Document Type
Article
Publication Date
8-2025
Abstract
Introduction
Ludwig Wittgenstein, in different ways in his earlier and later work, famously denies the general meaningfulness and consequently the legitimacy of traditional philosophical questions. Accordingly, he also denies the meaningfulness and legitimacy of any metaphysics. I focus here on Wittgenstein’s later view. In that view, words and statements are given their meanings by their uses in specific contexts of everyday life. As a result, any attempt to use words to talk or think about anything outside of those contexts literally deprives those words of their meaning. But traditional philosophical questions, and metaphysical questions and statements in particular, are characterized precisely by addressing all possible contexts. That is, they are not restricted by the specificity of any particular contexts. Metaphysical statements and standpoints are therefore literally meaningless. I shall, however, argue that in fact, and consistently with this view, Wittgenstein nonetheless makes room for metaphysics, in the sense that this basis for its denial itself leaves open room for the strictly contextualized meaningfulness and so legitimacy of traditional philosophical questions and consequently of metaphysics. In fact, it makes room for many incompatible metaphysical theories.
Recommended Citation
Barris, J. (2025). Later Wittgenstein’s Metaphysics. Borderless Philosophy, 8: 32-52.
Comments
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