"Davidson and a Twist of Wittgenstein: Metaontology, Self-Canceling Pa" by Jeremy Barris
 

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2017

Abstract

The paper proposes with Davidson that the talk of metaontology is literally meaningless, but with Wittgenstein that it is so in a way that grants a unique type of insight. More specifically, it argues both that Davidson’s arguments have a cogency that is hard to dismiss, and also that, since his own arguments are metaontological, they are self-referential, and consequently in turn undermine their own meaning as well. The paper argues further that metaontological statements cannot be avoided. Consequently, this kind of statement constitutes an unavoidable self-referential paradox that means what it also excludes as capable of meaning. The result is a reinstatement of the meaning of ontological insight and in fact, the paper argues, a deep enrichment and also a particularly cogent justification of it. In addition, the logical peculiarity of the paradox involved has further useful consequences for the outcome of this justification, including a mutually illuminating commonality with some versions of metaethics.

Comments

This is the author’s accepted manuscript. The version of record is available from the publisher at https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9928-7. Copyright © Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017. All rights reserved.

Included in

Metaphysics Commons

Share

COinS