized public institutions. Story agreed that New Deal efforts, such as construction and student work programs, greatly affected and advanced higher education into modern times by improving infrastructure, employing students, and increasing land grant spending. He further argued that

---

the New Deal’s political influence included faculty advisors in New Deal programs and increased academic progressivism. The study argues that the New Deal greatly influenced Marshall College in both positive and negative ways.

Scholarship on the Great Depression and the New Deal in broader context rarely mentioned the New Deal’s effect on higher education. Implying that, perhaps, the New Deal had little effect on colleges and universities. Those historians who have dealt with education tended to focus on the NYA. They described it as one of the most popular New Deal programs and concluded it acted as an agent to increase school attendance and reduce the burden on the job market by encouraging young people to attend college rather than find a job after high school.

A survey of the history of education revealed that, perhaps, the New Deal played more of a role in higher education than New Deal historians have implied. Christopher Lucas has stated that the federal government “poured” millions of dollars in student aid to colleges during the Great Depression. David O. Levine emphasized the importance of the student employment program in allowing impoverished students to attend college. He also contended that the New Deal’s requirement for states to pay a percentage of the relief effort cost applied “pressure on state budgets for [New Deal] employment and relief programs” and forced the states to reduce funds to state run colleges and universities. Many education historians have concluded that the New Deal had both positive and negative results on higher education.

---

Regional historians have also presented a mixed view of the impact of the New Deal. They mainly focused on the industrial, agricultural, and societal effects of New Deal programs and typically mentioned higher education in passing. Otis K. Rice and Stephen W. Brown devoted about two pages to discussing the nature of West Virginia higher education during the 1930s. They did not discuss student employment or building projects at colleges. However, the authors described the shift of higher education from teachers’ colleges to include liberal arts programs. They discussed Marshall president Dr. Morris P. Shawkey’s competition with West Virginia University. However, Rice and Brown mentioned very little about the politics behind Dr. Shawkey’s replacement as Marshall’s president.\textsuperscript{10} Jerry Bruce Thomas, a student of the New Deal in West Virginia, has described how the WVRA provided Marshall and West Virginia University with funds to train social workers to administer relief programs. While the initial program had been a state effort, FERA awarded sixteen scholarships to students that attended the program to further their social work education at larger universities like the University of Chicago and the University of Minnesota among others.\textsuperscript{11} Thomas briefly mentioned the PWA’s college building projects. He stated that the PWA provided some relief to colleges that experienced physical deterioration because of lack of funding.\textsuperscript{12} Generally, historians focusing on regions of the United States mentioned little about the New Deal and colleges, but when they did, they described it having a limited, positive effect.

Studies that focus on the Great Depression and New Deal at specific universities illustrated that the New Deal had mixed results on higher education. In her Ph.D. dissertation, \textsuperscript{10} Otis K. Rice and Stephen W. Brown, \textit{West Virginia: A History}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 248-249. \textsuperscript{11} FERA most likely offered the scholarships to universities that had an established social work program instead of encouraging new social work programs at Marshall and WVU. \textsuperscript{12} Jerry Bruce Thomas, \textit{An Appalachian New Deal: West Virginia in the Great Depression}, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1998), 129, 236. See also Paul Salstrom, \textit{Appalachia’s Path to Dependency: Rethinking a Region’s Economic History} (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1994).
Mary Garwood Reeves explored the Great Depression’s impact on higher education at three Georgia colleges: Emory University, the University of Georgia, and the Georgia Institute of Technology. She argued that the student employment program helped stimulate an increase in enrollment by allowing students to afford college. However, she contended that the employment program and new construction did not compensate for the “lagging endowment income or foreshortened state appropriations.” Kevin P. Bower, assistant professor in the Department of History at James Madison University, examined the impact of the NYA student employment program on Ohio universities. He contended that the program “did not radically alter the student population at American colleges.” Bower described the plight of higher education administrators like Ohio State University president George W. Rightmire, who lobbied the state for increased funding for his college after the state government cut the higher education budget. Historians of the New Deal at specific colleges found it did affect higher education but in a limited manner. The thesis will draw comparisons between Marshall’s experiences and those of Georgia, Ohio and other colleges or states.

**The Great Depression in West Virginia**

While many viewed the Stock Market crash of 1929 as the start of the Great Depression, it started much earlier in West Virginia. During the 1920s, West Virginia experienced hardships in its coal, farming, and banking industries. Coal mining, being West Virginia’s largest industry, dwindled from 121,000 employed in 1923 to 107,000 in 1929, “with an approximate forty percent decline in production.” Thousands of farmers lost their farms because they could not

---

13 Mary Garwood Reeves, “Economic Depression in Higher Education: Emory University, the University of Georgia and Georgia Tech, 1930-1940” (PhD diss., Georgia State University, 1985.), 54-61.
15 Quote from Rice and Brown, 266. See also Thomas, 7-9 and 27. Thomas states, “coal in the twenties provided the classic case of an industry beset with overcapacity and its associated ills: market gluts, chronic losses, frequent bankruptcies, and low wages.” These harsh conditions prompted the rise in coal mining unions, such as the
pay their taxes. According to Thomas, after paying for farm and family expense the average West Virginian farmer in 1929 had “only $70 to pay taxes and other expenses.” The state’s property taxes increased from $0.44 in 1913 to $1.26 in 1929 or about a $0.82 increase per $100. Nationally, the increase was only $0.64 on average in the same period. The situation contributed to the passage of the Tax Limitation Amendment in 1932 to reduce the tax burden on property owners. Because of the problems with the coal and farming industry, West Virginia’s banks also suffered. Approximately, thirty-nine banks either consolidated or collapsed during the 1920s.16

Though the stock market crash was not the cause of the Depression in West Virginia, it intensified the difficulties. Over one-hundred West Virginia banks collapsed between 1929 and 1932.17 With the failure of the banks, many coal-mining companies shut down and coal-mining employment dropped to a little over 86,000 by 1932.18 Coupled with the crash, West Virginia also experienced a drought in the summer of 1930 and another along with a flood in 1932. These events exacerbated the plight of many farmers in the region. Unfortunately, neither the national government nor the West Virginia government was prepared for these calamities.

West Virginia’s government responded the same way as the federal government, with a laissez-faire approach. At first, President Herbert Hoover and West Virginia Governor William G. Conley reacted with optimism that business would soon recover. Once the Depression worsened after the drought of 1930, Hoover consulted with the governors of each distressed state. Thomas states,

United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), and the subsequent backlash by business owners, backed by the conservative elements in the state government.

16 Thomas., 11-16 Many of these families only averaged about $1,000 annually in 1922 (equivalent to $13,800 in 2013). They had few modern conveniences including electricity, running water, or bathrooms. The West Virginia Farm Bureau along with national agencies worked throughout the 1920s to provide solutions to their plight. Additionally, West Virginia’s rural population, because of lack of good farmland and a chestnut blight, experienced a great decrease after 1910. The Tax Limitation Amendment and its effects on Marshall College will be discussed in Chapter 3 of the thesis.

17 Ibid., 27.
18 Rice and Brown, 266.
The conference agreed to a plan of drought relief that called for the establishment of state committees to oversee relief operations, aid to farmers in obtaining loans; assistance from the Red Cross; reduced railway rates for food, feed, and livestock; and expedition of federal road spending to give employment to drought-stricken farmers. President Hoover told reporters that the conference had agreed that the burden of meeting the crisis rested upon the affected states and counties themselves.¹⁹

The line of credit increased the burden on the already failing banks. Therefore, the relief committee encouraged the state legislature to request federal loans. Hoover, believing federal aid would create more problems, rejected the idea, and encouraged private charities and local communities to help the farmers. The relief effort failed and the subsequent political backlash in the 1930 election meant the start of the end of Republican control, both nationally and within West Virginia.²⁰

Between 1930 and 1932, President Hoover and Governor Conley explored numerous Depression relief efforts. Two notable efforts were the 1932 Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) and the Emergency Relief Agency (ERA). Both agencies provided loans to the state governments for public work and relief efforts respectively.²¹ Relief came too slowly and too late. Governor Conley formed a relief committee and took advantage of the loans as much as possible, seeking and gaining support for much of West Virginia.²² However, by then, the elections of 1932 occurred, and the people of the nation, including West Virginia, demanded

¹⁹ Thomas, 33.
²⁰ Thomas, 32-35. Progressive Democrat Mathew M. Neely beat James Elwood Jones for West Virginia’s U.S. Senate seat. The Democrats took control of West Virginia’s House of Delegates by forty-two seats and the Republicans still held the state senate but lost fourteen seats.
a change. Nationally, the change came in the form of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s pledge of a “new deal” and in West Virginia as Herman G. Kump’s campaign promises.\textsuperscript{23}

**A Background on Marshall College**

A Virginia Assembly delegate and local prosecutor, John Laidley was the primary founder of Marshall Academy in Huntington, West Virginia in 1837. Other founders included William Buffington, a founder of the Guyandotte community, and James Holderby, who owned the land. Laidley named the school after Chief Justice of the Supreme Court John Marshall, his friend and fellow 1829-1830 Virginia Constitutional Convention delegate. They founded the academy as a private institution on one and a fourth acres of land, bought for $40. In 1858, the Virginia General Assembly chartered the academy and subsequently renamed it Marshall College, but the institution did not become an official four-year college until 1920.\textsuperscript{24}

During the turmoil of the Civil War, Marshall College, as an educational institution, closed. However, the campus grounds housed a Union hospital and the Academy building served as the residence of J. W. Hite, a Confederate sympathizer. In 1867, after the war ended, the state legislature reestablished the school as a teacher training school and renamed it the State Normal School of Marshall College. In the subsequent years, Marshall experienced a succession of numerous administrators. Many, such as James E. Morrow (1872-1873) and James

\textsuperscript{23} Thomas, 64-67. The election of 1932 in West Virginia will be discussed more in Chapter 3 of the thesis. Kevin Starr, *Endangered Dreams: The Great Depression in California* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 156-199. Interestingly, The the New Deal played a role during the 1932 election in obtaining Democratic control of the in many states, California Republicans remained in power until 1939. Four factors allowed him to accomplish the feat. First, the cross-filing rules initiated by the Progressive California Legislature in 1918 allowed candidates to run in multiple primaries. The rule meant that Progressives could win the support of Democrats that shared their reform ideals. The second reason was Progressive Senator Hiram Johnson switched the party back to the Republicans after breaking with Franklin Roosevelt. The third reason was that the state lacked the industry to attract labor-minded democrats during the early part of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. The fourth reason was radical socialist Upton Sinclair ran on the Democratic ticket for governor in 1934. Sinclair endorsed a program named EPIC (End Poverty in California), a more extreme New Deal, which advocated for the state takeover of manufacturing and the collectivization of farming. Republican Frank Merriam, a conservative, charged Sinclair with communism and tapped into Red Scare fervor to gain reelection.

Beauchamp “Champ” Clark (1873-1874), served for only one year. Not until the administration of Thomas Hodges (1886-1896) would Marshall achieve administrative stability.\textsuperscript{25}

Like much of West Virginia, the Depression had already commenced at Marshall before the Stock Market Crash of 1929. During the 1920s, Marshall suffered from budgetary problems, overflowing classes, and lack of proper class materials. Marshall went from 690 students in 1923, when Dr. Morris P. Shawkey assumed office, to 1,700 students in 1931. The increased enrollment brought more revenues to the college, but the institution suffered from a limited budget. For example, Marshall historian, Charles Moffat, states that “one hundred students, who were admitted to chemistry classes in 1929, had no laboratory facilities.”\textsuperscript{26} After the crash, President Morris Shawkey was the lowest paid college president in the United States in 1930. Because of the effects of the Great Depression, Marshall lacked the space, resources, and funding to continue as a viable college without alternate financial support. Marshall, like many other colleges and universities across the nation, welcomed the New Deal recovery efforts.\textsuperscript{27}

\textbf{Two Marshall Presidents}

Two Marshall presidents held office during the Great Depression from 1929-1941. Dr. Morris P. Shawkey became president of the college in July 1923, replacing Dr. Frederick R. Hamilton. Marshall historian, Charles Moffat describes Dr. Shawkey as a “political educator,” who appealed to the students, alumni, and public rather than the faculty. A native of Pennsylvania and graduate of Ohio Wesleyan University, Dr. Shawkey held numerous academic positions, including teaching in Kansas and North Dakota, and State Superintendent of Free Schools in West Virginia. He also served on the West Virginia Board of Delegates. Before he became president of Marshall, he was the State Superintendent of the Beaver Pond School

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 15.  
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid, 76-77. Moffat most likely based these enrollment numbers on the average for two semesters.  
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
District in Bluefield, West Virginia. In much of his work, he focused on the promotion of teacher training. Moffat states that Dr. Shawkey felt that the “the highest honor a person could receive was to serve as the president of a teachers college.” Among many of his accomplishments, Dr. Shawkey established Marshall’s College of Arts and Sciences and obtained accreditation for both the Teacher’s College and the College of Arts and Sciences.  

In July 1935, following Dr. Shawkey’s resignation, Dr. James E. Allen became president of Marshall College. Dr. Allen had served for twenty-five years as president of the private Davis and Elkins College in Elkins, West Virginia, and was Marshall’s president from 1935-1942. Unlike Dr. Shawkey who focused on teacher training, Dr. Allen focused on the advancement of scholarship. He strongly expressed his opinion to the State Director of Teacher Certification, Genevieve Starcher, that “[t]eacher training courses do not educate the student.” Dr. Allen moved Marshall College further away from being just a teacher’s college by expanding the Arts and Sciences College, and establishing the graduate program and the Bachelors of Science degree. Each man possessed differing views on education, and these differences shaped the direction of Marshall College.

**Two Educational Ideologies**

Dr. Shawkey and Dr. Allen were members of two opposing schools of educational thought. Dr. Shawkey was a progressive educator, where Dr. Allen was a liberal arts or “Old School” educator. A progressive educator focused on “methodology and professional training for teachers,” whereas “Old School educators” focused on “values of discipline, character, and scholarship.” Many progressives approached education by allowing students to act on “natural

---

28 Moffat, 45-46, 49.
29 James E. Allen to Genevieve Starcher, n.d. quoted in Ibid., 87.
impulses” and sought to tailor education to encourage students to learn instead of focusing on making learning difficult to increase a student’s ability to solve complex problems. Rather than believe in knowledge for knowledge’s sake, progressives sought to advance training for skills to enter the teaching profession. While liberal arts dominated much of education before the 20th Century, the progressive educators in West Virginia, with the help of Dr. Shawkey, grew to prominence during the early part of the century.

**The Politics of Shawkey and the Normal School Bloc**

A progressive Republican, Dr. Shawkey focused on promoting teacher training in West Virginia. While Dr. Shawkey aspired to be the president of a teachers’ college, his motives were ideological as well as political. Led by Dr. Jasper N. Deahl, Dean of the college of education at West Virginia University (WVU), Shawkey and other like-minded individuals, such as Secretary to the State Board of Education and later Concord College president, Dr. Joseph Marsh, worked to place progressive administrators in public education during the early part of the 20th century. These educators and their allies, known by contemporaries as the Normal School Bloc, used their positions to influence legislation to change the focus of public schools to vocational training, increase the power of county superintendents, and hire school district supervisors who shared their educational views.

From 1909 to 1921, as State Superintendent of Free Schools, Dr. Shawkey was a member of State Board of Public Works. In the position, Shawkey oversaw the budget of numerous public agencies including the public schools and colleges, such as Marshall College. He used his

---

32 Ibid. Dr. Shawkey served as State Superintendent of Free Schools from 1909 until 1921 when he served as president of the Board of Education until he became president of Marshall College in 1923, and Marsh served as secretary of the Board until he became president of Concord College in 1929. Ambler provides a great amount of information on the West Virginia progressive education rise to prominence during the early 20th century.
33 Rice and Brown, 246-248.
position to influence spending on progressive initiatives in public schools.\textsuperscript{34} The state of West Virginia established the Board of Public Works in 1863, which consisted of the Governor, Secretary of State, Auditor, Superintendent of Free Schools, Treasurer, Attorney General, and Commissioner of Agriculture. The board’s stated purpose was to “protect the interests of the state in all works of internal improvement in the state.”\textsuperscript{35} The Board of Public Works controlled the finances of much of the state, which became very important during the Great Depression when finances would be very limited.

Continuing to employ politics to further his goals, Dr. Shawkey used his influence to become president of Marshall College. In 1923, he was serving as the Superintendent of Beaver Pond School District in Bluefield, West Virginia. After Republican G.W. Francisco resigned, the board had a Democratic majority. The shift created a problem for Dr. Shawkey, a Republican, who was politically out-numbered but held the most powerful seat on the board. Additionally, many of Marshall’s faculty and Huntington’s citizens wanted Dr. Shawkey as president of Marshall instead of Dr. Frederick R. Hamilton, who saw Marshall’s enrollment increase by almost six times under his leadership. The situation prompted Shawkey and the state Democrats to strike a bargain. In 1923, Hamilton, realizing the opposition he faced in Huntington, stepped down as president and the State Board of Education elected Dr. Shawkey to replace him. Former Bluefield District Superintendent, Democrat Edwin C. Wade, replaced Shawkey as superintendent.\textsuperscript{36} The change in Marshall Presidents illustrates the politicization of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Charles Lively, \textit{West Virginia Blue Book: 1936} (Charleston, West Virginia: Jarrett Printing Co., 1936), 53. During the Kump administration, Herman Kump was Governor and Chairman, W.W. Trent was Superintendent of Free Schools, and Homer A. Holt was Attorney General.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Marshall Buckalew, \textit{The Life of Morris Purdy Shawkey} (Charleston, WV: West Virginia Publishing Co., 1941), 70. Buckalew offers no reason for the lack of faculty and community support for Dr. Hamilton except that they wanted Dr. Shawkey as president instead.
\end{itemize}
Marshall’s presidency. Generally, both Shawkey and Hamilton had been performing their jobs well but the political environment controlled who held what position.

As president of Marshall, Dr. Shawkey continued to employ political tactics to increase Marshall’s influence in the state. According to Rice and Brown, “[Shawkey] aspired to make Marshall College into the state university for southern West Virginia” and competed with West Virginia University (WVU) for domination in the state. By becoming president of Marshall, he had set himself up as the leader of the normal school bloc and opposed Frank B. Trotter, the conservative president of WVU. In order to compete with Trotter, Shawkey worked to gain accreditation for Marshall, added a College of Arts and Sciences, and began issuing A.B. degrees. To accomplish these advances, Shawkey appealed to his friends on the State Board of Education.

The addition of the College of Arts and Sciences was Shawkey’s most controversial accomplishment, because Marshall College was a state normal school at the time, which meant its focus was teacher preparation. Opponents appealed to the governor and the attorney general to require that all normal schools only offer teacher training. They contended that the state government established Marshall as a normal school in 1867 and that mission had not changed. Shawkey argued that both the State Board of Education and legislature approved of the new college at Marshall. Neither the governor nor the attorney general took any action to prevent Marshall from adding the college; therefore, Marshall continued to grow and compete with WVU. Not long after Dr. John Roscoe Turner succeeded Dr. Trotter as WVU president in 1926,

---

37 Rice and Brown, 249.
38 Ambler, 483-484.
Shawkey shifted from competing with the university to agreeing to consolidate the two institutions.39 The political machinations of the New Deal would destroy these plans.

**Thesis Overview**

Chapter One of the study examines the student part-time employment program and its impact on Marshall College. First, it provides an overview of federal guidelines for the student employment program. Secondly, the chapter illustrates how presidents Shawkey and Allen viewed the program, handled issues, such as an overflow of applications, and administered the federal guidelines to provide aid to students and the college. Finally, the chapter will explore the impact of the program and its administration on Marshall’s student body.

Chapter Two explores how the PWA and WPA improved and rescued Marshall College. New Deal efforts ranged from basic maintenance of campus grounds, to building dormitories and other facilities, to flood relief after two floods. The chapter details the federal implementation of these efforts and the scope and effect of each program on the college and students.

Chapter Three investigates the political implications and effects of New Deal policy and Depression-era politics on Marshall’s College. It explores how politics affected an administration change at Marshall and how the change influenced Marshall College’s direction as an institution. Additionally, the chapter examines how New Deal relief efforts demands coupled with state legislation harmed Marshall College’s budget and how each president reacted to the budget cuts.

The Conclusion demonstrates the New Deal’s impact on higher education by weighing each aspect of the New Deal’s influence on Marshall College. It examines pros and cons of the student employment program, the WPA and PWA projects, and the political and financial impact on the institution. It illustrates that the New Deal greatly affected higher education.

39 Moffat, 58-60.
Chapter 1

What’s the New Deal with the Student Employment Program at Marshall?

“I have determined that we shall do something for the Nation's unemployed youth because we can ill afford to lose the skill and energy of these young men and women.” With these words, President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the National Youth Administration (NYA) with Executive Order 7086 in 1935. The NYA was part of a series of efforts President Roosevelt created to provide Depression relief by employing America’s youth. The NYA inherited the student part-time employment program from the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), which Roosevelt established in 1933 to oversee unemployment relief. Before the programs existed, many impoverished students at colleges, like those at Marshall College, sought loans, scholarships, or bartered produce to pay their way through college. The program affected Marshall College in many positive ways including providing financial relief to students and the college, increasing enrollment, and improving student morale. However, the relief was not enough to cover the budget cuts imposed by West Virginia’s government at the same time. Additionally, the increased enrollment, coupled with budget cuts, decreased Marshall’s ability to provide educational services to its students. While the student part-time employment program appeared to aid Marshall College, it may have inadvertently harmed the institution at the time.

---


41 Charles Moffat, Marshall University: Institution Comes of Age, 1837-1980 (Huntington, WV: Marshall University Alumni Assoc., 1981), 77. Dr. Shawkey allowed a student to pay his tuition with potatoes. Mary Garwood Reeves, “Economic Depression in Higher Education: Emory University, the University of Georgia and Georgia Tech, 1930-1940” (PhD diss., Georgia State University, 1985), 265 and 289. Similarly, the leadership of Emory University also accepted tuition promissory notes. The University of Georgia’s College of Agriculture allowed their students to pay tuition with farm produce, which the dorm cafeteria used for meals.
FERA administered the student part-time employment program from February 1934 to July 1935. As a part of Roosevelt’s desire for the states to administer a portion of the relief effort, FERA required state unemployment relief agencies to provide direct oversight of relief funds. In West Virginia, the West Virginia Relief Administration (WVRA) acted as the federal conduit for student employment funds until the advent of the NYA in 1935. The NYA controlled the student aid program until its end in 1943. The New Deal aided many institutions including Marshall College.

The part-time student employment program sought to reduce the nation’s unemployment and to offer impoverished high school graduates the chance to attend college. FERA provided aid to almost 165,000 students in approximately 2,000 colleges from the spring semester of 1934 and throughout the 1934-1935 academic year. FERA’s successor, the NYA, spent over $93 million and provided part time jobs to over 620,000 college students from 1935 to 1941. Compared to another New Deal agency, the Public Works Administration (PWA), through 1939, spent over $198 million on 662 building projects to improve the infrastructure of colleges. The funds spent on the part-time student employment program were thus about half of those spent on PWA construction, but the New Deal student part-time employment program affected more colleges than the PWA.

---

44 The federal government modeled the program after a similar program in Minnesota.
45 National Youth Administration Form No. 4 – 47, July 18, 1935, 2. Marshall University Archives, Record Group P, Office of the President 1935-1936, Box 11, Folder 41, (Accession No. 730000). (abbreviated as MUA, RG P with year, box, and folder from now on)
When President Roosevelt established FERA, he appointed Harry Hopkins to administer the federal agency. Harry Hopkins was one of President Roosevelt’s most trusted advisors and friends. His biographer, Robert E. Sherwood, described him as an “implementer rather than a planner,” who “looked to the immediate rather than the long-term result.” While Roosevelt oversaw the broad picture, Hopkins implemented the policies.

Following the stock market crash of 1929, Hopkins worked for the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor (AICP) to administer work relief efforts in New York City. His endeavor earned Hopkins the recognition of Jesse Straus, president of the R.H. Macy department store, who also served as president of Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt’s state employment relief agency, the Temporary Emergency Relief Administration (TERA). Straus chose Hopkins to be the Executive Director of the agency. Hopkins performed so well that Roosevelt made him president of TERA in 1932. The following year Roosevelt became president of the United States and asked Hopkins to join him in Washington to head FERA and other relief programs associated with the New Deal.

As director of FERA, in 1934, Hopkins sent a memorandum with ten guidelines to administer the student employment program.

1. Only tax-exempt, non-profit colleges or universities could receive funds.

---


49 Ibid., 14-44. Born August 17, 1890 in Sioux City, Iowa, Hopkins graduated Grinnell College in Grinnell, Iowa in 1912. His first job after college was a temporary position working with impoverished youths at a summer camp for New York’s Christodora House. His first position as public administrator was in 1914 as Executive Secretary of the Board of Child Welfare. As a member of the board, he worked with New York’s Democratic Mayor John P. Mitchel to provide jobs to the city’s unemployed, a prelude to his New Deal work. After Mitchel left office in 1917, Hopkins applied for service in World War I, but he the military rejected him for having a detached retina. Following the rejection, Hopkins served in a variety of relief roles including Chairman of the Gulf Division of the American Red Cross in 1917 and Executive Director of the New York Tuberculosis Association in 1924. Hopkins possessed the perfect resume for New Deal administration.

50 Ibid., 30-44.

2. The number of jobs available was to be 10% of the full time students enrolled as of October 15, 1933.

3. Student pay ranged from $10 to $20 a month. Each college received funds based on multiplying the average monthly pay of $15 by the number of qualified students.

4. Each state relief administrator applied for the allotment of funds based on the total amount requested by college presidents.

5. The approved jobs included “clerical, library, research, work on buildings and grounds, and in dormitories and dining halls,” but “[r]egular class instruction” did not qualify.\textsuperscript{52}

6. The criteria to qualify for student employment included:

   (a) \textbf{Need}. The student’s financial status shall be such as to make impossible his attendance at college without this aid.

   (b) \textbf{Character and ability to do college work}. The students shall be of good character and judged by the usual methods of determining ability employed by the particular college, shall possess such ability as to give assurance that they will do high grade work in college.

   (c) \textbf{Status as to present attendance}. Not more than 75\% of the funds allotted to any institution shall be paid to students who were regularly enrolled in some college during January 1934.

   (d) \textbf{Equitable division between sexes}. Jobs shall be allocated between boys and girls in proportion to the enrollment of each in the particular school.\textsuperscript{53}

7. The hourly pay rate had to be comparable to typical pay at the college for “services rendered but not less than 30 cents an hour.”\textsuperscript{54}

8. Students could only work a maximum of 8 hours a day and 30 hours in a week.

9. The state relief administration (WVRA) allotted the funds requested to each college president.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
10. FERA required the state relief administration to report the amount of funds allotted. The college president was to report fund allocation to both the state relief administration and FERA.\(^{55}\)

Hopkins’s memorandum provided general guidelines but relied on the college presidents to administer the program. The approach attempted to provide the college freedom to determine its own affairs.\(^{56}\) For the most part, institution administrators controlled who received what job, however, as issues emerged, such as questions about the application of funding, the federal government increased oversight.

Responding to issues introduced by college presidents, Hopkins issued amended program guidelines on July 3, 1934. These changes included increased aid provided by the program, clarification of guidelines, and new amendments to the rules. Hopkins increased the percentage of full time students receiving benefits from 10% to 12% and decreased the 75% allotment requirement to returning students to 50%. These modifications allowed more aid for new students. Hopkins further clarified other issues, including: (1) The aid was to be used to increase the number of college students, (2) funds were not to be used to replace other student aid provided by the college, such as scholarships, and (3) the jobs involved could not include janitorial work or waiting tables in the cafeteria and “other routine activities.”\(^{57}\) Hopkins stated, “Violation of the spirit of this provision shall be considered a cause for withdrawing a college’s entire allotment of student aid and assigning it to other institutions.”\(^{58}\) The further clarification

\(^{55}\) Ibid.

\(^{56}\) Ray Scott to M.P. Shawkey, February 15, 1935. MUA, RG P, 1934-1935, Box 10, Folder 20. The WVRA required a monthly financial report from Marshall College on the amount of money granted to clerical and office, library and museum, laboratory assistance, research assistance, education, recreation, health and welfare and all other jobs the students performed.


\(^{58}\) Ibid.
of the guidelines, with the addition of a punishment for misadministration of aid, represented a shift from non-interference in college affairs to more federal control of the employment program.

In July 1935, the NYA assumed control of the student part-time employment program. The NYA reported to the Works Projects Administration (WPA) but had its own executive director, Aubrey W. Williams. Overall, the employment program essentially remained the same with a few exceptions. First, the NYA removed the fifty percent of funds to new student requirement. Changing the criterion relaxed the requirement to encourage the attendance of new students and provided more aid to currently enrolled students. Secondly, it altered the student selection criteria. Individual student need remained the primary criterion, but the NYA changed the phrase “high grade work in college” to the “ability to do college work.” By removing the high-grade requirement, the NYA meant to encourage administrators to place need over any other criteria. Finally, instead of the president of the college reporting to the state-run administration, he reported activities to a State Youth Division, which the NYA National Advisory Committee appointed. The transfer of the program to the NYA increased centralized oversight. Instead of FERA and state agencies, like the WVRA, focusing on almost every aspect of unemployment, the NYA concerned itself specifically on with providing employment for unemployed youths. The change provided a more narrow focus that most likely contributed to the federal government’s ability to run the program more directly and efficiently. The shift to the NYA removed several restrictions placed on college presidents, like “good grade” requirements, while, simultaneously, represented a continuation of increased federal control over

---


the program, by removing more of the state’s role in New Deal relief process. The president of the college, however, still directly administered the program at his or her respective college.⁶¹

The guidelines detailed by FERA, and later the NYA, determined the amount of funds allocated to each institution and determined who administered these funds. Marshall College joined the employment program in February 1934. On October 15, 1933, 1,474 students attended Marshall. The statistics meant that 147 students could qualify for part time jobs under the program. The basis set the allotment total at approximately $2,205 for each month of the 1934 spring semester.⁶² The subsequent 1934 fall semester aid provided for 175 students a month at a total of $2,625 a month.⁶³ The number was increased to 177 (100 females and 77 males) because two students received what was termed “half-time” employment. Students working “half-time” averaged 15 hours a week and earned an average $7.50 a month. The “half-time” policy allowed for the aid of more students and was used only “in some cases where there are two students from the same family or when the student [lived] in Huntington or when other conditions [warranted] it.”⁶⁴ The NYA allotted $2,940 per month to the college totaling $26,460 during Dr. Allen’s first school year, 1935-1936, as president. The aid provided employment to 196 students during the period. Marshall possessed an average of 15% of the

---

⁶¹ For more information on the impact of the transition from FERA control to WPA control see Thomas, 137-138. The increased federal oversight sparked a backlash of complaints from conservative Democrats and Republicans who viewed the WPA as a political tool. Whereas the WVRA was an agency controlled by the state of West Virginia and reported to the governor, the NYA was federally controlled which meant Hopkins appointed positions without West Virginia Governor Herman Kump’s approval. The removal of the WVRA from oversight of the student part-time employment program represented a part of the ongoing conflict between Governor Kump and Harry Hopkins over who would control the Depression relief efforts in the state.

⁶² Harry L. Hopkins, “Memorandum to All State Emergency Relief Administrations, Subject: Part-time Jobs for College Students,” 2. MUA, RG P, 1934-1935, Box 10, Folder 35.

⁶³ M.P. Shawkey to Mr. N.C. Ashley, September 6, 1934. MUA, RG P, 1934-1935, Box 10, Folder 20.

⁶⁴ The Parthenon, September 21, 1934.
number of West Virginia students in the program and received an average of 20% of the funds allotted to the twenty-one colleges in the state.\textsuperscript{65}

The situation at Marshall was comparable to colleges and universities in West Virginia, Georgia, and Ohio. West Virginia University employed 228 students and received approximately $3,430 a month.\textsuperscript{66} “The University of Georgia employed 200 students during 1934 and received around $25,743 in funding for the 1935-1936 school year. Emory University in Georgia received $1,995 per month during the same fall semester for 133 students.\textsuperscript{67}

These funds did not cover all student expenses. According to William T. Doherty and Festus P. Summers, at the lowest end, the cost of attendance at West Virginia University (WVU), including books, tuition, room, board and laundry, was about $450 annually and at the high end $800 annually.\textsuperscript{68} The student employment program would pay for less than half of these costs. According to Kevin Bower, “tuition and fees at Ohio State University were $123 for Ohio residents (not including housing)” for a nine-month semester. Making the maximum of $180 a school year, “a thrifty student could have used his or her allotment to cover both living expenses and at least some portion of tuition.” However, he points out that the program would aid students “for whom college was a financial strain, not a financial impossibility.”\textsuperscript{69} Bower’s argument held true for both Ohio University and Marshall College.

At Marshall College, during the 1934-1935 academic year, wages were about $135 per student, per year, which was the majority of the $160 total cost of attendance per year for males.

\textsuperscript{65} William Beehler, \textit{Relief, Work, and Rehabilitation: West Virginia Relief Administration, August 1, 1932 to November 1, 1934}, 1934, 122. Approximately 177 Marshall students out of 1,155 total West Virginia students participated in the program during September and October 1934. The percentage of funds allotted is based on approximately $5,250 out of $26,515.13 awarded for the same period.

\textsuperscript{66} William T. Doherty Jr. and Festus P. Summers, \textit{West Virginia University: Symbol of Unity in a Sectionalized State}, (Morgantown: West Virginia University Press, 1982), 139.

\textsuperscript{67} Reeves, 274 and 296.

\textsuperscript{68} Doherty and Summers, 139-140.

\textsuperscript{69} Bower, 396.
and the $140 total cost of attendance for females per year. However, the cost did not include other expenditures such as food, transportation, and toiletries. Dr. Shawkey informed one male student that, including the other expenditures, a “year’s work in college will probably cost [the male student] about $150 in addition to what he earns” in the part-time employment program. According to Shawkey’s estimate, a male student paid approximately $310 for the entire 1934-1935 academic year. A 1936 Marshall Chamber of Commerce survey stated that “the average total cost per year for a student at Marshall [was] $438.32,” or about $219.16 per semester. The employment program paid for less than half of the student’s costs at Marshall, meaning they would have to find other employment or rely on their parents to supplement their college.

In addition to determining the funds allotted to each college, the guidelines determined who administered these funds. The president of the college shouldered most of the responsibility for the task. At Marshall, President Dr. Morris P. Shawkey followed by President Dr. James E. Allen filled the role. Each president possessed different opinions of the employment program but generally accepted the program’s goal to provide aid to students in need. Dr. Shawkey viewed the part-time employment program with welcomed relief. He referred to the program as a “boon to a group of worthy young people” and stated that the aid was “without a doubt accomplishing a great social good.”

Dr. Shawkey reacted with gratitude for the additional aid provided by the program but doubted he would meet limits set by Hopkins’s guidelines. One of his first concerns was for the employment of students already attending school. The guidelines stated that only 75% of the funds could go to full-time students currently enrolled. Dr. Shawkey expressed apprehension

---

70 MUA, RG R, University Catalog, 1934-1935, Marshall University, Huntington, West Virginia, 18.
72 *The Parthenon*, May 22, 1936.
74 M.P. Shawkey to Hon. F.W. Turner, February 17, 1934. Ibid.
that available funds would not adequately provide for the needy students currently enrolled. The WVRA responded by temporarily removing the limitation and allowing him to award 100% of the aid to all current full-time students. However, Dr. Shawkey did not use all the allotted funds, as there was approximately $1,040 in extra funds for February 1934. The surplus most likely occurred because Dr. Shawkey viewed the part-time employment program as a form of scholarship, and because the college received approval for the program during the middle of the month. Either not enough weeks remained in the month or not enough students received the jobs to account for the entire amount. Perhaps several students needed the jobs, but Shawkey was limited to the number he could hire based on the 10% guideline set by Hopkins. Additionally, he focused on awarding those who he saw as having “earned it on a merit basis” and interpreted the program’s primary goals as to “assist worthy students” and to provide additional government funding to the aid of colleges. In other words, most likely, not enough students made the grades required to receive the jobs to cover the allotment. To understand FERA’s purpose, Dr. Shawkey asked WVRA representative, F.W. Turner, if he was administering the program correctly. There was no apparent response from Turner. As previously stated, Harry Hopkins addressed Dr. Shawkey’s and other president’s questions about the program, in July 1934, with amendments to the program.

While Dr. Shawkey, a progressive Republican, welcomed the program, Dr. Allen, most likely a conservative Democrat, definitely did not. In a letter to Senator Rush Holt, he stated, “Everybody wants help whether it be a Ford or a Packard.” He most likely meant that students wanted either a small amount of help or a large amount. Dr. Allen further expressed his

---

75 M.P. Shawkey to F.W. Turner, February 17, 1934, and Grace F Wylie to M.P. Shawkey, February 27, 1934. MUA, RG P, 1934-1935, Box 10, Folder 35.
76 M.P. Shawkey to F.W. Turner, March 10, 1934. Ibid.
77 James A. Allen to Senator Rush Holt, September 6, 1938 quoted in Moffat, 100.
frustration in a letter to John Addair, Principal of Iaeger High School in Iaeger, West Virginia. First, he stated the problem of sorting through applications to determine which students actually needed the jobs. Secondly, he expressed concern about students obtaining employment and how it “takes too many hours from [their] study period.” Dr. Allen viewed the program as a “sacrifice of [their] academic opportunities for financial needs.” His language referring to the employment effort most likely reflected his opinion. His letters suggest a bureaucratic viewpoint. He referred to the 10% or 12% limit on the number of jobs as a quota. Dr. Shawkey used the word allotment or allowance. Dr. Allen’s words suggested he viewed the 12% limit as a goal to reach, whereas Dr. Shawkey’s words suggest a limit that restricts further aid. Nevertheless, Allen appears to have objectively administered it.

In spite of his prejudice against student employment, Dr. Allen, realizing the hardship faced by each student, handled each case with apparent fairness, grace, and compassion. He encouraged parents, like C. Forrest Hull, to financially support their children “for a month or two” to allow their children to attend college “immediately” in hopes that “a vacancy might arise.” He showed leniency toward students such as Lucille McGill who wrote Dr. Allen on October 5, 1935 for part-time employment. Dr. Allen first suggested she apply again in January. However, he stated, “Better still, if you could finance yourself the first semester there might be a chance for you later.” Dr. Allen recommended students who could not find employment at Marshall to contact other colleges, like Concord or Davis and Elkins, to request assistance to attend those institutions.

78 James E. Allen to John Addair, August 29, 1938. MUA, RG P, 1938-1939, Box 18, Folder 16.
80 James E. Allen to Mr. C. Forrest Hull, September 14, 1935. Ibid.
81 James E. Allen to Mrs. J.C. Graves, August 21, 1935. Ibid.
Although Dr. Shawkey and Dr. Allen differed in their opinions of the program, they dealt similarly with the inflow of applicants. To assist in the process, Dr. Shawkey and Dr. Allen referred worthy applicants to a committee chaired by Professor Lucy Prichard. The delegation of power was not uncommon among other schools, such as Miami University in Ohio. Professor Pritchard served as the chair of the Classical Language Department at Marshall from 1914 until her retirement in 1941. Among her accomplishments was the establishment and presidency of the West Virginia Division of the American Association of University Women (AAUA). Additionally, in 1961, Marshall named its newest women’s dormitory in her honor. She would be in charge of managing the student employment program and finding work for those students each Marshall President recommended.

Even before Marshall received official approval for the project from Hopkins, Dr. Shawkey received letters from students requesting aid. One student wrote Dr. Shawkey on February 13, 1934 requesting a FERA job. Dr. Shawkey informed the student that he appeared “eligible for assistance under the proposed Federal grant for the aid of students” but the government had not approved the program in West Virginia yet. By September 6, 1934, Dr. Shawkey had received approximately 500 applications for the 175 jobs available. Quite apparently, the demand and need of the students for financial relief existed.

Much like Dr. Shawkey, Dr. Allen contended with a barrage of applications. However, with Dr. Shawkey stepping down in July and Professor Prichard not available, applications accumulated during the summer of 1935. Presidential Secretary Attarah B. Blackwood

---

83 Bower, 371.
84 Huntington Advertiser, July 30, 1964.
85 M.P. Shawkey to Deral Craft, February 14, 1934. MUA, RG P, 1934-1935, Box 10, Folder 35.
86 M.P. Shawkey to N.C. Ashley, September 6, 1934. MUA, RG P, 1934-1935, Box 10, Folder 20.
instructed each applicant to contact Miss Prichard in August. Dr. Allen stated in a letter on August 21, 1935 “The matter of getting work at Marshall has reached the point almost of impossibility. We have perhaps five applicants for every available position.” Demand for student employment was so great that Dr. Allen made a public announcement that all the college had no positions available. In spite of the announcement, he still received student applications for fall semester employment into October 1935.

Both presidents contended with an abundance of applications, as Dr. Allen termed it, “from the poor and rich alike.” By August 1935, the criteria to narrow down these applicants ranked as follows: “1) need, 2) priority of application, 3) academic standing, and 4) ability to render service.” Each Marshall President generally applied these guidelines as he saw fit. The presidents’ letters do not define each criterion but they offer examples that fit each.

The first criterion of need, or the inability to afford tuition, was almost universal among students applying for employment. Incidents with both presidents illustrate an inclination to overlook student shortcomings, like poor work habits or grades, to provide aid to needy students. Even after a female student demonstrated poor work ethic, Dr. Shawkey was willing to allow her to work the following semester. The NYA’s removal of the good grade requirement allowed Dr. Allen to focus more on the need criterion. Dr. Allen told a student, who previously attended Marshall with a “C” average, stating that he performed “satisfactory work,” he would

---

88 James E. Allen to Mrs. J.C. Graves, August 21, 1935. Ibid.
90 James E. Allen to Miss Lucille McGill, October 7, 1935. Ibid.
91 James E. Allen to Hon. Calvin W. Price, August 20, 1935. Ibid.
93 The presidential papers are unclear as to how need was determined most likely because it was the duty of Professor Prichard’s committee.
recommend the student to Professor Prichard for a possible NYA job. The student, William B. Hacker, attended Marshall for three semesters and dropped out of college to work for the federal government. Hacker had resigned from his government job in 1931 to continue his education. His second attempt allowed Hacker to attend Marshall for only one semester because he did not have the money to continue. Dr. Allen overlooked the average grades of the student because said student expressed a need and desire to finish his education.

The second criterion concerned priority of application. For the most part, those who applied first received priority over later applicants. For the fall semester of 1934, Dr. Shawkey managed to get the 75% limit on current students lifted. However, because the guidelines in the 1934-1935 school year required that 50% the students be freshmen, the modification limited the amount of aid to those already attending college and forced Dr. Shawkey to give priority to freshman over other students in many cases. However, of the students currently attending Marshall, Dr. Shawkey gave “special consideration” to seniors over other students. Dr. Shawkey most likely attempted to provide aid to as many currently enrolled students as possible, but the 50% limitation prevented him from providing aid to everyone.

Once the NYA removed the 50% new student requirement in 1935, Dr. Allen could grant aid to all grade levels, as he deemed appropriate. Since Dr. Allen contended with a backlog of applications (over 1000 in the fall of 1935), he considered those already attending Marshall to be the most important. Like Dr. Shawkey, Dr. Allen gave priority to students who had attended Marshall the longest “in order that they may not have to drop out.” He encouraged one student to enroll in the fall of 1935 to “be in a much better position to secure aid” in the spring semester.

---

96 William Hacker to The President of Marshall College, January 6, 1936, W. N. Beetham to James E. Allen, January 8, 1936, James E. Allen to William Hacker, January 9, 1936. Ibid.
97 M.P. Shawkey to Mrs. A.L. Vincent, July 23, 1934. Ibid.
98 James E. Allen to Mr. R.H.F. Parsley, August 21, 1935. Ibid.
Priority of application factored less under Dr. Shawkey’s administration than Dr. Allen’s administration because FERA guidelines demanded that Shawkey show favoritism to freshman over students currently enrolled in Marshall.

The third criterion of academic standing factored more under Dr. Shawkey’s administration than Dr. Allen’s administration. Because the NYA lowered the academic standards requirement during Dr. Allen’s administration, Dr. Shawkey most likely focused more on grades than Dr. Allen. In a letter to Justus A. Deahl, Superintendent of Preston County Schools, Dr. Shawkey emphasized that he received numerous applications for the employment program but would give “as favorable consideration as possible” to “two or three good students” that applied from his school district.\(^99\) In a letter to student Doris E. Hart, Dr. Shawkey accepted her request for part time employment. However, he implied that making good grades would help keep her in the program. He reminded her “a good scholastic record always helps in other things.”\(^100\) Dr. Shawkey emphasized the scholastic criterion again in a letter dated June 18, 1935 to W.L. Clavell who had written Shawkey about his nephew, Jack Bates. Mr. Clavell emphasized the poverty of Bates’ family. Dr. Shawkey responded by stating that the “[part-time employment] committee [would] give his case sympathetic consideration,” but “good students [were] given preference.”\(^101\) By utilizing the good student guideline, Dr. Shawkey eliminated several student applications.

The NYA’s removal of the “good student” guideline allowed Dr. Allen to accept more students with lower grade point averages into the program. However, Dr. Allen still considered grades important. He asked student applicants to provide copies of their credits from high school and their previous college. Dr. Allen stated, “If they are good they will help you in securing

\(^{100}\) M.P. Shawkey to Doris Hart, July 30, 1934. Ibid.
\(^{101}\) M.P. Shawkey to W.L. Clavell, June 18, 1935. Ibid.
your position.” In a letter to Mrs. Emma R. Nunely, he commended her son, William, on his “splendid record in high school” and said that a “boy who has made such fine progress and whose finances are limited should have the benefit of [NYA] aid if possible.” Even though the NYA lowered the academic standards to enter the program, Dr. Allen still considered good academic standards when recommending students for aid.

The fourth criterion Dr. Shawkey considered was the ability to render service. The criterion most likely included the student’s office skills, such as typing or other skills, like musical skill, that might benefit the college. Considering its ranking, the skill criterion appears to have factored last for both presidents. However, at times, it mattered. In one case, Mr. S.M. Funk of Columbia College recommended two female students and one male student for the employment program. Dr. Shawkey replied that he did not want the two women for the program, without providing a reason, but wanted the male student. The male student, Marvin L. Jacobs, could type and perform bookkeeping, but most importantly played in his school’s orchestra for four years and band for two years. He also possessed straight “A’s” in Instrumental Music. Dr. Shawkey forwarded the recommendation letter to Harry Mueller who taught music at Marshall during this time. Mueller responded in a note on the letter by stating, “If you can offer him anything – get him.” He underlined “get him” three times. While his bookkeeping skills would help Jacobs perform a clerical job, his musical experience most likely appealed more to Dr. Shawkey, who thought the students skills could benefit Marshall’s music program.

Similarly, Dr. Allen favored a student who possessed similar skills as Marvin Jacobs. He referred Albert Varney to Professor Prichard, who, he said, “had splendid special training.”

103 James E. Allen to Mrs. Emma R. Nutley, March 6, 1936. Ibid.
104 S.M. Funk to M.P. Shawkey, August 1, 1934. MUA, RG P, 1934-1935, Box 10, Folder 20.
Albert had eight years of experience in the school band, and three years typing and bookkeeping experience. Like Jacobs, Varney’s typing experience would make him good at doing office work in a NYA part-time job, and his musical skills most likely helped Marshall’s band. Even though both presidents looked at work skills, like typing, other abilities, such as musical talent, were a determining factor in the selection process. Evidence suggests that presidents Shawkey and Allen most likely used the employment program to recruit students who would improve Marshall’s extracurricular projects, such as its band.

In addition to Marshall’s administration, the student part-time employment program had an effect on Marshall’s students as well. Evidence suggests that the student part-time employment program influenced Marshall’s student enrollment, which increased after the program’s establishment at the college. Other institutions experienced an increase as well. Reeves asserts,

> It was money from FERA, which was, perhaps, the most help for students initially. From September 1934 to June 1935, FERA funds allowed 94,331 students in 1,466 colleges and universities [nationally]…As a result, enrollment figures began to climb. There was a five percent increase as a total, and more significantly, perhaps, a fourteen percent increase in freshmen.106

*The Parthenon* reported on August 3, 1934 that student enrollment at Marshall for the 1934-1935 academic year had increased compared the 1933-1934 academic year. The publication attributed this increase to the 50% freshman requirement.107

| Table 1.1: Marshall Enrollment by Fall Semester: Fall 1933-Fall 1935 |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Fall Semester | Semester Enrollment | % of Increase from Previous Semester |
| 1933 | 1,497 |  |
| 1934 | 1,630 | +8.2% |
| 1935 | 1,709 | +4.6% |

*Source: Eleventh Biennial Report of West Virginia Board of Control,* (Charleston, West Virginia, Jarrett Printing, 1936), 329.

106 Reeves, 24-25.
107 *The Parthenon,* August 3, 1934.
As illustrated by the chart above, *The Parthenon*'s assessment held true. Marshall’s enrollment increased 8.2% (133 students) between the fall of 1933 and the fall of 1934. Overall, from the fall of 1933, the semester before the program began, to the fall of 1935, student enrollment at Marshall increased approximately 12.4%. The increase continued with the enrollment of 1,903 students in the fall of 1940 at Marshall; a 28.6% increase in enrollment from 1934.\(^{108}\) By offering financial aid, the student employment program most likely played an important factor in this increase.

**Table 1.2: Marshall Enrollment with Tuition Rates: 1928-1942**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>National Students Enrollment</th>
<th>% National Enrollment Increase</th>
<th>Marshall Student Enrollment</th>
<th>% Marshall Enrollment Change</th>
<th>Marshall Tuition Rates/Semester</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>1,054,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,664</td>
<td></td>
<td>$17.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1,101,000</td>
<td>+4.5%</td>
<td>2,964</td>
<td>+11.3%</td>
<td>$21.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1,154,000</td>
<td>+4.8%</td>
<td>3,243</td>
<td>+21.0%</td>
<td>$21.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1,055,000</td>
<td>-8.6%</td>
<td>3,106</td>
<td>-4.2%</td>
<td>$28.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1,208,000</td>
<td>+14.5%</td>
<td>3,421</td>
<td>+10.1%</td>
<td>$30.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1,351,000</td>
<td>+11.8%</td>
<td>3,220</td>
<td>-5.9%</td>
<td>$30.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1,494,000</td>
<td>+10.6%</td>
<td>4,105</td>
<td>+27.5%</td>
<td>$35.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1,404,000</td>
<td>-6.0%</td>
<td>3,329</td>
<td>-18.9%</td>
<td>$35.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{108}\) Moffat, 100; Thomas Richard Ross, *Davis & Elkins College 75: The Diamond Jubilee History* (Elkins, WV: Davis and Elkin College, 1980), 88. Additionally, the private Davis and Elkin’s College decreased from 195 full time students in 1932-33 to 183 in 1933-34. Ross suggests that many factors including FERA and NYA funding played a role in increasing enrollment in 1934-1935 to 213 and maintaining above 200 until 1939-40 where it dropped to 191. McLaran Sawyer, *Centennial History of the University of Nebraska, Vol II: the Modern University, 1920-1969* (Lincoln, Nebraska: Centennial Press, 1973). 4. Land grant university, the *University of Nebraska,* experienced decline earlier than the Marshall College. Sawyer illustrates that the total college students enrolled in the University of Nebraska dropped from 10,052 in 1930-31 to 9,533 in 1931-32 to 8,761 in 1932-33 to 7,880 in 1933-34 and increased steadily for the remainder of the decade to 9,462 in 1938-39.
Nationally, from 1932 to 1934, as illustrated by the chart above, before the New Deal student employment program gained a national foothold, college enrollment decreased by 100,000 students. After the federal government initiated the employment program nationwide, enrollment increased from 1,055,000 in 1934 to 1,208,000 in 1936 and eventually to 1,494,000 in 1940. Enrollment numbers increased by 41.6%, or about 439,000 students enrolled overall, in a six-year period! Examining enrollment at Marshall College each year, enrollment decreased from 3,243 in 1932 to 3,106 in 1934 (-4.2%). However, between the school years 1934 and 1936 enrollment increased from 3,106 to 3,421 (+10.1%). Even though Marshall’s enrollment did not increase as steadily as the national enrollment, both enrollment numbers remained above their pre-Great Depression numbers until after the student employment program stopped.

Other institutions across the nation would experience increases in enrollment similar to Marshall. Doherty and Summers attribute New Deal funding at West Virginia University (WVU), in part, to this increase, stating,

With enrollment gaining by 1935, WVU had become the second largest industry in Monongalia County. With assistance from government subsidies both in the Depression years and in the war years, enrollment figures in the early 1930s were in the 2,000 range; from 1934 to 1941 to the mid-3,000 range. While attendance dropped in September 1944, to the lowest point of 1,749 students, it rose by 1946 to a total of 4,010 with the first of the World War II veterans taking advantage of the educational provisions of the GI Bill of Rights.

In Georgia, Emory University increased 7.5% in 1934-1935 and 7.8% in 1935-1936. Georgia Tech increased 11.9% from 1934-1935, but only 5.3% from 1935-1936. The University of Georgia enrollment increased 12.25% in 1934-1935 and 1935-1936 12.34%. Many

109 Bower, 367-368.
110 Doherty and Summers, 140. Considering WVU’s enrollment at the time was most likely more than that of Marshall College, Doherty most likely uses a different method of enrollment reporting than that of Marshall’s College Bulletin and the West Virginia Board of Control’s report. However, it is evident that WVU follows a similar pattern of increase and decrease, with a jump after 1934, as that of Marshall and other colleges.
111 Reeves, 55-57.
influences could have caused this increase, including expansion of a physical plant and the
addition of a new college. Several historians, however, also suggest that tuition increases and
decreases may have played a factor in increased enrollment as well.\footnote{Ross argues that, at Davis and Elkins College, the “low tuition ($75 per semester)” “accounted for the
stability and slight increase in the enrollment.” Ross, 80. Additionally, Arthur Gordon Slonaker. 
\textit{A History of Shepherd College} (Parsons, WV: McClain Printing Co., 1967, 85. Slonaker suggests that increasing tuition at
Shepherd College played a role in the 1933-34 decrease in enrollment at Shepherd College.}
A great increase in tuition
(from $21.50 to $28.75 per semester) did coincide with the 1934 decrease. However, as
Marshall was gaining students, as illustrated by the Table 2 above, its tuition increased as well.
Even after tuition stabilized at $30 per semester, enrollment increased. Furthermore, enrollment
capped out at over 4,000 in 1940 when Dr. Allen increased Marshall's tuition to the highest in the
decade. An increase in tuition could have caused the subsequent decrease in 1942, but male
students joining the military to fight in World War II could have as well. However, according to
experiences at Marshall College as well as other colleges, the federal student employment
program most likely played an important factor in increased enrollment nationwide.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>Per Capita Expenditures</th>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>Per Capita Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1927-1928</td>
<td>$234.14</td>
<td>1938-1939</td>
<td>$92.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-1929</td>
<td>$207.7</td>
<td>1939-1940</td>
<td>$90.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-1930</td>
<td>$221.69</td>
<td>1940-1941</td>
<td>$95.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-1934</td>
<td>$151</td>
<td>1941-1942</td>
<td>$129.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936-1937</td>
<td>$93.40</td>
<td>1942-1943</td>
<td>$211.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937-1938</td>
<td>$101.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Data from \textit{Ninth through Twelfth Biennial Report of West Virginia Board of Control} (Charleston, West
Virginia, Jarrett Printing Co., 1924-1943). 1933-1934 per capita expenditure was obtained from “Costs Per Student

The part-time jobs helped students to stay in school and provided more funding to
colleges, such as Marshall, but, according to Reeves, in Georgia, it did not make up for the
“lagging endowment income or foreshortened state appropriations” at many institutions. As late as 1940, Marshall still did not have an endowment, and the state drastically cut the budget of Marshall and other state institutions. The table above demonstrates how these factors affected Marshall. As enrollment increased, the funds available to provide college services to students decreased. Before the enrollment increase, the per capita expenditures averaged around $220 per academic year. However, during the latter part of the Great Depression (1936 to 1941) and the enrollment increase, the average expenditures was about $95 per academic year or well under half of what it was before 1930. The trend is similar to what occurred at other institutions such as the University of Nebraska. The increased student enrollment did not allow Marshall to provide as many academic services as it did before the Great Depression. Therefore, the enrollment increase caused by the student employment program actually hurt Marshall’s finances.

Not only did the program encourage better students and increase enrollment, it also brought hope to those who could not normally attend college because of financial reasons. Morale among students ran high during the mid and late 1930s. The student employment program most likely contributed to this effect. The letters of the office of the president provide a view into the impact on student morale. Both Dr. Shawkey and Dr. Allen received letters from students, high school faculty, and even relief administrators pertaining to the employment of students. Most pertained to freshmen just entering college. For example, student

113 Reeves, 59.
114 Moffat, 100; Herman G. Kump, “Address Before a Public Rally Sponsored by a Citizens’ Committee,” May 1, 1934, State Papers and Public Addresses of H.G. Kump: 1933-1937, Complied by James W. Harris, Jr. and William E. Hughes, (Charleston, West Virginia: Jarrett Printing Co., 1937), 181-185. In 1934, Governor Kump called for the budgets of state institutions of higher education to be decreased to 60% of their 1931 budgets. The effects of state budget cuts will be discussed further in chapter three of the thesis.
115 Sawyer, 61. The per capita cost of the University of Nebraska went from $210 during 1929-1931 biennial year to $149 during the 1935-1937 biennial year.
116 Marshall’s financial problems will be further detailed in Chapter 3 of the thesis.
117 Reeves, 59.
George Hindson wrote Dr. Shawkey, “The height of my ambition at this time is a college education which, it seems, I can attain only by working my way through.”\textsuperscript{118} He offered his experience in journalism to request work on \textit{The Parthenon}. Dr. Shawkey informed him that freshmen could not work on \textit{The Parthenon}. However, he could contact Professor Prichard for part-time employment.\textsuperscript{119} The New Deal program offered Hindson a chance to achieve his dream of attending college.

Other letters related to students transferring from another college to Marshall or former Marshall College students seeking to attend the institution once more. Roscoe Junior Brown attended the more expensive Salem College in Salem, West Virginia as a freshman on scholarship, but “even if [he] secured a $15 a month job at Salem [College], [he] could not have met [his] expenses because of the high tuition there.”\textsuperscript{120} He thus planned to transfer to Marshall College because of its lower tuition. Student Eugene A Vaughn thanked Dr. Allen stating,

I feel that without your aid I would have had a hard time, indeed, in obtaining the necessary money for this semester’s schooling…I realize the inadequacy [sic] of words in conveying my appreciation but perhaps you will have a more concrete expression for it when the reports for the coming semester are available.\textsuperscript{121}

Dr. Allen thanked him for his letter and stated, “Any man with the proper sense of appreciation can never lose sight of his obligation to this American nation of which we are all a part.”\textsuperscript{122} While the program did not provide enough money for Vaughn to attend the more expensive Salem College, it allowed him to continue college at Marshall.

While allowing some students to continue college, the program also gave other students the hope that they could attend college in the first place. Principal Justus A. Deahl expressed this

\begin{small}
\textsuperscript{118} George Hindson to M.P. Shawkey, June 25, 1934. MUA, RG P, 1934-1935, Box 10, Folder 20.
\textsuperscript{119} M.P. Shawkey to George Hindson, July 5, 1934. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{120} Roscoe Junior Brown to James E. Allen, June 11, 1936. MUA, RG P, 1935-1936, Box 11, Folder 41.
\textsuperscript{121} Eugene A. Vaughn to James E. Allen, January 29, 1936. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} James E. Allen to Eugene A. Vaughn, January 31, 1936. Ibid.
\end{small}
to Dr. Shawkey by explaining the situation at Preston County High School. Of the 235 high school graduates, he wrote that only about three out of approximately sixty “well prepared” students could afford to attend college unless they receive financial aid.\(^{123}\) Deahl explained, “Our boys and girls who are anxious to continue in school are willing to work at anything honorable.”\(^ {124}\) The part-time student employment program increased the optimism of a variety of students. Without this, many students could not have attended college and would have increased the poor economic and social situations that existed during the Great Depression.

College administrators, like Dr. Shawkey, viewed the student part-time employment program as a boon. Moreover, even Dr. Allen, although reluctantly, nonetheless chose to properly administer it. Each, perhaps, realized the benefits of such a program. Not only did it provide extra income to the college in the form of tuition, but it also acted as a tool for Dr. Shawkey and Dr. Allen to recruit higher quality students. Both presidents, especially Dr. Shawkey, treated the program almost like a scholarship. Many times, they focused on referring students with higher grades and exceptional skills, like musical talent, to Professor Prichard’s committee. Using the program in this manner was, perhaps, contrary to Hopkins’s goal of providing as much relief to students in need. The presidents may have granted preference to exceptional students over lesser-gifted students that still qualified and may have had more need. Many college presidents most likely utilized the program in this manner.

The employment program appears to have had the greatest positive affect on the students. Perhaps its most profound impact on higher education was its effect on student morale. Without the program, hundreds of students had little to no hope to expand their education beyond high school. The new student parameters of the program most likely caused an increase in

\(^{124}\) Ibid.
enrollment. On the surface, this initially seemed to be a benefit. However, Marshall College, as well as other intuitions across the state and nation, soon experienced state imposed budget cuts, which meant less money for the education of the increased amount of students funded by New Deal programs. Therefore, the student employment program ultimately hurt Marshall’s ability to function financially and most likely limited the education many students received in the process. The decreased per capita expenditures meant Marshall had less money to spend on student education. To add to this problem, the expanded enrollment meant that Marshall had to expand its housing facilities and improve its overall physical plant. Two New Deal agencies, the PWA and the WPA, stepped in and provided the much needed expansion and modernization of Marshall College.

The PWA and the WPA were among the largest agencies that provided jobs to the unemployed during the Great Depression. However, their primary influence on Marshall was not providing jobs but improving, expanding, and restoring the campus grounds. Not only did they perform minor jobs like landscaping but also built three major structures for the college. Additionally, they became instrumental in recovery after two floods, the second devastating the city of Huntington as well as the institution. As shall be revealed in the next chapter, the PWA and WPA restored and saved Marshall College during one of the hardest financial eras in history.
Chapter 2

What’s the New Deal with the PWA and WPA at Marshall?

Much as the part-time student employment program brought positive and negative effects to Marshall, the efforts of the Public Works Administration (PWA) and the Works Progress Administration (WPA) had the same effect. These two agencies provided relief during two floods that affected, nearly, the entire Ohio River, Huntington, and Marshall in 1936 and 1937. In addition to flood relief, from 1935 to 1937, the PWA and WPA performed numerous restorations and minor additions to existing structures and they aided in the construction of three major new buildings at Marshall, costing over $500,000 in total construction expenses.¹ The three new buildings included the Albert Gallatin Jenkins Teacher Training School, begun in November 1935, and two dormitories, Laidley and Hodges halls, in March 1936. Each project provided much needed expansion during a time when Marshall College experienced a significant growth in enrollment. Although the state directly paid for the WPA and PWA expansions, Marshall still indirectly funded the efforts in the form of the state budget cuts to higher education. Many New Deal projects required the states to pay the majority of the costs, which prompted West Virginia to find the means to reduce its expenditures including its budget for

¹ Charles Moffat, *Marshall University: An Institution Comes of Age, 1837-1980* (Huntington, WV: Marshall University Alumni Assoc., 1981), 106. The cost would be over $7.9 million in 2012 dollars. Jerry Bruce Thomas, *An Appalachian New Deal: West Virginia in the Great Depression*, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1998), 129. While not a PWA or WPA program, another notable federal project was a short-lived social work summer class that trained students on how to implement relief programs. Both Marshall and West Virginia University hosted the program during the summer of 1934, which taught 120 students total. William Beehler, the head the West Virginia Relief Administration, developed the idea believing that West Virginia did not possess the experienced people to implement relief programs. As a follow up on the program, FERA offered sixteen scholarships to students to further their social work training at colleges like the University of Chicago, The Carnegie Institute of Technology, and the University of Pittsburgh among others. While the program only lasted for a summer at Marshall and West Virginia University, it assisted students who wanted to continue their education.
higher education. Although the PWA and WPA expanded and restored Marshall College, their fiscal requirements of the states severely limited Marshall’s budget.

Founded on June 16, 1933, the PWA’s “basic objective was to restore purchasing power - to bolster a sagging national income” by providing unemployment relief during the Great Depression. Its original budget of $3.3 billion would balloon to almost $6.1 billion with 34,508 public works projects nationally between July 1933 and March 1939. These efforts included building and repairing airports, dams, bridges, hospitals, and buildings at many institutions of higher education including Marshall. The PWA spent over $198 million in constructing 662 college buildings across the United States. The agency’s work encompassed dormitories, classroom buildings, administration buildings, and waterworks. However, the PWA’s spending would be dwarfed by its sister organization, the WPA.

Established on May 6, 1935 by executive order 7034, the WPA succeeded the Federal Emergency Relief Agency (FERA). Like FERA, Harry L. Hopkins also headed the WPA, which gradually took control of FERA funding with the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1937 completely liquidating FERA’s assets. The establishment of the WPA marked the shift from federal support of state relief agencies, like the West Virginia Relief Administration (WVRA), to direct federal funding of relief efforts. The WPA expected the state or institution requesting the aid to provide a percentage, typically 55% to 75%, of the cost of said projects. In total, the federal government spent $12.95 billion on WPA programs between May 1936 and March 1943. Of this amount, the administration spent over $163 million in West Virginia. Like the PWA,

---

3 Ibid., 7-8, 135.
the federal government established the WPA to provide unemployment relief. The diversity of employment the WPA offered was the primary difference between the two groups. In addition to public building projects, the WPA also funded endeavors like the Federal Art Project to employ artists and the National Youth Administration to employ students. Both the PWA and the WPA played a major role in relief, development, and recovery at Marshall College during the mid-1930s.

The PWA and WPA restorations at Marshall College included renovating the president’s office, washing the walls of Morrow Library, and plumbing renovations on several buildings including the chemistry lab, gymnasium, and the Old Main administration building. One of the few projects completed under Dr. Shawkey, the PWA constructed a 75-foot flagpole in front of Old Main costing approximately $400. Workers completed the flag’s concrete base, emblazoned with the college’s insignia, in December 1934. Finally, after three months, on March 1, 1935 Marshall’s school newspaper, The Parthenon, proudly announced “75 Foot Pole Erected Here.” A symbol of pride for Marshall College, the American Legion dedicated it on March 8, 1935 with a ceremony hoisting an American flag.\(^6\) Though this project may appear minor, the flagpole not only provided jobs for unemployed workers, but also, considering the praise the Parthenon gave the flagpole, it appears to have instilled a sense of pride for Marshall College students.

In addition to construction improvements, the WPA’s Federal Art Project employed artists on a salary basis to produce works of art. The subjects of these works were anything the artist wanted. However, once they were completed, the art became federal property. Typically, the WPA “loaned” these works of art to a national or state institution, like Marshall College,

\(^6\) The Parthenon, December 21, 1934; March 1, 1935; March 8, 1935; and February 21, 1936. Marshall Superintendent of Building and Grounds, James L. Mullen, oversaw much of the PWA and WPA activity at the university.
until a donor, generally a civic association, paid the cost of materials. Once this occurred, the donor would “donate” the art back to the receiving institution. The Federal Art project “loaned” twelve works of art, valued at over $1,000 to Marshall that displayed them in the Morrow Library for the institutions 1937 centennial. By the time of Marshall’s centennial, donors had purchased six pieces for the college. The collection included various paintings, lithographs, and woodcut. Titles included “Antique Shop,” “Funeral on a Gray Day,” and “Under the High Level Bridge.” Modern city life and labor were the main themes of many works. One of the most interesting works was a watercolor by Victor Candel, of New York, titled “Men at Work.” The Parthenon described the work stating,

The eight or nine figures in the drawing are partially hidden by the equipment with which they are working. Pipes leading from the upper right corner of the picture to an excavation in the street obscure other figures. The excavation is fenced off, there are red flags at each corner, and in the foreground is a sign reading, ‘Men Working.’ Every figure in the painting is busy at some task.

The painting contained a political message that represented the hope brought about by the New Deal’s employment efforts. The artist most likely intended to encourage those unemployed that they would be able to find a job. The prominence of the “Men Working” sign also, most likely, sought to instill pride into those men who had jobs under the Work Progress Administration. Productions like this not only employed artists, but they also acted as a form of government propaganda that advertised the employment efforts of New Deal agencies.

Even though these New Deal contributions were relatively minor compared to the other PWA and WPA projects at Marshall, the flagpole and donated paintings provided the college with a means for improvement that helped lessen the impact of the Depression. The college did

---

7 The Parthenon, March 5, 1937. In the case of the art donated to Marshall the cost of materials ranged from about $2.25 to $8.50 for each work.
8 Ibid.
9 The Parthenon, May 31, 1937.
not have to pay for the pole out of its budget, and the paintings, by adding new works of art, most likely improved Marshall’s environment without Marshall having to pay for them. Additionally, both projects, most likely, acted as morale booster by instilling both a sense of national pride through the symbolism of the American flag flying over the campus and a sense of collegiate pride when the college received the art works during the college’s Centennial celebration.

While, on the surface, these minor projects aided Marshall College, they perhaps, indirectly hurt Marshall. As David O. Levine contends, the New Deal’s “[p]ressure on state budgets for [New Deal] employment and relief programs led to the sharp curtailment of funds for public higher education.” The federal government required states to match, three to one, every dollar spent by New Deal projects, like Marshall’s flagpole. Nationally many institutions, like the University of Minnesota, experienced budget reductions that averaged about 8% less than what they were during the 1920s. The University of California’s appropriations dropped 15%.\textsuperscript{10} In 1934, the state of West Virginia did the same as other states. It cut the budget of several state programs and agencies. Higher education suffered the most. The state reduced the budget for higher education to 45% of what it was in 1931. It only reduced other state agencies to about 60% of their 1931 totals. One of the primary reasons for reduction, according to Governor Herman Kump, was to meet the New Deal financial demands on the states.\textsuperscript{11} These budget cuts meant a decrease in every Marshall salary by as much as 35%-40%, including that of the president, which dropped from $7,000 to $5,100 in 1932.\textsuperscript{12} Shawkey’s salary went from $7,000

\textsuperscript{12} James E. Allen to Dr. Frank H. Bowles, March 9, 1939. MUA, RG P, 1938-1939, Box 18, Folder 34.
annually to $5,100 annually (a 27% decrease). While the flagpole and minor repairs did not cost the state, and indirectly the college, much money, construction of three buildings on Marshall’s campus would affect the college far more.

The Albert Gallatin Jenkins Teacher Training School was the first of the buildings the New Deal agencies began on the Marshall College campus. The construction crew broke ground for the new building on November 25, 1935 next to the old teacher training school building, which WPA workers moved to allow space for the new structure. Jenkins Hall sustained between 500 and 600 schoolchildren (K-12) in twenty-two classrooms on the first and second floor. Additionally, it had a theatre and library on the second floor. The theatre had 130 seats and served as a place to hold music events, plays, and other school activities. The basement housed a workshop and home economics classroom. Jenkins Hall epitomized the modernization that New Deal efforts brought about on Marshall’s campus. According to Professor Otis G. Wilson, Dean of the Marshall’s Teachers College, it was “the first air-conditioned college building in the state” and the “most needed building [Marshall did] not

---


14 According the Marshall University catalog, “now, Jenkins houses administration, offices, and classrooms of the College of Education. The facility includes a statistical laboratory, a learning resource center, a mathematics education laboratory, a school plant laboratory, and an adult reading center.” Marshall University Undergraduate Catalog, 2011-2012 (Huntington, West Virginia: Marshall University, 2011), 12. The college referred to it as the model school until the college’s 1937 Centennial celebration. The term model school meant that it provided a model environment for student teachers to have hands on teaching experience before they graduated and obtained employment at a regular elementary or high school. During the celebration, Marshall officials dedicated the model school in honor of Confederate General Albert Gallatin Jenkins who was a native of Cabell County and served as a cavalry officer during the Civil War.

15 The Parthenon, November 28, 1935. The college referred to it as the model school until the college’s 1937 Centennial celebration. The term model school meant that it provided a model environment for student teachers to have hands on teaching experience before they graduated and obtained employment at a regular elementary or high school. During the celebration, Marshall officials dedicated the model school in honor of Confederate General Albert Gallatin Jenkins who was a native of Cabell County and served as a cavalry officer during the Civil War.
have.” However, construction of Jenkins Hall did not proceed smoothly because the construction company experienced a series of setbacks before the building’s completion.

The first was the shortage of skilled labor. G. C. Christian, chief engineer of the Huntington branch of the WPA, indicated that the WPA typically worked on street improvement projects because such tasks maximized the employment of unskilled labor with little cost of equipment. Conversely, Christian noted that “building projects, however, [required] a high financial outlay for material. Then, too, they need[ed] from [eighty] to [ninety] per cent skilled labor.” At the time, according to Christian, “The skilled labor market [had] very stiff [competition] in Huntington.” Therefore, the WPA had to outsource to private labor and pay an additional price which meant the “whole financial schedule for the project [was] thrown off balance.”

A shortage of skilled labor also plagued the second and third building projects, the construction of Hodges and Laidley Halls, respectively a men’s and women’s dorm. Costing over $300,000, both Hodges and Laidley Hall were three stories and housed approximately 150 students each. The architects designed each dorm in Early American style and the workers constructed them on the corner of Huntington’s Third Avenue and Eighteenth Street. The college named Hodges Hall after Thomas E. Hodges, president of Marshall College from 1886 to

---

16 The Parthenon, February 26, 1937. Charles Cano Talbert, The University of Kentucky: the Maturing Years (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1965), 117-122. Building projects at the University of Kentucky were not as advanced. PWA Construction crews built new dormitories, a student union building, and a biological science building, among many others. The plans called for an air conditioning system that workers did not install due to lack fund. The lack of air conditioning created problems as the buildings lacked opening windows. Construction crews installed an ineffective system of fans in the student union buildings. Eventually, the college had to install new windows.

17 G.C. Christian quoted in The Parthenon, November 8, 1935. Lack of workers would be the first delay the Jenkins Hall construction crew would experience, but it was not the last. As shall be detailed later in the chapter, two floods in the following two years would create more delays.
1896. It named Laidley Hall after the founder of the college, John Laidley, who was a friend of Chief Justice John Marshall. The college dedicated both halls along with Jenkins Hall during the 1937 Centennial Celebration.

The college’s original plan also called for the construction of six small dormitories housing on average about twenty-two students each or 130 students in total. Marshall College was to use these dorms as fraternity houses, with the plan to have a women’s dormitory built later. From April 1934, the West Virginia Board of Control sought $135,000 in funds from the PWA, which student rental fees would pay back over a twenty-year period. The PWA rejected these plans in November 1934, because the agency did not have the funds at the time. The setback resulted in the development of a new plan to build one male and one female dormitory. The board asked for $100,000 for each dorm of which the PWA would provide thirty percent of the starting cost and student room fees would pay the rest over time.

Other institutions benefited from New Deal building programs and had similar experiences as Marshall College. At West Virginia University (WVU), the PWA built a five – story men’s dormitory housing 360 men and expanded the women’s dormitories to house 150 more women. According to Doherty, the university’s President John Roscoe Turner referred to the construction as the “most progressive step in a decade.”

---


19 *Marshall University Undergraduate Catalog* 2011-2012, 12. As of 2012, Laidley Hall “houses the Regents Bachelor of Arts program, administrative offices for college courses in the high schools, Tutoring Services, and University College.”

20 *The Parthenon*, April 5, 1934; November 28, 1934; and April 12, 1935. $35,000 of the original $135,000 funds was to be a grant, and the $100,000 was to be a loan.

requested a loan of $400,000 from a private investment firm. However, the PWA funded the construction, which eventually cost $625,000 because of a miscalculation in the plans.\textsuperscript{22}

Other states, like Georgia, also experienced legal problems with PWA funding. The University of Georgia and Georgia Tech received $313,000 and $204,000 respectively for their projects, which included dormitories and a canning factory for Georgia Tech’s School of Agriculture. Like Marshall’s dormitories, they were self-liquidating, with proceeds from the buildings paying for the cost. Georgia institutions faced issues obtaining funds from the PWA. Similar to Marshall’s desires, in 1933, the Georgia Board of Regents requested a long list of buildings, totaling $3,570,000 in loans. However, Harold Ickes, administrator of the PWA, questioned whether a state institution, like the Georgia Board, could request federal loans. To establish a legal precedent, the Board brought a case before the Georgia Supreme Court. In 1935, the Georgia Board of Regents made a compromise which required the state to provide $1,000,000 if the Board canceled the PWA loan request. Eventually, the Board circumvented the compromise by requesting grants instead of loans, with the Board using the state funds to match the percentage required by PWA guidelines.\textsuperscript{23} As with Marshall, that faced resistance from the PWA because of lack of funding, Georgia also met opposition. Each of these cases illustrates the difficulties faced by educational institutions as federal involvement in state affairs increased. Due to budgetary limitations, inadequate planning, and political opposition, many institutions faced setbacks in receiving the benefits of New Deal relief. Marshall’s case was no different.

Marshall College’s dormitory construction bids opened on November 27, 1935. The PWA rejected the first six bids because the agency decided the bids were too high. In response, the architects redesigned the buildings to allow the contractors to bid lower. Finally,

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 154.
\textsuperscript{23} Mary Garwood Reeves, “Economic Depression in Higher Education: Emory University, the University of Georgia and Georgia Tech, 1930-1940” (PhD diss., Georgia State University, 1985.), 161-162.
Consolidated Engineering of Baltimore won the contract, and C.B. Huff served as the company’s construction superintendent. However, before construction of the new dormitories could commence, the construction crew would need to remove the women’s residence Champ Clark Cottage, two private dwellings, and the former Theta Rho sorority house. The G.K. Jeffers Company of Huntington purchased them, destroyed the first three buildings, and moved the fourth to Fourth Avenue.24

Consolidated Engineering planned to begin construction of the men’s dormitory first, but, according to the contract, the company had a time limit of 250 days from the day work began to complete both dorms. Therefore, the construction crew had to build both simultaneously to meet the deadline. Each dorm could house approximately 150 people. The men’s dorm was 187 feet long and 87 feet wide. The women’s was the same width but only 177 feet long. Before construction could commence, the treasury department had to approve the PWA loan. It delayed approval until the State of West Virginia deposited the money for the buildings’ furnishings to ensure their purchase once the dorms were completed. The approval came on March 6, 1936. However, soon after the president of the State Board of Control, James A. Chambers, announced the funds were available, disaster struck. On March 20, 1936, The Parthenon reported that the Ohio River was rising to flood stage. The dormitory construction area was within the expected flood zone.25

The same day that The Huntington Advertiser announced, “Dormitory Work at College Gets Final Approval,” it declared, “Warning of Flood with Over Fifty Feet.”26 As the Ohio River reached 32.3 feet, the Advertiser quoted an engineer as stating, “It’s not a question of the

24 The Parthenon, December 13, 1935; February 7, 1936.
25 The Parthenon, February 7, 1936; March 10, 1936; and March 20, 1936.
26 The Huntington Advertiser, March 17, 1936.
The WPA went on alert to provide flood relief, expecting the river to rise to sixty-two feet. Should the water reach this height, it would have engulfed or isolated several of the Huntington WPA offices and numerous projects in the city. Fortunately, the predictions were wrong and the water rose only to 56.85 feet in Huntington. However, within the city, the flood caused over $100,000 in damages. The WPA would be instrumental in cleaning up the flood’s aftermath at Marshall.

Luckily, the dormitory construction crew had not yet begun its work. However, the local minor damage occurred which included Marshall’s music hall and the Morrow Library basement, which housed the journalism classrooms. During the week following the flood, the college held classes in the council chamber near President Allen’s office, the dormitory social room, and the cafeteria. The WPA provided clean-up funds.

When the river receded, three feet of water surrounded the music hall and infirmary, the student union basement still contained six feet, and a foot of water covered the gymnasium. By Tuesday March 31, The Parthenon reported, “College affairs settled down to normal routine yesterday.” However, the music hall still did not have electricity. “According to Mullen,” the article continued, “all repairs that must be made can be handled by his local staff,” which consisted of “football men” who were hired to move furniture. However, Mullen requested and received $1,500 from the WPA to paint the basement of the Morrow library, repair the music hall floor, and repair Jenkins Hall.

The Parthenon announced the commencement of construction of the new dorms in the same issue it declared business as usual at Marshall. The article explained, “The first floor of the

---

28 The Huntington Advertiser, March 24, 1936 and March 31, 1936.
29 The Parthenon, March 27, 1936.
30 The Parthenon, March 31, 1936; April 17, 1936; and February 26, 1937.
dormitories will be approximately six feet above the present level of the land.”31 The precaution would help prevent floodwaters from entering the building “providing [the water did] not rise three feet higher than the [water] last week.”32 Unfortunately, the effort would prove futile the following year.

The construction of the two dorms represented another step toward Marshall College’s further expansion. During the groundbreaking ceremony, on April 1, 1936, Board of Control member, James A. Chambers, announced the desire to build a cafeteria for the two dorms and possibly a field house for the college. Chambers predicted that this expansion would foster even more growth at Marshall declaring that “we will not stop until there is an enrollment of 3,500 students, which is bound to follow.”33 The construction efforts provided not only economic relief but, as Chamber’s comments suggest, they apparently provided inspiration and hope of Marshall’s growth during the hard times. By adding the new buildings, the New Deal paved the way for the further expansion of Marshall’s campus.

However, the dormitory groundbreaking was not the end of the New Deal’s involvement at Marshall. The events over the following year further illustrated the effect of the New Deal’s construction programs on the college. Much like with the model school, the lack of skilled labor delayed dormitory construction during the summer of 1936. However, as workers became more available, C. B. Huff announced in September 1936 that the dorms were almost finished.34 In spite of this announcement, construction continued for four months until January 1937.

The college planned to open the dormitories during the second half of the 1936-1937 academic year. As the construction crew finished major construction in January 1937, the

31 The Parthenon, March 31, 1936.
32 Ibid.
34 The Parthenon, September 15, 1936.
laborers were still moving furnishings into the dormitories as the first occupants were applying for residency. On January 12, Marshall’s officials announced their plans to complete minor construction and furnish the dormitories by January 25, three days before the semester commenced. The events of January 1937 insured that this did not occur.

In his inauguration speech, on January 18, 1937, the newly elected Governor Homer Holt announced continued state budget reductions of which he blamed on New Deal demands for funding. Holt declared that, the state of West Virginia needed between “$6.5 million and $9.5 million annually depending on the character and extent of independent federal (New Deal) activities for relief of the unemployed.” The announcement would not be the only bad news Marshall College received that day.

The Ohio River had started rising on January 5, 1937, and, by January 18, the Huntington Advertiser announced that it would reach flood stage of fifty-two feet within a few days. Huntington slowly began shutting down, becoming isolated as water covered a portion of Huntington’s Thirty-First Street and threatened to cover the route between Huntington and Point Pleasant, West Virginia by the night of the 18th. Recognizing the worsening conditions, the city’s flood relief committee and other relief agencies mobilized. Abe Forsythe, director of the WPA’s Fifth district, which included Huntington, was one of the first to answer Huntington’s Mayor George R Seamonds’ plea for assistance.

The following day, on January 19, with the Ohio River at fifty feet and rising, several relief agencies, including the WPA, the Red Cross, Naval Reserves, Salvation Army, and the city engineers began evacuating families living along the river. Additionally, Forsythe authorized

---

35 *The Parthenon*, January 12, 1937.
37 *The Huntington Advertiser*, January 18, 1937.
$2,000 to aid the relocation process. While relief crews evacuated the shorelines, merchants on Third Avenue began clearing out their lower levels and pumping water out of basements. The Advertiser reported no major damage; however, the river continued to encircle Huntington as it obstructed the route between Catlettsburg and Ashland, Kentucky. Even though meteorologists predicted the waters would only reach fifty-four feet, relief agencies prepared for higher waters.38

As Huntington’s relief agencies and shop owners prepared for the worse, on January 19, Marshall student reporter, Mary Lou Geary, published an article in the Advertiser titled, “New Dormitories Turned Over To Marshall Today.” She described the amenities of each dormitory including a library in the women’s dorm and showers in the men’s. She further announced that Parsons-Souders Co. of Clarksburg, West Virginia would provide the furnishings costing $20,000. Geary optimistically announced that the dorms would open to students by January 28.40 Ironically, Marshall did not officially receive the dormitories until after the floodwaters receded. Like many Huntington residents, Mary Lou Geary did not realize the full magnitude of the disaster to come.

Like Geary, Huntington’s officials did not predict what was to come. On January 20, the Ohio River was at fifty-three feet. In spite of the continued rainfall, officials still expected the river to rise to only fifty-five feet. The evacuation efforts expanded, as the water covered Huntington’s Third through Fifth Avenues north of Sixteenth Street, the WPA and other relief

38 William B. Newcomb, interview by Robert Sawrey, November 2, 1983, 64-308b, transcript, Oral History of Appalachia Collection, Marshall University, Huntington, West Virginia. In an interview years later William Newcomb related his experience as the son of the owner and manager of the Anderson Newcomb-Stone and Thomas building on Third Avenue. He stated, “I happened to be called the flood president because I was the only officer of the company on the job in Huntington, ah, when that flood hit. And, ah, we kept the water out of that basement until it was already washing over the sidewalk out front.”


agencies evacuated approximately 150 homes. The city’s isolation increased as water started covering River Street in the Guyandotte neighborhood. To complicate matters, garbage pickup halted because water flooded the dump’s incinerator.\textsuperscript{41} Events were growing harsh, but the city officials remained positive about their situation.

Optimism waned by January 21 as the floodwaters rose to fifty-six and a half feet overnight, and officials expected the water to rise to fifty-eight or fifty-nine feet as the rain intensified. On this day, relief workers evacuated 200 families, and approximately 500 families took refuge in centers established at local schools in the area away from the expected flood zone. Huntington continued to shut down as officials closed at least five local schools including Marshall’s model school. However, the college itself remained open despite the fact that the flood had begun to affect Marshall. Additionally, the city’s isolation continued to grow as the river surrounded neighboring Proctorville and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad halted all trains that evening.\textsuperscript{42} Events had become worse than experts had predicted.

On January 22, the river reached about fifty-six feet nine inches at Dam 28 almost the same height as the 1936 flood. Officials predicted that the river would crest around sixty feet at Dam 28 and sixty-two feet on Huntington’s Tenth Street. Huntington’s mayor announced that “[i]t [was then] apparent that an emergency of larger proportions than had been anticipated [was] facing the city.”\textsuperscript{43} He reorganized the city’s flood committee and requested four Coast Guard boats to rescue flood victims. Additionally, the state government sent twelve police officers to assist in policing Huntington.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{41} James A. Wallen, “Additional Rains Fail to Increase Ravages of Flood,” \textit{The Huntington Advertiser}, January 20, 1937.
\textsuperscript{43} James R. Harworth, “City Reorganizes Relief Units to Meet Flood Need,” \textit{The Huntington Advertiser}, January 22, 1937.
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{The Huntington Advertiser}, January 22, 1937.
Sadly, also on January 22, *The Huntington Advertiser* reported the first two tri-state flood related deaths. One was a male, resident of Huntington and WPA worker, who fell from his work truck. The other was a female who drowned in the flooded pond near her house. The flood had become deadly. To add to the problems, the flood prevented city officials from delivering the city’s milk supply. However, the city’s gas, water, and electricity utilities were still operating. The superintendent of Huntington’s Water Corps stated that the flood would not threaten the water supply unless the river reached sixty-eight feet. Because city officials halted garbage pickup, the city sanitation officer recommended either burying the garbage if possible or placing it in an area higher than the flood.\(^{45}\)

Continued rain pushed the river to fifty-nine and a half feet on January 23. Overall, for the month, the *Advertiser* reported over nine inches of precipitation had fallen; the historical average for the month was about four inches. To add to this, temperatures had dropped to around thirty degrees by the 23\(^{rd}\) causing the rain to become sleet. Instead of just rain, the workers had to contend with hypothermia and the slippery conditions caused by the ice. Huntington continued to become more isolated as water covered all roads leading into neighboring Chesapeake, Ohio. The only major highway still open was the route to Logan and a majority of Huntington’s streets were submerged. The flooded streets prompted Mayor Seamonds to order the confiscation of boats for relief efforts. Fearing water contamination, the West Virginia Health Commissioner tested Huntington’s water supply and declared, “From a health standpoint, the situation is in no way alarming.”\(^{46}\) However, they still administered inoculations for typhoid fever as a preventative measure. The *Advertiser* reported that 387 WPA workers helped relocate 560 of the over 2,000 total Huntington families, who had moved since

---

\(^{45}\) Ibid.  
the flood began. In the WPA district as a whole, 735 WPA workers provided aid and helped move 870 families.\textsuperscript{47} Relief efforts became more desperate as the streets of Huntington disappeared. Luckily, the WPA and other relief agencies offered their assistance.

Also on January 23, at Marshall, the administration canceled classes and closed many of the buildings including “the music hall, science hall, library and student union building as well as the dormitory annexes.”\textsuperscript{48} Luckily, for many students, this cancelation came during exams. In an interview years later, Marshall student Selma Gale Martin, described the scene that she watched with fellow students from the third floor of Marshall’s Old Main building as the waters pushed up manhole covers. She stated that the students “cheered because that meant that there’s water all around the building except on the south side and then the notice went up that no exams [would be held].”\textsuperscript{49} The students would receive an average grade based on their semester performance. The Old Main administrative building was on higher ground than the rest of the campus and school officials did not expect the flood to affect it. President Allen and his staff continued to work entering the campus by boat.\textsuperscript{50} The 1937 flood had engulfed Marshall College.

With no classes, the college students either remained in the upper levels of the campus dorms or took refuge at other peoples’ houses. Some, like Selma Gale Martin, wanted to weather the flood in their own homes. A Huntington resident, she lived on the west side of Huntington on Adams Avenue and Seventeenth Street. To get home, Martin walked most of the three miles and road in a boat the rest of the way to her house that eventually contained five and

\textsuperscript{47} The Huntington Advertiser, January 23, 1937. Thomas, 73. In Louisville, Kentucky, “The WPA proved invaluable.” Over 500 WPA men worked in and around the city “building dykes, reinforcing the levees, mending bridges, roads, telephone and power wires.”

\textsuperscript{48} The Parthenon, January 23, 1937.

\textsuperscript{49} Selma Gale Martin, interview by Paula T. Click, February 24, 1982, interview 62, transcript, Oral History of Appalachia Collection, Marshall University, Huntington, West Virginia.

\textsuperscript{50} The Parthenon, January 23, 1937.
a half feet of water. Her family resolutely remained in their home. However, an underground
gas tank explosion two blocks away set houses on fire, and rescue workers evacuated the area.
Her mother went “out in the country to stay with her sister (Selma’s aunt) and [Selma] went to
[Fifth] Street West” to stay with a friend.\(^5\) Martin stated that other students who could not go
home “lived in the mountains” and “weren’t worried about the flood and probably delighted with
just a vacation.”\(^5\) She observed, “[W]e (the students) weren’t very careful about our all-
encompassing thoughts about people.”\(^5\) Many Marshall students sought refuge wherever they
could, with little regard for the seriousness of the situation.

The January 25 issue of the \textit{Advertiser} proclaimed the flood to be the “[w]orst
catastrophe in the history of the Ohio Valley.”\(^5\) Considering the water had risen to more than
sixty-six feet at the Tenth Street gauge and was still rising at one tenth of a foot an hour, weather
officials abandoned any attempt to predict how high the waters would reach. The rise was
almost as high as the 1913 flood, which was over 66.7 feet. Almost twelve inches of rain had
fallen on Huntington for the month. With these new developments, Mayor Seamonds instructed
the Huntington residents to “prepare for the worst.”\(^5\)

Officials closed all Huntington public schools on January 25. Additionally, relief
workers relocated numerous city refugees, already housed in several public schools, to other
schools and centers such as City Hall and the Salvation Army citadel because of flooding threats
to their original locations. Utility services remained intact for the most part. Gas and telephone

\(^{51}\) Selma Gale Martin interview.
\(^{52}\) Ibid.
\(^{53}\) Selma Gale Martin interview; The WPA among other groups fought the fire after a gasoline tank
exploded in the Mill Creek District of Cincinnati, Ohio during the flood. Thomas detailed, “A conflagration spread
over an area of two square miles,” which “brought destruction and death wherever it touched.” Thomas, 35.
\(^{54}\) James A. Wallen, “Rise Prolonged Several Days Continued Rains,” \textit{The Huntington Advertiser}, January
25, 1937.
\(^{55}\) George R. Seamonds quoted in James E. Haworth, “Relief Agencies Expand Work as Rise Continues.”
Ibid.
services continued in non-flooded areas, and officials did not predict any interruption in electricity services. As the floodwaters progressed, the WPA had to move its offices from Sixth Avenue in Huntington. Relief efforts did not slow as the Mayor commended all the relief agencies for working together efficiently to relocate and rescue the citizens of Huntington. Furthermore, officials restored the city’s milk supply. Relief efforts progressed well, even though many officials lost hope that the flood would end soon.

Events at Marshall were just as bleak as they were in the rest of the city on January 25. The floodwaters rose three feet into the basement cafeteria of Marshall’s main dormitory building. Additionally, it rose two feet in the boiler room adjacent to the cafeteria. The water forced the college to shut off the dorm’s heat and the thirty female students taking refuge in the dorm had to evacuate to private residences in the city. Furthermore, four feet of water covered the floors of the new men’s and women’s dormitories. The Advertiser reported, “All the other college buildings were under water including the first floor of the new training school.” It predicted, “No campus building [would] escape serious damage.” Even Old Main’s basement flooded. Selma Gale Martin described how the basement was marked, indicating the height of the floodwaters.

---

56 The Huntington Advertiser, January 25, 1937.
57 Most likely College Hall
58 The Huntington Advertiser, January 25, 1937.
59 Selma Gale Martin, interview, See pictures of flood damage.
Figure 2.1. Old Main during 1913 flood. Courtesy of Marshall University Special Collections, Marshall University.

Figure 2.2. Old Main (far left) during 1936 flood. Courtesy of Marshall University Special Collections, Marshall University.
“Huntington was an island today. Every means of entrance and exit except afoot or by boat was cut off. The city’s eighty thousand people were ‘on their own.’” 60 These words were the first sentence of an article in the January 26 Huntington Advertiser. The mayor urged the people of Huntington not to panic and assured them that the food supply was sufficient. In spite of this reassurance, however, food profiteering occurred as local businesses inflated the price of food to prey on the fear of the citizens. Over 5,000 residents stayed in the refugee shelters. Another 1,400 relocated that morning by train to Charleston before the waters engulfed the tracks. Reporter Joe Klasman described the remainder of the citizens living in the flood zone as “hundreds of families who huddle together on the second and third floors of homes and refuse to abandon their water-soaked residences.” 61

60 The Huntington Advertiser, January 26, 1937.
To complicate issues further, the flood endangered the city water supply as well. It was still clean, but the mayor instructed citizens to conserve and store water should a shortage occur. Gas and electric services still functioned in areas not flooded. Additionally, in order to improve sanitation at refugee camps, the mayor ordered the building of latrines at relief shelters. The WPA provided the labor, and the city provided the materials. To supplement the lack of water, the mayor ordered creameries to commandeer boats not used for the relief effort to make milk deliveries. As the floodwaters continued to isolate Huntington, the city’s services became more threatened.

To make matters worse, a water main ruptured the night of the 26th. In response, officials shut off the city water supply. On the 27th, City health officials tested numerous well water supplies and deemed only seventeen of them suitable that morning. They instructed citizens to boil all untested water for twenty minutes. With the city water turned off, the issue of sanitation worsened, and the WPA increased its efforts to provide latrines. Without city water, luckily, however, the city’s milk supply continued, and gas and electricity were still available in non-flooded areas. The citizens did experience some relief on January 27 as the rains stopped and the river leveled off just over sixty-nine feet. However, officials predicted rain that night or the following day.

The break in the rain continued on January 28 as the water receded to sixty-eight and a half feet at the Tenth Street gauge and slowly declined over the next several days. The cessation allowed relief crews to focus on clean-up rather than rescue. During this time, the WPA continued building latrines and making other sanitation improvements as well as aiding in the clean-up effort, providing labor, water pumps, and fire hoses to clean streets and basements as

---

63 The Huntington Advertiser, January 28, 1937.
the city water service slowly returned. At one point, all 1,950 Cabell County WPA workers, including those that had been working at Marshall, labored to clean up Huntington. After about two weeks of clean-up efforts, officials had restored all city services, five Huntington residents were dead, and Huntington had suffered over $17 million in damages.\(^6^4\)

Selma Gale Martin related her, and likely the typical Huntington resident’s, experience during the flood’s aftermath, stating that everything in her house was “sodden.” Mud covered the rugs, the brooms, the curtains, and almost everything else. She said that once her family and she had swept out the house, they had to light fires to dry the house. Despite this, Martin relates, “you still had this cold [feeling].”\(^6^5\) She said that it took three months to clean the mud off the floor. She praised the water pumps provided by relief workers. However, she bemoaned, “Of course there were not enough pumps for everybody, but people pumped out their basements” the best they could.\(^6^6\)

In a letter, dated February 15, to former governor Herman Kump, Marshall president Dr. James Allen described his experience:

Mrs. Allen and Marguerite left on the last train for Danville, Virginia. Carter and I found refuge among faculty friends. We had three and one half feet of water on the first floor but succeeded in getting all furniture, including books to the second floor, so there was no personal loss. The floor and the paper on the first floor will probably have to be entirely replaced. We have had miserable weather since the flood so there has not been a great deal of drying in the interior of houses.\(^6^7\)

As can be seen from this letter, Dr. Allen experienced similar hardships as many Huntington residents did during one of the greatest natural disasters in Huntington’s history.


\(^6^5\) Selma Gale Martin, interview.

\(^6^6\) Ibid.

\(^6^7\) Dr. James E. Allen to Governor Herman Kump, February 15, 1937. Marshall University Archives, Record Group P, Office of the President, 1936-1937, Box 13, Folder 47, (Accession No. 730000). Dr. Allen was most likely describing the flood damage to his house.
Marshall delayed re-opening until school officials determined the extent of the damage caused by the flood. Dr. Allen surveyed the damages with members of the state board of control. The main concern with the dormitories was to determine if the first floor inner walls as well as the electrical wiring needed replacement. Additionally, the college had lost telephone, electricity, and gas services during the flood. Recovery work continued over the next weeks. By February 8, Marshall announced that registration for the spring semester would begin on the Wednesday, February 11. Classes would begin on Thursday. However, this announcement did not signal Marshall’s complete recovery.

---

68 The Huntington Advertiser, February 2, 1937 and February 8, 1937.
Water still flooded all dormitories and most other student housing on 12 February. *The Parthenon* published an aerial photograph of the campus titled “As Flood Waters Turned the Campus into a Lake.”\(^{69}\) The dire situation prompted the Dean of Men, Dr. John T. Krumpelman, and the Dean of Women, Miss Lee Fairchild Bacon, to issue orders that forbade the students from inhabiting dwellings on Third Avenue, Fourth Avenue, and most of Fifth Avenue. The students could not occupy the new dormitories until the spring semester. The *Parthenon* warned, “If these instructions are not complied with, steps will be taken to remove [students] from such houses.”\(^{70}\) Old Main housed the majority of the Marshall female students that hailed from out of state. However, others would have to find alternate living quarters. The two deans asked students to inform them if they could not find a place to live. Dean Bacon recommended finding residences in Huntington’s Highlawn building. In spite of limited space, Dean Bacon stated that only two female students reported that they could not find housing. The two deans warned students not to eat or drink from places that were flooded unless the establishment “displays a

\(^{69}\) *The Parthenon*, February 12, 1937. See Figure 2.4.

\(^{70}\) *The Parthenon*, February 12, 1937.
written permit from the health office allowing re-opening.\textsuperscript{71} The State Board of Control estimated it would cost about $277,221 to repair the flood damages at Marshall.\textsuperscript{72} Costs included $210,020 to rebuild the first and second floors of the dorms, raise the buildings, and about $54,000 to cover the flood damage to other college buildings. The state approved $130,000 for flood relief, the WPA provided over $15,000 and the PWA over $106,000.\textsuperscript{73} The total dwarfed the $1,500 in federal aid to repair the damages caused by the 1936 flood.

The new model school had slight damage with water stains on the walls and ruined cement. WPA workers restarted its construction the week of 26 February. However, the new dormitories did not fare as well. The first and second floors of each building flooded. Henry G. King described in \textit{The Parthenon} the scene as three \textit{Parthenon} representatives toured the dorms:

\begin{quote}
All of the rooms on the first floor [of Hodges Hall (the men’s dorm)] were found in the same general condition, plaster streaked, yellowed, and cracked, the floor blocks covered
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{72} Equivalent to over $4.3 million in 2012.
\textsuperscript{73} \textit{The Parthenon}, February 12, 1937; March 16, 1937; and \textit{The Huntington Advertiser}, Feb 11, 1937.
with mud and elft [sic] as the water had deposited them after leaving the marks of the four strips in each block firmly outlined on the ceiling.\textsuperscript{74}

He continued by describing the second floor:

Ascending to the second floor the group saw the watermark dividing the untouched white walls and the flood-saturated portion. This mark extended by a scant quarter of an inch above the floor level but the damage to the blocks was as heavy as it would have been with five feet of water. The flooring had warped dizzily, in some rooms rising in a gentle swell from the baseboard to the center while in others sharp creases had absorbed the increased size. Damage to the second floor was confined to the flooring material. It must be replaced throughout.\textsuperscript{75}

Laidley Hall’s, the women’s dormitory, destruction was just as extensive. The flood had greatly damaged Marshall’s newest additions.

Figure 2.5: Laidley Hall during the 1937 flood. Courtesy of Marshall University Special Collections, Marshall University.

Over the next few weeks, restoration of the campus progressed. Workers aired and fumigated the buildings, scrubbed their floors, and washed their walls. Additional repairs included replacing the gymnasium floor, renovating the student union building, destruction of several small houses such as the Pi Kappa Sigma sorority house, and various other projects.\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{The Parthenon}, February 12, 1937.
\textsuperscript{75} ibid.
\textsuperscript{76} \textit{The Parthenon}, April 16, 1937; April 20, 1937; May 4, 1937; May 11, 1937.
The clean-up process at Marshall advanced with one exception: the restoration of the new dormitories.

Lack of funds and labor delayed the plans to rebuild and raise the dorms. The intensity of the project counted as one of the reasons for the delay, as workers had to replace the entire first floor of one dorm and raise both buildings. However, the process also included the addition of a modern dining room in one building and clinic facilities in the other. Board of Control member, C.P. Nelson, deemed that these expansions to be “highly useful and desirable.” These additions required more time and money, and workers were to complete them while raising the buildings.

To obtain the funds, the state of West Virginia, applied for additional PWA assistance. However, the agency rejected the application and, on May 14, the state Board of Control applied to the WPA for additional funds totaling $20,362. Abe Forsythe, head of the WPA Fifth District, observed that the WPA would not approve the support because of the lack of skilled labor. Furthermore, the WPA was “cutting down its appropriations to embrace only relief labor.” Forsythe offered a compromise by stating that if the “application [could] be changed so that the WPA [was] asked to furnish only common labor on this job” it had a better chance for approval. Again, the lack of skilled labor had delayed the New Deal projects at Marshall. Eventually the issue of skilled labor was resolved and the dormitories were ready, once again, for occupancy by the fall of 1937, with the completion of the floor in the women’s dormitory the week of July 31. With the Depression hitting hard, the flood of 1937 could have been disastrous for Marshall. However, New Deal agencies like the PWA and WPA provided much needed aid.

---

78 Abe Forsythe quoted in Ibid.
79 The Parthenon, February 26, 1937; and September 21, 1937.
Unfortunately, West Virginia’s budget limitations continued to impair the New Deal aid to Marshall up until the end of the Great Depression. For example, the WPA was to build a cafeteria to service both Laidley and Hodges Halls. However, the West Virginia state Board of Control, that approved Marshall’s budget, resisted covering the cost for the building until the 1939-1941 biennium budget. Thus, the federal government did not construct the $130,000 building until 1941, four years after the two halls that needed it.80

The New Deal construction efforts expanded and rescued many colleges like Marshall, but they also taxed West Virginia’s funding for higher education. Projects like the erection of the flagpole and the donation of art provided aid to improve Marshall’s educational environment and most likely improved the morale of the students and faculty. The three larger construction projects greatly aided Marshall. Jenkins Hall and the dormitories were part of the modernization of institutions of higher education in the United States. Furthermore, Hodges and Laidley Halls provided additional space to house Marshall’s expanding student body. The New Deal modernized many schools, like Marshall, that could not do so on their own during the harsh times of the Great Depression. Additionally, it allowed the college to recover after two back-to-back floods, costing over $200,000 total. Had it not been for the New Deal, states and colleges would have had to bear the full burden of the recovery effort. While, projects, like the two dormitories, paid for themselves through student room and board charges, others such as Jenkins Hall and even the flagpole did not repay the state directly. The state responded by reducing state expenditures especially on higher education. Even though the New Deal building projects provided recovery, modernization, and psychological relief to Marshall, as the next chapter shall

demonstrate, the politics surrounding the New Deal would influence the college’s faculty and budget.

The New Deal symbolized the progressive shift in American politics and education during the 1930s. However, conservative elements within the Democratic Party in West Virginia would resist this evolution. The change in Marshall’s administration soon after the 1933 Democratic takeover of the federal and state governments demonstrates the conservative resistance. Ironically, many Democratic politicians, like West Virginia’s governors, Herman Kump and Homer Holt, would oppose many of the New Deal projec
Chapter 3

What’s the New Deal with Politics at Marshall?

The political impact of the New Deal began before President Franklin Roosevelt established the various agencies that provided Depression relief. In 1930, West Virginia University’s (WVU) president Dr. John R. Turner and Marshall College’s president Dr. Morris P. Shawkey began a dialog about the union of the two institutions. The plans for this merger never saw light for two reasons: both presidents stepped down in 1935, and the financial problems of the era prevented the combination.¹ The advent of the New Deal contributed to both reasons. During the 1932 election, Herman G. Kump used the popularity of Franklin Roosevelt and his “new deal” to help his election. Governor Kump lobbied for Dr. Shawkey’s replacement and installed Dr. James E. Allen once Shawkey stepped down. Additionally, West Virginia’s Governors argued that the New Deal requirements of the state placed an economic burden on West Virginia. Harry Hopkins wanted to focus on construction projects whereas Governor Kump felt the people of the state wanted road improvements and free public education. Additionally, the Tax Limitation Amendment reduced the tax income for the state to pay for state and federal relief programs. These factors limited the funds of the state and prompted budget reductions. These cuts intensified Marshall’s financial difficulties Dr. Shawkey faced, which prevented the merger. These problems continued into Dr. Allen’s presidency. The New Deal’s political impact saved Marshall’s integrity as an independent institution, but increased the strain on the college’s budget.

The proposed union between WVU and Marshall College possessed social as well as political connotations. Dr. Turner first suggested the idea of a merger between WVU and Marshall College following Marshall College’s 1930 commencement after the passage of a resolution by Marshall College alums, who expressed their desire for Marshall to become the “Southern [West Virginia] University.”² Dr. Shawkey downplayed the proclamation to Dr. Turner as a statement of school pride and not a serious plan of action. While Dr. Turner disapproved of the statement, he accepted Dr. Shawkey’s explanation. He further detailed his plan of union between the two institutions. His plan called for Marshall College, West Virginia University, New River State, and Potomac State to be combined “into a single organization with a unified purpose, plan and program.”³ The unification “[would] be the first and strongest move toward creating the type of thought we must have preparatory to a simplified, well-coordinated State system.”⁴ Dr. Turner termed the new organization as the “Greater West Virginia University,” and declared that it would not be subject to the Board of Control or the Board of Education, but to a separate board.⁵ The union, according to Turner, would “carry a volume of influence to give order and direction to the entire State system.”⁶ The institution would “gather in, classify, train and select students for their highest usefulness…to become the great workers

² M.P. Shawkey to Dr. John R. Turner, July 25, 1930. Marshall University Archives, Record Group P, Office of the President 1930-1931, Box 6, Folder 30, (Accession No. 730000). (abbreviated as MUA, RG P with year, box, and folder from now on).
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ For information on the Board of Control see the Eleventh Biennial Report of West Virginia Board of Control (Charleston, West Virginia, Jarrett Printing Co., 1936), 1-15. The Board of Control regulated the financing of West Virginia colleges. Founded in 1909, the Board of Control oversaw the finances of several state institutions including mental institutions, hospitals, prisons, and the Romney School for the Deaf and Blind. In 1911, the responsibility of the board expanded eventually to include state universities and colleges in 1911. By the time of the Great Depression, the Board managed fifty-nine agencies. The government entity would determine the financial fate of Marshall College, Huntington State Hospital, Hopemont Sanitarium, West Virginia Penitentiary, West Virginia University, Concorde State Teachers’ College, and the West Virginia Veterinary Board were among the institutes under the jurisdiction of the Board in 1936.
upon whom all great works depend.”

Liberal Arts would serve as a general foundation, but the institution’s main goal would be to prepare students for specific fields especially those in education. By training teachers in their line of progressive thought, Turner and Shawkey could influence education from elementary school and upward. Dr. Shawkey responded by stating,

> We all have a desire for independence. The average friend of Marshall would rather see the institution go ahead as it is going. I confess myself to a little feeling of regret that it should become a part of an institution instead of being something wholly within itself. Our situation is potential. Within a radius of 100 miles we have a population of over 2,000,000 people and practically no college facilities outside of Marshall. Moreover, conditions are developing all about us which foster the growth of a string institution. The C. and O. [Railroad] is concentrating, not only its shop and office work here, but now it is developing its laboratory work right at our door, with a very friendly attitude toward us. Up the Kanawha and up the Big Sandy [Rivers] the chemical and by-product industries are making for a great institution here. Nevertheless, we have a state situation to meet. I believe your plan has great possibilities. I am willing to sacrifice some pride to be ripe for action. I am willing to join you definitely in the task of reducing the plan to a workable organization. When you are ready to suggest a next step, let me know and I will respond as promptly as possible.  

While Dr. Shawkey understood the potential for Marshall’s growth as an independent institution, he also realized that a union with WVU would likely be economically and politically advantageous. The “state situation” Dr. Shawkey mentioned could mean either West Virginia’s economic situation or political situation. Consolidation of institutions might reduce the financial burden on the state during the Depression. Additionally, Shawkey perhaps saw the political sway he could gain by establishing a virtual monopoly on the education system in the state. By controlling education in West Virginia, he could influence many of the politicians, who graduated from the state’s educational system. He most likely realized that a merger would promote his goals to establish progressive education as the norm in West Virginia.

---

7 Ibid.  
8 M.P. Shawkey to Dr. John R. Turner, July 25, 1930. Ibid.  
Marshall historian Charles Moffat suggests that Dr. Shawkey’s motivation centered on a feeling of guilt for opposing the $15,000 salary offered to Dr. John B. Withers to succeed Dr. Trotter as president of WVU. Dr. Shawkey had written George M. Ford, State Superintendent of Education, in opposition to such a large salary, as Dr. Trotter only received $9,000 and Dr. Shawkey received $5,000. The Charleston Gazette published his opposition. The article sparked public backlash against Dr. Shawkey because the people felt that he stepped out of bounds by trying to influence events at other colleges. Consequently, Dr. Withers did not take the offer and Dr. Turner became president of WVU at the $15,000 salary, which became $7,500 after the Depression budget cuts. Moffat suggests that the talk of merger was to “heal the wounds inflicted by the John Withers incident.”

However, considering that Dr. Shawkey spent much of his career cultivating the progressive educational system, Dr. Turner’s plans coincided with Shawkey’s own desires. While it may have been grief over the Withers incident, Dr. Shawkey’s political goals also may have played a major role.

The consolidation discussion continued up into 1932, with WVU Dean Earl Huddleston asking Dr. Shawkey if he still wanted the union. Shawkey responded that his “attitude had not changed since the proposal was first introduced,” but “we cannot be aggressive about it, because our actions would be misunderstood.” Shawkey most likely feared the public backlash in Huntington and other parts of West Virginia. Dr. Shawkey’s replacement by Dr. James E. Allen and the economic problems of the Great Depression caused these talks to subside. The New

The events included the stock market crash of 1929, a major drought, mineworker strikes, the reelection of Democrat Matthew Neely to the senate by almost 140,000 votes, and a forty-two seat Democratic majority in West Virginia’s House of Delegates. Dr. Shawkey most likely foresaw the end for Republican control in West Virginia after these events.

10 Moffat 58-59.
11 Morris P. Shawkey to Earl Huddleston, May 10, 1932 found in Ibid., 60.
Deal’s political impact factored in both the replacement of Dr. Shawkey as well as the college’s Depression related financial problems that halted the merger talks.

Franklin D. Roosevelt’s promise of a “new deal” offered change to the American people in 1932. However, the manner of change confused many, even Roosevelt’s supporters. He offered many promises tailored to certain people or regions. Historian David M. Kennedy has emphasized this method by pointing to several situations in which Roosevelt demonstrated ambiguity or changed positions to fit his needs at the time. Roosevelt, an avowed internationalist at one time, denounced, in February 1932, the United States involvement in the League of Nations. Kennedy argues, “That move was widely understood as naked and cynical appeasement of the powerful Democratic kingmaker, the archisolationist William Randolph Hearst.”

Kennedy continues by describing Roosevelt’s Topeka, Kansas speech detailing his agricultural policy as “empty of content, designed, as one [Roosevelt] aide put it, to win the Midwest ‘without waking up the dogs of the East.’” At times, he advocated federal unemployment relief. However, at other times, Roosevelt called for a reduction in government spending and attacked Hoover for wanting to increase the power of the central government. Roosevelt’s political maneuvering muddled even his brain trust, who wanted to present real solutions to problems rather than political appeals. At one point, they “presented [Roosevelt] with two absolutely incompatible drafts of addresses on tariff policy – one calling for blanket reductions, the other for bilateral agreements.” Roosevelt instructed the men to combine the two ideas into one speech. Acting as a political pragmatist rather than an idealist, Roosevelt portrayed his new deal as both conservative as well as progressive to obtain the presidency. His political ambiguity, combined with the public’s disdain against Hoover, would win him the

---

Roosevelt’s conservative stances most likely appealed to West Virginia’s conservative Democrats like Herman G. Kump who supported Roosevelt’s presidency in 1932. However, Harry Hopkins’s administration tactics would turn Kump away from Roosevelt’s New Deal after the election. The New Deal’s influence on the West Virginia election, with the election of Kump, instigated a change in the political make-up of the state’s government as well as prompted administrative changes in state institutions, including Marshall College.

West Virginia historian John G. Morgan described Herman G. Kump stating, “To Democrats, at least, he was to the state what Franklin D. Roosevelt was to the nation. He was the New Deal, West Virginia style.” A conservative Democrat, Kump campaigned on the platform of tax and government reform. He felt that reducing the tax burden and removing Republicans from office were the main solutions to the Depression in West Virginia. Kump’s views differed from the views of progressive Democrats in West Virginia who many argued that unemployment relief was the main solution to Depression problems. Additionally, Kump did not support labor rights whereas many liberal Democrats and his Republican opponent, T.C.

---

14 Kennedy, 95-103, quote from 102. Kennedy provides more information on Roosevelt’s campaign. See also, New York Times, September 26, 1932. In addition to conservative Democrats, Roosevelt also had progressive Republican supporters. California Senator Hiram Johnson of California and Senator George Norris of Nebraska were among his Republican supporters. A. James Reichley, The Life of the Parties: A History of American Political Parties (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992), 227-229 provides more details on the nature of the progressive Republican divergence with FDR. A progressive politician typically focused on social welfare and labor issues and emphasized using direct federal government aid for relief programs. The stance usually meant increased federal involvement in state and local affairs. Conservative politicians generally focused on reducing government spending and believed in a weaker federal government, allowing the states to administer relief efforts.

15 Thomas, 3. Thomas provides more detail about Kump’s conflict with New Deal administrator Harry Hopkins.

16 John G. Morgan, West Virginia Governors: 1863-1980 (Charleston West Virginia: Charleston Newspapers, 1980), 139-140. Kump was born on October 31, 1877 in Capon Springs, Hampshire County, West Virginia. He studied law at the University of Virginia from 1903 to 1905. After graduation, he opened up practice in Elkins, West Virginia. In 1908, Kump served as a prosecutor in Randolph County West Virginia until he joined the army as a Captain in the Ordinance Department in Washington D.C. He had also served as a delegate to the 1920 Democratic National Convention. From 1928 until he became Governor in 1932, he was a judge in the Upshire-Randolph judicial circuit court. James Kay Thomas Interview by John Morgan, Interview 227, March 2, 1982, transcript, Oral History of Appalachia Collection, Marshall University, Huntington, West Virginia. Former legislator James Kay Thomas referred to Kump as a “gutty man” that “had some ideas, thoroughly honest, and was one of the best governors [West Virginia] [has] ever had.”
Townsend, did. Kump’s desire for political and financial reforms threatened the job security of several Republicans who served in public office including that of Marshall’s president, Dr. Shawkey.

During the 1932 elections, both Kump and Townsend supported the Tax Limitation Amendment and West Virginia voters, by a five to one majority, approved of it as well. In an effort to provide Depression relief to property and business owners, the Tax Limitation Amendment lowered the property taxes and mandated that the West Virginia government could not increase property tax. Generally, the amendment succeeded in relieving the taxpayer burden but at a cost to the budget of several state institutions.

While the New Deal was the federal government’s response to the Great Depression, The Tax Limitation represented West Virginia’s answer to the Depression problems. One of Kump’s advisors, WVU professor Dr. John F. Sly, explained that the voters in the 1932 election viewed the amendment as a way to “protest against an antiquated tax structure, unequal assessments, mounting delinquencies, a conviction of extravagance, and, possibly the most important of all, inflexible tax tickets, and vanishing personal and corporate incomes.” Among its provisions, it would limit state taxes on farms, urban, and rural residential properties. Additionally, the law allowed for a progressive income tax and “limit[ed] state property tax for general revenue purposes” to .01% of the property value. The amendment was so broad in scope, regulating not

18 *Huntington Advertiser*, November 9, 1932.
19 Thomas, 70-90. Thomas provides a discussion on the effects of the Tax Limitation Amendment. James Kay Thomas Interview by John Morgan, Interview 227, March 2, 1982, transcript, Oral History of Appalachia Collection, Marshall University, Huntington, West Virginia. Once Kump entered office, he convened a special session of the West Virginia Legislature that lasted for three normal sessions, 240 days in order to implement the amendment.
21 Ibid., 8-9.
only state tax code but counties and cities as well, that it took three attempts to convince the West Virginia Supreme Court to approve of the amendment. During the time that the state Supreme Court struck the legislation down, the West Virginia government had little to no funds. Therefore, according to John Kay Thomas, a former state legislator, “Governor Kump probably exceeded his power in borrowing several hundred thousand dollars from Chase National Bank to keep the…state going.”22 Once approved, the amendment’s tax cuts forced the legislature to find alternate means to raise money, like a sales tax and budget cuts, to cover expenditures for not only usual state projects but also for New Deal projects.

In his inaugural address, Kump prepared the state for the changes to come. He asked for “tolerance and cooperation” because the Tax Limitation Amendment, which reduced state tax revenues, meant that the legislature would have to collect over $15 million in additional taxes.23 He pledged “to balance the budget, to pay the deficit, and to equalize the burden of taxation.”24 Kump’s plans to improve West Virginia’s rural roads and offer free public school would make this more difficult. He also called for the resignation of all state officials “whose tenure is subject to executive action.”25 Potentially, this meant an almost total public sector takeover by Democrats. To raise the funds to cover the Tax Limitation Amendment deficit as well as pay for the road and school projects, the state government instituted new taxes, like an income tax and sales tax, as well as slashed the budgets of higher education.26 Kump’s political purges, including the replacement of Dr. Shawkey, would drastically affect Marshall College.

---

22 John Kay Thomas interview.
23 Herman G. Kump quoted in Huntington Advertiser, March 4, 1933.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
Governor Herman G. Kump had promised to “clean house” in 1932, which meant the removal of almost every Republican from the government bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{27} In many cases, he would use the 1921 statute that allowed a governor to replace any person holding a position appointed by the governor.\textsuperscript{28} Even though the State Board of Education determined the presidency of Marshall College, Dr. Shawkey, being a Republican and very active politically, was in danger of losing his job. According to Dr. Shawkey’s biographer, Marshall Buckalew, Shawkey had three things against him: “(1) His continued illness, (2) lack of complete faculty support, and (3) the determination of Governor H. G. Kump to force the resignation of the political educators, especially those who were members of the Republican Party.”\textsuperscript{29} Of these, his illness and Kump’s determination would perhaps be Dr. Shawkey’s main downfall.

Dr. Shawkey fell ill, most likely from cancer, in November 1932. He had been sick for months, but it intensified when he was in New York at an Association of American College Presidents meeting. He underwent an operation and eventually returned to office in December. Tragically, he experienced another relapse and underwent another operation after his wife died on January 6, 1933. His disease would continue to plague him for the rest of his life and, of course, endangered his career at Marshall even more.\textsuperscript{30} To add to his problems, before Shawkey returned after his second surgery, rumors spread that the State Superintendent of Schools William C. Cook was going to replace Shawkey. Cook denied the rumors.\textsuperscript{31} Buckalew suggests that the Board of Education had planned to replace Shawkey with Cook if Shawkey did not

\textsuperscript{27} Morgan, 140. While Democrats held many elected positions, Republicans still held several unelected bureaucratic positions within the government.
\textsuperscript{28} Chapter 94, \textit{Acts of West Virginia Legislature}, Regular Session, 1921 (Charleston: The Tribune Company, 1921), 231.
\textsuperscript{29} Buckalew, 104.
\textsuperscript{30} Buckalew refers to his illness as a “disease” and it was “perhaps cancer.” Ibid., 99-100.
\textsuperscript{31} \textit{The Parthenon}, January 27, 1933.
return after Cook’s successor W.W. Trent assumed office. Shawkey’s recovery did not stop Kump’s plans to remove Shawkey from office.

Kump could not directly remove Shawkey from office, but he could apply pressure to the State Board of Education. Kump addressed the State Board of Education on 21 June 1933:

GENTLEMEN OF THE BOARD: It is not my purpose unduly to intrude my views into the deliberations and actions of the board except to aid and assist you so far as I am able to do and to accentuate certain matters that seem to me to be of highest importance to the people of our State – so much so that they have become the fixed policy of this administration.

Probably first among these matters is that politics must be taken out of our State-supported educational institutions, and kept out. There is no place for the politician in the schools maintained by the State. The Board is requested and expected to see to it that this policy is promptly and effectually pursued in the institutions under your control.

Shawkey managed to survive Kump’s initial purge due to connections with the new State Superintendent of Free Schools, Dr. W. W. Trent.

Dr. W.W. Trent defended Dr. Shawkey against Kump’s attack. Trent’s main goal as superintendent was to look past politics and look at the strength of the educator. He did not believe that Dr. Shawkey was as political as Kump implied. In a letter before his election, Trent informed Shawkey that those educators who “do not play politics with their positions” and “who are efficient in their work” do not have to worry about their positions if he became superintendent. Shawkey downplayed his political ties by stating that educators cannot be free of political influence or opinion, but must avoid allowing politics to affect their job performance. He finished by stating, “We are undertaking to maintain strictly professional practices in

---

32 Buckalew, 101.
34 W.W. Trent to Dr. Morris P. Shawkey, October 13, 1932. RG P, 1932-1934, Box 9, Folder 35.
Marshall.”35 Shawkey’s reassurance earned Trent’s respect and guaranteed that he would fight to keep the president in office.

In spite of Trent’s efforts, Shawkey faced too much pressure. In addition to political attacks by Kump, he would lose several members of Marshall’s faculty and the trust of the people of Huntington. According to Marshall Buckalew,

Real warning of a change in the Marshall administration came in March 1935, when P.P. Gibson presented to the state board of education reports on the current opinion in Huntington demanding a change in the Marshall athletic staff. By the middle of April, the movement had gained such momentum that Shawkey felt compelled to appear before the board to defend his whole administration.36

While Trent held Shawkey’s opponents at bay until 1935, he could not stop the onslaught.37

To add to his political stress, Dr. Shawkey faced financial stress as well. By May 1934, Governor Kump stated in order to cover the budget shortfalls caused by the Tax Limitation Amendment the state executive departments’ budgets would be 61% of what they were on 30 June 1931. Furthermore, he specifically addressed institutions of higher education stating that budgets would be 45% of 1931 numbers. He ordered the legislature to reduce all other state institutions to about 60% of 1931 budgets.38 Kump argued that New Deal demands on the states contributed to these budget problems as the Tax Limitation Amendment reduced the funds available to meet them.

35 M. P. Shawkey to W.W. Trent, October 18, 1932. Ibid.
36 Quote from Buckalew, 104. Moffat describes how “vengeful democrats” in the Board of Education removed several faculty from Marshall based on political reasons. He quotes Shawkey as stating, “The board dropped two of our faculty members for political activities” including Carl G. Campbell the Chairman of the Chemistry Department. Moffat, 79.
37 John Douglas Machesney, The Development of Higher Education Governance and Coordination in West Virginia (MA thesis., West Virginia University, 1971.), 60-66. Doherty and Summers, 154-155. Not only did Kump attack Dr. Shawkey, he went against West Virginia University president Dr. John R. Turner. In the case of WVU, Kump removed several members of the Board of Governors and replaced them with his own supporters to achieve Turner’s removal. Additionally, He appeared before the Board of Governors in April 1934 to discuss the termination of Dr. Turner. Political favoritism was among the accusations leveled against Turner. Republicans held a great majority (thirty-two out of thirty-eight) in WVU’s administration.
The appointment of Henry Beehler to head the West Virginia Relief Administration (WVRA) best exemplified the problems with New Deal and the Tax Limitation Amendment. The WVRA, headed by Major Francis Turner when Kump came into office, was in charge of relief in West Virginia. However, Kump, viewing Turner as too elderly to perform his duties, asked him to step down. Harry L. Hopkins, then head of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), appointed William N. Beehler to lead the WVRA. Kump viewed Hopkins’ actions as a threat to his power as governor because not only did he consider Beehler an outsider, but Beehler also reported directly to Hopkins instead of Kump. The enraged governor angrily stated to Hopkins that “[He (Kump) was] the Governor of a sovereign state.” and that “[He] refus[ed] to be further humiliated or influenced by the clumsy threats of relief administration subordinates.” 39 Kump’s words signified his split with New Deal program administrators over relief efforts.

The argument between Kump and Hopkins was an ongoing conflict between the two on how to handle relief efforts. Hopkins appointed Beehler because he felt that Kump was resisting New Deal efforts for recovery by not meeting the state requirement to match federal programs. 40 Kump argued that cuts demanded by the Tax Limitation Amendment prevented the state from meeting these requirements. Moreover, Kump contended that the federal government demands were contrary to what the state of West Virginia wanted. 41 The demand to cover the New Deal’s relief requirements increased the strain on West Virginia’s budget, which, in turn, increased budget cuts on higher education in West Virginia.

39 Herman G. Kump to Harry L. Hopkins, November 23, 1934. State Papers and Public Addresses of H. G. Kump, 332-334. Kump did not object to the relief effort itself, but rather to the management of it by someone who was not from West Virginia and outside his sphere of control. Kump acknowledged his loyalty to Roosevelt and that “[he] yield[ed] to none in [his] unfaltering support of His Excellency, President Roosevelt, and his wise policies.”

40 The ratio was typically 3:1. The state government paid three dollars for every one dollar the federal government paid.

41 Thomas, 113-135.
Soon after the 1932 elections, the State Board of Control suggested a $69,500 cut in Marshall’s budget. The Board’s reduction and the one the following year would decrease every salary by as much as 35%-40%, including that of the president. Shawkey’s salary went from $7,000 annually to $5,100 annually (a 27% decrease), which was not increased even after Dr. Allen entered office. Additionally, the amount of expenditures available per student for 1933-1934 school year averaged $151, one of the lowest in the state at the time. The decrease in funding would not only create problems for Dr. Shawkey but also his successor, Dr. Allen.

Dr. Shawkey appears to have reacted to the financial cutbacks the New Deal and Tax Limitation Amendment triggered with a positive attitude. He declared, “The education ship is seaworthy though wracked in a pretty severe storm.” Shawkey typically accepted the budget cuts as necessary to maintain the stability of the state. In response to the problems faced by the state, Dr. Shawkey voluntarily returned $13,917.83 of Marshall College’s personal budget for 1933-1934 to help the state. The Marshall president’s act to gain favor with the state government “completely shattered faculty morale at Marshall College” and most likely contributed to the 5.8% reduction in personal budget for the subsequent 1934-1935 fiscal year.

Dr. Shawkey endeavored to keep costs low for the state; boasting that Marshall “[has] been able to operate at the lowest cost to the State among all State colleges.” Dr. Shawkey’s actions contributed to Marshall’s financial problems caused by the New Deal and alienated Marshall’s faculty during a time when he faced political pressure to step down. The return of the money

---

42 The Parthenon, December 7, 1932. The Parthenon reported that Dr. Shawkey did not respond to the announcement of the cut because of his hospitalization.
43 James E. Allen to Dr. Frank H. Bowles, March 9, 1939. MUA, RG P, 1938-1939, Box 18, Folder 34.
46 Morris P. Shawkey quoted in Moffat, 78.
47 Moffat, 78.
contributed to the loss of support Marshall Buckalew named as one of the causes of Dr. Shawkey’s resignation.

Dr. Shawkey’s positive attitude did not mean he did not complain about the college’s situation. In the same speech to the State Board of Education about removing politics from state funded education, Governor Kump recommended increasing enrollment fees in state colleges “to a reasonable figure that will provide a suitable portion of the cost of education in such institutions.”49 Dr. Shawkey protested the subsequent legislative effort to raise tuition across the state by $50 per semester. He stated that the increase in tuition would decrease enrollment, as students could not afford to attend college. Dr. Shawkey observed that an “addition of $50 or a little more would certainly stop a large number of farmers’ sons and daughters throughout the state from attending college.”50 Even without the great increase in tuition, Marshall’s 1933-1934 academic year experienced a decrease of almost one hundred and forty students or just over 4%.51 If Marshall’s tuition increased, as some of West Virginia’s politicians wanted, the New Deal’s student part-time employment programs would not have been able to assist as many students. The money students received for work only paid for half the student’s expenses without the tuition increase. Dr. Shawkey realized that increasing tuition during a time when many students could not afford to attend college would create more problems. His successor, Dr. James E. Allen, more vigorously protested Marshall’s budget problems.

Dr. James E. Allen was a member of the “Old School” liberal arts educators and most likely a conservative Democrat much like his friend, Governor Kump, who appointed him to his

50 Morris P. Shawkey to Governor Herman G. Kump, May 20, 1933. MUA, RG P, 1932-1934, Box 9, Folder 8.
51 Marshall University Archives, Record Group R, 1933-1934, Marshall University, Huntington, West Virginia.
position. Dr. Allen did not like the purpose of the teachers’ college. He argued against their educational value.\textsuperscript{52} Like many traditional liberal arts educators, he sought to change the college to focus more on scholarly endeavors rather than vocational training. Therefore, he emphasized science and humanities classes. During his term, Marshall College added several social science, classics, and economics courses. Additionally, it began offering Bachelor in Science and Bachelor of Engineering Science degrees in the college of arts and science. Most importantly, under his presidency, Marshall began offering Masters in Arts degrees in psychology, chemistry, history, education, political science, and sociology.\textsuperscript{53} While Dr. Shawkey established the groundwork for much of the expansion, it represented a move away from the WVU merger and more toward strengthening the independence of Marshall College. The MA degree programs most likely represented the shift the most, as only WVU faculty had previously taught graduate level classes on Marshall’s campus. Allen believed that strengthening the reputation of Marshall would in turn improve the perception of a degree from the college.

Before serving at Marshall, Dr. Allen had been the President of Davis and Elkins College in Elkins, West Virginia, where Herman Kump had served as judge. Thomas Richard Ross suggests that most of the residents of Elkins expected Dr. Allen’s appointment as Marshall’s president. He indicates that Herman Kump, W.W. Trent, and the secretary of the board of education David Kirby all hailed from Elkins. Therefore, they would favor Dr. Allen, as president of their hometown college, for the position.\textsuperscript{54} However, many of Marshall’s faculty

\textsuperscript{52} James E. Allen to Genevieve Starcher, n.d, quoted in Moffat, 87.
\textsuperscript{53} Moffat, 88-90.
\textsuperscript{54} Thomas Richard Ross, \textit{Davis and Elkins College: 75 the Diamond Jubilee History} (Elkins, WV: Davis and Elkins College, 1980), 110-111. Ross describes the hard times Dr. Allen faced as president of Davis and Elkins. He lists several reasons Dr. Allen left the college. The reasons included the lack of community financial support to maintain the college. Even the founders of the college left very little as endowment. Additionally, he believed the college needed someone younger gather the financial support needed. Finally, because of lack of funds, Allen had been underpaid. He thought going to Marshall College would solve many of his problems. Unfortunately, he met many of the same problems.
favored Thomas Donnelly, Chairman of the Political Science Department and apparent supporter of Dr. Shawkey. In spite of the faculty wishes, Kump insisted upon Dr. Allen’s appointment. Dr. Allen’s appointment upset many in the faculty including Donnelly, who left Marshall shortly after.\textsuperscript{55} A few months after President Allen assumed office in 1935, Governor Kump visited Marshall for his second time since he became governor and spoke in front of an assembly of Marshall students. The main theme of his speech echoed the desire for government “clean up” that helped elect him. Kump stated he wanted to “weed politics out of our state educational institutions.” Furthermore, he praised Allen and offered his “sympathy, understanding, and loyal support of which [Allen] and [Marshall College] have so much need.”\textsuperscript{56} Ironically, Kump, who campaigned against the politicization of education, not only used his position to get his friend the presidency but also publically offered his assistance, as a politician, to the new president and the college.

The Hopkins and Kump conflict continued even after Dr. Shawkey’s administration. In 1936, Kump complained to Hopkins, then WPA head, about the building programs. Kump referred to the WPA as causing “harassment and confusion” and that “nothing worthwhile is being accomplished.”\textsuperscript{57} He expressed his exasperation that the citizens of West Virginia have complained about the programs and that he had no “means of satisfying their reasonable requests” for him “to do something” about the issue.\textsuperscript{58} The primary difficulty was, as Kump stated, “From the very beginning, it has been known that our State and its local governmental

\textsuperscript{55} Thomas C. Donnelly, \textit{I Came Down from the Hills}” (Portales, NM: Bishop Publishing Co., 1979), 82-83. Donnelly sums up Shawkey’s political situation, “Shawkey was a Republican, and the Democrats had captured the governorship and had a majority on the State Board which governed Marshall. Since West Virginia has always been benighted in its politics, and the Democrats as well as the Republicans were spoilsmen, Shawkey had to go.”

\textsuperscript{56} Herman G. Kump quoted in \textit{The Parthenon}, September 20, 1935. Interestingly, the new head coach, Cam Henderson and the new Dean of the Teachers’ College, Dean Wilson were former residents of Elkins as well.

\textsuperscript{57} Herman G. Kump to Harry L. Hopkins, November 22, 1936. \textit{State Papers and Public Addresses of H. G. Kump}, 335. Ironically, a year later (1937) the WPA and the PWA would be involved in saving many lives during the 1937 flood.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
units are without funds to match federal allocations from the appropriations of Congress for public works and human relief.”

According to Kump, the New Deal was placing financial burden on West Virginia that diverged from the improvement of rural roads and free public primary education, which was what the state viewed as the primary relief need. Hopkins would not help because the state could not meet the requirements for aid. To do so, the state would have to continue to levy taxes and cut the budgets of higher education. Dr. Allen would face the similar budget short falls as his predecessor. However, it would not be until Kump’s successor, Homer Holt, Dr. Allen would encounter major problems with West Virginia's governor, and New Deal inspired budget limitations.

Much like Herman Kump, Homer Holt was a conservative Democrat and won the 1936 governorship with a landslide victory. Holt’s inauguration address laid out the plan for his administration. His primary economic theme was that very little would change from Kump’s administration. He pointed out that West Virginia had a balanced budget and that he was going to ask the legislature to maintain the balance. He called for legislature to make the temporary sales tax permanent. Additionally, he explained that the state required increased revenues because the New Deal relief effort “calls for between $6,500,000 and $9,500,000 annually depending on the character and extent of independent federal activities for relief of the

---

59 Ibid.
60 Morgan, 5, 148-160. Until the 1970 Governors Succession Amendment, West Virginia governors could only serve one consecutive four year term. Holt was born on March 1, 1898 in Lewisberg, West Virginia to Robert Byrne Holt, a farmer and businessman. Before becoming Attorney General in 1932 under the Kump administration, he attended Washington and Lee University (W&L) where he earned an A.B. degree in 1918. Holt never fought in World War I, but he did serve an eleven-month term at Fort Monroe, where he rose to the rank of Second Lieutenant. After discharge in 1919, Holt moved back home and eventually went back to W&L to teach and earn his law degree. After he earned his law degree in 1923, he continued to teach at W&L, but eventually opened up his own law practice in Fayette, West Virginia in 1925. In Fayette, Holt served on the district board of education and as chairman of the Fayette County Democratic Executive Committee. In 1932, he became attorney general. His duties, as attorney general, included arguing for the constitutionality of laws that allowed the Tax Limitation Amendment to function.
unemployed.”61 Holt’s words signified that although much of the budgetary issues had been resolved by the time Holt entered office, the New Deal’s demands continued to apply financial pressure on the states and thus Marshall College.

Contrary to Dr. Shawkey, Dr. Allen adopted a more active role in the financial affairs of the state. When Dr. Allen entered office, he faced many of the same financial issues as Dr. Shawkey had. Before the budget cuts, the Ph.D. top salary was $4,200 and, as of 1939, it was $2,500. The reduction in salary caused him to lose, according to Dr. Allen, “four or five young Ph.D.’s.”62 As detailed in Chapter 1, Marshall’s per capita expenditures would drop as low as $90.42 in 1939. Dr. Allen compared his budget situation to the equivalent of operating an institution of higher education on high school funding.63 He stated in a form letter to several public officials that he felt that there was no possibility he “[could] operate the college under such a personnel budget unless [Marshall] charge[d] the students more tuition or reduce the enrollment from 1,700 [students] to 1,400 [students].”64 Eventually, he would take the former option and increase tuition from $30 to $35 in 1941.65 Before he placed more burdens on students, he appealed to the power players of West Virginia.

Dr. Allen utilized several tactics to lobby for an increase in Marshall’s budget. Perhaps the debate over the 1939-1941 biennial budget best exemplifies his actions. He contacted his friend, former governor Kump. Additionally, he wrote several letters to notable public figures, such as many members of the Board of Public Works including Governor Homer Holt, asking

64 James E. Allen to Judge H. Clay Worth, December 2, 1938. Ibid.
for supporting in increasing Marshall’s budget. Dr. Allen received mixed responses from direct aid, to political posturing, to cold replies.

Table 3.1: 1939-1941 Biennium Budget Request/Appropriation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>July 1939 - June 1940 Requested</th>
<th>July 1939 - June 1940 Appropriated</th>
<th>July 1940 - June 1941 Requested</th>
<th>July 1940 - June 1941 Appropriated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal Service (Salaries)</td>
<td>$329,414</td>
<td>$287,500</td>
<td>$329,414</td>
<td>$287,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Expense</td>
<td>$45,000</td>
<td>$37,500</td>
<td>$45,000</td>
<td>$37,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repairs &amp; Alterations</td>
<td>$15,000</td>
<td>$15,000</td>
<td>$15,000</td>
<td>$15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>$46,800</td>
<td>$17,500</td>
<td>$39,300</td>
<td>$17,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings &amp; Lands</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
<td>$85,500</td>
<td>$20,000</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data from James E. Allen to Fifth Senatorial and the Legislature from Cabell County, January 5, 1939, 1. MUA, RG P, 1937-1939, Box 17, Folder 30.

As illustrated by the chart, during 1938, Dr. Allen requested $976,928 for the 1939-1941 biennium budgets. The major item in the budget was $100,000 for the new dining hall that the PWA and WPA were to build between the new dormitories. However, the West Virginia Board of Control approved $805,000. They only allowed for about $287,500 each school year for personal service and $85,500 for buildings and lands for 1939-1940 and $5,000 for 1939-1940. Dr. Allen requested $329,414 for personal service both years and $100,000 for 1939-1940 and $20,000 for 1940-1941 for buildings and lands. The budget cut reflected the continued constraints by the Tax Limitation Amendment as well as the demands of the New Deal projects. West Virginia government’s reluctance or inability to supplement New Deal projects had delayed and almost prevented the construction of Marshall’s much-needed dining hall.

66 According to Bower, similar to President Allen’s tactics, neighboring Ohio State University State University (OSU) President George W. Rightmire, “openly lobbied Ohio Governor Martin L. Davey [a Democrat] to allocate more funds to the university after Davey vetoed $1.2 million in appropriations for OSU, which had been voted by the state legislature. Rightmire was certainly correct in complaining ‘that in these times the university has not been a favored child of the state.’ The campus newspaper put the crisis in more specific terms, reporting that the school could not even ‘supply gasoline for tractors to harvest the alfalfa and soy beans on its farms.’” Bower, 367.


68 According to Moffat, 106, eventually, in 1941, the New Deal built the $130,000 dining hall. The construction occurred four years after the construction of the dormitories that utilized it.
Dr. Allen formed a faculty committee to investigate the nine-month salaries in seventy different colleges about the same size as Marshall. The committee contacted the heads of the out-of-state colleges by letter and used a state publication on 1936 college salaries to obtain the average of fifteen West Virginia college salaries. The study detailed that assistant professors in West Virginia earned $425 less, associate professors earned $845 less, and professors earned $1,393 less than the average of seventy out-of-state colleges. The committee concluded that “the salaries paid to the faculties of West Virginia colleges [were] considerably out of line with the salaries paid to the faculties of collegiate institutions generally. Only one institution of those surveyed – Ohio Wesleyan – reported a salary scale at all commensurable with the salary scales of West Virginia colleges.”

Allen would send the information to several influential people to build the case for the relief of Marshall’s budgetary problems.

Ex-governor Kump was one of those Dr. Allen contacted for assistance. He provided Kump with a copy of the committee’s findings. Kump responded to Allen’s requests by expressing his sympathies that he could not help and that due to reduced revenue, “Marshall College did not suffer more than other institutions and services.” Most likely, he based his conclusion on the assessment that the study illustrated that Marshall College assistant professors earned $107 more than the West Virginia average and professors earned $119 more than the West Virginia average. Even though Marshall’s faculty earned less than the average of the out-of-state colleges, it fared better than the average West Virginia college.

In addition to contacting former Governor Kump, Dr. Allen sent a letter to the state Senate and House of Delegates on January 5, 1939. First, he provided the details of the budget

---

69 College Salaries In West Virginia. MUA, RG P, 1940-1942, Box 22, Folder 39. Among the seventy colleges were Alabama College, Georgia State College for Women, Montana School of Mines, University of North Carolina Women’s College, The Citadel, and Texas State College for Women, among others.

70 Herman G. Kump to Dr. James E. Allen, Feb 8, 1939, Ibid.
reduction and a copy of the letter he sent to the Board of Control in response to the reduction. The letter asked the Board to increase the Personal Service fund by $19,649. He stressed that he worried about keeping his Ph.D. professors with an “average maximum salary of $2,402.” Allen concluded with an explanation of where the increase would go with the most going to teaching staff. He knew he could not recover the full amount lost, but he at least wanted the Budget Commission to restore a partial amount.\footnote{James E. Allen to Fifth Senatorial and the Legislature from Cabell County, January 5, 1939, 1-4. MUA, RG P, 1937-1939, Box 17, Folder 30.}

Of the many senators and delegates who responded, was Senator Reverend A.M. Martin, who had graduated from Marshall and had sons and a daughter who also graduated from Marshall. He offered any assistance he could provide.\footnote{Reverend A.M. Martin to Dr. James E. Allen, January 28, 1939, Ibid.} Other politicians had attended Marshall. For example Marshall alum, Judge Charles W. Ferguson, contacted several influential people including W.W. Trent on Marshall’s behalf. He stressed that the college was losing professors due to underpay. He continued by emphasizing Marshall’s importance as being located in the key industrial region of the state and where the bulk of the state’s population is located. Finally, he lauded Dr. Allen’s administrative ability and “hoped that [Trent] will give [Dr. Allen’s] request [his] most sympathetic attention.”\footnote{Charles W. Ferguson to W.W. Trent, u.d. MUA, RG P, 1937-1939, Box 17, Folder 30.}

Governor Holt offered very little support to Marshall’s plight. In a letter to Holt, Dr. Allen made the case for Marshall. First, he listed nine items Marshall had accomplished under his administration. Among these was the Centennial celebration, which he pointed out was “without cost to the State.”\footnote{James E. Allen to Governor Homer A. Holt, May 28, 1940. MUA, RG P, 1939-1940, Box 19, Folder 41.} He noted that Marshall increased enrollment by about three hundred and fifty with appropriations “slightly less than $210,000” to cover them.\footnote{Ibid.}
experienced great advances in the liberal arts, teacher training school, and science courses including the addition of offering graduate degrees. Finally, the college added several professors with Ph.D. degrees instead of Master’s degrees. He also pointed out the three new buildings added by the PWA. He then followed his list with two requests. First, he asked the Governor advocate “[restoring] to some degree the drastic faculty salary cuts in 1932-1933. Common justice demands a recognition of this.” Secondly, he requested that the government make provisions to add a dining hall between the new dormitories. Even though Dr. Allen stated that Holt did not have to respond, the Governor thanked him for detailing Marshall’s accomplishments and recommended that Dr. Allen address the issue with the budget director and that he would “have [Dr, Allen’s] letter before [him] when the Board of Public Works considers the budget.” Essentially, the wording and tone of the letter implied that Holt would do very little to aid Marshall College.

Dr. Allen’s efforts to increase Marshall’s budget would partially work with small incremental increases each year, but he incurred a political backlash from Governor Holt. Dr. Allen bemoaned his plight to Walker Long of the Huntington Publishing Company. In a letter thanking Long for his assistance by writing to Holt about Marshall’s budget problems, Dr. Allen

76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Governor Homer A. Holt to James E. Allen, May 31, 1940. MUA, RG P, 1939-1940, Box 19, Folder 41. Eric Anthony Moyen, *Frank L. McVey and the University of Kentucky: A Progressive President and the Modernization of a Southern University* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2011), 189-193. In Kentucky, Democratic Governor, Ruby Laffoon, would also impose a sales tax to make up the state’s deficit. The increase in taxes sparked a call by many conservatives to reduce funding, or even temporarily close, state supported institutions like the University of Kentucky (UK). The threat prompted progressive university president Frank McVey to defend his institute before the Kentucky General Assembly. Much like Dr. Allen, McVey sought aid from influential UK alum like Kentucky Speaker of the House, John Young Brown. However, Brown, being a conservative, supported the budget cuts and opposed the sales tax. The state legislature passed the tax regardless of Brown’s protest. In spite of the increased revenues, UK’s budget was reduced by 15%, which allowed it to remain open. However, salary cuts were necessary to continue functioning. In total, the University of Kentucky lost about 40% of its budget. It decreased from $1,100,000 in 1931-1932 to $650,000 in 1932-1933. In spite of having a progressive, democratic governor that advocated a sales tax, the conservative elements of Kentucky would cause the University of Kentucky to experience comparable budget cuts during the same period as Marshall.
complained about a Charleston Gazette editorial by Charles R. Moss. Moss threatened, “No order has been sent out, but department and institution heads have been made to understand that if they don’t cooperate [with budget reductions], the Governor can find new executives who will.”79 The warning unsettled Dr. Allen who stated in the same letter “that such intimidation does not exist in the privately endowed college.”80 Such strain most likely contributed to Allen stepping down in 1942.

Franklin Roosevelt’s “new deal” campaign promises created the climate for Herman Kump to capitalize on the change West Virginia citizens demanded. In an effort to purge Republicans from the state government, Governor Kump lobbied to remove Dr. Shawkey and replaced him with Dr. Allen. The administrative change moved Marshall College away from focusing on progressive education and a merger with WVU to expanding the college’s liberal arts programs and its own independence. The New Deal also affected the finances of Marshall. The New Deal’s financial requirements of the states limited West Virginia’s ability to make up for the deficit caused by the Tax Limitation Amendment. To cover the shortage, the state government reduced funding for state institutions like Marshall, which strained Marshall’s already hurting finances while prompting President Allen to appeal to politicians for aid. The New Deal’s political implications changed Marshall’s administrative and educational direction as well as increase the financial burden on Marshall College.

80 James E. Allen to Walker Long, December 27, 1938. Ibid.
Conclusion

What IS the New Deal with Marshall?

The New Deal’s impact on Marshall was not wholly positive or negative, with several benefits and some detriments. What did the student part-time employment program do for Marshall? To what extent did the PWA and WPA help the college? How did New Deal related politics factor into events at Marshall? Just what was the New Deal with Marshall?

So What's the New Deal with Student Employment?

Before the federal government initiated the student part-time employment program, Dr. Shawkey struggled to find aid for students attending Marshall. He welcomed the new funding with open arms and saw it as a relief from financial burdens. While Dr. Allen did not share Dr. Shawkey’s view on student employment, he still realized its benefits to the college. As evidenced by the numerous letters received by Dr. Shawkey and Dr. Allen, the program also provided a means for students who wanted to attend college but could not afford it, which increased Marshall’s enrollment.

While the program may have provided financial relief to both the college and students, it had limitations. As enrollment increased at Marshall College, the increased tuition revenues did not offset the decreasing state appropriation. It appears the boost in enrollment may have actually harmed Marshall. Marshall’s per capita expenditure was approximately $220 per school year during the 1920s. During the 1934 academic year, Marshall’s per capita expenditures was amongst the lowest in the state at $151. Coincidently, it was the first year the Tax Limitation Amendment came into effect. The subsequent years it dropped considerably more to $90.42 in 1939-1940. In 1942-1943 per capita cost rose to be almost equal to that of pre-Depression years.
As Marshall’s budget decreased, the number of students increased. Both Dr. Shawkey and Dr. Allen refused to raise tuition to levels that would most likely benefit the college. They reasoned that if they did so it would, in the words of Dr. Shawkey, “certainly stop a large number of farmers’ sons and daughters throughout the state from attending college.”

They were most likely right because many students, such as Roscoe Junior Brown, even with a New Deal job, could not afford to attend colleges that are more expensive. Thus, Marshall had fewer funds to spend per student. The student employment program increased enrollment and in doing so added more burden on Marshall’s finances.

**So What’s the New Deal with the PWA and WPA Projects?**

One of the most critical benefits of the PWA and WPA projects was that they helped modernize Marshall. Jenkins Hall provided a much-needed advancement to Marshall’s teachers’ college by adding additional and modern facilities to educate new teachers. Additionally, the two dorms boasted modern décor to reflect the times. The buildings, along with the various maintenance projects, the erection of the flagpole, and WPA paintings, improved Marshall College and most likely, judging from the positive coverage in *The Parthenon*, inspired college pride during a time when “the college [was] living on limited rations” and budget problems “harassed [Dr. Allen] almost beyond endurance.”

The building projects provided extra housing for students. Each new dorm housed over 150 students, more than doubling the capacity of the average of 236 students on campus during the 1935-1936 academic year. The addition created space for the 320-student increase that

---

81 Dr. Morris P. Shawkey to Governor Herman G. Kump, May 20, 1933. MUA, RG P, 1932-1934, Box 9, Folder 8.
83 Dr. Morris. P. Shawkey quoted in Moffat, 77.
84 Dr. James E. Allen to A. L. Suhrie, July, 1939 quoted in Ibid., 101.
85 *Eleventh Biennial Report of West Virginia Board of Control* (Charleston, West Virginia, Jarrett Printing Co., 1936), 238.
occurred between 1934 and 1936 and would reduce overcrowding at Marshall, but not eliminate it as the college suffered from overcrowding before the New Deal had come into effect.

Perhaps the greatest New Deal benefit occurred during the two floods that ravaged Marshall College in 1936 and 1937. The New Deal’s flood relief efforts saved Marshall College. WPA workers aided in the rescue of several Huntington citizens including, perhaps, many Marshall students. Additionally, PWA and WPA workers and funds contributed to the cleanup during the aftermath. The aid included a massive recovery effort at Marshall College, which was effectively a lake at one point during the flood.

While the PWA and WPA efforts greatly aided Marshall College, there is at least one downside to consider. The New Deal intensified the West Virginia government budget cuts imposed on Marshall. The costs of the buildings constructed and the repairs on Marshall’s campus increased the need for state to decrease its budget. While the room and board fees of the dorms helped pay for the PWA loans, the state of West Virginia still had to contribute a great percentage of the cost of Jenkins’ Hall. To compensate for these programs the West Virginia government drastically cut the budget of higher education. Therefore, in effect, Marshall, rather than the state, paid for the construction of the new buildings and improvements. Dr. Shawkey and Dr. Allen viewed the projects with great appreciation but, perhaps, did not consider that Marshall was suffering financially because of them.

So What’s the New Deal with Politics?

New Deal politics both helped and harmed Marshall College. The New Deal played a part in changing Marshall’s leadership. West Virginia historian Jerry Bruce Thomas argues that Herman G. Kump used Franklin Roosevelt’s popularity to aid his 1932 campaign.86 Kump’s

---

campaign goals forced Dr. Morris P. Shawkey out of office. Kump’s actions ended Shawkey’s ambition to merge with West Virginia University and weakened progressive education dominance in West Virginia. Kump’s appointment of Dr. James E. Allen strengthened Marshall’s independence from WVU by offering new curriculum and adding new degrees such as the Masters of Arts. The change altered Marshall’s future as an institution of higher education.

Governor Kump and Governor Holt attributed the New Deal requirements as a cause of state budget cuts. They argued that the Tax Limitation Amendment prevented the state to pay for New Deal backed programs. The budget cuts to higher education severely damaged Marshall’s budget. Governor Kump clashed with New Deal administrator Harry Hopkins over the allocation of federal funds. Kump wanted to support road improvement and free public primary education whereas Hopkins focused on building projects. To fund both endeavors, the West Virginia government reduced funding for higher education. These cuts greatly limited Marshall College’s budget adding to the college’s Depression problems, which, as Marshall historian Charles Moffat suggests, contributed to preventing the merger with WVU. 87 Dr. Shawkey publically maintained a positive attitude about the state budget cuts and even returned money allotted to faculty salary, which created problems with his faculty. Dr. Shawkey’s biographer Marshall Buckalew lists lack of faculty support as another cause of Shawkey’s resignation. 88 Conversely, Dr. Allen fought for every dollar to overcome the cuts and increase faculty salaries. He experienced some success; however, his efforts would draw public antagonism from Governor Homer Holt and his supporters. Dr. Shawkey may have made a

---

mistake in his reaction to Depression problems, but the New Deal intensified the state’s need to reduce Marshall’s budget and thus contributed to preventing the merger between WVU and Marshall.

**So What’s the New Deal with Marshall?**

On the surface, the New Deal greatly aided Marshall College. It expanded enrollment, restored and increased its physical plant, and played a role in maintaining the college’s independence. However, it had unintended negative consequences on Marshall’s fiscal stability. The enrollment increase did not make up for the state budget cuts to pay for New Deal requirements. The new buildings built by the PWA and WPA contributed to the burden on the state that worsened the financial cuts. Hopkins’ desire to focus on construction projects conflicted with Governor Kump’s plans to focus on state road improvements and free public schools. The conflicting goals caused continued political and financial burden on Marshall College that cost the institution several faculty members and, most likely, two presidents. As exemplified by Marshall College during the Great Depression, the New Deal provided economic relief at the expense of higher education.
Bibliography


Beehler, William. *Relief, Work, and Rehabilitation: West Virginia Relief Administration, August 1932 to November 1, 1934,* 1934.


Marshall University Archives, Record Group P, Office of the President 1930-1931, Box 6, (Accession No. 730000).

----------, Record Group P, Office of the President, 1932-1934, Box 9, (Accession No. 730000).

----------, Record Group P, Office of the President 1934-1935, Box 10, (Accession No. 730000).

----------, Record Group P, Office of the President 1935-1936, Box 11, (Accession No. 730000).

----------, Record Group P, Office of the President, 1936-1937, Box 13, (Accession No. 730000).

----------, Record Group P, Office of the President, 1937-1939, Box 17, (Accession No. 730000).

----------, Record Group P, Office of the President, 1938-1939, Box 18, (Accession No. 730000).

----------, Record Group P, Office of the President, 1939-1940, Box 19, (Accession No. 730000).

----------, Record Group P, Office of the President, 1940-1942, Box 22, (Accession No. 730000).

----------, Record Group R, University Catalog 1927-1928, Marshall University, Huntington, West Virginia.

----------, Record Group R, University Catalog 1929-1930, Marshall University, Huntington, West Virginia.

----------, Record Group R, University Catalog 1931-1932, Marshall University, Huntington, West Virginia.

----------, Record Group R, University Catalog 1933-1934, Marshall University, Huntington, West Virginia.
--------, Record Group R, University Catalog 1935-1936, Marshall University, Huntington, West Virginia.

--------, Record Group R, University Catalog 1937-1938, Marshall University, Huntington, West Virginia.

--------, Record Group R, University Catalog 1939-1940, Marshall University, Huntington, West Virginia.

--------, Record Group R, University Catalog 1941-1942, Marshall University, Huntington, West Virginia.


Reeves, Mary Garwood. “Economic Depression in Higher Education: Emory University, the University of Georgia and Georgia Tech, 1930-1940.” PhD diss., Georgia State University, 1985.


Appendix A

Office of Research Integrity

August 5, 2013

Hubert W. Rolling
3923 St Rt 218
Gallipolis, OH 45631

Dear Mr. Rolling:

This letter is in response to the submitted thesis abstract titled “What’s the New Deal with Marshall University?” After assessing the abstract it has been deemed not to be human subject research and therefore exempt from oversight of the Marshall University Institutional Review Board (IRB). The Code of Federal Regulations (45CFR46) has set forth the criteria utilized in making this determination. Since the information in this study does not involve human subjects as defined in the above referenced instruction it is not considered human subject research. If there are any changes to the abstract you provided then you would need to resubmit that information to the Office of Research Integrity for review and a determination.

I appreciate your willingness to submit the abstract for determination. Please feel free to contact the Office of Research Integrity if you have any questions regarding future protocols that may require IRB review.

Sincerely,

Bruce F. Day, ThD, CIP
Director