Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2014
Abstract
The paper argues that dreams (or the recollected experience of dreams) consist partly in an awareness or experience of the conceptual fabric of our existence. Since what we mean by reality is intimately tied to the concepts given in our experience, dreams are therefore also partly an awareness of the fabric of what we mean by being itself and in general, that is, by objective as well as subjective reality. Further, the paper argues that this characteristic of dreams accounts for several other, more specific aspects of dreams and their possible interpretation, and that it allows us to see how these aspects are related to each other. These more specific aspects are the peculiar types of conceptual or logical relations and transitions that occur within dreams, dreams’ distinctive feeling texture, and some dimensions of the grounds and nature of suitable methods of interpreting dreams.
Recommended Citation
“Dreams as a Meta-Conceptual or Existential Experience,” Philosophia 42.3 (2014): 625-644, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9532-z.
Comments
This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9532-z. For Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, see https://www.springernature.com/gp/open-research/policies/accepted-manuscript-terms.